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ABSTRACT 
Global disaster reports continue to present a disturbing steady growth in the 
frequency and magnitude of disasters. The same reports also tell of escalating disaster 
effects and impacts on the myriad of at-risk communities. Despite the avalanche of 
these concerning reports, both literature and practitioner field views bemoan the 
current disconnect between upper (global and national) level disaster risk reduction 
(DRR) rhetoric and abysmal support to local level DRR action. 
 
This study recognizes therefore that while there is a growing worldwide interest 
in DRR, poor local capacity for DRR remains probably the biggest impediment to 
speeding up required global DRR progress. The study also recognizes that community 
capacity building for disaster risk reduction (CCB4DRR) is a pivotal enabler to local DRR 
with knock-on effects to global DRR progression. In order to accelerate global DRR 
progress therefore, it is imperative to challenge the current state of key stakeholder 
prioritization and support for community capacity building for disaster risk reduction 
(CCB4DRR).  
 
The study adopts case study research strategy and uses interviews, document 
reviews and observations to investigate the state of CCB4DRR within 6 INGO and donor 
case studies in Kenya. In addition, the study identifies factors behind one of Kenya’s 
most successful CCB4DRR initiative---Yatta’s Operation Mwolyo Out (OMO). The analysis 
of case study data reveals that while there’s an overall general understanding of the 
importance of supporting local DRR action, support to CCB4DRR is at varying degrees 
within the 6 INGO and donor case studies.  The analysis of factors behind OMO’s great 
success reveals how it is one thing for DRR stakeholders to understand the importance 
of prioritising and supporting CCB4DRR and yet another for the same stakeholders to 
grasp how to practically get it right. This is the reason one case donor reflected, “I think 
we are still very limited in the understanding of DRR and how to translate it into the 
practical things.”  
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The study adds nuance to our understanding of the present state of CCB4DRR in 
Kenya. It also underscores the importance of donors being intentional at providing 
informed guidelines on how funds allocated to government Disaster Risk Management 
(DRM) agencies should be prioritized between different DRM activities. The study 
recommends that donor guidance to respective partners should emphasize the need for 
targeting larger amounts of allocated funds to resilience-building DRR activities versus 
the on-going practice of allocating more to emergency preparedness and response. 
Probably the most important output of the study is the proposed conceptual framework 
aimed at helping DRR stakeholders in the country understand which critical pieces of 
information are required for them to be able to make informed in-country DRR choices.  
 
Keywords: community capacity building, disaster, risk reduction, local DRR action, 
donors, INGOs. 
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1 CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background and Rationale 
According to the World Humanitarian Data And Trends report (UN-OCHA, 2018), 
95.1 million people were affected by natural disasters and 68.5 million people were 
forcibly displaced by violence and conflict in the year 2017 alone. And stepping into 
Africa, Eastern Africa which includes the Horn of Africa countries of Ethiopia, Kenya, 
Somalia, Tanzania and Uganda is a region exposed to various disaster risks ranging from 
cyclic droughts and famines, floods, landslides, epidemics to conflict-induced people 
displacements. Relatedly, the region also benefits from enormous donor and local 
government development funding, where, unfortunately, development gains are 
repeatedly reversed and or wiped out by aforementioned cyclic disaster shocks.  
 
On disaster risk reduction (DRR), a review across  Gaillard and Mercer (2013),  
Robertua (2013),  UNISDR (2013b),  UNISDR (2013c), Izumi and Shaw (2012), Benicchio 
(2012), van Riet and van Niekerk (2012), Hagelsteen and Becker (2012), Scott and 
Tarazona (2011), J Twigg and Bottomley (2011), Kent (2011), Pelling (2007b), UNDP 
(2004), Walter (2004), Walter (2002) and Walter (2001) resounds with consensus on one 
critical aspect of disaster risk reduction:  that while there is growing worldwide interest 
and focus on disaster risk reduction, poor local capacity for DRR remains probably the 
biggest impediment to speeding up required global DRR progress and cite  ‘top-down 
approaches’ to DRR implementation as a top negating factor responsible for poor local 
DRR capacity and related poor DRR action. 
 
As late as 2004, a United Nations DRR report lamented how “examples of the 
successful and long-term strengthening of local communities do exist, but remain 
uncommon” (UNDP, 2004). The lamentation is further corroborated by Pandey and 
Okazaki (2005) who in their work on community-based disaster management bemoan 
that issues of sustainability including local capacity building in most disaster mitigation 
initiatives are rarely addressed. In support of foregoing concerns, a consultations 
synthesis report on post-2015  framework for DRR  indicates that the majority of 
stakeholders engaged called for more attention to capacity building targeting both local 
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governments and people living in vulnerable conditions (UNISDR, 2013c). This is the 
reason Robertua (2013) with urgency asserts that “governments must realize that local 
communities are the first to be affected by disasters and enhancing the capacity of local 
communities will accelerate the creation of communities that are sustainable and well-
prepared for disasters.”  
 
Fully aware of the importance and yet apparent weak state of community capacity 
building for DRR (CCB4DRR) in the global remit of DRR, coupled with the a near absence 
of literature on the level of prioritization and support to CCB4DRR in Eastern Africa, the 
researcher set out to bridge the identified evidence gap by undertaking a study aimed 
at exploring, investigating and challenging the state of institutional donor and INGO 
prioritisation to supporting community capacity building for DRR in Kenya; and to 
identify and analyse critical factors and or good practice concepts responsible for highly 
successful cases of CCB4DRR in the country.  One of the study’s objectives is to develop 
a conceptual framework through which DRR stakeholders in the country including 
institutional donors and INGOs could determine how and where to prioritise DRR 
support.   
 
1.2 Justification of Kenya as the focus research country, and 
Institutional Donors and INGOs in Kenya as units of 
analysis 
 
The Kenya Draft Disaster Management Policy (GOK, 2009, p. 5) indicates that the 
country ’s disaster profile is dominated by droughts, floods, fires, terrorism, 
technological accidents, diseases and epidemics that disrupt people’s livelihoods, 
destroy infrastructure, divert planned use of resources, interrupt economic activities 
and retard development. And while drought and floods are the most significant hazards 
affecting the country, effects of drought are the most severe in the country (Owuor 
(2015).  
 
DARA (2011) asserts that “at a glance, Kenya seems to be a regional success story”. 
Given that Kenya has a fairly stable government in a region riddled by violent civil 
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conflicts, boasts the region’s strongest economy and has attained middle-income status; 
has a very strong donor and INGO presence; is a regional humanitarian hub; benefits 
from enormous donor and local government development funding; and according to 
Swithern (2014) received US$436 million in international humanitarian assistance to the 
2011 drought and hunger crisis; it is conceivable therefore that ‘community capacity 
building for disaster risk reduction’ ought to already be a priority consideration 
supported and mainstreamed by all the country’s major relief and development 
partners.    
 
In spite of the country’s high disaster risk index (Birkmann et al., 2011), a very high 
in-country donor and INGO presence, very large emergency response expenditure 
(Development-Initiatives, 2017), by the time of conceptualising this study, there was a 
literature blackout on the level of prioritization and support given to community 
capacity building for DRR by multiple stakeholders in the country (Kenya). This study, 
therefore, set out to bridge the knowledge gap by way of exploring, investigating and 
challenging the state of institutional donor and INGO prioritisation to supporting 
community capacity building for DRR in Kenya. Study findings will, therefore, enable key 
DRR stakeholders in the country to rethink the place of CCB4DRR in the overarching DRR 
remit in the country. And the resultant conceptual framework will aid DRR stakeholders 
in the country including institutional donors and INGOs to have a simple tool with 
adequate filters and lenses through which they could determine how and where to 
prioritise DRR support.   
 
NOTE: relatedly, the justification for focusing on institutional donors and INGOs in Kenya 
is well described under section 2.4.3 which discusses Community Capacity Building for 
DRR, and in sub-section 2.4.3.1 which unpacks “the origins and role of institutional 
donors and INGOs in CCB4DRR.” 
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1.3 Research Aim, Questions and Objectives 
 
1.3.1 Research Aim: 
 
The aim of the research was to explore and investigate the state of institutional donor 
and INGO prioritisation to supporting community capacity building for DRR (CCB4DRR) 
in Kenya, and to identify and analyse critical factors or good practice concepts behind 
highly successful CCB4DRR initiatives in the country.  And the study was guided by the 
following research questions and objectives:  
 
1.3.2 Key Research Questions  
 
i. What are the DRR priorities currently being supported by respective institutional 
donors and INGOs working on DRR in Kenya? 
ii. How do institutional donors and INGOs working on DRR in Kenya determine DRR 
support priorities?  
iii. How do institutional donors and INGOs measure DRR success in Kenya?  
iv. What changes do institutional donors and INGOs working on DRR want to see as 
a result of their contribution to the DRR agenda in the country?  
v. What are the critical factors and or good practice concepts responsible for highly 
successful community DRR action where this has been achieved in the country?  
 
1.3.3 Key Research Objectives 
 
i. Explore current institutional donor and INGO DRR support priorities. 
ii. Establish how individual institutional donors and INGOs working on DRR in Kenya 
decide which DRR priorities to support. 
iii. Assess whether intuitional donors and INGOs working on DRR understand the 
importance of prioritising and supporting community capacity building for DRR 
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(by analysing how they measure DRR success and the changes they want to see 
as a result of their contribution to the DRR agenda in the country). 
iv. Identify highly successful cases of community capacity building for DRR and 
analyse critical factors and or good practice concepts responsible for this 
success. 
v. Develop a conceptual framework through which institutional donors and INGOs 
working on DRR would determine where to prioritise DRR support.   
 
1.4 Contribution to knowledge 
 
The study intends to contribute to both theory and practice in multiple ways. Firstly, the 
study will provide insights into current case donor and INGO DRR priorities in the 
country, ways case donors and INGOs measure DRR success, country level (either upper 
or lower level) at which case donors and INGOs would like to see changes or results 
consequent to their effective engagement in the country’s DRR agenda, and the status 
of CCB4DRR in the broad-spectrum of DRR in the country. A compendium of these 
findings will reveal whether or not target case INGOs and donors generally understand 
the importance of supporting local DRR action including support to CCB4DRR. Secondly, 
one of the study’s greatest contributions to theory will be the identification of factors 
behind one of the region’s most successful DRR initiatives—Yatta’s Operation Mwolyo 
Out (OMO). 
 
Thirdly, study findings will provide insights into how target case donors and INGOs in Kenya 
reflect in the mirror of previous studies by Watson et al. (2015), Kelman (2013) and Kellett 
and Caravani (2013) who uncovered a concerning global trend of spending heavily on 
disaster preparedness and response while investing far less in resilience-building DRR. 
Perhaps the study’s greatest contribution to practice will emanate from the 
development of a conceptual framework aimed at helping DRR stakeholders in the 
country understand critical pieces of information required for one to be able to make 
informed in-country DRR choices.  
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1.5 Structure of the thesis   
 
1.5.1 Chapter 1: Introduction 
 This chapter introduces the research study explored and discussed in this thesis. 
The chapter begins by presenting the background and rationale to the research, 
followed by the justification of the research and Kenya as the focus country; research 
aim, questions and objectives; contribution to knowledge; and ends by presenting the 
structure of the thesis.  
1.5.2 Chapter 2:  Literature review 
Chapter 2 presents a detailed literature review of key concepts associated with this 
study. The chapter begins with a general overview of disasters and DRR, defines key 
terms used in the DRR discourse, presents the recorded history of DRR, highlights the 
overall DRR landscape of Kenya as a country, presents a global overview of community 
capacity building for DRR that dovetails into CCB4DRR in Kenya, and lastly presents 
conclusions showing knowledge gaps and possible areas of focus for this study.  
1.5.3 Chapter 3: Research methodology 
Chapter 3 presents the various steps adopted by the researcher in studying the research 
problem along with the logic behind them (Kothari, 2004, p. 8). The chapter starts by 
discussing the research philosophy and research paradigms, followed by research 
approach, research strategy in which ‘case study research strategy’ is adopted for this 
study, methodological choices, and research techniques.  
1.5.4 Chapter 4: Conceptual framework 
Chapter 4 presents a conceptual framework providing a theoretical overview of 
intended research (M. Miles & Huberman, 1984), key concepts and contexts of the 
research (Blaxter & Hughes, 1996), and what data are going to be collected and analyzed 
(Leshem & Trafford, 2007). The framework demonstrates how global and national level 
DRR priorities eventually affect the wellbeing of community-level DRR action.  
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1.5.5 Chapter 5: Data analysis and discussion of case studies 
Chapter 5 presents data analysis and discussion of individual case study by case study. 
Firstly, the chapter begins by presenting background information about case studies. 
Secondly, the chapter presents individual case study analysis and discussion of findings 
in the order that mirrors the research questions and objectives. And lastly, the chapter 
presents key findings from the cross-case analysis. The chapter doesn’t not provide a 
discussion of amalgamated findings but leaves this for Chapter 6. 
 
1.5.6 Chapter 6: Summary discussion of amalgamated findings 
With Merriam and Tisdell (2015) asserting that “findings are the outcome of the inquiry-
--what you, the investigator, learned or came to understand about the phenomenon,”  
this chapter presents a summary discussion of amalgamated findings which have been 
presented case study by case study in chapter 5.  
 
1.5.7 Chapter 7: Conclusions 
 
Informed by the context obtaining from chapters 2-6, this chapter is dedicated to 
drawing conclusions about the aims and objectives of the thesis. In this chapter, 
therefore, findings are presented and evaluated in response to the research questions 
and objectives proposed in chapter one.  
  
1.6 Summary and link 
 
This chapter presented the introduction to the research discussed in this thesis, 
highlighted the background and rationale behind the research, presented the 
justification for Kenya as a research country; indicated the research aim, questions and 
objectives; underscored contribution to knowledge; and lastly presented the structure 
for this thesis. The following chapter presents the literature synthesis undergirding the 
study.  
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2 CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction to the Literature Review 
 
The rationale behind this literature review is to explore and present global scholarly 
evidence and opinion on the theme of “community capacity building for disaster risk 
reduction” as the first step to setting the stage for planned research on the theme in 
Kenya. The review will, therefore, provide a critical analysis of what’s already been 
researched and or published on the theme; identify gaps in reviewed literature and 
point out the relevance and feasibility of the planned research study. The review is 
presented in four inter-related sections, starting with a focus on ‘disasters and disaster 
risk reduction’, followed by a review of ‘overall DRR in Kenya’, moving on to ‘community 
capacity building for DRR’, and ending with ‘conclusions’ linking the review to the 
planned research study.  
2.2 Disasters and Disaster Risk Reduction 
  
This section is arranged and presented under four sub-sections beginning with 
‘definitions of disaster, disaster risk and disaster reduction’, followed by a review of the 
‘recorded history of disaster risk reduction’ and closing with a critical appraisal of both 
the ‘Hyogo Framework for Action’ and the ‘Sendai Framework for DRR’.  
2.2.1 Definitions (Disaster, Disaster Risk and Disaster Risk Reduction) 
 
2.2.1.1 Disaster 
In the words of Rutherford and de Boer (1983, p. 10), “the universe, we are told, 
began with a big bang, and ever since, nature has provided a series of unexpected bangs 
and calamities of one type or another.” It is these ‘calamities’ and ‘bangs’ that the world 
including the academia has come to refer to as ‘disasters’. And similar to other terms 
central to this study, the term disaster has been a subject of much debate (Parker & 
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Handmer, 1992) and therefore does not come into use without bringing its own share 
of confusion about meaning. According to Rodríguez et al. (2009), Shaluf (2007, p. 707), 
and al-Madhari and Keller (1997), there are many definitions of the term disaster and 
each definition seems dependent upon the discipline using the term.  
 
Similarly, E. Quarantelli (1986) and Pidgeon (1997) pointed out that no definition 
of the term disaster is universally accepted. This is why Rutherford and de Boer (1983) 
humorously recognise that the term disaster is applicable to everything from an event 
like an earthquake to occasions when two ladies turn up for a party wearing the same 
dress. Moving forward, it will be helpful to explore definitions of the term disaster 
presented by some of the leading institutions and scholars.  
 
In their work on ‘risk management and disasters’, Keller and Al-Madhari (1996, 
p. 19), define a disaster as an event localized both in time and space, and meeting one 
or more of the following results over a relatively short period of time: ten or more 
fatalities; damage cost exceeds US$1 million; and 50 or more people evacuated. 
Relatedly, in their work with the Center for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters 
(CRED), Guha-Sapir et al. (2012) indicate that CRED defines a disaster as “a situation or 
event which overwhelms local capacity, necessitating a request to a national or 
international level for external assistance; an unforeseen and often sudden event that 
causes great damage, destruction and human suffering”.  
 
CRED maintains a worldwide database on disasters known as EM-DAT, and for a 
disaster to be entered into the database, at least one of the following criteria must be 
fulfilled: 10 or more people reported killed; 100 or more people reported affected; 
declaration of a state of emergency; and a call for international assistance (Guha-Sapir 
et al., 2012, p. 7). CRED’s definition of a disaster has close similarities with that offered 
by Keller and Al-Madhari (above) for the two agree on the minimum number of fatalities 
and the call for international or external assistance. However, in comparison to Keller 
and Al-Madhari’s definition, CRED adds another dimension of the ‘number of people 
affected’, and the ‘declaration of an emergency’ while omitting the ‘value in damage 
cost.’  
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 Raphael (1986, p. 5), describes a disaster as an overwhelming event and 
circumstance that tests the adaptational response of community or individuals beyond 
their capability, and lead, at least temporarily to massive disruption of function for 
community or individual. Raphael’s definition, which is one of the most dated, brings 
out the aspect that different communities have different resilience and or capacity to 
cope with disasters. Another definition offered by notable scholars comes from Keller et 
al. (1989) who state that a disaster is ‘an event that afflicts a community the 
consequences of which are beyond the immediate financial, material or emotional 
resources of the community’. Keller et al’s definition seems to be more attuned to 
disaster effects more than any other element of disasters. 
  
Still on defining the term disaster, after careful examination of the concept, 
Parker and Handmer (1992) suggested that the preferred definition of disaster is: an 
unusual natural or man-made event, including an event caused by failure of 
technological systems, which temporarily overwhelms the response capacity of human 
communities, groups of individuals or natural environments and which causes massive 
damage, economic loss, disruption, injury, and/or loss of life. Unlike foregoing 
definitions of the term disaster, it is Parker and Handmer that expand the margins of the 
definition to encompass ‘technological accidents’, ‘disease outbreaks’, and 
‘environmental consequences.’  
 
To date, a more commonly used definition of the term disaster is that offered by 
UNISDR, stating that a disaster is a serious disruption of the functioning of a community 
or a society involving widespread human, material, economic or environmental losses 
and impacts, which exceeds the ability of the affected community or society to cope 
using its own resources- UNISDR (2009, p. 9). Though seemingly simplified, the UNISDR 
definition covers the most critical aspects of a disaster, which include ‘serious 
disruption’, ‘widespread effects’ and ‘exceeding the ability to cope’.  
 
A read across all foregoing definitions of the term disaster points to the fact that 
while there is no universally agreed definition given that the term is defined fairly 
differently by different disciplines, there still remain binding strands in most of the 
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definitions. And it is the UNISDR definition that seems to collect and present a definition 
that encompasses the most important of these strands including:   ‘serious disruption’, 
‘widespread effects’ and ‘exceeding the ability to cope’.  One would assume that 
environmental impacts are covered under the ‘widespread effects’ wording of the 
definition.  
 
During this literature review, the definition presented by Sundar and Sezhiyan 
(2007, p. p.v), was found to be veering off one of the three most common 
aforementioned definitive phrases used when defining the term disaster.  Sunder and 
Sezhiyan state that “a disaster is a crisis situation causing widespread damage which far 
exceeds our ability to recover.” Their application of the word ‘recover’ is not the same 
as using the word ‘cope’ when defining disaster situations.  Sunder and Sezhiyan seem 
to suggest that all disaster-affected communities do not have the ability to recover, and 
this goes against known examples where communities ravaged by disasters have been 
able to rebuild their lives and livelihoods many times with very little or no external help, 
irrespective of initial disaster damage and losses suffered.  
 
However, this is not to entirely dismiss the fact that there are times when 
disasters especially cyclic ones, have eventually eroded peoples’ capacity to recover. 
Case examples of the latter can be cited from the Horn of Africa counties of Kenya and 
Somalia where cyclic droughts (1983-1984; 1995-1996; 1999-2001; 2005-2006; 2008-
2009; and 2011-2012) coupled with cattle rustling-related conflicts have literally 
decimated many household livestock herds and crippled traditional community coping 
mechanisms where severely affected households used to be restocked by friends and 
relatives. And as reported by  Ojwang (2009) and De Jode and Tilstone (2011, p. 21), 
there are people in the Horn of Africa presently known as ‘pastoralist dropouts.’ These 
are people that were once pastoralists but are no more. Many of these people are trying 
to ‘cope’ by adopting alternative livelihoods including dwelling near urban centres in 
search of menial jobs. One would be reasonable to, therefore, conclude that while this 
group of people did not ‘recover’ their previous pastoralist livelihoods, they are still 
copying and recovering by adopting alternative livelihoods, however difficult this 
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process must be. It is therefore inaccurate for  Sundar and Sezhiyan (2007) to imply that 
a phenomenon is not a disaster if it does not exceed the people’s ability to recover.  
2.2.1.2 Disaster Risk 
 
    UNISDR (2009, p. 9) defined disaster risk as potential disaster losses, in lives, 
health status, livelihoods, assets and services, which could occur to a particular 
community or a society over some specified future time period. Relatedly, ADRC (2005, 
p. 5) indicates that disaster risk can be explained as a function of the hazard, exposure 
and vulnerability as follows: Disaster Risk = function (Hazard, Exposure, Vulnerability). 
(Shaw et al., 2013) state that “disaster is a function of hazard, vulnerability and 
capacity”. Unlike ADRC, Shaw et al have introduced ‘capacity’ into the disaster risk 
equation while omitting ‘exposure’.  Equally, but with a distinctive addition, in her work 
on the “components of risk”, Thywissen (2006, p. 39) explains how risk is understood as 
a function of hazard, vulnerability, exposure, and resilience; and could be presented as 
follows: Risk = f (hazard, vulnerability, exposure, resilience). Thus, while upholding the 
three elements presented by ADRC, and the three elements presented by Shaw et al, 
Thywissen introduces the fourth element of ‘resilience’ as an important factor in 
explaining how disaster risk can either be formed and or be reduced. In her definition of 
‘resilience’ provided below, Thywissen explains the relationship between capacity and 
resilience in the disaster risk equation.   
 
In relation to foregoing  definitions of disaster risk presented by UNISDR, ADRC 
and Thywissen; Bosher (2013, p. 240), provides a good example by explaining that while 
hazards, such as earthquakes, cyclones and tsunamis are natural in origin; the way that 
disaster risk has become embedded in contemporary urban landscapes, for instance, is 
largely anthropogenic. Bosher observes that decades of mass urbanization accompanied 
by poor urban planning, non-existent or poorly regulated building codes and little or no 
proactive adaptation to the impacts of climate change have increased humanity’s 
exposure to these hazards. And (Cannon, 1994, p. 16) supports Bosher when he asserts 
that hazards are natural but disasters are not.   
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Given that it is the interaction between the different elements presented by both 
ADRC and Thywissen (above) which result in disaster risk, it is reasonable to explore the 
meaning of each of these four elements.  
 
Hazard: according to UNISDR (2009, p. 17), a hazard is a dangerous 
phenomenon, substance, human activity or condition that may cause loss of life, injury 
or other health impacts, property damage, loss of livelihoods and services, social and 
economic disruption, or environmental damage.  
 
Exposure:   ADRC (2005) describes exposure as that which is affected by natural 
disasters, such as people and property; while UNISDR (2009) describes it as people, 
property, systems, or other elements present in hazard zones that are thereby subject 
to potential losses. Similarly, UNDP (2004) describes exposure as the elements at risk, 
an inventory of those people or artefacts that are exposed to a hazard. Unlike the 
discourse on other terms already described in this literate review, there appears to be 
consensus on the definition of the term exposure.  
 
Vulnerability:  One of the earliest definitions of vulnerability in relation to 
disaster risk was presented by Piers et al. (1994) who described it as being prone or 
susceptible to damage or injury. Later on, UNISDR (2009) defined vulnerability as the 
characteristics and circumstances of a community, system or asset that make it 
susceptible to the damaging effects of a hazard;  while ADRC (2005) defined it as a 
condition resulting from physical, social, economic, and environmental factors or 
processes, which increases the susceptibility of a community to the impact of a hazard.” 
UNU (2012, p. 14) describes vulnerability as the social, physical, economic and 
environment-related factors that make people or systems susceptible to the impacts of 
natural hazards and adverse consequences of climate change. From these four 
definitions, the words ‘characteristics’, ‘factors’, ‘being’ and ‘condition’ emerge; words 
which point to inherent attributes of the substance being discussed, thus signalling 
consensus among the four authors.     
 
Resilience: UNISDR (2009) defines resilience as the ability of a system, 
community or society exposed to hazards to resist, absorb, accommodate to and 
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recover from the effects of a hazard in a timely and efficient manner, including through 
the preservation and restoration of its essential basic structures and functions.  
 Thywissen (2006, p. 38),  argues that when considering disaster risk, the harm 
done does not only depend on hazard, vulnerability and exposure, but also on the coping 
capacity and the resilience of the element at risk. She observes that in various literature, 
most definitions show a large overlap between coping capacity and resilience and that 
the two terms are often used as synonyms. However, she agrees that the coping capacity 
and resilience dimensions of a harmful event cannot be easily separated from each 
other. Thywissen further explains that coping capacity encompasses those strategies 
and measures that act directly upon damage during the event by alleviating or 
containing the impact or by bringing about efficient relief, as well as those adaptive 
strategies that modify behaviour or activities in order to circumvent or avoid damaging 
effects. Thywissen stresses that resilience is all of these things, plus the capability to 
remain functional during an event and to completely recover from it. Thus while it is not 
easy to delineate coping capacity and resilience, resilience is the more encompassing 
term that includes coping capacity.   
 
 UNDP (2004) gave a good explanation of how the described foregoing elements 
interact to compound into disaster risk. They explain that for instance, without people 
exposed to hazardous events, there is no risk to human life. Physical exposure is 
therefore not an indicator of vulnerability but is a condition sine qua non for disaster 
risk to exist. Without people exposed to hazardous events, there is no risk to human life. 
Physical exposure, however, is insufficient to explain risk. This is the reason countries 
and or communities with similar levels of physical exposure to a given hazard experience 
widely differing levels of risk. Similarly, Bosher (2013);  Cutter (2005); E. L. Quarantelli 
(2005); Benjamin Wisner et al. (2004) ; UNDP (2004); Mileti (1999); D. E. Alexander 
(1993) and O'Keefe et al. (1976) all agree that while hazards may have a natural origin, 
disasters are not defined by fixed events but by “social constructs”,  and these are liable 
to change. In sync with the foregoing view, Cater and Walker (1994, p. 11), emphasise 
that disasters are human events, not natural ones.   
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2.2.1.3 Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) 
 
    UNISDR (2009, p. 10), defines DRR as the concept and practice of reducing 
disaster risks through systematic efforts to analyse and manage the causal factors of 
disasters, including through reduced exposure to hazards, lessened vulnerability of 
people and property, wise management of land and the environment, and improved 
preparedness for adverse events. A closer look at the UNISDR definition of DRR confirms 
that DRR is only possible through addressing the four components of disaster risk 
already discussed above. Before reviewing the global history and current status of DRR 
in ensuing sections, this seems to be the right place to present some of the views and 
tell-tale status indicators of DRR especially during the period immediately before the 
advent of the HFA.      
 
A report by UNDP (2004) indicates that for many people around the world, 
development does not appear to be working and that the escalating number and 
increasing intensity of disasters with a natural trigger are one way the crisis is presenting 
itself. While the report acknowledges the increasing impact of ‘natural disasters’ on 
development, its focus is on how development itself shapes disaster risk; demonstrating 
that disaster risk is not unavoidable, but on the contrary, can be managed and reduced 
through appropriate development policies and actions. Both UNDP (2004, p. 10), and 
Yodmani (2001, p. 4) observe that disasters are no longer entirely perceived as extreme 
events created by natural forces but increasingly being viewed as manifestations of 
unresolved development problems. In a related work on challenges to integrating 
disaster risk reduction into international development, Schipper and Pelling (2006) point 
to an assumption where scores of development practitioners think that disaster risk 
reduction is already incorporated into ‘pro-poor development’. In alignment with both 
UNDP, and Schipper and Pelling’s foregoing arguments, Adger (2006);  Benjamin Wisner 
et al. (2004); Frankenberger (2003); Yodmani (2001); Jaspers and Shoham (1999); 
Chambers (1989);  and Swift (1989) all agree that vulnerability (one of the key 
ingredients of disaster risk) and poverty are not the same.  
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From the preceding discourse, it emerges, therefore, that good intentioned 
development initiative may not necessarily reduce but many times inadvertently 
increase people’s vulnerabilities. One of the critical objectives of DRR, therefore, is to 
support the strengthening and protection of development initiatives; for instance, to 
strengthen the livelihoods of poor rural people and protect the same livelihoods against 
external shocks. This is where the integration of DRR into development planning 
becomes a ‘do-or-die’ development requirement.   
 
And going by Hardin’s prioritization test of “show me your chequebook, and I'll 
show you your priorities”(Matthew B, 2015),  the proportion of development related 
funding dedicated to DRR should be considered a prime indicator when assessing 
prioritization of DRR.  In their report on ‘Financing Disaster Risk Reduction’ which looked 
back at the 20 years story of international aid from 1991 to 2010, Kellett and Caravani 
(2013, p. 5) assert that DRR had been at best a very low priority over these two decades. 
Their claim is backed by data revealing that the international community committed just 
over $3 trillion in aid in the same period. Of this, $106.7 billion was allocated to disasters 
and of that, just a fraction, $13.5 billion, was for risk reduction measures before disasters 
strike, compared with $23.3 billion spent on reconstruction and rehabilitation and $69.9 
billion spent on response. Of overall aid financing over 20 years, the $13.5 billion spent 
on DRR accounts for just 0.4% of the total amount spent on international aid. Simply 
stated, for every $100 spent on development aid, an abysmal 40 cents has been invested 
in protecting that aid from the impact of disasters. (Ref to Fig 2.1 for an illustration of 
the above detail).  
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Figure 2. 1: DRR spending Vs development spending (Watson et al., 2015, p. 2)  
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2.2.2 Recorded History of Disaster Risk Reduction 
In regard to the documented history of DRR, probably the oldest record available 
is the Biblical story of Joseph and the seven years of famine preparedness in Egypt 
followed by seven years of famine and famine response in Egypt and surrounding 
countries; Stamps et al. (1984).  And according to Habermehl (2013, p. 9), this ancient 
story of Joseph and his famine preparedness and response must have happened 
between  2700-2600 BC. While there must have been many other DRR efforts between 
Joseph’s time and present-day history, little seems to be known and recorded about 
those efforts until the advent of the United Nations. UNISDR (2014a) presents a timeline 
of key milestones in the history of DRR following the formation of the United Nations, 
and the ensuing chronological bullet points are an adapted summary of this timeline.  
 
The 1660s: during this period, the United Nations General Assembly (UN/GA) adopted 
measures regarding severe disasters 
 1962: The Buyin-Zara earthquake struck Iran and killed more than 12,000 people. 
The GA requests member states to intervene.    
 1663: The earthquake at Skopje, Yugoslavia, caused the death of more than 1,200 
persons. The GA passed a resolution for assistance.  
 1963: A hurricane struck the territories of Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, 
Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago resulting in loss of thousands of lives and causing 
considerable material damage. The GA passed a resolution for assistance.  
 1968: A severe earthquake struck Iran killing Approx. 10,000 people. The GA 
requests the Secretary-General (SG) and heads of specialized agencies, in the light 
of funds available, to assist the Government of Iran including the reconstruction of 
the devastated areas when deciding on the services to be provided to the Member 
States. 
 
1970-1986: Assistance in cases of natural disaster 
 1970: Res.2717 supporting ‘assistance in cases of natural disaster’, invites the 
Secretary-General to submit recommendations in particular on  (b) Pre-disaster 
planning at the national and international levels; (d) the application of technology 
   36 
 
to, and scientific research for, the prevention and control of natural disasters, or a 
mitigation of the effects of such disasters, including arrangements to disseminate 
effectively to all countries the fruits of research from satellites and other 
sophisticated technology with a view to strengthening international co-operation to 
determine the causes and early manifestation of impending disasters and the 
development and improvement of early warning systems.  
 1971: Res. 2816 creates the United Nations Disaster Relief Office (UNDRO).  
 1972: Res.2959; the GA reaffirms "the vital importance, in order to lessen the impact 
of disasters, of assistance to disaster-prone countries in preventive measures, 
disaster contingency planning and preparedness." 
 1978: The GA requests the Governing Council of the United Nations Development 
Programme at its next session to give consideration to the inclusion of technical co-
operation activities for disaster preparedness and prevention in its regional and 
interregional programmes. 
 1979: The GA "Welcomes the decision taken by the Governing Council of the UNDP... 
to give consideration to the inclusion of technical co-operation activities for disaster 
preparedness and prevention in national and regional programmes; ... "Requests the 
Preparatory Committee for the New International Development Strategy to take into 
account, matters concerning disaster relief, preparedness and prevention;" 
 
1990-1999: The International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction (IDNDR) 
 1990: The GA “urges the international community to implement fully the 
International Framework of Action of the IDNDR (Res. 44/236), to establish national 
committees and reaffirms the need for the secretariat of the Decade work in close 
co-operation with UNDRO.” 
 1991: The GA “endorses the New York declaration and the recommendations 
contained in the first annual report of the Scientific and Technical Committee (STC) 
on the Decade as well as the proposal of the STC to convene in 1994 a world 
conference of representatives of national committees for the Decade.” 
 1993: The GA “decides to convene in 1994 the World Conference on Natural Disaster 
Reduction.” 
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 1994: The World Conference was held at Yokohama, Japan from 23 to 27 May 1994. 
Res. 49/22 A endorses the Yokohama Strategy and its Plan of Action adopted at the 
World Conference. 
 1994: first steps for early warning systems 
 1995: The GA “decides to convene a closing event of the Decade in order to facilitate 
the full integration of disaster reduction into the substantive efforts for sustainable 
development and environmental protection by the year 2000.” 
 As the IDNDR concludes, the international community is increasingly aware that 
natural disasters are a major threat to social and economic stability and that disaster 
prevention is the main long-term solution to this threat. The biggest challenge of the 
Decade lies, therefore, in the creation of a global culture of prevention. It is in this 
context that the IDNDR Secretariat in the United Nations has organized the IDNDR 
Programme Forum 1999 within the closing event of the Decade. Thematic and 
regional events with respect to natural disaster prevention have been held as part 
of the 1998 - 1999 Action plan for the concluding phase of the IDNDR; culminating 
in the IDNDR Programme Forum 1999 provided a platform for global multi-sectoral 
and inter-disciplinary dialogue between all concerned partners within IDNDR. 
Results of the Programme Forum will constitute a major input to the UN Economic 
and Social Council (ECOSOC) deliberations on IDNDR. 
 
2000-2007: Disasters, Vulnerability, and the ISDR 
 2000: Taking note of Economic and Social Council resolution 1999/63 of 30 July 1999 
on the successor arrangements for the International Decade for Natural Disaster 
Reduction, the GA endorses the proposal of the Secretary-General to establish an 
inter-agency task force and inter-agency-secretariat for disaster reduction, under 
the direct authority of the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs; 
decides to maintain the observance of the International Day for Disaster Reduction 
on the second Wednesday of October. 
 2001: The GA requests the relevant organizations of the United Nations system to 
support the implementation of the goals of the Strategy and endorses the proposal 
of the Secretary-General to review the implementation of the Yokohama Strategy 
for a Safer World. 
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 2002: The GA requests the Secretary-General, with the assistance of the inter-
agency secretariat for the Strategy, to plan and coordinate, in consultation with 
Governments and relevant organizations of the United Nations system, including 
international financial institutions, the 2004 review of the Yokohama Strategy. 
 2002: The World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD), in Johannesburg, 
South Africa, in August-September 2002 provided the ISDR with a concrete set of 
objectives within the sustainable development agenda to which both the Inter-
Agency Task Force on Disaster Reduction and the UN/ISDR secretariat, along with 
partners, will increasingly turn their attention and capacities to integrating and 
mainstreaming risk reduction into development policies and processes. This is the 
Johannesburg plan of action. 
 2002:  In his report on the ISDR (A/57/190) the UN Secretary-General specifies that: 
"This review process will help identify gaps and means of implementation in a way 
that will chart the course of action for the forthcoming decade while taking into 
account the outcome of the World Summit on Sustainable Development." 
 2003: The GA decides to convene a World Conference on Disaster Reduction in 2005, 
to conclude the review of the Yokohama Strategy and its Plan of Action; to identify 
specific activities aimed at ensuring the implementation of relevant provisions of the 
Plan; to share best practices and lessons learned to further disaster reduction within 
the context of attaining sustainable development and identify gaps and challenges; 
to increase awareness of the importance of disaster reduction policies; and to 
increase the reliability and availability of appropriate disaster-related information to 
the public and disaster management agencies in all regions, as set out in the relevant 
provisions of the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation.  The ten-year review takes 
into account several relevant processes, such as the Johannesburg Plan of 
Implementation of the World Summit on Sustainable Development, and will 
culminate in the Second World Conference on Disaster Reduction to be held in Kobe, 
Japan, in January 2005. 
 2005: GA Res. 60/195 endorses the Hyogo Declaration and the Hyogo Framework 
for Action 2005-2015: building the resilience of Nations and communities to 
disasters adopted by the World Conference on Disaster Reduction, held at Kobe, 
Hyogo, Japan, from 18 to 22 January 2005.  
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 2006: GA Res.61/198 notes the proposed establishment of a Global Platform for 
Disaster Risk Reduction as the successor mechanism of the Inter-Agency Task Force 
for Disaster Reduction, and, taking into account the implementation of the Hyogo 
Framework for Action (HFA), decides that the Global Platform shall have the same 
mandate as the Inter-Agency Task Force for Disaster Reduction, and requests the 
Secretary-General to include information on the Global Platform, for consideration 
by the General Assembly, in his next report; Decides that the proposed 
establishment of the Global Platform should continue to be carried out in an 
inclusive and transparent manner and be open to all Member States. 
  2007: GA Res. 62/192 takes note with great interest and appreciation of the holding 
at Geneva, from 5 to 7 June 2007, of the first session of the Global Platform for 
Disaster Risk Reduction, the successor mechanism of the Inter-Agency Task Force for 
Disaster Reduction, as a useful forum for Member States and other stakeholders to 
assess progress made in the implementation of the Hyogo Framework for Action, 
enhance awareness of disaster risk reduction, share experiences and learn from 
good practice, identify remaining gaps and identify actions to accelerate national 
and local implementation. 
Suffice to say it here therefore that while there must have been scores of DRR practices 
all over the world before founding the United Nations in 1945, such efforts did not 
marshal global synergies to culminate into a globally agreed DRR framework. It is the 
post-1960s incremental United Nations efforts which eventually resulted in the 
endorsement of the first global DRR framework for the period 2005-2015 known as the 
Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA). HFA is the focus for review in the following two sub-
sections.  
 
2.2.3 HFA: Purpose, Expected Outcomes & The 5 Priorities 
Writing on HFA, ISDR (2005) states that The World Conference on Disaster 
Reduction held in January 2005 in Kobe, Hyogo, Japan, provided a unique opportunity 
to promote a strategic and systematic approach to reducing vulnerabilities and risks to 
hazards; and underscored the need for, and identified ways of building the resilience of 
nations and communities to disasters. The Conference climaxed into the adoption of a 
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decade long (2005-2015) framework for action with the purpose of “Building the 
Resilience of Nations and Communities to Disasters”. The Conference agreed to 
thereafter refer to the plan of action as the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA). HFA’s 
expected outcome was the “the substantial reduction of disaster losses, in lives and the 
social, economic and environmental assets of communities and countries.” 
 
In the final Conference report, ISDR (2005, p. 3) stresses that the realization of 
the aforementioned HFA outcome will require the full commitment and involvement of 
all actors concerned, including governments, regional and international organizations, 
civil society including volunteers, the private sector and the scientific community. 
Observation: unless one thinks that local communities are part of the ‘civil society’ 
wording mentioned above, which seems unlikely, one would not be wrong to conclude 
that right from the start, community participation in the HFA agenda was not given the 
due diligence it deserved.  
 
 According to ISDR (2005), in order for the HFA to realize the aforementioned 
outcome, the Conference adopted the following five priorities for action: 
 
1. Ensuring that disaster risk reduction is a national and a local priority with a strong 
institutional basis for implementation. 
2. Identifying, assessing and monitoring disaster risks and enhancing early warning. 
3. Using knowledge, innovation and education to build a culture of safety and 
resilience at all levels. 
4. Reducing the underlying risk factors. 
5. Strengthening disaster preparedness for effective response at all levels. 
 
A careful analysis of the HFA reveals that the five priorities form the core of the 
framework. It is upon the five priorities that more narrowed down and targeted 
activities are prescribed for implementation. The five priorities are also a reflection of 
lessons learned and gaps identified from the implementation of the previous decade’s 
Yokohama strategy. The following section will discuss the HFA progression.  
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2.2.4 HFA Assessment 
According to UNISDR (2014b), HFA orchestration included systematic monitoring 
and reporting from regional and respective country DRR platforms on progress being 
made in implementing prescribed activities under the five HFA priorities. The reporting 
follows a common structure including reporting on each monitoring indicator under 
every HFA Priority. However, it is from the 2013 consultative reports on a post-2015 
framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, presently dubbed HFA2, that one can effectively 
distil both what worked and did not work well during the implementation of the 2005-
2015 HFA.   
 
 According to (UNISDR, 2013c), most progress was made under Priority Areas 1 
and 5, with limited progress reported under Priority Area 4 (refer to Fig.2.2).  This 
portrays improving capacity to prepare for and respond to disasters, though with 
abysmal attention given to addressing underlying causes. The more reason D. Alexander 
and Davis (2012) bemoan that “If that priority (# 4) had been converted into positive 
action, then some dramatic reductions in vulnerability would have been possible.” 
 
Figure 2.2: HFA Progress per Priority Area: 2007-2012 
 
Source: UNISDR (Synthesis Report: Consultations on a Post-2015 Framework on Disaster Risk Reduction (HFA2) 
 
Figure 2. 2 HFA Progress per Priority Area: 2007-2012 
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 A closer review of two UNISDR 2013 consultative reports UNISDR (2013b) and UNISDR 
(2013c)  on Post 2015 Framework for DRR (HFA2) reveals that while the highest HFA 
progress was registered under Priority Area 5 (strengthening disaster preparedness for 
effective response at all levels), this progress did not happen at all levels, as described 
below.  
 
One UNISDR (2013b) report presents key issues raised during the May 2013 
Global Platform discussions on HFA2 and also provides a list of 12 proposals made for 
critical consideration while developing HFA2 (refer to Box 1). Of the 12 proposals, top 
on the list is ‘the importance of community-level involvement’. And all the first four 
proposals on the list can be summed up as ‘local action’. This is proof, therefore, that 
much of the progress 
credited to Priority Area 5 
did not trickle down to 
both community and local 
government level, the 
primary locus where 
ultimate DRR should be 
taking place and getting 
measured. Since disasters 
affect people and people 
dwell in communities 
whether rural or urban, 
and knowing that its local people and their organizations that are both first responders 
and key players in DRR John Twigg (2004b); Walter (2004); Walter (2002), one should be 
worry to ascribe much progress to Priority Area 5 when local DRR action is still very 
much abysmal.  
 
 D. Alexander and Davis (2012, p. 2) provide a befitting conclusion on HFA when 
they assert that “Despite a decade of action in the IDNDR and almost a decade of the 
Hyogo Framework, the world can still only count on a few beacon projects and a great 
deal of lip-service to ideals that remain elusive”. 
Box 1: Issues Raised For Critical Consideration During the 
Development of HFA2 
1. The importance of community-level involvement 
2. Targeting and including the most vulnerable populations 
3. Women as leaders 
4. Children and youths: new generation of opportunity 
5. Health 
6. Integrating climate change adaptation, development, and DRR 
7. The role of science 
8. Knowledge sharing and education 
9. Capacity building: financing, risk assessment, preparedness and 
early warning 
10. Private sector involvement in DRR 
11. Political will and leadership 
12. Governance, accountability, transparency, and inclusiveness 
Souce: UNISDR: Post-2015 Framework for Disaster 
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The following section provides a critical review of the SFDRR, the successor 
framework to the HFA.  
 
2.2.5 The Sendai Framework For DRR (SFDRR) 
According to UNISDR (2015), the SFDRR 2015-2030 was adopted at the Third UN 
World Conference in Sendai, Japan, on March 18, 2015. It is the outcome of stakeholder 
consultations initiated in March 2012 and inter-governmental negotiations from July 
2014 to March 2015, supported by the United Nations Ofﬁce for Disaster Risk Reduction 
at the request of the UN General Assembly. The Sendai Framework is, therefore, the 
successor instrument to the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA) 2005-2015.  
  
UNISDR further states that building on HFA, the SFDRR aims to achieve the 
following outcome over the next 15 years: “the substantial reduction of disaster risk and 
losses in lives, livelihoods and health and in the economic, physical, social, cultural and 
environmental assets of persons, businesses, communities and countries.” To attain the 
above outcome, it was agreed the following goal must be pursued: “prevent new and 
reduce existing disaster risk through the implementation of integrated and inclusive 
economic, structural, legal, social, health, cultural, educational, environmental, 
technological, political and institutional measures that prevent and reduce hazard 
exposure and vulnerability to disaster, increase preparedness for response and recovery, 
and thus strengthen resilience.”  
 
UNISDR explains that to enable the assessment of global progress in achieving the 
outcome and goal of SFDRR, seven global targets were agreed as follows: 
  
1. a substantial reduction in global disaster mortality; 
2. a substantial reduction in numbers of affected people; 
3. a reduction in economic losses in relation to global GDP; 
4. a substantial reduction in disaster damage to critical infrastructure and 
disruption of basic services, including health and education facilities; 
5. an increase in the number of countries with national and local disaster risk 
reduction strategies by 2020; 
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6. enhanced international cooperation for developing countries;  
7. And increased access to multi-hazard early warning systems and disaster risk 
information and assessments. 
 
Lastly but not least, UNISDR indicates that taking into account experiences gained 
through the implementation of HFA, and in pursuance of the expected outcome and 
goal, there is a need for focused action within and across sectors by States at local, 
national, regional and global levels in the following four priority areas: 
Priority 1: Understanding disaster risk. 
Priority 2: Strengthening disaster risk governance to manage disaster risk. 
Priority 3: Investing in disaster risk reduction for resilience. 
Priority 4: Enhancing disaster preparedness for response. 
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Table 2. 1Review of the Sendai Framework for DRR 2015-2030 by Marcus Oxley, July 2015 
Marcus (2015) provides a rich critical review of the SFDRR. Table 2.1 is an expert from  
Marcus’ review report. 
 
Review of the Sendai Framework for DRR 2015-2030 by Marcus Oxley, July 2015. 
STRENGTHS 
1. Adopted by 187 member states (HFA-167 
member states) 
2. Extensive multi-stakeholder consultations 
3. Emphasis on disaster risk governance 
4. Focus on both risk creation & reduction 
5. Inclusion of people in vulnerable situations, 
including a stronger role of women, children 
and youth, persons with disabilities, elderly 
persons and indigenous groups 
6. Enhanced multi-stakeholder engagement 
7. Increased international cooperation 
8. Preparedness for resilient recovery 
9. Thirteen guiding principles 
10. Seven global targets 
11. 15-year timeframe  - synchronised with SDG 
/ Climate frameworks 
12. Recognition of small scale, recurrent shocks 
13. Multi-scale approach: global/ regional / 
national/ local  
14. Stronger linkages with health issues 
15. Strong on the role of science and 
technology 
16. Recognised role of the private sector 
17. Broader scope – natural and man-made 
hazards. 
 
WEAKNESSES: 
1. Incomplete problem analysis which underutilizes lessons learnt and 
findings from HFA implementation and final review Complex, poorly-
constructed goal, outcome & priority areas 
2. Weak connecting logic between problem analysis, lessons learnt, 
principles, objectives, actions 
3. Ambiguous global targets – need specificity  
4. Some missing principles: legal basis (human rights); environmental 
integrity;  
5. Missing discussion on power dynamics shaping political economy of 
development 
6. Weak strategic connections with other post-2015 development 
frameworks  
7. Contextual appropriateness in situations of complexity;  informality; 
fragility and insecurity (including conflict) not discussed 
8. Missing cultural dimensions – related to societal and individual behaviours, 
norms, values and perceptions of risk 
9. Weak on accountability and transparency 
10. Undervalues learning processes, including systemising post-disaster 
lessons learnt  
11. No additional or predictable financial resources through international 
cooperation 
12. Specific versus comprehensive risk management 
13. Strong emphasis on top-down government-centric actions with less 
emphasis on connecting and strengthening informal community-owned 
approaches 
14. Underplays significance of local knowledge and capacities, particularly in 
relation to small-scale disaster 
15. Underplays role of ecosystems in reducing/modifying natural hazards, 
including recognition of limits/thresholds 
16. Need to establish stakeholder advisory groups 
17. No policy guidance on the transition from HFA to SFDRR  
18. SFDRR formulation process was expensive – does the outcome doc 
represent value-for-money? 
OPPORTUNITIES 
1. Development of joint implementation 
actions (assessments, programming, 
monitoring, evaluation in conjunction with 
other post-2015 frameworks 
2. Multi-stakeholder collaboration and 
partnership under a post-2015 sustainable 
development agenda 
3. Potential synergy of resources, time and 
effort with other development actors  
4. Resilience as a trans-boundary convening 
concept to breakdown thematic silos 
5. Linkages to human-rights agenda  
6. Development of strong domestic legal basis 
for reducing risk to acceptable levels 
 
 
THREATS 
1. Limited relevance to local realities – fragility, insecurity, conflict, 
informality, small scale. 
2. Continued upwards trend in disaster losses 
3. Complex risk landscape – requires systems-wide perspectives and holistic 
approaches  
4. Lack of political commitment - weak implementation / limited impact / non-
compliance and/or enforcement  
5. Lack of strategic coherence with other frameworks 
6. Competition amongst other higher profile post-2015 development 
agendas 
7. Inability to forge strategic coalitions to address underlying risk drivers ( as 
per HFA) 
8. High expectation within LDCs on increased international 
cooperation(resources) 
9. Less impact than the HFA despite increased losses and significant 
accrued learning. 
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A close look at Marcus’ SWOT analysis of the SF4DRR reveals that just like the HFA, 
there is not a single ‘Strength’ alluded to local level or community engagement. Instead, 
under the ‘Weaknesses’ section, the SWOT underscores SFDRR’s poor utilisation of 
lessons learned and findings from HFA implementation. Among the 18 weaknesses 
identified in the SF4DRR SWOT,  two of them (# 13 &14) underscore the strong emphasis 
on top-down government-centric actions will less emphasis on connecting and 
strengthening informal community approaches, and underplaying the significance of 
local knowledge and capacities particularly in relation to small-scale disasters. The 
number one threat identified under the ‘Threats’ section of the SWOT underscores 
“limited relevance to local realities: fragility, insecurity, conflict, informality and small 
scale.  
On lessons learned, gaps and challenges for the future identified from HFA, UNISDR 
(2015) reports that despite progress in reducing losses since the adoption of the HFA, 
evidence indicates that in all countries, (especially developing countries), the creation 
of disaster risk is increasing than the ability to enhance disaster risk management 
capacities. The result is a continued rise in disaster losses which undermine efforts to 
achieve sustainable development. Whilst this is a problem that needs to be addressed 
by SFDRR, Marcus (2015) observes that even though community resilience is the 
foundation and basic building block of a resilient society, under SFDRR, local action is 
not prioritised. Thus while Wahlström (2015) asserts that SFDRR champions an approach 
that is people-centred and preventive, it remains to be seen how this will be turned into 
reality without strengthened local DRR action. 
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2.3 Overall DDR in Kenya 
 
2.3.1 Kenya in General 
Kenya is one of the 
Greater Horn of Africa countries 
(others being Burundi, Djibouti, 
Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, 
Rwanda, Tanzania, Somalia and 
Uganda), and according to 
DARA (2011), “at a glance, 
Kenya seems to be a regional 
success story”. The country has 
a fairly stable government in a 
region riddled by violent civil 
conflicts, boasts the region’s 
strongest economy; has a very 
strong donor and INGO 
presence; is a regional 
humanitarian hub; benefits 
from enormous donor and local government development funding; and according to 
Swithern (2014) received US$436 million in international humanitarian assistance to the 
2011 drought and hunger crisis that affected all Horn of Africa Countries and parts of 
the Great Lakes Region of Africa.  
 
And according to WorldBank (2019), in 2015 Kenya had a population of 47 million 
and a population growth rate of1.8%. An estimated 43% of the population lives below 
the poverty line, and the county’s Human Development Index stood at 0.548. 
 
 Kenya’s Recent Disasters and Impacts 
Year Approx. # of people that required  
humanitarian assistance (in millions) 
US$ spent on 
humanitarian 
Response (in 
millions) 
2017 3.7M drought  
2013 1.8M (drought, floods, refugees, and 
clan conflicts 
$269M 
2012 2.86 M (drought and refugees)  $405M 
2011 4.3M  (drought, refugees and IDPs) $283M 
2010 2.3M (drought, floods, cholera, 
refugees and elections violence) 
$305M 
2009 4.4M (drought, elections violence, and 
refugees) 
$216M 
2008 1.34M (drought, elections violence) $38M 
2004-
2006 
3.5M drought  
1999-
2001 
4.4M drought 340 million 
1995- 1.4M drought  
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2.3.2 Kenya’s Disaster Risk Profile/ Exposure to Disasters 
In the last two decades, the frequency and intensity of disasters in Kenya has 
been increasing (Owino, 2019). And according to  UNDP (2019), UNDP (2017) and the 
Kenya Draft Disaster Management Policy (GOK, 2009, p. 5), the country ’s disaster 
landscape is dominated by droughts, fires, floods, landslides, terrorism, technological 
accidents, human conflict, and diseases and epidemics---all of which disrupt people’s 
livelihoods, destroy infrastructure, divert planned use of resources, interrupt economic 
activities and retard development. And while drought and floods are the most significant 
hazards affecting the country, the effects of drought are the most severe in the country 
(Owuor, 2015). And according to the WorldBank (2019), on average, around 5.5 million 
people mainly in the central regions of Kenya are affected by water scarcity each year. 
And each year, 150,000 people and around 200 education and healthcare facilities 
nationally are affected by flooding.  
 
 According to Owino (2019), “extreme weather events, high poverty levels, and the 
vast size of arid lands have been identified as causes of disaster and exacerbators of its 
impact.”  
And in agreement with Owino, UNDP 
(2019) argues that “over time, the 
frequency and intensity of disasters in 
Kenya has increased due to a number 
of factors including climate change, 
widespread poverty and rapid 
population growth especially in the 
urban centres.” UNDP therefore 
points out rapid population growth as 
yet another ingredient responsible for 
the increased frequency and impacts 
of disasters in the country.  
 
 
Figure 1: Kenya's Arid and Semi Arid Lands. 
Source: USAID/FFP (https://www.usaid.gov/kenya/food-
assistance) 
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  Arid and semi-arid lands (ASALs) cover the vast majority of Kenya (89%) and is 
home to more than one-third of Kenyans (36%).” He also observes that ASALs have some 
of the highest poverty indices in Kenya (Owino, 2019). Owino records that “eight out of 
the ten counties with the highest poverty headcount figures are in the most arid areas 
with aridity figures of between 85% and 100%.”  
 
 And according to WorldBank (2018), with over 60 percent of the ASALs population 
living below the poverty line, ASALs are characterized by some of the highest poverty 
levels and lowest levels of human development in Kenya and are the focus of national 
investment and economic development priorities. The World Bank further indicates that 
“ASALs contain 18 of the 20 poorest counties in Kenya; some counties in the north, such 
as Turkana, Marsabit, Wajir and Mandera, have between 74 percent and 79 percent of 
people living below the absolute poverty line.” 
 
 In one of their programme documents titled “Supporting Disaster Risk Reduction 
and Communities’ Resilience”, UNDP (2017) explains that “the arid and semi-arid lands 
in Kenya are highly vulnerable to natural and man-made calamities such as drought, 
floods and conflict. The impact of these disasters continues to intensify due to several 
factors such as; high frequency, severity and intensity of their occurrence as well as 
increasing levels of vulnerability among affected communities.” UNDP further explains 
that “in these regions, where communities rely heavily on pastoralism and agro 
pastoralism as their main source of livelihoods, majority are exposed to the prolonged 
droughts, unpredicted floods as well as perennial inter- community conflicts over 
natural resources.” UNDP also explains that besides being prone to disasters, counties 
in the ASAL regions are characterized by poor socio-economic conditions including high 
poverty levels, low literacy rates and limited access to basic services which exacerbates 
communities’ vulnerability. 
 
  Going by foregoing observations, one would be right to surmise that in general, 
Kenya’s vulnerability to disaster and risk exposure are therefore exacerbated by location 
(ASALs), rapid population growth, poverty, low literacy rates (in the ASALs), poor socio-
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economic infrastructures, climate change through related extreme weather events, and 
effects of frequent resource-based conflicts especially in the majority ASALs.   
Reporting on Kenya’s Disaster Risk Profile, WorldBank (2019) underscores that 
Kenya and the Horn of Africa region experience droughts very frequently---“on average, 
a major drought occurs every decade and minor ones every three to four years. Recent 
droughts took place in 1991, 1994, 1997, 1999, 2004, 2005, 2008 and 2010-2011, and 
most recently in 2017. The 2011 drought left more than 3.75 million people in need of 
food assistance; and in 2017, around 3 million people required emergency food 
assistance.” On flooding, the same World Bank report reveals that “the large flood in 
2018 killed more than 100 people in Kenya and hundreds of thousands of people were 
affected. And according to available disaster databases, there have been over 50,000 - 
150,000 people affected each year by floods in the past decade.”  
 
Kenya was ranked number of 5 out of the 10 countries with the highest % of their 
population affected by drought in the period 1991 to 2010 (Kellett & Caravani, 2013). 
And a Government of Kenya report (GOK, 2013) reveals that drought accounted for 
US$12.1 billion in drought-related damages and losses between 2008 and 2011. Table 
2.2 provides numbers of people affected by key disasters in the country.  
 
The 2011 World Risk Report (Birkmann et al., 2011) which uses the World Risk 
Index framework and analyses disaster risk as a complex interplay of natural hazards 
and social, political and environmental factors presents disaster risk as a function of 
exposure and vulnerability. Within the report, vulnerability is comprised of three main 
elements including ‘susceptibility’, ‘lack of coping capacities’, and ‘lack of adaptive 
capacities.’ The World Risk Index is therefore recorded and measured on the basis of 
four components; namely, ‘exposure to a natural hazard or a climatic stimulus’, 
‘susceptibility’, ‘coping capacities’, and ‘adaptive capacities’(Birkmann et al., 2011, p. 
14).  
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The report which provides data 
on 173 countries and presents its 
findings per country using the ‘very 
low’, ‘low’, ‘medium’, ‘high’ and ‘very 
high’ score on all the four 
aforementioned components presents 
Kenya’s status among the 173 assessed 
countries as follows: has high exposure 
to natural and climatic stimulus; has 
very high vulnerability; has very high 
susceptibility; is among the top 15 
countries with the poorest copying capacities; ranks high among countries with lack of 
adaptive capacities and is the 67th most disaster risk country out the 173 assessed 
countries (Birkmann et al., 2011, pp. 63-66). Fig.2.3 shows some of the 2011 drought 
decimated herds.  
 
And given the country’s aforementioned regional development position and disaster 
profile, it is conceivable to assume that ‘community capacity building for disaster risk 
reduction’ ought to already be a priority consideration supported and mainstreamed by 
all major Government of Kenya relief and development partners in the country.   
 
2.3.3 Kenya’s Disaster Risk Management Framework 
A review across Owino (2019), UNDP (2019),  WorldBank (2018), PreventionWeb 
(2018),  UNDP (2017), Mondoh (2013), GOK (2013), Songok et al. (2011) and GOK (2009) 
reveals that by August 2019, the Government of Kenya had the following overall disaster 
management infrastructure, much of which developed in the wake of the HFA: 
 
a. Kenya’s 2010 constitution underscores the importance of disaster management 
as reflected in articles 185 (2), 186 (1), 187, all of which providing enablers for 
disaster management legislation. 
 
  
 
Source: https://wwalert.wordpress.com/tag/severe-drought-in-
kenya/ 
Figure 2. 3: 2011 drought decimated herds in Northern 
Kenya 
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b. In May 2018, Cabinet approved the National Disaster Risk Management Policy. 
This policy paper had been in draft since 2003. According to PreventionWeb 
(2018) which is a global knowledge platform for DRR, “the Policy is benchmarked 
on the best practices in disaster risk management. It lays down the strategies for 
ensuring the Government commits itself to enhancement of research in disasters 
and formulation of risk reduction strategies.”  
 
c.   A WorldBank (2018) report observes that “As part of the transition to a more 
proactive approach to managing disaster and climate risks, Kenya has developed 
a series of disaster-related laws and policies. These include Sessional Paper No. 8 
on the National Policy for the Sustainable Development of Northern Kenya and 
other Arid Lands (the “ASAL Policy”, 2012), the EDE MTP (2012), the National 
Drought Management Authority (NDMA) Act (2013), and the National Climate 
Change Action Plan (2013). 
 
d.  In addition, the WorldBank (2018) report on Kenya observes that, “various 
entities have been established to support the country’s institutional 
architecture for DRM. These include the National Disaster Operations Centre; the 
National Disaster Management Unit (NDMU); the National Drought Management 
Authority (NDMA) and the State Department of ASALs.” The report further 
indicates that “an informal initiative known as the National Platform for Disaster 
Risk Management brings together stakeholders interested in DRM and provides 
an opportunity for State, non-governmental, private and international 
institutions to participate in consultation and decision-making processes for 
DRM. However, there is a lack of coordination across these agencies and 
initiatives.” 
 
e.  In their report titled “DRM Governance in Kenya: Overview” which provides a list 
of  Kenya’s leading Disaster Risk Management institutions, (UNDP, 2019) shows 
that “with support from the UN, a national DRR platform was established to 
support the Government in coordinating disaster issues at the national level. The 
Principal Disaster Risk Management Institutions include: the National Drought 
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Management Authority (established after the 2011 drought) and National 
Disaster Operation Center. Disaster Risk Management is coordinated by the 
Directorate of Special Programmes under the Ministry of Devolution and Planning 
while some disaster response functions are within the Ministry of Interior and 
Coordination of National Government.” No doubt, this is evidence of the 
proliferation of government-funded disaster risk management institutions are 
the national level.  
 
f.  According the PreventionWeb (2018), the National Disaster Operations Center 
(NDOC) was established to monitor, co-ordinate, mobilize and respond to 
disaster incidences in the country. Relatedly, NDMA (2019) asserts that “the 
National Drought Management Authority (NDMA) is a public body established 
by the National Drought Management Authority (NDMA) Act, 2016. It previously 
operated under the State Corporations Act (Cap 446) of the Laws of Kenya by 
Legal Notice Number 171 of November 24, 2011. The Act gives the NDMA the 
mandate to exercise overall coordination over all matters relating to drought risk 
management and to establish mechanisms, either on its own or with 
stakeholders, that will end drought emergencies in Kenya. 
 
g. Relatedly, the country had a drought risk management and ending drought 
emergencies medium plan (2013-2017), which is part of the Kenya Vision 2030.  
 
h. In one of her Disaster Risk Management (DRM) Policy Financing instruments to the 
Republic of Kenya aimed at improving the country’s capacity to reduce disaster 
risks and improve management of the socioeconomic and fiscal impacts of 
disasters, WorldBank (2018) comments that “under the devolved governance 
structure that was established by the 2010 Constitution of Kenya, the country’s 
forty-seven county governments play a key role in DRM. The Constitution 
integrates key provisions on DRM including national level support to counties 
which are required to develop their respective DRM policies and programs in line 
with the National DRM Policy.” 
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i. In a study to tracking sub-national investments in DRR in Kenya, Owino (2019) 
reports that “major progress is being made in addressing the DRR legislation both 
at the county and country level. However, slow implementation of the policies as 
a result of slow progress of policies at the debating stage, lack of political will and 
competing priorities in government will derail the overall goal of DRR legislation. 
Political interference during draft stage, poor prioritisation and weak 
coordination additionally add to the legislation hurdles.” 
 
j. Owino further reports that all the four sampled counties reviewed had bills and 
policies governing the management of disaster risk. He observes that, for 
instance, “Kisumu County Disaster Management Act 2015, Laikipia Risk 
Management Policy 2016, West Pokot Disaster Management Act 2016, and 
Baringo County Disaster Management Policy 2017 are the main reference 
documents for disaster risk management in the counties. Owino also observes 
that, generally, these policies are used to guide effective coordination and 
management of DRR activities, public awareness and sensitisation on DRR 
through community involvement and public participation and the integration of 
modern scientific technology to promote early warning systems. Additionally, 
these policies promote the creation of various institutions and mechanisms to 
help in mainstreaming DRR in the county development agenda. 
 
k. Regrettably though, According to Songok et al. (2011), “in Kenya, most polices are 
formulated with limited or no involvement of communities. Even as climate 
change and the need to better prepare for disasters is a major development 
concern, responses from key informant interviews confirm that the country does 
not have a policy on either CCA or DRR. In this regard, a common sentiment 
expressed by respondents during the FGDs and echoed by policy actors was that 
policymaking processes in Kenya are generally more inclined towards protecting 
political and institutional interests, with the needs of vulnerable agro-pastoralists 
less prioritized.”  
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l. And finally, Owino (2019) observes that “while DRR is a responsibility of both 
county and national government, where counties are the first responders, the 
latter lack capacity to implement programmes. The institutions created by some 
of the policies and acts discussed above lack implementation structures and legal 
backing to execute programmes or policies in DRR. This coupled with competing 
priorities in the development (including education, roads and health) minimises 
economic resources available for DRR.” 
 
m. A document accessed by this research titled “Governance for DRR in Kenya” reads 
in part, “despite the exposure to recurrent natural and human-induced hazards 
in Kenya, her disaster management strategy has largely remained reactive. The 
Government is often compelled to re-direct development resources to address 
emergency response and reconstruction needs at the expense of development 
programmes” (UNDP, 2019). 
A synthesis of the above anecdotes reveals a country in the throes of making steady 
progress in the area of DRM governance, but which is not yet out of the woods when it 
comes to translating the establishment of multiple DRM institutions and enactment of 
DRM-related policies into tangible grassroot resilience-building DRR outcomes. Part of 
the remaining DRM struggle to date, seems to be lack of political will to demand and 
lead a move away from the predominant multi-stakeholder focus on disaster 
preparedness and response to the politically less ‘vote-catching’ resilience building DRR 
agenda. And this is where in its mid-term review of HFA, UNISDR (2011b) sadly observed 
that “national institutional arrangements are not enough to promote effective action 
when resources do not reach local communities. For a nation can adopt marvellous laws, 
national platforms, plans, and all the things that the HFA recommended without truly 
affecting the grassroots in either city or countryside.”  And regrettably, Kenya plays no 
exception to this sad reality.  
2.3.4 DRR Footprint Among Kenya’s Relief and Development Partners  
As an effort to gauge the DRR footprint in Kenya, a web-based secondary data 
review for 17 International Non-Governmental Agencies (INGOs) including ADRA, Action 
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Aid, CARE, Caritas, Danish Church Aid, Christian Aid, Cord Aid, Food for the Hungry, IIRR, 
IRC, Mercy Corps, Oxfam, Norwegian Church Aid, Save the Children, Samaritan Purse, 
and World Vision was  undertaken.   Additional on-line secondary data review for 5 UN 
agencies including FAO, UNDP, UNHCR, UNICEF and WFP and 7 bilateral donor agencies 
including Australian Aid, DFADT/ CIDA, DFID, ECHO, Japan International Cooperation 
Agency (JICA), SIDA, and USAID was completed.  
 
Findings from this on-line presence lead to the conclusion that all the 
aforementioned INGOs, UN agencies and bilateral and multilateral donors indicate 
engagement with DRR in the country at various levels and in different forms. This DRR 
engagement is presented in  the  ‘what we do’, ‘focus’, and ‘projects’ tabs; while for 
others, its woven into their online strategy papers, stories and reports. There is 
therefore enough on-line evidence to suggest that almost every international relief and 
development partner with the Government of Kenya is in one way or another involved 
in supporting DRR practice in the country. The following section will discuss community 
capacity building for DRR, the theme line for this research.  
 
2.4 Community Capacity Building for DRR 
 
Building on the preceding exploratory literature on ‘disasters and disaster risk 
reduction’, this section presents a literature review on ‘community capacity building 
for DRR’, an area critical for either making or breaking desired sustainable DRR at the 
community level. The section is presented in a cascading order starting with a focus on 
‘community’, ‘moving on to community capacity building’, to ‘community capacity 
building for DRR’ and ending with ‘community capacity building for DRR in Kenya’.  
2.4.1 Community 
The word ‘community’ means different things to different people, and over the 
years, different academics and professional disciplines have defined the term 
‘community’ differently for their practice, (Craig (2007). The earliest  definition this 
literature review accessed was that  offered by Queen (1923, p. 382) where she 
describes community as “a local grouping of people who share a number of important 
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interests and activities, and who are more concerned about those things they have in 
common than about those wherein they differ.” In a much later work on community-
based participatory research where 118 participants in four different locations in the US 
were involved in answering the question “what does the word community mean to 
you?”(Green & Mercer, 2001), a common definition of community emerged as “a group 
of people with diverse characteristics who are linked by social ties, share common 
perspectives, and engage in joint action in geographical locations or settings.” Bates 
and Bacon (1972) corroborate the above definition by describing community as a group 
of people inhabiting a limited area, who have a sense of belonging together and who 
through their organized relationships share and carry on activities in pursuit of their 
common interests. Equally, Chaskin et al. (2001) define communities as functional units 
around which collective action may be mobilized.   
 
A synthesis of various scholarly works including Ferdinand (2014), Matthews (2013), 
Craig (2007), Colclough and Sitaraman (2005), Green and Mercer (2001), Casswell 
(2001), McMillan and Chavis (1986), E. L. Quarantelli and Dynes (1985), Hillery (1982), 
Korten (1980),                                                                                        Bates and Bacon (1972) 
and Hillery Jr (1963) on definitions of the term  ‘community’ reveals at least five core 
elements of a community. They include sharing, joint action, social ties and diversity. 
Whilst a variety of words and or different terms are used by different scholars in 
reference to the above five core elements, they all point to the same core elements.   
 
And while there is consensus among various scholars on the application of the term 
‘community’ like presented by aforementioned scholars, there also remain differing 
scholarly views on the same. For instance, in his sociological work that analyzed 94 
scholarly definitions of the term community, Hillery (1982) indicates that rural 
sociologists tended to associate the ‘community’ concept to be a rural phenomenon. 
Rural sociologist, therefore, argued that urban communities tend to be larger, more 
complex and more diverse social units; and the complexity and diversity of these social 
relationships obscure the fundamental basis upon which community rests.  
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Similarly, Gusfield (1975) distinguished between two major uses of the term 
community. The first is the territorial and geographical notion of community-
neighbourhood, town, and city. The second is "relational," concerned with "quality of 
character of the human relationship, without reference to location" (p. xvi). Gusfield 
noted that the two usages are not mutually exclusive, although in their work on ‘sense 
of community’, McMillan and Chavis (1986) reveal how modern society has developed 
community around interests and skills more than-around locality making territorial 
communities (neighborhoods) to be equal to relational communities, examples being 
professional and spiritual communities.  
 
Chaskin et al. (2001) corroborates the preceding view and observe that while 
‘community’ usually infers effective aspects of community solidarity, current aspects of 
increased ease of travel, population mobility and improved communications across large 
geographical expanses have all enabled relationships to extend beyond the local 
community, and the most intimate ties are no longer bound to the neighbourhood. 
However, for purposes of this research, the definition presented by Green and Mercer 
(2001) has been adopted on the basis that it provides a good reflection of the disaster-
prone communities in Kenya.  
  
2.4.2 Community Capacity Building (CCB) 
While Duncan and Thomas (2000)  described CCB as ‘the New Holy Grail’ in one 
of their reports, in his work on the shifting paradigms of capacity building  practice, 
Kaplan (2000) laments how capacity building has become one of the most regularly 
invoked of modern development concepts and yet continues to resist a shared definition 
of what it means in practice.  Equally, Craig (2007) argues that the term CCB was 
introduced as part of a political fashion especially in policy papers as far back as 1992 
and that by 2001, use of the term CCB had become widespread within several Northern 
countries so much so that it had become the target of cynical humour. The more reason 
Eade (1997, p. 1) quips “no UN summit goes by without ritual calls for capacity building 
programmes for NGOs and other social organisations…”. In sync with foregoing views, 
James (1994)  acknowledges the growing interest and use of the capacity building 
vocabulary among  Northern NGOs working in the South but bemoans their limited 
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understanding of what capacity building in reality entails. Based on the foregoing 
literature, there appears to be a wide gap between the CCB policy rhetoric and the 
realities on the ground.   
 
In his work on community capacity building, Chaskin et al. (2001) indicate that 
the term capacity includes the ideals of both containing (holding, storing) and ability (of 
mind, of action). Chaskin also defines community capacity building as “the interaction of 
human capital, organizational resources, and social capital existing within a given 
community that can be leveraged to solve collective problems and improve or maintain 
the wellbeing of that community” (p. 7). His work, therefore, identifies particular capitals 
which when leveraged and helped to interact could lead to target people’s improved 
wellbeing. This view is supported by Duncan and Thomas (2000) when they suggest that 
CCB involves development work which strengthens the ability of community-based 
organizations and groups to build their structures, systems, people and skills. And Craig 
(2007) recommends that where there are organizations within target communities, 
building the capacity of such organizations should be considered part of CCB. 
 
In a related work though on Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) capacity 
building, James (1994, p. 5) defines capacity building as “an explicit outside intervention 
to improve an organization’s performance in relation to its mission, context, resources 
and sustainability”. James’ definition, therefore, focuses on improved performance as 
the main outcome of capacity building. However, James is worried about the word 
‘building’ within the term capacity building, for it brings the connotation of building 
something from scratch or using a blueprint approach. Nonetheless, he agrees the term 
capacity building is less clumsy in English compared to using, for instance, the term 
capacity strengthening.  
 
2.4.2.1 Approaches to CCB 
 
Apart from the general rhetoric and common misunderstanding of what true CCB 
entails (reference to the above literature), a review of some scholarly works shows that 
different entities engage in various forms of CCB using different approaches and having 
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different end results as their targets.   In one of her works on CCB, Casswell (2001) 
identifies two different but overlapping approaches to CCB: community action and 
community development. Casswell argues that community action tends to be linked 
with the local-level implementation of specific public policies, for instance, policies on 
the use of alcohol and drugs. In contrast, community development approaches are 
characterized by the wider general goal of community empowerment rather than 
addressing the more specific policy goals.  In addition, community action and community 
development initiatives tend to put emphasis on different things. For instance, reaching 
out to the under-represented will be more amplified in community development than it 
will be in community action initiatives.  
 
In their related work on evaluating community projects,  Duignan et al. (1993) 
stress that community action projects can usually rely on a reservoir of community 
concern over the issues being addressed, issues that grant moral but not vigorous 
support in the long term. On the other hand, a common characteristic of community 
development is that local actions are centred on community-defined issues. An analysis 
of the two approaches (community action and community development) to CCB reveals 
that though they have many overlaps and may even do the same things including 
enhancing networks, alliances and skills; the major difference lies in the value and 
emphasis put on community development processes.   
 
2.4.2.2 Importance of CCB 
 
 McKnight and Kretzmann (1997) remind us that history shows significant 
community development only takes place when local community people are committed 
to investing themselves and their resources in the effort. They are categorical that 
development must start from within the community, for communities cannot be 
developed from the top down, or from the outside in, p.2.  They further argue that 
communities have never been built upon their deficiencies; rather, community 
development has always depended upon mobilizing the capacities and assets of a 
people and a place, p.17.  
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On the importance of CCB, Eade and Williams (1996, p. 556) propose that the 
most useful form of support to marginalized communities is capacity building; and Eade 
(1997) reinforces the opinion that capacity building is one of the necessary essentials for 
development to become sustainable. And perhaps every discourse on CCB will be 
considered incomplete till Roberts Chambers’ much acclaimed scholarly work on the 
subject has been reflected upon. Chambers (1998) presents evidence proving how the 
realities and priorities of poor people often differ from those imagined for them by 
professionals and policy-makers. He remarks, “the challenge is to enable poor and 
marginalized people to analyse their conditions and identify their priorities in ways which 
freely express their realities, and generate proposals that are doable, credible and 
persuasive to policy-makers”, P. 289. Chambers further suggests that for the realities of 
"lowers" to count, "uppers" have to “hand over the stick”, a process he terms 
“empowerment”, and the changes in the “uppers” dominant behaviour entail having 
respect, standing down, shutting up,  facilitating, enabling and empowering. 
 
Across the preceding literature, it emerges that while there are numerous 
reasons for undertaking CCB, the primary importance of CCB is to enable target 
communities make decisions and take actions that lead to improvements in their 
wellbeing; a process leading scholars on the subject including Robert Chambers have 
called ‘empowerment’.  Similarly, writing on the origins and background of capacity 
building, Eade (2007, p. 632) explains that the early origins of the capacity building 
concept lay in the belief that the role of an engaged outsider is to support the capacity 
of local people to determine their own values and priorities, to organize themselves to 
act upon and sustain these for the common good, and to shape the moral and physical 
universe that we all share. 
 
2.4.2.3 Empowerment 
Like many other terminologies used in the development discourse, the term 
empowerment doesn’t seem to be used without its own share of complications. An 
array of scholars including Brown et al. (2014); Jupp et al. (2010); Adamson (2010); 
Maton (2008); Scrutton and Luttrell (2007); Alsop and Heinsohn (2005); Moore (2001); 
Page and Czuba (1999), Wilkinson (1998); Pastor (1996); Rappaport (1995); Perkins 
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(1995); Wolff (1993); Zimmerman (1990); Kieffer (1984), and Rappaport (1984) point to 
the confusion surrounding the definition of the term empowerment and its use, abuse 
and interchangeability with other conceptual terms. They note that in various literature, 
the term ‘empowerment’ is often used interchangeably with ‘participation’, 
‘involvement’ and sometimes with ‘engagement’. And in 1984, Rappaport, a leading 
scholar on the subject admitted that “we do not know what empowerment is, but like 
obscenity, we know it when we see it”, p.2.  
 
Relatedly, in their literature review of articles demonstrating a focus on 
empowerment, Page and Czuba (1999) reveal how the review resulted in no clear 
definition of the concept, especially one that could cut cross disciplinary lines. 
Consequently, Page and Czuba note that many authors were employing the concept very 
narrowly, and even without having to define the term at all. Wilkinson (1998) agrees 
and notes that the term is used very loosely and it is not always clear whether we are 
comparing like with like. Page and Czuba, therefore, concluded that many writers had 
come to view "empowerment" as nothing more than a popular buzz word thrown in to 
make sure old programs attract new funding. And like Page and Czuba, Perkins (1995) 
observes that to most people, empowerment is a vague buzz word heard in political, 
community development, and management circles, p.776. In the words of an 
interviewed Africa-based donor staff, “there is a lot of lip service paid to some of these 
issues at all levels, be it government, be it donors” (Katwikirize, 2001, p. 50). The more 
reason Moore (2001, p. 331) delivers an open reprove when he states that “the World 
Bank and other international development agencies have declared empowerment to be 
central to their anti-poverty programmes, but they are vague over meaning and may be 
using the term partly to advance their own organisational interests”.    
 
With the aforementioned confusion and seeming rhetoric, it’s helpful to explore 
some of the working definitions for the term empowerment (within the concept of CCB) 
presented by some of the leading scholars on the subject. According to the literature 
reviewed,  it is Rappaport (1987, p. 122)  and Minkler (1989) that present the earliest 
definition of the term empowerment, and they commonly define it as a process and a 
mechanism by which people, organisations and communities gain mastery over their 
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lives/affairs and over their environment. A seemingly more referenced definition is 
provided  by The Cornell Empowerment Group (1989, 2) who describe empowerment 
as an  intentional, ongoing process centred in the local community, involving mutual 
respect, critical reflection, caring and group participation, through which people lacking 
an equal share of valued resources gain greater access to and control over those 
resources.  
 
Relatedly, in their scholarly work on empowerment, Page and Czuba (1999) 
define empowerment as a multi-dimensional social process that helps people gain 
control over their own lives. They further describe empowerment as a process that 
fosters power in people for use in their own lives, their communities and in their society 
by acting on issues they define as important. Similarly, Maton (2008, p. 5) describes 
empowerment as a group–based, participatory, developmental process through which 
marginalized or oppressed individuals and groups gain greater control over their lives 
and environment, acquire value resources and basic rights, and achieve important life 
goals and reduce societal marginalization.   
 
And according to (Pastor, 1996, pp. 2-3), there are two aspects of empowerment 
that must be considered for anyone to understand the empowerment concept fully. The 
first is “personal empowerment”, that is, that which individuals are responsible for 
doing for themselves in order to feel empowered in their lives regardless of 
circumstances. The second dimension of empowerment has to do with “the way in 
which we work with others” to nurture their sense of self-esteem, autonomy and 
growth. Pastor likens empowerment to an “anointing”, where the king takes his sword, 
lays it on the knight errant’s shoulder and tells him he is now empowered to lead the 
crusade, to sally forth into the realm and just “do it!”, whatever “it” is. Similarly, Pinkett 
and O'Bryant (2003, p. 194) agree that the foundation for community empowerment 
lies ultimately in the empowerment of the individual.  
 
Though not in contrast with the above definitions, Moore (2001) offers two 
propositions to the definition of empowerment. He calls the first definition 
“materialistic”, under which the focus is on “improving the material status of poor 
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people” which translates into weakened social, economic and political dependences; 
thus providing poor people with greater freedoms and autonomy.  However, Moore 
warns of how many governments in developing countries are brandishing this approach 
when it’s all but “cheap talk”. Thus, according to Moore, to talk seriously of 
empowerment calls for talking about the second proposition, which he calls 
“organisation”, and this, therefore, brings in a political dimension. Moore argues that 
left uncoordinated, poor people simply cannot do much in the different spheres of their 
lives.  Similar to Moore’s foregoing second proposition of ‘organizing’ toward 
empowerment, which he notes then becomes political, Brown et al. (2014, p. 22) 
observe that participatory approaches, especially those that aim at empowerment are 
political tools for they aim to change the balance of power.    
 
Upholding preceding insights on ‘power’ in empowerment, Page and Czuba 
(1999) and Smith (1997) recognize and state that at the core of the concept of 
empowerment lie the idea of power, which makes scores of scholars consider the 
process of empowerment to be partly political. In the words of Smith (1997, p. 120), “to 
empower is to give power, to open up, to release the potential of people. Page and 
Czuba (1999) further explain that there are two things upon which the prospect of 
empowerment depends. First, empowerment requires that power can change. If power 
cannot change, if it is inherent in positions or people, then empowerment is not 
possible, nor is empowerment conceivable in any meaningful way. In other words, if 
power can change, then empowerment is possible. Second, the concept of 
empowerment depends upon the idea that power can expand. This second point reflects 
our common experiences of power rather than how we think about power. 
 
  Expounding further on this position, Page and Czuba explain that power is often 
related to the ability to make others do what we want, regardless of their own wishes 
or interests, and that traditional social science emphasizes power as influence and 
control, often treating power as a commodity or structure divorced from human action. 
And conceived in this way, power can be viewed as unchanging or unchangeable. 
However, Weber (2009) overcomes this limitation by recognizing that power exists 
within the context of a relationship between people or things. Power does not exist in 
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isolation nor is it inherent in individuals. By implication, since power is created in 
relationships, power and power relationships can change. Empowerment as a process 
of change, then, becomes a meaningful concept. Freedheim and Weiner (2013, p. 479) 
affirm the foregoing view and note that power in relationships can and does shift over 
time, leading to a focus on the process of empowerment. That’s why  Page and Czuba 
(1999) suggest that empowerment is a process that fosters power (that is, the capacity 
to implement) in people, for use in their own lives, their communities, and in their 
society, by acting on issues that they define as important.  
 
Page and Czuba (1999) also suggest that three components of their definition 
(above) are basic to any understanding of empowerment. Empowerment is multi-
dimensional, social, and a process. It is multi-dimensional in that it occurs within 
sociological, psychological, economic, and other dimensions. It also occurs at various 
levels, such as individual, group, and community. Empowerment, by definition, is a social 
process, since it occurs in relation with others. Empowerment is a process that is similar 
to a path or journey, one that develops as we work through it. They argue that other 
aspects of empowerment may vary depending on the specific context and people 
involved, but the three dimensions remain constant. Page and Czuba further note that 
in both the definition and process of empowerment, the individual and community are 
fundamentally connected. 
 
 Probably for this review, no other scholar gives better concluding remarks on the 
issue of ‘power’ in empowerment than Eade (2007, p. 630) when she observes that 
many conventional NGO practices are ultimately about retaining power, rather than 
empowering their partners. Eade further warns that when concepts like 
‘empowerment’, or ‘capacity building’ become fashion accessories or mere buzzwords 
invoked in order to negotiate bureaucratic mazes, they are not only drained of any 
remaining political content but may actually end up crushing local capacities rather than 
releasing their potential. She further asserts that if capacity building means anything, it 
is surely about enabling those out on the margins to represent and defend their interests 
more effectively not only within their own immediate contexts but globally. Eade 
laments that reading some of the literature, one could be forgiven for thinking both 
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that capacity building is an exclusively Southern ‘need’, and that international NGOs 
are among those best placed to meet it. She remarks, “The sad reality is that most 
development aid has precious little to do with building the capacities of ‘The Poor’ to 
transform their societies. Not even the best-intentioned NGOs are exempt from the 
tendency of the Development Industry to ignore, misinterpret, displace, supplant, or 
undermine the capacities that people already have”, p.633.  
 
 In alignment with Eade ’s foregoing remarks, Freire (2000, p. 45) suggests (in his 
classic work toward the liberation of the oppressed) that true generosity consists 
precisely in fighting to destroy the causes which nourish false charity. False charity 
constrains the fearful and subdued, the "rejects of life," to extend their trembling hands. 
True generosity lies in striving so that these hands—whether of individuals or entire 
peoples—need be extended less and less in supplication so that more and more they 
become human hands which work and, working, transform the world.  And relatedly, 
Gill (2002, p. 315) concedes when he asserts that “empowerment is literally giving 
people power.” Gill further asserts that empowerment is about making people able to 
do what needs to be done and that in practice, empowerment is about giving people 
knowledge, skills, opportunity, freedom, self-confidence and resources to manage 
themselves and be accountable. Gill further points out that important aspects of 
empowerment include stimulating people’s intellects and imagination, in particular, 
their creativity in the change process.  
 
 A read across foregoing CCB literature presents a number of common grounds 
between authors. It emerges that the main purpose of CCB is empowerment whose 
ultimate result is people gaining mastery over their lives and their environment. 
However, as an array of authors noted, there is a big disparity between the continuing 
high-level rhetoric about CCB and realities on the ground, with many purported CCB 
actors ignorant and therefore not even able to grasp what true CCB entails, requires and 
what their intended outcomes should be looking like. It also emerged that at the core of 
empowerment is the transfer of power, a process which can be likened to using one 
torch of fire to light up many other torches without this original torch losing its fire. 
Empowerment doesn’t, therefore, mean emptying oneself of power but sharing the 
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power. And as noted by Eade (2007), capacity building is not an exclusively Southern 
need, and Northern actors including Northern NGOs need to evaluate their own 
limitations in this aspect. Inability and or unwillingness to do this will lead to the 
continued undermining of existing people’s capacities in the South, a process that 
frustratingly leads to botched and non-sustainable development results.  
 
2.4.3 Community Capacity Building For DRR 
In their paper titled ‘local DRR in Latin America urban areas,’ Hardoy et al. (2011, 
p. 401) reflect that “it is at the local or neighbourhood level that disasters happen, lives 
and livelihoods are lost, houses and infrastructure are damaged or destroyed, and 
health and education compromised.” In a corroborative work titled “Why is community 
action needed for disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation?,” 
Satterthwaite (2011, p. 340) explains that when disasters happen, the speed and 
effectiveness of response depends very heavily on local organizations that represent the 
needs of those most impacted and most vulnerable. Satterthwaite further explains that 
it is also at the local level that many of the disaster risks can be addressed before 
disasters occur. Satterthwaite argues that local DRR action is best constituted of 
partnerships between local government, communities and civil society.  
In the aforementioned paper titled ‘local DRR in Latin America urban areas,’ 
Hardoy et al. (2011) acknowledge that disaster risk reduction is a development issue 
best addressed locally with community involvement as an integral part of local 
development. However, Hardoy and team also observe that there are many constraints 
and realities that complicate the attainment of this ideal. They strongly argue that “in 
order to be effective, disaster risk reduction has to be driven locally and must include 
the involvement of communities at risk as well as local governments.” And in agreement, 
van Niekerk and Coetzee (2012) observe that “in essence, communities remain the most 
important element in understanding how disaster risk and vulnerability are created and 
how it can be reduced because they are the once’s most affected.”  
In concert with foregoing views, Pandey and Okazaki (2005) demand that the  
emphasis of disaster management efforts should focus on communities and the people 
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who live in them. They argue that “unless the disaster management efforts are 
sustainable at individual and community level, it is difficult to reduce the losses and scale 
of the tragedy.” And while Hardoy et al. (2011) argue that disaster risk reduction needs 
to be community driven to be sustained over the long term, that actions must respond 
to local needs and possibilities and that they should address multiple problems at the 
same time, they also make yet another critical observation. In sync with Satterthwaite, 
they (Hardoy et al) observe that “community driven” does not necessarily mean that 
the actions are designed and promoted by the community alone, but rather, working 
together in association with local governments and other local actors.  
Hardoy and team’s views on the need to enhance ‘community-driven’ DRR 
resonate with veteran development practice scholars including Chambers (1998), Eade 
(1997), and McKnight and Kretzmann (1997)---who argue that development must start 
from within the community, for communities cannot be developed from the top down, 
or from the outside. These veteran scholars all assert that communities have never been 
built upon their deficiencies; rather, community development has always depended 
upon mobilizing the capacities and assets of a people and a place. Therefore, every effort 
that helps to break the bankrupt top-down approach to local DRR action eventually 
contributes to the much needed CCB4DRR.  
A read across various literature including Hardoy et al. (2011), Satterthwaite 
(2011), Carcellar et al. (2011), Davidson et al. (2007), and Weru (2004) indicate that local 
DRR action takes place in two different but inter-related settings; the two settings 
being the ‘rural’ and ‘urban’ settings. Relatedly, in his work titled “Managing Disasters, 
Involving Communities” where he shows the importance and advantages of community-
based disaster risk management, Parkash (2013, p. 32) observes that “although disaster 
mitigation has gained increasing credence in the recent past, most efforts tend to focus 
towards disaster management of populated and built areas, while hazards in remote and 
unpopulated areas are neglected.”  
And a read across Van Niekerk et al. (2018),   Matthies (2017),  Initiatives (2017), 
Chhoun (2016) Ranmuthugala et al. (2013), CATHERINE Fitzgibbon and ALEXANDRA 
Crosskey (2013) ,  Parkash (2013), van Riet and van Niekerk (2012),   van Niekerk and 
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Coetzee (2012), Shaw (2012b),    CORDAID and IIRR (2011), De Jode and Tilstone (2011), 
IFRC (2009), and John Twigg (2004a) reveals that much of the CCB4DRR is effected 
through an approach dubbed “Community-Based Disaster Risk Management,”---
shorted to CBDRM.   
In his panel remarks on CBDRM to the OSCE Economic and Environmental Forum, 
Krummacher (2014) reflected that “over the past two decades, the concept of 
Community-Based Disaster Risk Management (CBDRM) has emerged and is now 
generally recognised in the fields of disaster preparedness and mitigation, and 
increasingly also in disaster response and recovery.”  
And to trace its roots, how did the CMDRR/CBDRM concept and or journey 
begin? Maskrey (2011) observes that “at the time of the 1984 Ocho Rios Conference, 
the bibliography on CBDRM was frugal, to say the very least. And while pioneering NGOs 
in Africa, Asia, the Caribbean and Latin America were implementing projects and 
programmes at the community level, it was unusual for these to be systematically 
documented and even rarer to be explicitly described as CBDRM.” 
And according to Van Niekerk et al. (2018), Levinson (2017) and  Gaillard and 
Gomez (2015), the emergence of CMDRR/CBDRM approaches are rooted in critical 
research reflections which pointed out that for too long have communities been used 
as inputs to the research cycle and not treated as part of the knowledge creation 
process.  It is this general reflection on the role of communities in the ‘knowledge 
creation process’ that eventually influenced disaster researchers on the need to 
reconsider the role of communities in the entire disaster management practice.  
In their paper on CBDRM, Van Niekerk et al. (2018) explain that “emerging from 
the 1980s, a shift in focus occurred in the management of disasters and also the role of 
communities within civil protection and disaster (risk) management. A growing 
realization from researchers and practitioners alike occurred, that a greater 
understanding of the dynamics of vulnerabilities, hazardous exposure and resilience can 
only be gained if the knowledge creation process is seated within, and by those effected. 
Local knowledge and culture need to be respected, and indigenous and scientific 
knowledge need not be mutually exclusive. However, limited resources, capacities and 
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technical abilities hamper random and spontaneous community-based disaster risk 
management (CBDRM). Therefore, outside intervention is still needed in most cases.”  
Relatedly, in a work titled “Overview of Community-Based Disaster Risk 
Reduction,” Shaw (2012a) explains that  community-based disaster-related activities 
have been termed differently over time. He shows that more than a century 100 ago, 
before the existence of most of the states, people or communities were taking care of 
themselves through collective actions during disaster situations. And after the formation 
of state, government-based disaster risk reduction programs started, which failed to 
serve the needs of the people and communities. Shaw observes that for the past 20–30 
years, we have been again talking about the need for community-based disaster risk 
reduction (CBDRR).  
Shaw, therefore, argues that “a culture of DRR exists in all communities…the 
community-based approach is not new. Rather, we are going back to the old and 
traditional approaches of risk reduction. CBDM had been a popular term in later 1980s 
and 1990s, which gradually evolved to community-based disaster risk management 
(CBDRM), and then to CBDRR. CBDRM and CBDRR are often used with similar meaning, 
with enhanced focus on ‘risk’; however, there still exists a thin line of distinction.” Shaw 
explains that “while CBDRR focuses more on pre-disaster activities for risk reduction by 
the communities, CBDRM focuses a broader perspective of risk-reduction-related 
activities by communities, both during, before, and after the disaster.” 
In regard to the question of “what is CBDRM?”, Van Niekerk et al. (2018), 
Krummacher (2014), Shaw (2012a), and Abarquez and Murshed (2004) agree on the 
common ingredients of CDBRM. They describe CBDRM as a process of disaster risk 
management in which at-risk communities are actively engaged in the identification, 
analysis, treatment, monitoring and evaluation of disaster risks in order to reduce their 
vulnerabilities and enhance their capacities. This means that the people are at the heart 
of decision making and implementation of disaster risk management activities. A 
CBDRM approach responds to local problems and needs, capitalizes on local knowledge 
and expertise, improves the likelihood of sustainability through genuine ‘ownership’, 
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strengthens community technical and organizational capacities, and empowers people 
by enabling them to tackle these and other challenges. It is about listening to people. 
 Van Niekerk et al. (2018) assert that in CBDRM, “community empowerment and 
ownership through, and of the process is key.” And Shaw and Goda (2004) emphasize 
that “CBDRM is culture and context specific, and therefore, cannot be successfully 
implemented by “outsiders”. In CBDRM, local knowledge and trust becomes very 
important.”  
In a feature article titled “Managing Disasters: Involving Communities,” Parkash 
(2013) answers the question of “Why Community-Based Disaster Risk Management?” 
by first presenting five shortcomings of the dominant top-down DRR approach, followed 
by seven advantages of CBDRM.  The five shortcomings of the top-down DRR approach 
include: 1. “The same plan, regardless of the regional characteristics, is implemented or 
imposed everywhere; 2. Local knowledge, experiences, skills, resources and techniques 
are not given due importance. Rather external resources and techniques are proposed to 
be utilised; 3. Negligence about local cultural instincts and heritage; 4. Prioritisation is 
decided by an outsider and not the stakeholders or the community itself; 5. Local 
community does not have any information about the disaster management plans for 
their area and the role of different sectors in helping the community during disasters.”  
In addition to the aforementioned five shortcomings of the dominant top-down 
approach to DRR, Parkash identifies and shares the following seven advantages of 
CBDRM, as a rallying call to increase the adoption of CBDRM: “1. Feelings of coordination 
and self-belonging to the society are developed; 2. Local geo-climatic and socio-cultural 
characteristics get the attention of people in development and disaster management; 3. 
Local initiatives begin, and the community provides assistance to executing agencies 
involved in disaster management; 4. There is exchange of knowledge, information, skills 
and techniques between the community and the experts involved from outside; 5. 
Community comes forward to put forward its ideas for selection of appropriate 
programmes suitable to their locality and society; 6. Community can monitor the quality 
of works being done in its locality. It will also generate a sense of responsibility among 
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the community; 7. It will lead to capacity building of the community on issues of disaster-
safe developmental activities.”  
The more reason Walter (2004) asserts that during slow-onset crises such as 
drought, there are rural communities that have developed extraordinary capacities to 
cope and bounce back. However, top-down approaches by most agencies are 
undermining this local resilience. Corroborating Walter’s view, Pelling (2007a) observes 
that too often, local initiative and capacities continue to be overlooked during external 
interventions. 
Relatedly, while writing and making the case for the need for wider adoption of 
CBDRM, Pandey and Okazaki (2005) reflect that “while different community 
empowerment programmes related to disaster mitigation have achieved their 
objectives, they are often short term, and issues on sustainability in these efforts are 
rarely addressed. Government, non-government and international organizations 
implement various programmes before and after the disasters. Most of them are very 
successful during the project period, but gradually diminish as the years pass. There are 
many reasons for this kind of phenomena, however, lack of effective participation and 
capacity building of local communities to pursue the program remain major factors for 
lack of sustainability.”  
In their “Field Practitioners’ Handbook for CBDRM’, Abarquez and Murshed 
(2004) outline seven steps in the CBDRM process. These steps include:  
i. Selecting the community 
ii. Rapport building and understanding the community 
iii. Participatory disaster risk assessment 
iv. Participatory disaster risk management planning 
v. Building and training a community disaster risk management organization 
vi. Community-managed implementation 
vii. Participatory monitoring and evaluation. 
With all its good intentions though, CBDRM doesn’t come and go without facing 
challenges. In her review of the CBDRM practice for Nepal, Laursen (2015) observed that 
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while CBDRM began in the 1980s and 1990s as an alternative to the top–down 
approaches which were dominant at the time, even with CBDRM, there are still top-
down huddles with related stakeholder engagement. Laursen observes that until 1950, 
Nepal was a closed country. And when it opened up, the country began receiving foreign 
aid and many of the DRR programs in Nepal are donor driven. Laursen identified two 
things that make what would have been a community-driven CBDRM project to be a 
donor-driven project: the project’s time period and content of the project.  
Laursen reflected that “from the CBDRM program I looked at, NSET had prepared 
a proposal of activities, which the donor accepted. This is a normal procedure among 
most donor-driven programs. The problem is, however, that there is not much room for 
the community to influence the content of the program, which, in turn, impedes the 
community’s actual participation. As several disaster committee members informed me, 
they had ongoing ideas for different activities. But, as Bhagawan explained: ‘We have 
requested NSET that certain such trainings will be very useful for us and out of all 
suggestions, and they have their own idea about what suggestion is, what trainings are 
needed here, as for example mason training that was their idea not ours, and we are 
pressing them for first aid training, rescue team training, exedra, but technically they 
are the very experts so they design the training, they design the survey and we accepted 
it, we accepted because they are experts.’” 
  Laursen laments that there is, therefore, an understanding that experts– 
because of the mere fact that they are experts–know best. In addition, because the 
content of the program is already fixed, which according to NSET is necessary for a donor 
to accept the proposal, it is not possible to change the activities. The community is 
therefore not included in the decision-making process for the content of the program. 
And on sad note, Laursen concludes that “CBDRM in Kathmandu Valley is not 
straightforward.” This anecdote from Nepal cannot be taken as a standalone experience 
and left to isolation. This is the actual frontline practitioners’ reality. The devils of top-
down DRM practice continue to haunt and harass good intentioned CBDRM approaches.  
Annexe 1 (which is an excerpt from Pandey and Okazaki (2005, pp. 6-7) provides a 
good example of a multi-country CBDRM project. This is a school earthquake safety 
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initiative which aimed at “Reducing Vulnerability of School Children to Earthquakes”. 
The project was supported jointly between United Nations Centre for Regional 
Development (UNCRD) and the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA) 
in Asia-Pacific region. And the project which was implemented in Fiji Islands, India, 
Indonesia and Uzbekistan included retrofitting of school building in a participatory way 
with the involvement of local communities, local governments and resource institutions; 
and trainings on safer construction practices to technicians, and disaster education in 
school and communities. 
A review across Gaillard and Mercer (2013); Robertua (2013); UNISDR 
(2013a);UNISDR (2013b); Benicchio (2012); Djalante et al. (2012); Izumi and Shaw 
(2012); van Riet and van Niekerk (2012); Hagelsteen and Becker (2012); Scott and 
Tarazona (2011); J Twigg and Bottomley (2011); Kent (2011); Pelling (2007a); UNDP 
(2004) ; Walter (2004); Walter (2002); and Walter (2001)---much of which researched 
and written during the HFA tenure reveals consensus among these authors that while 
there continues to be a growing interest and focus on DRR, poor local capacity for DRR 
remains a major impediment to making required progress. And thus while the CBDRM 
movement is still growing, it is still minimal given its total required global footprint, and 
where it is growing, it still faces the top-down challenges, like indicated in the Laursen’s 
account on Nepal.  
 
Knowing that towards the closure of HFA UNISDR (2013b) reported that while 
there already existed some community participation in DRR, this participation remained 
low compared to the potential it has got to grow, there is urgent need to address the 
gap between global DRR agendas, national level policies and strategies and local level 
risk reduction activities. Based on this increased realization, there’s a need to advocate 
in the early years of SFDRR to ensure that ‘local DRR action’ especially the CMDRR and 
CBDRM good practices get moved from the current state of low prioritisation to the fore 
of the global DRR agenda. And going by Ijaz’s emphasis that ‘what gets measured gets 
done’ (Ijaz et al., 2012), bringing local DRR action and its highly recommended CBDRM 
and CMDRR good practices from current state low prioritisation to the fore should not 
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be considered complete till adequate mechanisms have been put in place to both 
measure and report on progress being made.  
 
 
2.4.3.1 The origins and role of institutional donors and INGOs in CCB4DRR 
According to Khan and Shaw (2015), paradigm shifts have occurred in the 
understanding of disasters which consequently influenced the evolution of disaster 
management theory. Relatedly, according to Madu and Kuei (2017), Khan and Shaw 
(2015) and Abarquez and Murshed (2004), disasters are no longer seen as extreme 
events created entirely by natural forces but also as manifestations of unresolved 
problems of development. The more reason Khan and Shaw (2015) assert that “it is now 
recognised that risks (physical, social and economic) unmanaged or mismanaged for a 
long time lead to disasters.  
 
And that is why Khan and Shaw (2015) and Sudmeier-Rieux et al. (2013) agree 
on the fact that there is a growing awareness that disaster risk reduction cannot be 
separated from pressing concerns of sustainable development, poverty reduction, social 
equity and environmental protection. The foregoing views are corroborated by Collins 
(2018) who argues that it is now common knowledge that disaster events impact on 
development possibilities, and this calls for the application of DRR to sustainable 
development. Collins further observes that this is the sole reason the SF4DRR is 
recognized as a driver for achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).  
 
Reflections therefore indicate that it is this growing realisation that disasters are 
a consequence of unsolved development problems that has translated traditional 
institutional donors who used to fund northern INGO-initiated development 
programmes (in developing and less developed countries) that resulted in the paradigm 
shift. It is a paradigm shift where the same donors are now channelling a portion of usual 
development assistance funding to the same INGOs to address disaster risk 
management issues in developing countries.  
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For instance, in their work titled “Disaster Risk Reduction Approaches in 
Pakistan”, Khan and Shaw (2015, p. 281) report that ‘non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) play a vital role in disaster risk reduction…This goal of development and 
resilience community can be achieved through contribution of NGOs in those sectors 
where government pays less attention or has least resources.”  And in a section of the 
same work titled “NGOs Funding in Pakistan”, Khan and Shaw reflect that “even though 
the work done by the NGOs is for the development and social uplift of local 
communities, there is almost no support provided by the federal or local governments. 
Almost all of the funding is by international donor agencies…Donors publish 
advertisements calling for Proposals. In response to that, NGOs submit project 
proposals…Several multilateral and bilateral donors are involved in DRM work in 
Pakistan…The guidelines for NGO operations and activities are generally provided by 
donors/funding agencies.”  
 
A critical review of Khan and Shaw’s foregoing reflections shows that donors and 
INGOs are filling a gap left by either lack of government focus on local level development 
challenges and or lack of government capacity to address the same challenges.   And in 
their study titled “Financing Disaster Risk Reduction: a 20 year  story of international 
aid,” Kellett and Caravani (2013) highlight that “funding for DRR comes broadly from 
two interconnected sources: funding direct from donor nations and funding that is 
managed by a variety of development banks; and funding mechanisms and 
implementing agencies.”  
 
This once again makes it clear that institutional donors and their implementing 
agencies who in most cases are the INGOs and host governments have a critical place in 
directing in-country DRR agendas. Field experience shows that apart from the disaster-
prone communities, the most important DRR actors in many developing countries are 
institutional donors and INGOs, followed by host governments that are responsible for 
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creating a conducive DRM working environment including addressing DRM governance 
issues, policies, strategies and all required frameworks.  
While Khan and Shaw (2015) observe that “donor support is imperative to ensure 
strengthening of DRR and climate change adaptation measures”, they also observe that 
in the past “outside support has been a low priority for DRR…Only 1% of total reported 
official humanitarian assistance to Pakistan between 2005-2009 was allocated to 
disaster prevention and preparedness.”  Khan and Shaw further indicate that in recent 
years, DRR has gained great prominence and international recognition through global 
initiatives like the Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR) and the 
UN International Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction (ISDRR).  
 
The aforementioned Pakistan donor and INGO engagement in DRR at all levels 
within the country is simply a case that represents many other developing countries. 
For instance, writing on the Philippines’ CBDRM experience as part of their work on 
“Partnerships for Disaster Reduction in South East Asia,” Torrente et al. (2008, p. 27) 
report that “agencies such as World Vision, Caritas-Manila and the Philippine Relief and 
Development Services have integrated CBDM into their existing emergency services. At 
present, there are a number of NGOs--both local and international who have adopted 
the CBDRM principles. Aside from those mentioned, the others who are doing successful 
CBDRM as part of their socio-economic programs and projects are Plan International, 
International Organization for Migration, Christian Aid, and Oxfam, among others. The 
bilateral and multilateral donors have likewise been actively supporting CBDRM with 
their financial and technical assistance.”  
 Torrente et al. (2008) further assert that intrinsic in most of CBDRM initiatives is 
the deliberate effort to build and strengthen cooperation and networking among 
concerned stakeholders: the beneficiaries, community-based organizations, national 
and local governments, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), donor community, 
and on a limited scale, the private sector. And in his work titled “Revisiting community-
based disaster risk management”,  Maskrey (2011) observes that because of the 
traditional role played by INGOs in the development sector, “it is probably not 
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coincidental that Community Based Disaster Mitigation heavily emphasized the 
potential role of NGOs as supporters of CBDRM.” Maskrey therefore concludes that “a 
key factor in the adoption of CBDRM has certainly been the uptake by international 
NGOs such as OXFAM, CARE, ActionAid, Tear- fund as well as by the International 
Federation of the Red Cross.  
To conclude this sub-section, it’s clear that it was the emergence of a paradigm 
shift in the understanding of disasters which consequently influenced the evolution of 
the disaster management theory. And part of the evolved theory is that disasters are no 
longer taken as extreme events created entirely by natural forces but now viewed as 
manifestations of unresolved problems of development. And when lead development 
practitioners, especially intuitional donors and INGOs that depended on each other to 
respectively fund and implement programmes in developing countries realised that 
sustainable development is not achievable without complementary community-driven 
DRR through the CBDRM methodologies; the same symbiotic developments actors 
gradually adopted CBDRM as a critical element of  their community focused 
developmental   approaches.  
 
Thus because of the traditional role of institutional donors and INGOs in the 
development sector especially within developing countries, the global adoption of 
community-driven DRR as a driver for sustainable development  meant that by virtue of 
their place in the development sector, institutional donors and INGOs would therefore 
organically become key drivers of CBDRM and its ingrained CCB4DRR in all respective 
target countries. It may be a slow process, but the movement has steadily grown. 
 
 
2.4.4 Community Capacity Building For DRR in Kenya 
It is worth noting that a complimentary detailed background to this sub-section 
is provided under section 2.3 and its sub-sections 2.3.1, 2.3.2, 2.3.3 and 2.3.4 which 
present the country’s generic profile, followed by the country’s disaster risk profile, 
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followed by the country’s disaster risk management framework, and lastly the DRR 
footprint among Kenya’s relief and development partners.  
This researcher though it best to partly review the state of the country’s 
CCB4DRR by firstly identifying what the country’s (phased-out) HFA reports had 
indicated about CCB4DRR.  The following collection of statements by Mondoh (2013) in 
his report on Kenya’s national progress in the implementation of HFA (2011-2013), 
provide clues (thus  not details) to the state of community capacity building for DRR in 
the country: 
 
 Attempts at creating awareness on preventive risk reduction have been 
conducted. However, due to limited resources…, such initiatives do not get to 
a level where they can be put to practice or implemented. 
 Do post-disaster programmes explicitly incorporate and budget for DRR for 
resilient recovery? No. 
 Contingency planning for major hazards is not yet fully institutionalized in Kenya. 
Subnational structures still lack the technical capacity to develop or implement 
contingency plans. 
 Are there identified means and sources to convey local and community 
experience or traditional knowledge in disaster risk reduction? No 
 The challenge at the moment is the centralized national nature of disaster risk 
reduction institutions with limited capacities to address community-level 
challenges in risk reduction. 
 DRM governance has not fully been devolved to local communities in Kenya 
save for ad hoc efforts mostly by the Non-Governmental Organizations. 
 The challenge here has been the ‘response-oriented mindset’ among 
humanitarian agencies and institutions, government, communities and even 
donor agencies.  There has been much concentration at allocating resources to 
response programs but little towards long-term risk reduction. 
 
While the HFA has since been phased out and succeeded by the Sendai 
Framework for DRR (SF4DRR), Kenya’s HFA assessment reports are invaluable in 
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providing an excellent baseline upon which to measure successive progress especially 
on identified areas of growth which include the much needed support to local DRR 
action, including CCB4DRR.  
Apart from CCB4DRR anecdotes rendered by the HFA reports, what else do we 
know about the state of Kenya’s local DRR action including CCB4DRR? In a revealing 
report titled “Tracking Sub-National Government Investments in Disaster Risk Reduction 
in Kenya”, Owino (2019) reflects that Kenya’s capacity to manage disaster risk is partly 
constrained by a lack of deliberate action towards proactive disaster risk 
management. Owino reports that in an evaluation of drought responses between 1999 
and 2001 indicates that only US$171 million would have been spent on relief responses 
instead of double that amount had the country put in place appropriate mitigation and 
preparedness measures.  
The more reason why in their report titled “Political Will for Disaster Reduction: 
What Incentives Build It, And Why Is It So Hard To Achieve?”, Ben Wisner et al. (2011) 
point out that one of the challenges of attracting political good will for DRR stems from 
the fact that because the success of good DRR is measured by way of disaster loses that 
are NOT incurred, the resultant absence of a crisis or loss does not grab headlines or win 
votes. For many a politician world-over, it is sensationalism that brings in the votes. And 
Scott and Tarazona (2011) concede that local politicians engage more in disaster 
response than risk reduction, as they perceive that a quick response will be more likely 
to win favorable publicity and, ultimately, votes.  
And corroborating this view, Schipper and Pelling (2006) assert that “the low 
visibility of disaster risk reduction work in comparison to emergency relief has made it 
unattractive for governments chasing votes and international recognition and for non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) dependent on disasters for funding”. Schipper and 
Pelling argue that “when countries declare a state of emergency, international funds are 
more easily available, and blame gets placed on the hazard, rather than on the 
conditions of vulnerability that have resulted from, for example, poor governance and 
corruption, unchecked neo-liberal development policies and marginalisation of the 
poor.” 
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And in concert with foregoing views, UNDP (2019) asserts that “despite the 
exposure to recurrent natural and human-induced hazards in Kenya, her disaster 
management strategy has largely remained reactive. The Government is often 
compelled to re-direct development resources to address emergency response and 
reconstruction needs at the expense of development programmes.” It is this lack of 
deliberate action towards proactive disaster risk management in the country, therefore, 
that continues to constrain the desired shift from key stakeholder overspending on 
disaster response to pre-disaster investments in resilience-building DRR actions. And 
CCB4DRR is an integral part of resilience-building DRR.  
 
As already presented in the sub-section titled “DRR Footprint among 
Government of Kenya Partners”, to gain more information on the DRR footprint in 
Kenya, a review of web-based secondary data of 17 International Non-Governmental 
Agencies (INGOs), 5 UN agencies and 7 bilateral donor agencies was conducted. Based 
on their online presence, all reviewed INGOs, UN agencies and bilateral donors indicate 
engagement with DRR at various levels and in different forms across the country. This 
engagement is presented in the “what we do”, “focus”, and “projects” tabs; while for 
some, it is woven into their online strategy papers, stories and reports. There is, 
therefore, sufficient evidence to suggest that almost every international relief and 
development partner with the Government of Kenya is in one way or another involved 
in supporting DRR practice in the country.  
 
However, across this online review, there was little found on how reviewed 
Government of Kenya relief and development partners are engaged in supporting and 
or promoting community capacity building for DRR. Findings from this web-based 
secondary data review of the aforementioned agencies, therefore, corroborate with 
statements presented by Mondoh (2013) in his report on Kenya’s national progress in 
the implementation of HFA (2011-2013). Evidently, there is a big gap between national 
level DRR achievements and local level DRR execution in the country.   
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2.5 Conclusion from Literature Review (Key Gaps) 
 
 
This literature review unveiled a gap between policy rhetoric and grass-root or 
local level execution realities on critical development issues including but not limited to 
community capacity building and empowerment. And progress in the implementation 
of the already wrapped up 2005-2015 HFA did not demonstrate the exception to these 
gap realities, hence poor local capacity for DRR remains probably the biggest 
impediment to making required global DRR progress.  
 
While the literature identified ‘poor local capacity for DRR’ as a major 
impediment to the global DRR agenda and highlighted ‘top-down approaches’ which for 
long have dominated DRR domain to be partly responsible for this poor local capacity 
for DRR and related action, the literature also noted the advent of an alternative to the 
top-down DRR approach, known as CBDRM, which advocates for community-driven 
DRR.  
 
Given that examples of long-term strengthening of local communities for DRR 
remain uncommon (UNDP (2004), that the growing CBDRM practice is still faced with 
traditional top-down challenges as witnessed the case of Nepal (Laursen, 2015), that 
much of the available literature on CBDRM is from South America and East Asia with a 
handful from Africa, and with van Niekerk and Coetzee (2012) reporting that “individual 
countries and respective regions in Africa were (by 2012) still struggling to put the 
required governance and institutional arrangements in place to facilitate an 
empowering environment for risk reduction at community level,” it becomes important 
to investigate the current state of CCB4DRR in especially high disaster risk countries, 
including Kenya.   
 
And given aforementioned teething challenges with the still growing community-
driven DRR approaches, it is also important to identify the most successful community-
driven DRR cases in Africa (and other regions) and analyze factors and or concepts which 
were adopted that contributed to the stellar success of these case studies for wider 
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sharing. A presentation of both supportive concepts and negating factors to local DRR 
action will equip related DRR stakeholders ranging from donors, national and sub-
national governments, INGOs, local NGOs and local communities themselves with 
knowledge on enablers and disablers of local DRR action, thus identifying areas for 
critical emphasis especially as we continue with the Sendai Framework for DRR. Heeding 
professional advice from White (2006) who asserts that “you cannot conquer what you 
do not confront, and you cannot confront what you do not identify,” the aims, objectives 
and research questions in the ensuing research were, therefore, framed to address the 
key gaps that have been identified. 
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3 CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
(RM) 
3.1 Introduction to Research Methodology 
 
Kothari (2004, p. 8) describes Research Methodology (RM) as “a way to 
systematically solve the research problem, and in it, we learn the various steps adopted 
by the researcher in studying the research problem along with the logic behind them.” 
Remenyi (1998) asserts that RM is the procedural framework within which the research 
is conducted, while Jonker and Pennink (2010) describe RM as a domain or a map and 
refer to a method as a set of steps to travel between two places on the map.  
 
And according to Wahyuni (2012, p. 72), RM   “refers to a model to conduct 
research within the context of a particular paradigm; and comprises underlying sets of 
beliefs that guide a researcher to choose one set of research methods over another.” 
Similarly,  Dainty (2008, p. 3) explains that in social inquiry, RM “refers to far more than 
the methods adopted and encompasses the rationale and philosophical assumptions 
underlying a particular study.” 
 
3.2 Research Philosophy and Research Paradigms  
Research philosophy is an overarching term relating to the development of 
knowledge and the nature of that knowledge (M. Saunders, 2012, p. 127). Research 
paradigms address the philosophical dimensions of social sciences (Wahyuni, 2012, p. 
69), and like any human action, research is implicitly or explicitly grounded on 
philosophical perspectives (Amaratunga & Baldry, 2001, p. 95). Whilst philosophical 
backgrounds usually remain implicit in most research, they affect the research practice 
(Wahyuni, 2012, p. 69). Andrade (2009, p. 43) notes that “researchers’ basic beliefs and 
worldviews lie behind their theoretical perspectives.” Guba (1994) corroborates 
Andrade’s view and urges the need for researchers to make explicit both their 
ontological and epistemological assumptions before embarking on any research project. 
Following these suggestions, various research paradigms are discussed below to help 
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justify the theoretical assumptions and fundamental beliefs underpinning this particular 
research.  
 
According to M. N. Saunders et al. (2011), Kalof et al. (2008) and Laughlin (1995), 
the two main philosophical dimensions to distinguish existing research paradigms are 
ontology and epistemology.  The two relate to the nature of knowledge and the 
development of that knowledge, respectively.  
 
3.2.1 Ontology, Epistemology & Axiology 
According to M. Saunders (2012, p. 149), there are three major ways or branches 
of thinking about philosophy, namely: ontology, epistemology and axiology. Ontology is 
the view of how one perceives a reality (Dainty (2008); Wahyuni (2012). It relates to the 
nature of reality, that is, what things, if any, have existence or whether reality is “the 
product of one’s mind” (Burrell & Morgan, 1979, p. 1). The researcher’s view of reality 
(ontological view) is the cornerstone to all other assumptions, that is, what is assumed 
here determines the researcher’s other assumptions (Holden & Lynch, 2004, p. 5). The 
second assumption, epistemology, is the beliefs on the way to generate, understand and 
use the knowledge that is deemed to be acceptable and valid (Wahyuni, 2012). It is the 
study of the nature of knowledge, that is, how is it possible, if it is, for us to gain 
knowledge of the world? (Hughes & Sharrock, 1980). Epistemology is therefore 
concerned with the nature, validity, and limits of inquiry (Rosenau, 1991).   
 
Answering the ontological question, “what is the form and nature of reality, and 
therefore, what is there that can be known about it” is the first step in defining how the 
researcher may approach a research problem (Guba & Lincoln, 1994, p. 108). Because 
ontological views influence epistemological assumptions (Holden & Lynch, 2004, p. 3), 
the epistemological question, “what is the nature of the relationship between the 
knower or would-be knower and what can be known” (Guba & Lincoln, 1994, p. 108) 
must be answered in a consistent way with the ontological view. 
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 In addition to the first two fundamental research philosophies (ontology and 
epistemology), two other beliefs that affect the way to investigate reality are ‘axiology’ 
and ‘methodology’. Axiology is a branch of philosophy that studies judgements about 
values and in particular focuses on the researcher’s view of the role of values in research 
(M. Saunders, 2012, pp. 137, 140). Methodology refers to a model for undertaking a 
research process in the context of a particular paradigm (Wahyuni, 2012, pp. 69-70). 
Table 3.1 below provides a summary of the fundamental beliefs and how they relate 
with research paradigms. 
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3.2.2 Research Philosophies in Social Sciences 
Table 3.1: Summary of Fundamental Research Philosophies-(Source: Sounders: 2012, 140) 
 
 Research Paradigms 
Fundamental 
Beliefs 
Pragmatism Positivism 
(Naïve realism) 
Realism Interpretivism 
(Constructivism) 
Ontology: the 
researcher’s view of 
the nature of reality 
or being. 
External, multiple, view chosen 
to best enable answering of the 
research question. 
External, objective and independent 
of social actors. 
Is objective. Exists independently of 
human thoughts and beliefs or 
knowledge of their existence (realist), 
but is interpreted through social 
conditioning (critical realist). 
Socially constructed, 
subjective, may change, 
multiple. 
Epistemology: 
the researcher’s view 
regarding what 
constitutes 
acceptable 
knowledge 
Either or both observable 
phenomena and subjective 
meanings can provide 
acceptable knowledge 
dependent upon the research 
question. Focus on practical 
applied research, integrating 
different perspectives to help 
interpret the data. 
Only observable phenomena can 
provide credible data, facts. Focus 
on causality and law-like 
generalizations, reducing 
phenomena to simplest elements. 
Observable phenomena provide 
credible data, facts. Insufficient data 
means inaccuracies in sensations (direct 
realism). Alternatively, phenomena 
create sensations which are open to 
misinterpretation (critical realism). 
Focus on explaining within a context or 
contexts. 
Subjective meanings and 
social phenomena. Focus 
upon the details of the 
situation, a reality behind 
these details, subjective 
meanings and motivating 
actions.  
Axiology: the 
researcher’s view of 
the role of values in 
research 
Value plays a large role in 
interpreting results, the 
researcher adopting both 
objective and subjective points 
of view.  
Value-free and etic. Research is 
undertaken in a value-free way; the 
researcher is independent of the 
data and maintains an objective 
stance. 
Research is value-laden; the researcher 
is biased by world views, cultural 
experiences and upbringing. These will 
impact on the research.  
Research is value bound, the 
researcher is part of what is 
being researched, cannot be 
separated and so will be 
subjective. 
Data collection 
techniques most 
often used.  
Mixed or multiple method 
designs, qualitative and 
quantitative.  
Highly structured, large samples, 
measurement, quantitative, but can 
use qualitative.  
Methods chosen must fit the subject 
matter, quantitative or qualitative.  
Small samples, in-depth 
investigations, qualitative.  
Table 3. 1 Summary of Fundamental Research Philosophies-(Source: Sounders: 2012, 140) 
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3.2.3 Philosophical Positioning for this Research 
 
“Institutional donor and INGO support to community capacity building for DRR” 
is the social phenomena to be studied under this research. And the aim of this research 
is to explore and investigate the state of institutional donor and INGO prioritisation to 
supporting community capacity building for DRR (CCB4DRR) in Kenya, and to identify 
and analyse critical factors or good practice concepts behind highly successful CCB4DRR 
initiatives in the country.  To realise the research aim, the researcher had to interact 
with target research participants (donors and INGOs), listen to and capture their 
different narratives, interpret each of their stories and seek to construct meaning from 
every conversation. This was, therefore, a highly subjective research process.  
 
Based on the subjective nature of this research and taking into consideration 
philosophical assumptions presented in Table 3.3, this research (and NOT the 
researcher) identifies itself more with the interpretivism research paradigm and 
therefore takes the posture of an interpretive/constructivist research. The highly 
objective positivism and realism research paradigms were not conducive for this highly 
subjective research.  However, while this research has adopted the interpretivism 
research paradigm, the researcher allies himself more with the pragmatism paradigm 
where a research paradigm is simply chosen to best enable answering of the research 
question. The interpretive/constructivist research paradigm was therefore chosen on 
the basis that it was best suited to answering the research question.  
 
3.3 Research Approach 
M. Saunders (2012) presents 3 research approaches, namely deductive, 
inductive and abductive. When research starts with a theory, often developed from 
reviewing academic literature and the research develops a strategy to test the theory, 
that research would be using a deductive approach. Key characteristics of deductive 
approach include using a structured methodology, following the principle of 
reductionism where problems as a whole are better understood when reduced to the 
simplest possible elements; and careful sample selection to enable generalisation. On 
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the other hand, when research starts by collecting data to explore a phenomenon, and 
one builds up a theory often expressed as a conceptual framework, then one is using an 
inductive approach. The abductive approach combines both deductive and inductive 
approaches, with the purpose of generating either a new or modifying an existing theory 
that may also be subsequently tested through additional data collection. And according 
to M. Saunders (2012, p. 149), no approach is better than the other, they are all better 
at different things, depending on where the research emphasis lies.  
 
The literature reviewed identified poor local capacity for DRR as a major 
impediment to the global DRR agenda and highlighted top-down approaches which 
dominate much of the DRR domain to be partly responsible for this poor local capacity 
for DRR and related action.  The literature, however, did not unveil other hindrances to 
local DRR action nor factors required for successful local DRR action including CCB4DRR. 
Thus both negating and or supportive factors for local DRR action (including CCB4DRR) 
remain largely unidentified, undocumented, unshared and therefore unaddressed. With 
examples of long-term strengthening of local communities for DRR  remaining 
uncommon (UNDP (2004), it is important to investigate reasons for this uncommonness, 
and identify factors responsible for the uncommon successful CCB4DRR when found.  
 
Reflecting on the research questions and objectives, this research sought to 
address more of the ‘why is this happening’ and less of ‘what is happening’. The 
research, therefore, adopted an inductive approach where the process flow started 
with data collection followed by exploring them to identify emerging themes and ended 
with theory building.   
 
3.4 Research Strategy 
A research strategy is “a plan of how a researcher will go about answering a 
research question(s),” and it is the nature of research questions and objectives that 
inform methodological choices and subsequent research strategies (M. Saunders, 2012). 
According to Teddlie and Tashakkori (2009), there are two major research 
methodologies: quantitative and qualitative, and the two are respectively related to 
positivism and interpretivism. A third methodology, referred to as integrated 
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methodology (Cibangu, 2010, p. 178) or multiple methodology (M. Saunders, 2012, p. 
164), can also be adopted, depending on the researcher or research questions.  
 
This, therefore, presents three research design options: quantitative, qualitative 
or multiple method research design. A quantitative research design is generally more 
associated with positivism and deductive approaches, while qualitative research is 
associated with an interpretive philosophy. The integrated/ multiple methodology is 
likely to combine both deductive and inductive approaches (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011; M. 
Saunders, 2012).  According to Creswell and Clark (2007), one methodology may be 
embedded into another, e.g. when quantitative questions are included in an interview 
schedule. Creswell and Clark refer to this as “embedded mixed methods research.”  
 
According to M. Saunders (2012, p. 170), the way a researcher frames research 
questions determines the nature or purpose of the research, and there are three ways 
of looking at this: exploratory, descriptive or explanatory. Exploratory studies ask open 
questions aimed at discovering what is happening to help further understanding. 
Descriptive studies aim at gaining an accurate profile of events. Explanatory research 
aims at studying a situation/ problem in order to explain the relationship between 
valuables.  
 
3.4.1 Types of research strategies, and those not adopted for 
this study 
 
M. Saunders (2012, p. 173) lists eight types of research strategies, namely: 
experiment, survey, archival research, case study, ethnography, action research, 
grounded theory and narrative inquiry. Saunders asserts that experiments and surveys 
are exclusively linked to quantitative design; archival research and case study may 
involve quantitative or qualitative research, or a mixed design combining both. The final 
four strategies are principally linked to a qualitative research design. The following 
narrative explains why most of the above research strategies were not adopted for this 
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research, while the strategy adopted for the research will be discussed in the 
subsequent sub-subsection.  
 
Experiment as a research strategy was not used because it uses a predictive 
hypothesis rather than open research questions that form the core of this research. 
Surveys were not used because they are generally associated with deductive research 
designs, and are good at answering the ‘what’, ‘who’, ‘how much’, and ‘how many’ types 
of questions (M. Saunders, 2012). While document review was one of the data collection 
techniques employed in the research, Archival Research was not adopted as a research 
strategy because of its overreliance on archival records as the main source of data.  
 
Ethnography, which is a research strategy most suited for studying people 
groups in their settings was not deemed appropriate in a study where institutional 
donors and INGOs and successful community DRR projects were the main cases to be 
studied. The purpose of an Action Research strategy is to promote organisational 
learning through identifying issues, planning action, taking and evaluating action, and 
repeating the cycle (M. Saunders, 2012, p. 183). Both the purpose and process of Action 
Research were not found appropriate for research questions identified for this study. 
While the Narrative Inquiry strategy is somewhat similar to in-depth interviews 
employed in qualitative case studies, it (narrative inquiry) is more suited to investigating 
events, and according to (M. Saunders (2012, p. 190), the Narrative Inquiry does not 
have a well-developed set of analytical procedures, thus could make data analysis very 
cumbersome. It is on these two grounds that the Narrative Inquiry strategy was not 
adopted for this research.  
 
3.4.2 Justification for the adopted research strategy 
 
With regard to choosing a research strategy, expert advice from M. Saunders (2009, 
p. 141) observes that “What is most important is not the label that is attached to a 
particular strategy, but whether it will enable you to answer your particular research 
question(s) and meet your objectives. Your choice of research strategy will be guided by 
your research question(s) and objectives, the extent of existing knowledge, the amount 
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of time and other resources you have available, as well as your own philosophical 
underpinnings.” Saunders further observes that “no research strategy is inherently 
superior or inferior to any other.” 
 
Case Study Strategy: according to M. Saunders (2012, p. 179), the case study 
strategy has considerable ability to answer the ‘what’, ‘how’ and ‘why’ types of 
questions and is most often used in exploratory and explanatory research. Since this 
research aimed at exploring and investigating the state of institutional donor and INGO 
prioritisation to supporting community capacity building for DRR (CCB4DRR) in Kenya, 
and to identify and analyse critical factors or good practice concepts behind highly 
successful CCB4DRR initiatives in the country; and the research therefore sought to 
answer the ‘what’, ‘how’ and ‘why’ types of questions, it was deemed appropriate to 
adopt the case study research strategy.  
 
In their seminal research practice work titled ‘Designing Qualitative Research’, 
Marshall and Rossman (2014), argue that “when relying primarily or exclusively on 
qualitative methods, the researcher may be informed by the assumptions or  strategies 
of a variety of qualitative genres…thus blending the genres.” Marshall and Rossman 
further argue that “single-standing genre or not, case studies present many advantages, 
chief among them being the flexibility to incorporate multiple perspectives, data 
collection tools, and interpretive strategies.”  
 
Relatedly, it should be noted that initially, the researcher had initially nurtured 
interest in blending the research strategy genres by adopting the Case Study Strategy 
and adapting it by bringing on board some of the Grounded Theory strategy practices as 
recommended by Andrade (2009). However, after careful examination of the two 
strategies, it emerged that while both are intense and were appropriate in answering 
the research questions, Grounded Theory requires considerable time to master and 
therefore more practical competence (M. Saunders, 2012, pp. 180, 186) which given the 
part-time student’s timelines was not going to be practically possible. It is on this basis 
that the researcher opted to leave out elements of Grounded Theory and stick to Case 
Study Strategy alone.  
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By definition, a case study is a research strategy that explores a research topic or 
phenomenon within a context, or within a number of real-life contexts (M. Saunders, 
2012, p. 179). It is a research strategy focused on gaining a rich understanding of the 
dynamics present within single settings (Amaratunga & Baldry, 2001, p. 99; Eisenhardt, 
1989, p. 534). According to Yin (2014), all case study research starts from the same 
compelling feature: the desire to derive an-up-close or otherwise in-depth 
understanding of a single or small number of “cases” set in their real-world contexts. 
And according to Marshall and Rossman (2014), even though there have been many 
attempts to define the case study, and despite the variations existing among these  
definitions, “the centrality of contextualised deep understanding is recognised almost 
uniformly”. Marshall and Rossman further assert that “case studies favour intensity and 
depth, as well as exploring the interaction between case and context.” The following 
section presents selected units of analysis, rational behind case selection, case 
boundaries and type of case study design. 
 
 
3.4.3 Units of Analysis and Case Boundaries 
 In his seminal work titled “ A Brief Refresher on the Case Study Method’, Yin (2014) 
points out that “when doing contemporary case studies, three steps provide a helpful 
framework for the minimal design work.” Yin lists these three steps as: 1. Defining a 
‘case’; 2. Selecting one of the four types of case study designs; and 3. Using theory in 
design work.  Yin therefore argues that when doing contemporary case studies, the first 
step is to define the “case” that you are studying. He also observes that “even a tentative 
definition helps enormously in organizing your case study.” Yin further points out that 
generally, one should stick with their initial definition because one might have reviewed 
literature or developed research questions specific to this definition.” And this is the 
route which was taken by this study---for the research questions were designed specific 
to case definitions. However, Yin also advises that “a virtue of the case study method is 
the ability to redefine the ‘case’ after collecting some early data. Such shifts should not 
be suppressed.” 
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According to Yin (2014), “a ‘case’ is generally a bounded entity (a person, an 
organization, a behavioural condition, an event, or other social phenomenon), but the 
boundary between the case and its contextual conditions—in both spatial and temporal 
dimensions—may be blurred.” Yin further explains that “the case serves as the main unit 
of analysis in a case study.”  
 
The following sub-section presents the cases (the main units of analysis), 
describes the rationale behind case selection, defines the case boundaries and also 
points which of the four types of case study design represents this research. The 
following sub-section presents selected units of analysis.  
 
3.4.3.1 Selected Units of Analysis  
Guided by expert advice from Yin (2014) who observed that all case study research 
share a compelling and common desire to derive an-up-close or otherwise in-depth 
understanding of a single or small number of cases set in their real-world contexts, the 
research identified and selected cases according to the research questions. For research 
questions 1-4, three case institutional donors and three case INGOs were selected for 
data collection; while for research question number 5, three NGO-supported CCB4DRR 
projects had been selected. However, as a result of the riots and violence that followed 
the annulment of the 2017 presidential elections results in Kenya, the ensuing insecurity 
made it impossible to reach two of the three CCB4DRR projects leaving only one (Yatta’s 
OMO) safe to visit and investigate.   
The following sub-section presents the rationale behind individual case selection.  
 
3.4.3.2 Rationale for Indivual Case Selection  
According to Eisenhardt (1989, p. 537), selecting an appropriate population controls 
extraneous variation and helps to define the limits for generalizing the findings. 
However, this being a theory-building research from would-be selected cases, an 
unusual sampling of cases from the chosen population was adopted. This was 
theoretical sampling, that is, cases were chosen for theoretical and not statistical 
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reasons (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Regarding the actual selection of cases, and as 
recommended by Patton (2002) and Sandelowski (1995) it was important for the 
researcher to choose those cases that would be of most use analytically.  
 
And as indicated in Chapter 5, each case was given pseudonym to help protect the 
case identity during the research process and therefore anonymise the presentation of 
findings. The three INGO cases were anonymised as INGO1, INGO2 and INGO3; while 
the three institutional donor cases were anonymised as Don1, Don2, and Don3. The 
leadership of Yatta’s OMO (the only accessible CCB4DRR project during data collection) 
permitted open presentation and discussion of Yatta’s OMO because they want its 
success to be unveiled.  
 
Starting with institutional cases and ending with the only CCB4DRR case, the 
following paragraphs present brief descriptions rationalising why each case was 
individually selected.  
 
INGO 1 is a humanitarian relief and development organisation that had by Dec 2017 
been working in Kenya for more than 40 years. It has an annual country office budget of 
more than US$ 60 million, works in more than 70% of Kenya’s 47 counties, reached more 
than 1.5million people through direct implementation in 2017---making it one of the 
largest INGOs in the country in terms of budget size, geographic coverage and direct 
population reach through its varied integrated programs. INGO1 was therefore selected 
because she represents the large-sized INGOs working on DRR in the country.  
 
INGO 2 is a humanitarian and development organisation that has worked in Kenya 
since the 1990s, works through partners, and is therefore not a direct implementing 
agency. It has very strong advocacy and influencing agenda with a keen focus on 
‘shifting power’ to local institutions and works in less than 20% of Kenya’s 47 counties. 
Its budget and geographic spread make it fit the middle-sized INGO category in the 
country.  INGO2 was therefore selected to represent middle-sized INGOs engaged in 
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the DRR agenda in the country, and with the added uniqueness of being an NGO that 
would represent INGOs that work through partners.  
INGO 3 is a faith-based INGO that works with partners and uses three integrated 
pillars for its programming. The three pillars include community development, disaster 
relief and rehabilitation, and peace and justice. Through its local partners, INGO 3 
supports people in community groups to work together to overcome illiteracy, 
malnutrition, unemployment, child mortality and injustice. Its budget and geographic 
spread make it fit the small-sized INGO category in the country. INGO3 was therefore 
selected to represent small-sized INGOs engaged with the DRR agenda in the country.  
 
Don1: with an annual development and humanitarian grant contribution of more 
than US$ 90 million to the government of Kenya, Don1 is a European donor that falls 
under the large types of donors in the country. Don1 therefore represents the large 
types of donors engaged in the Kenya’s DRR agenda.  
 
Don2 was selected because she represents unique qualities of being one of the 
donors from the Far East with strong use of technical volunteers deployed to its overseas 
development missions.  
 
Don3: With a published expenditure of about US$ 27million for her Kenya 
Country Programme in 2017, Don3 aims to address poverty, inequality and 
exclusion in an integrated and area-based approach supporting communities and 
government to achieve sustainable and inclusive economic growth. Based on her 
2017 expenditure budget, Don3 was selected to represent the category of 
medium to small-sized donors engaged with the country’s DRR agenda.  
 
Concerning research question # 5 and research objective # 4 which focused on 
identifying the most successful cases of community capacity building for DRR and 
analysing factors and or good practice concepts responsible for this unusual success, 
three cases had been selected for data collection and analysis. Yatta’s OMO, which is 
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located in the South Eastern part of Kenya was and remains the most prominent of the 
three cases, and the other two are respectively located in Kisumu County (Western 
Kenya) and Turkana County (North Western Kenya).  
 
Yatta’s Operation Mwolyo Out (OMO) which means ‘operation kick dependency out’ 
was selected on the basis that it is probably the most successful CCB4DRR project in the 
East Africa region having transformed a hitherto well-known drought-prone community 
from decades of dependency on food handouts to becoming on-going export-oriented 
market producers in the last ten years.   
 
There are clear indicators which point to Yatta’s OMO as a big regional success story. 
For instance, by the time this researcher visited Yatta’s OMO in December 2017, OMO’s 
visitors’ book showed that 84 different study groups from Kenya, Tanzania, and Sudan, 
including INGOs, government delegations, community groups, donors, universities and 
banking institutions had visited Yatta in the year 2017 alone (refer to Annexe 7: 2017 
List of Study Groups to Yatta’s OMO). The same visitor’s book shows that Yatta’s OMO 
has received study groups from Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia and Malawi. This is testament 
to how much INGOs, churches, universities, donors, governments and media houses 
have come to appreciate OMO’s unique success story.  
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3.4.3.3.  Case Boundaries  
 
 When using the case study strategy, Baxter and Jack (2008, p. 546), Yin (2003), and 
Stake (1995) recommend putting boundaries on the case (binding the case) to ensure 
the study remains within reasonable scope. For this research, ‘place’- in this regard 
Kenya, and ‘activity’- in this regard being ‘engaged in supporting DRR activities in 
Kenya’ were the two 
boundaries placed on selected 
cases.  
Table 3.2 presents this 
study’s units of analysis and 
their boundaries.  
                                              Table 3. 2    Units of Analysis and Case Boundaries 
 
3.4.3.3 Type of Case Study Design  
 As indicated in the foregoing text, Yin (2014) explains that a second step in case 
study design calls for deciding whether your case study will consist of a single or multiple 
case—what then might be labelled as a single or a multiple-case study. Yin indicates that 
whether single or multiple, one can also choose to keep the case holistic or to have 
embedded subcases within an overall holistic case. The resulting two-by-two matrix 
leads to four different case study designs; namely: single holistic, single embedded, 
multiple holistic, and multiple embedded.   
 
  M. Saunders (2012) offers a plausible rationale for choosing either single or 
multiple case study designs when he asserts that “a single case is often used where it 
represents a critical case or, alternatively, an extreme or unique case. Conversely, a 
single case may be selected because it is typical or because it provides you with an 
opportunity to observe and analyse a phenomenon that few have considered before.” 
Saunders further explains that “a case study strategy can also incorporate multiple 
cases, that is, more than one case. The rationale for using multiple cases focuses upon 
the need to establish whether the findings of the first case occur in other cases and, as 
Units of 
Analysis 
Case Boundaries 
Institutional 
donors and  
INGOs 
Must be present in Kenya and 
engaged in supporting the Disaster 
Risk Reduction agenda in the country.  
Successful 
CCB4DRR 
Project  
Must be a successful community 
capacity building for DRR project in 
Kenya. 
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a consequence, the need to generalize from these findings. For this reason,  Yin (2003) 
argues that multiple case studies may be preferable to a single case study and that, 
where you choose to use a single case study, you will need to have a strong justification 
for this choice.  
 
 Going by explanations offered by Yin (2014), M. Saunders (2012), and  Yin (2003), 
this study is therefore categorized as a multiple-holistic case study design. This is 
because the study is exploring and investigating multiple cases of institutional donors 
and INGOs (for research questions 1-4) and successful CCB4DRR projects (for research 
question 5) as the units of analysis.   
 
3.5 Methodological Choices 
According to M. Saunders (2012), there are two main methodological choices, 
that is, ‘mono-method’ and ‘multiple methods’. Mono method is where a single data 
collection 
technique and 
corresponding 
analytical 
procedures are 
used. This may 
either be 
qualitative or 
quantitative. 
Multiple methods 
refer to using more 
than one data 
collection 
technique and associated analytical procedures to answer a research question. Multiple 
methods are in turn divided into multi-method research and mixed method research. In 
multi-method research more than one data collection technique is used with associated 
analysis procedures, but this is restricted within either a quantitative or qualitative 
Methodological Choices 
 
Source: (M. Saunders, 2012) 
Figure 3. 1 Methodological Choices 
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design (M. Saunders, 2012, p. 165). In mixed research design, both quantitative and 
qualitative research is combined in research design (ref to Fig. 3.1).  
 
Guided by Figure 3.1, and having adopted a case study research strategy which 
would include the use of interviews, document reviews, and observations with related 
data analysis, this research is classified as a multi-method qualitative study.  
 
3.6 Research Techniques 
This section presents research techniques chosen for this study, including data 
collection and data analysis techniques. The two reflect the interpretivism/ 
constructivism research paradigm; exploratory and explanatory research (based on 
research questions); and are recommended for the multi-method qualitative study.  
 
3.6.1 Data Collection 
 
According to Baxter and Jack (2008, p. 554) and Gillham (2000), the hallmark of 
case study research is the use of multiple data sources. Relatedly, Yin (2014) presents 
six common sources of this evidence: 1. Direct observations (e.g., human actions or a 
physical environment); 2. Interviews, e.g., open-ended conversations with key 
participants; 3. Archival records e.g. student records; 4. Documents e.g., newspaper 
articles, letters and e-mails, reports; 5. Participant-observation e.g., being identified as 
a researcher but also filling a real-life role in the scene being studied; and 6. Physical 
artefacts, e.g., computer download of employees’ work.  
 
Based on Yin’s suggested case study sources of evidence, this study employed 
semi-structured interviews to answer questions prepared for selected donors, INGOs 
and assisted communities and triangulation with the government of Kenya officials. And 
as an effort to increase the reliability of interview findings from multiple cases, the study 
adopted use of a case study interview protocol for each case type. The purpose behind the 
protocol was to provide the case study researcher with uniform sets of procedures on how 
to consistently prepare for, collect and analyse data from multiple cases, and write and 
present the research report using approaches that enrich reliability. The protocol, therefore, 
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helped to minimise variations by laying out specific guidelines for each stage of the case 
study. 
 
The study also reviewed both donor and INGO policies, strategies, reports and 
other relevant print or electronic publications. Observation was used and complimented 
drawing on all five senses, taking field notes and ultimately creating a narrative based 
on what had been seen, heard, and or sensed. Visual observation was greatly used 
during the visit to Yatta where the researcher spent two interactive days with OMO’s 
leadership, OMO’s participants, and participants on a study expedition to Yatta’s OMO. 
Some of the aids to be used in this technique included an audio recorder, and an 
integrated still and video phone-camera.  
 
 
3.6.2 Data Analysis 
As explained in sections 3.4.2, 3.4.3.1 and 3.4.3.2 above, the study adopted a case 
study research strategy with a multiple holistic case study design in which six 
institutional case studies (three institutional donors and three INGOs) were conducted 
to address research questions 1-4; and one CCB4DRR case study (out of the initially 
intended three CCB4DRR cases) was conducted to address question 5.  
 
[It should be noted that cross-case analysis was only intended between the six 
institutional cases (donors and INGOs) selected for data collection to answer questions 
1-4; and between the three identified successful CCB4DRR projects selected to for data 
collection to answer question 5. There was therefore no planned intention for cross-
case analysis between institutional cases (donors and INGOs) and CCB4DRR projects, 
because the two case types were investigating different variables which couldn’t 
therefore be compared and contrasted. However, it is the sum total of findings from the 
two case types that help to achieve the research aim.)  
 
Within the six case institutional case studies and one CCB4DRR case study, data were 
mainly collected through semi-structured interviews (with key informants), document 
reviews, social-media reviews (for the CCB4DR case) and direct observation when the 
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researcher made an interactive research visit to Yatta’s OMO.   Interview questions were 
guided by research questions and objectives, and were therefore designed to capture: 
 current institutional donor and INGO DRR support priorities,  
 how individual institutional donors and INGOs working on DRR in Kenya decide 
which DRR priorities to support,  
 how institutional donors and INGOs measure DRR success 
 the changes institutional donors and INGOs want to see as a result of their 
contribution to Kenya’s DRR agenda, 
 whether institutional donors and INGOs working on DRR in Kenya understand 
the importance of prioritising and supporting community capacity building for 
DRR. 
 Factors and or good practice concepts behind OMO’s unusual CCB4DRR success.  
Altogether, 17 semi-structured interviews were conducted within the six institutional 
and one CCB4DRR case studies with the following breakdown: 
a. 3 interviews within the 3 donor cases, which is one interview per donor case.  
b. 3 interviews within the 3 INGO cases, which is one interview per INGO case. 
c. 11 interviews in the CCB4DRR case study. This included 1 interview with the 
leader of Operation Mwolyo Out (OMO), 5 with OMO community participants, 
and 5 from members of a visiting team whose participants had been drawn from 
different parts of Kenya and were on a two-day learning expedition to Yatta’s 
OMO.  
3.6.3 Procedures adopted in analysing the case studies 
As indicated in the preceding section, 17 semi-structured interviews were 
conducted within the six institutional and one CCB4DRR case studies.   
And as explained in section 3.6.1, a uniform  interview guide was prepared for 
institutional donors and INGOs working on DRR in Kenya with the aim of capturing 
respective current DRR support priorities in the country, how they decide which DRR 
priorities to support; how they measure DRR success; the changes they want to see as  
a result of their contribution to country’s DRR agenda;  and  whether these intuitional 
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donors and INGOs working on DRR in Kenya understand the importance of prioritising 
and supporting community capacity building for DRR. Relatedly, four different interview 
guides were prepared for four different types of participants within the CCB4DRR case 
study, that is, one for OMO’s leadership, one for OMO community participants, one for 
members of the visiting team to OMO, and one for the leadership of the visiting team.  
Prior to conducting each semi-structured interview, target institutional donor 
and INGO participants received a briefing pack that included a research brief, participant 
information sheet, the interview guide and a participant consent form. For the 
community case study, only the leader of Operation Mwolyo Out received the briefing 
pack in advance. In all the 7 case studies and their 17 interviews, participants gave 
consent for the researcher to use a digital audio recorder and record interview 
proceedings. In keeping with the recommended practice of commencing data analysis 
early in the data collection process  (Forman & Damschroder, 2007; Merriam & Tisdell, 
2015), immediately after every interview, the researcher wrote memos summarising key 
reflections, observations, impressions, hunches and things to pursue during subsequent 
interviews.   
 
For every interview, writing of aforementioned first impressions memos was 
then followed by transcribing the audio interview recording into full MS Word 
transcripts and thereafter comparing transcripts with audio recordings, a process that 
would aid the researcher to make direct quotations from interviews during data 
presentation, hence increasing the reliability and validity of findings. Annexe 4 
presents a sample exhibit of a memo written after the interview with INGO2, while 
Annex 3 presents a sample exhibit of a transcribed case study interview. And as 
described in detail in section 3.6.2.1 of the Methodology Chapter, the researcher used 
qualitative content analysis techniques in which data are analysed solely qualitatively 
without the use of counting or statistical techniques, and aiming at detail and depth 
rather than measurement (Forman & Damschroder, 2007; Hsieh & Shannon, 2005; 
Mayring, 2000; M. B. Miles & Huberman, 1994; Patton, 2002).  
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It should be noted that for the greater part of content analysis, the researcher 
embraced the recommended approach of dividing content analysis into three phases, 
namely: immersion, reduction, and interpretation (Coffey & Atkinson, 1996; Gillham, 
2000; M. B. Miles & Huberman, 1994; Sandelowski, 1995). 
 
It is during the immersion phase that the researcher: 
 
 wrote quick memos summarising key reflections, observations, 
impressions, hunches and things to pursue during subsequent 
interviews; 
 listened to audio interview recordings to further engage with the data 
before doing transcription; 
 transcribed audio interview recordings into MS word transcripts; 
 concurrently read interview transcripts alongside listening to their 
source audio recordings; 
 Wrote sense-making memos from emerging thoughts triggered by the 
process of both reading/ and or listening to recorded interviews.  
 
Following expert emphasis from Baxter and Jack (2008); Yin (2003) and ) on the 
importance of creating and using a case study database to effectively organise raw data 
to enable independent inspection thus improving reliability; during the reduction 
phase, the researcher used NVivo software (Version 11 Plus)  to create a case study 
database, organise and apply codes to segments of data deemed relevant to answering 
the research questions.   
 
And as recommended by Forman and Damschroder (2007, p. 45), the researcher 
used a combination of deductive and inductive codes. Deductive codes were 
identified/constructed from the literature reviewed (relevant empirical work), the 
conceptual framework guiding this research, research questions, and data collection 
categories which were the interview questions. Inductive codes were developed from 
the data itself. Deductive codes were only used as parent codes (or parent Nodes in 
NVivo language) to develop a framework upon which relevant raw data represented by 
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child codes (or child nodes in NVivo language) could be coded. Inductive codes were 
therefore used as child codes under parent nodes.   
 
Codes, therefore, helped to reduce the raw data and reorganize remaining 
relevant data into categories in a way that addressed the research questions. The end 
result of coding was the generation of code reports. When the researcher felt he had 
reached saturation point in the reduction/ coding process, he embarked on the 
interpretation process.  The interpretation process included writing descriptive and 
interpretive individual case study summaries in the form of mind maps. This was 
followed by the development of a consolidated mind map summarising key findings 
from the 3 donor case studies and a separate mind map summarising key findings from 
the 3 INGOs case studies. Individual case study mind maps were used to support cross-
case analysis, while separately consolidated donor and INGO mind maps were used to 
compare and contrast findings for donor case studies with those of INGO case studies. 
All the while, this iterative process that included reading, coding, writing memos, 
drawing summaries, comparing and contrasting and checking back with the data and 
memos---aimed at discerning patterns in the data and drawing preliminary conclusions. 
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CHAPTER 4: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
4.1 Introduction  
 
The previous two chapters respectively presented the literature review and research 
methodology pertaining to this study. This chapter highlights the importance a study’s 
conceptual framework, discusses the process adopted for the development of this 
study’s conceptual framework, the different pieces which were brought together to 
construct the framework, and presents the conceptual framework itself. The chapter is 
therefore structured as follows:  
 
• Firstly, the importance of a conceptual framework is explained.  
• Secondly, the process of developing the conceptual framework is discussed.  
• Thirdly, key issues identified from the literature, the researcher’s experiential 
knowledge, and experiences of peers in the disaster risk management practice 
are discussed.   
• Fourthly, the constructed conceptual framework of the study is presented and 
also interpreted.   
 
4.2 The importance of a conceptual framework  
 
Both J. A. Maxwell (2012) and Robson and McCartan (2016) describe a conceptual 
framework as “a system of concepts, assumptions, expectations, beliefs, and theories 
that support and inform your research.” Maxwell further points out that a conceptual 
framework is primarily “a conception or model of what is out there that you plan to 
study.”  M. B. Miles and Huberman (1994, p. 18) define a conceptual framework as “a 
visual or written product, one that explains, either graphically or in narrative form, the 
main things to be studied—the key factors, concepts, or variables—and the presumed 
relationships among them.” And in an earlier text, M. Miles and Huberman (1984, p. 33) 
defined a conceptual framework as “the current version of the researcher’s map of the 
territory  being investigated.” 
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 Relatedly, expert opinion from Baxter and Jack (2008) and M. B. Miles and 
Huberman (1994) indicates that a study’s conceptual framework serves several 
purposes, including (i) identifying who will and will not be included in the study; (ii) 
describing what relationships may be present based on logic, theory and/or experience; 
and (iii) providing the researcher with the opportunity to gather general constructs into 
intellectual bins.  Baxter and Jack maintain that “The conceptual framework serves as an 
anchor for the study and is referred at the stage of data interpretation.” 
 
The importance of conceptual frameworks in research is further underscored by 
Kumar and Antonenko (2014) who assert that “As a tool for organizing professional 
practice inquiry, conceptual frameworks allow practitioner-scholars to connect their 
problems of practice with their experiential knowledge, contextual features, and relevant 
theoretical foundations and design studies that provide both practical and theoretical 
contributions to the field.”  Suffice it to close this section with a quote from J. A. Maxwell 
(2012) asserting that “your conceptual framework is a theory, however tentative or 
incomplete it may be.” 
 
4.3 The process of developing the conceptual framework 
 
         J. A. Maxwell (2012, p. 41) reasons that “a conceptual framework for your research 
is constructed, not found. It incorporates pieces that are borrowed from elsewhere, but 
the structure, the overall coherence, is something that you build, not something that 
exists ready-made.” Maxwell further asserts that your research problem is part of the 
conceptual framework because it identifies something that is going on in the world, 
something that is itself problematic or that has consequences that are problematic. 
Relatedly, Locke et al. (1993, p. 48) observe that in any active area of inquiry, the current 
knowledge base is not in the library but in the invisible college of informal associations, 
unpublished papers and heads of people. They also argue that exclusive orientation 
toward literature leads the researcher to ignore own experience, his/her speculative 
thinking and any pilot and exploratory research the researcher may have done.  
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Guided by forgoing expert opinion, the researcher drew upon the research problem, 
the literature reviewed, informed opinions from peers in the Disaster Risk Management 
practice, and added to these a layer of his own experiential knowledge in the disaster 
risk management practice and contextual knowledge of Kenya to construct the study’s 
conceptual framework. The following section presents the body of key issues assembled 
from various sources to inform the construction of the study’s conceptual framework.  
 
4.4 Issues from critical sources that informed the conceptual 
framework 
 
Beginning with the end in mind, Merriam and Tisdell (2015) assert that “findings are 
the outcome of the inquiry---what you, the investigator, learned or came to understand 
about the phenomenon.” The focus phenomena being studied is, therefore, a critical 
piece in the process of constructing the conceptual framework.  The social phenomena 
to be studied under this research is ‘institutional donor and INGO support to community 
capacity building for DRR,’ while the aim of this research is “to explore and investigate 
current institutional donor and INGO prioritisation to supporting community capacity 
building for DRR in Kenya.” Both the social phenomena to be studied and the aim of the 
research were critical pieces in constructing the study’s conceptual framework.  
The second piece that informed the construction of the conceptual framework was 
the literature reviewed.  Chapter 2 presented a detailed literature review of key 
concepts associated with this study, beginning with a general overview of disasters and 
DRR, followed by definitions of key terms used in the DRR discourse, recorded history of 
DRR, the overall DRR landscape of Kenya as a country, global overview of community 
capacity building for DRR that dovetailed into CCB4DRR in Kenya, and lastly presented 
conclusions showing knowledge gaps and possible areas of focus for this study.  
The literature review unveiled a gap between policy rhetoric and grass-root or 
local level execution realities on critical development issues including but not limited to 
community capacity building and empowerment. And progress in the implementation 
of HFA did not demonstrate the exception to these gap realities, hence poor local 
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capacity for DRR remains probably the biggest impediment to making required global 
DRR progress. While the literature identified ‘poor local capacity for DRR’ as a major 
impediment to the global DRR agenda and highlighted ‘top-down approaches’ which 
dominate much of the DRR implementation to be partly responsible for this poor local 
capacity for DRR and related action, the literature reviewed did not reveal other factors 
affecting local DRR action. Other factors affecting the progression of local DRR action 
therefore still remain unidentified, undocumented, unshared and therefore 
unaddressed.  
 
The literature also showed that examples of long-term strengthening of local 
communities for DRR remain uncommon (UNDP (2004), thus uncovering the need to 
investigate reasons for this uncommonness. This also revealed the need and importance 
of identifying successful cases of CCB4DRR to analyze and document factors responsible 
for their unusual success for wider sharing. The aim, objectives and research questions 
in the ensuing research were framed to address these identified knowledge gaps, and 
they, in turn, informed the construction of the conceptual framework. At the same time, 
the construction of the conceptual framework helped to refine the research aim, 
objectives and research questions.     
 
 The researcher’s experiential knowledge of the goings-on in the disaster risk 
management practice is what in the first place led to the desire to undertake this 
research. The researcher has many years of working at the nexus of development and 
emergency response sectors and has over the years been struck by the disconnect 
between high-level rhetoric on disaster risk reduction and real-life realities of risk 
reduction at the community level. This included working with organizations that have 
had ‘resilience-building DRR language’ well woven in the fabric of their organizational 
strategies, but not being intentional at executing much of what is required to get to the 
desired end picture. This is not the researchers’ lone experience, but an increasing 
outcry from many disaster risk management professionals. Experience has also shown 
the researcher that Donors and INGOs play a critical role in driving DRR agendas in many 
developing countries. This is the reason the research prioritised to focus the 
phenomenon under inquiry on donors and INGOs and not on other stakeholders.  
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Section 4.5 (Figure 4.1) presents the study’s conceptual framework constructed 
using the foregoing issues assembled from indicated critical sources.  
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Figure 4. 1 The Conceptual Framework 
4.5 The conceptual framework  
Research Topic: Community Capacity Building for Disaster Risk Reduction: Exposing and Challenging Level of Prioritisation in Kenya 
Global Level Context National Level Context Sub-National Level Context Community Level Context Community-level Outcomes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Community level 
Outcomes 
Eventual state of 
community DRR 
action INGOs: (what to 
investigate) 
DRR support priorities, 
how priorities are 
determined, % funding 
toward capacity building 
for DRR, how DRR success 
is measured and desired 
DRR changes in Kenya. 
Global DRR agendas, 
frameworks and 
priorities, e.g. the Hyogo 
Framework for DRR, and 
Sendai Framework for 
DRR 
Key DRR actors:  
 Governments 
 Donors 
 INGOs 
 NGOs 
 Private Sector 
 
Global literature review 
revealed a near absence 
of meaningful focus on 
local DRR action within 
global DRR frameworks 
 
Donors: (what to 
investigate) 
DRR support priorities, 
how priorities are 
determined, % funding 
toward capacity building 
for DRR, how DRR success 
is measured and desired 
DRR changes in Kenya. 
 
County/District 
level: 
 
Key DRR actors, 
DRR priorities, 
capacity to support 
community level 
DRR action. 
Community level: 
 
Enablers of and 
impediments to 
community 
capacity for DRR 
action. 
  
Proposition: the state of community DRR action is highly influenced by level of prioritisation given to it by both global and national level actors 
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4.5.1 Interpreting the conceptual framework 
 
As indicated in Fig.4.1, “Community Capacity Building for Disaster Risk 
Reduction: Exposing and Challenging Level of Prioritisation in Kenya” is the research 
topic that captures and summarises the phenomena under study. Literature review 
together with the researcher’s knowledge shows that DRR agendas are orchestrated 
within a multi-layered context. This context includes the global level, national level, sub-
national level, and community level contexts. It is within the global level context that we 
find global DRR agendas including DRR frameworks, the on-going one being the Sendai 
Framework for DRR (SF4DRR).  A review of these frameworks reveals critical 
stakeholders in moving DRR forward, including governments, donors, INGOs, NGOs and 
the private sector. Consequently, the literature reviewed within the global context 
revealed a near absence of meaningful focus on local DRR action.  
 
Because donors and INGOs were identified to be critical DRR drivers within the 
developing countries, at least within the East Africa context, this is the reason donors 
and INGOs are the focus units of analysis within the national level context. At the sub-
national level, Kenya as a country has county and district government structures. It is a 
group of districts that make up a Kenya county.  Lastly, within the contextual DRR 
hierarchy, we have a community level context. It’s within the global context that the 
literature review revealed gaps between high-level DRR rhetoric and local/ community 
level DRR action. And because of the importance of CCB4DRR in enabling local DRR, the 
study focused on exploring the status of CCB4DRR among donor and INGO cases in the 
country.  
 
As indicated by the framework, there are a number of important relationships 
among different variables; and there are also a number of assumptions informing the 
conceptual framework. For instance, the framework assumes that when support for 
local DRR including CCB4DRR is prioritized at the global level especially through on-going 
DRR frameworks, this global prioritization would have a cascading effect by way of how 
donors and INGOs also prioritize support to local DRR action including CCB4DRR within 
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their in-country strategies. The conceptual framework is undergirded by the assumption 
and or proposition that the state of community DRR action is highly influenced by the 
level of prioritisation given to it by both global and national level actors.  
 
4.6 Summary and conclusion 
 
In summary, the study’s conceptual framework presents the research phenomena 
to be studied (the research topic), shows the overarching context for the research, 
highlights some of the critical gaps identified by reviewed literature, shows who will and 
will not be included in the research, highlights relationships between key variables in 
the study, and presents key   underlying assumptions including the stated proposition.  
 
The following chapter presents data analysis and discussion of case studies.      
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CHAPTER 5: DATA ANALYSIS & DISCUSSION 
OF CASE STUDIES 
5.1 Introduction 
While Chapter 4 illustrated the process involved in developing the conceptual 
framework for the research, this chapter presents data analysis and discussion of case 
studies and the chapter is organised as follows:  
 Firstly, background information about case studies are once again explained.  
 Secondly, the analysis and discussion of institutional (donors and INGOs) case 
studies are presented in the order that mirrors their research questions and 
objectives, which includes exploring current institutional donor and INGO DRR 
support priorities; establishing how individual institutional donors and INGOs 
working on DRR in Kenya decide which DRR priorities to support; and assessing 
whether intuitional donors and INGOs working on DRR understand the 
importance of prioritizing and supporting community capacity building for DRR. 
 Thirdly the analysis and discussion of the only CCB4DRR case (Yatta’s OMO) is 
presented mirroring research question # 5 and research objective # 4 with a 
focus on identifying factors and or good practice concepts behind OMO’s 
unusual success.  
 
 Thirdly, key findings from cross-case analysis of the six institutional case studies 
are presented. Cross-case analysis of CCB4DRR project cases was not possible 
since only one out of the 3 had-been identified cases remained accessible.  
All findings presented served to accomplish the following research aim:  
to explore and investigate, and where need be, challenge the state of institutional donor 
and INGO prioritisation to supporting community capacity building for DRR (CCB4DRR) 
in Kenya; and to identify and analyse critical factors or good practice concepts behind 
highly successful CCB4DRR initiatives in the country.   
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5.2 Background Information to case studies 
 
5.2.1 Background Information and Case Study Description 
In order to keep the identities of investigated cases anonymous, a pseudonym 
was assigned each of the donor and INGO cases. However, pseudonyms were not used 
in the community case study because the community has opened itself up for visitation, 
offers CCB4DRR related training to willing learners from within and without Kenya and 
therefore invites people with keen interest to come and have an interactive experience. 
There is, therefore, nothing private about the community case study.  
As an effort to enhance a good flow of presenting the analysis, the researcher 
thought it prudent to commence each individual case study analysis with the case study 
description. Each case study analysis and discussion section, therefore, starts off with 
the case study description. And as an effort to strengthen donor and INGO case 
anonymity, only brief descriptions are provided per case study thus leaving out major 
details that would easily give away individual case identities.  
5.3 Analysis & Discussion of Case Study 1 – INGO1 
 
INGO 1 is a humanitarian relief and development organisation that had by Dec 2017 
been working in Kenya for more than 40 years. It has an annual country office budget of 
more than US$ 60 million, works in more than 70% of Kenya’s 47 counties, reached more 
than 1.5million people through direct implementation in 2017---making it one of the 
largest INGOs in the country in terms of budget size, geographic coverage and direct 
population reach through its varied integrated programs.    
5.3.1 What are the DRR priorities currently being supported 
by respective institutional donors and INGOs working 
on DRR in Kenya? 
During data analysis, it emerged all the six case study responses to this question 
could be organised and presented under four broad categories, and these include 
‘government-focused priorities’, ‘community-focused priorities’, ‘intra-agency focused 
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priorities’ and ‘cross-cutting priorities’. And a close examination of INGO1’s response to 
the question revealed that INGO1’s current DRR priorities in Kenya fall under 3 of the 4 
aforementioned broad categories. The 3 broad categories include government-focused 
priorities, community-focused priorities, and intra-agency focused priorities. The 
ensuing presentation of analysis and discussion follows the same sequence, and 
therefore starts with ‘government–focused DRR priorities’.   
Government-focused priorities.  
Under government-focused priorities, INGO1 presented two sub-areas of focus, 
and these are ‘institutional capacity building for DRR’ and a combination of ‘advocacy 
and influencing’ aimed at securing required governance changes in the way the 
Government of Kenya generally manages the entire DRR agenda. On supporting 
institutional capacity for DRR, INGO1 explained,    
“we are supporting county governments at the level where we are working, which 
is at the sub-county level, to train heads of departments in DRM and supporting 
them to come up with  DRM strategies that may contribute to the county DRM 
strategy”.  
 Data analysis further reveals that INGO1 is strategically using its capacity building 
support to county government institutions with the aim of eventually being able to 
influence them towards greater DRR support especially in sub-counties where INGO1 
has a presence.   
“Unlike before, County Governments have a lot of resources. This is why we were 
targeting Heads of Departments and the Members of the County Assembly 
(MCAs) ---the politicians in those areas. They come to the training---including the 
commissioners, and actually the DCs (District Commissioners) ---that line of 
commissioners from the office of the President. They have been coming to our 
five-day training.  
 On linking INGO1’s support to county government capacity building for DRR with 
eventual influencing for county governments to resourcefully support local DRR action,  
INGO1 further explained,  
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“…we are very proud of Katito and Lambwe programs in the Lake Region...They 
have very good community DRM teams…Once communities have come up with 
their risk reduction strategies, they (communities) lobby and market these 
strategies to their county leadership knowing there are more resources in the 
Counties…And because the networking with government by those two programs 
has been so tight and amicable, they have been getting a lot of support from the 
government.  
Explaining more on advocacy and influencing, INGO1 narrated,    
“We are using advocacy so that we engage at different levels starting at the 
national level through the national platform because we are active participants 
on the national platform. For example, in 2016 we were part of the national 
platform team that came up with DRR priorities for the country for the next 2-3 
years. This is based on the Sendai framework that Kenya is a signatory to.  So we 
were part of that process and the Platform in their own wisdom decided to make 
us (INGO1) the lead agency for priority number 2 which is about strengthening 
risk governance for effective disaster risk management…we are on the forefront 
engaging the government and advocating that Government should dedicate up 
to 10% of its budget to Disaster Risk Management”.  
This is, therefore, advocacy and influencing aimed at improving disaster risk 
governance in the country as asserted by Wahlström (2015) when she points out that 
that the implementation of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction requires 
strong commitment and political leadership both at national and local levels. Wahlstrom 
reasons that this is essential to ensure stronger risk governance and capable institutions 
that can take the lead and mobilize and motivate stakeholders. 
Community Focused Priorities 
The analysis of INGO1’s community-focused priorities revealed three areas of 
emphasis at this level. The three areas include CCB4DRR, partner CB4DRR and Child-led 
DRR.  
Speaking about CCB4DRR, with a beam reflecting a sense of mastery in the subject, 
INGO1’s DRR Advisor explained, 
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For DRR, our flagship is in training community members in community managed 
disaster risk reduction. And to drill the point home, he emphasised, this is at the 
community, grass root level.  
On supporting partners with capacity building for DRR (CB4DRR), INGO1 explained, 
We developed guidelines and have transformed what as an organisation we used 
to call ‘community disaster preparedness plans’---the CDPPs-- that were 
reviewed annually. Instead of being the CDPP at the grass root level, we have 
elevated it so that we work with the county heads of department, other partners, 
NGOs, religious groups, FBOs, the youth, and women groups at county level so 
that we support them to strengthen some of their structures for disaster risk 
management activities. In the last one year alone, I am proud to say we have 
covered nine different counties in the sub-county where we work. 
 During the HFA tenure, it was Kenya’s Ministry of State for Special Programmes 
(MoSSP) which was responsible for collaborating with contributing stakeholders and 
compiling related HFA progress reports. INGO1’s 2010 HFA-related report to the MoSSP 
reads in part,   
 
…The government’s and partner agencies’ efforts in development are facing 
major setbacks as communities’ 
capacities barely enable them to 
cope. This has left communities 
vulnerable in the face of risks, 
hence disasters. Aware of this 
situation from many years of 
working with needy and resource-
constrained communities, INGO1 
initiated a DRR project to be 
managed through the community… The 
project purposes to train 120 Disaster 
Management Committee (DMC) members, 320 community members, 160 
 
Figure 5. 1 members of one community DMC 
conducting hazard mapping. The photo shows 
effluent from a sisal farm polluting a community 
water source. 
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community volunteers, 80 teachers, and 160 students in the target communities 
in 8 districts… In addition, DRR is also being mainstreamed in all the programs 
designed and implemented by INGO1 from 2008. The overall aim of these is to 
strengthen community capacities for disaster mitigation and preparedness, with 
a view to anchoring them on a solid foundation for (‘good’) transformational 
development.  
 Back et al. (2009) and Benson and Bugge (2007) assert that engaging children 
directly in the design and delivery of DRR activities can have many benefits and that this 
work is referred to as ‘child-led’ DRR and covers a broad spectrum of actions. Data 
analysis indicated that INGO1 is a strong believer in child-led DRR, and during the 
interview, INGO1’s DRR advisor passionately reflected,   
We have proven that children actually try and implement what they have been 
taught. If you go to a place like Katito, a place like Lambwe, where with small 
funding we trained teachers on child-led DRR---they took it up and went and 
trained their children in their clubs---some of them formed clubs---some of them 
used clubs which were existing---which is what we like. For instance, these 
schools use health, agricultural, or environment clubs, or any existing clubs 
including first aid clubs and introduce child led DRR into them—and they have 
done wonders. 
Intra-agency focused priorities 
Besides having government-focused and community-focused DRR support 
priorities, the analysis showed that INGO1 also had intra-agency or internally focused 
DRR priorities. By the time of conducting the interview with INGO1, the organisation had 
been implementing various integrated programmes in 37 counties and had also just 
completed a massive restructuring process. Explaining the intra-agency DRR priorities, 
INGO1 commented,   
By the time of doing the restructuring, we had trained 68 staffs in direct DRR 
engagement---right from the national level including all the technical leads and 
programme officers in the field. And due to usual uncertainties that come along 
every announced restructuring process, by the time the restructuring process 
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started, a number of the 68 staffs had left. But during the actual restructuring 
process alone, we lost 22 staff.  
…it is like starting afresh from last year---so we have not had the requisite 
capacity to effect much of the Sendai Framework. So right now, when we planned 
for this FY, we have planned to train staff in all the 37 counties--- We have 37 
counties where we are operating and we are going to train two staff in each as 
point persons for DRR. 
 Reflecting on all data collected on INGO1 together with the preceding analysis, 
it becomes clear that INGO1 has a very strong history of long-term engagements with 
prioritised communities around the world. Analysis showed that in Kenya, INGO1’s DRR 
priorities have a lot to do with strengthening local DRR action. Even capacity building for 
county government institutions is aimed at influencing the same local/ county 
governments to be able to eventually release resources in support of community-
prioritized DRR activities.  Relatedly, in agreement with Howard’s affirmation that ‘we 
cannot teach what we don’t know’ (Howard, 2014), INGO1’s internally-looking priority 
of training more staffs in DRR is aimed at ensuring the organisation has adequate DRR 
implementation capacity in all its program areas.  
5.3.2 How do institutional donors and INGOs working on DRR 
in Kenya decide which DRR priorities to support in the 
country?   
While all aggregated six case study responses to this question were categorised 
under ‘externally looking’, ‘internally looking’ and ‘not involved’ criteria, INGO1 uses 
externally looking criteria to select her DRR priorities. 
 
Externally looking selection criteria 
Data analysis showed that INGO1 uses an externally looking lens to scrutinise 
and decide her DRR priorities. It was evident INGO1’s DRR advisor had a clear 
understanding of global DRR frameworks and had been involved in HFA’s National DRR 
Platform in the country, and was presently engaged in the Sendai Framework discourse 
in the country.  
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Explaining factors which influence how they select their DRR priorities, INGO1 pointed 
out,  
…right now, the main thing is the Sendai Framework…On the Sendai Framework, 
we look at those areas that are going to contribute more on the delivery of our 
core programming areas which include health, livelihoods and resilience, WASH, 
and Education---as well as issues to do with gender and disability in DRR. Even 
through our trainings, we ensure that gender issues are captured during 
assessments.  
INGO1 then pauses the question, “how do we then choose”, and goes on to answer it,  
We look at it from the angle of government priorities---like the ones we crafted 
in Naivasha last year based on the Sendai Framework. We then match these 
priorities with our intervention sectors/areas, e.g. to address or implement 
through education or through WASH. And because county integrated 
development plans also try as much as possible to align themselves with National 
Policies and Strategies, we also try as much as possible to fit into the framework 
or those priorities. That is how we chose our DRR activities. 
 In summary, INGO1 supports community managed DRR and supports 
communities in sub-counties of presence in the process of identifying their disaster risks, 
coming up with DRR priorities and working with sub-county leaders to ensure these 
select DRR priorities get adopted into county integrated development plans. It was 
extraordinary to, therefore, note that INGO1 also considers community identified DRR 
priorities during the process of determining her DRR priorities; a practice that points to 
INGO1’s high level of prioritisation for CCB4DRR.  
5.3.3 Knowledge and use of international DRR frameworks 
 In each of the six INGO and donor case study interview guides, there were 
specific questions indirectly looking at whether donors and INGOs have knowledge of 
global DRR frameworks and whether these frameworks have had any influence on 
agency DRR priorities. INGO1’s DRR advisor was found to be very conversant with both 
HFA and the SF4DRR. “I am aware of HFA…During preparation of the last HFA report, 
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Government invited NGOs and INGOs working in the field of disaster management to 
share our contribution or what we have been implementing in the community…We 
compiled and submitted a report on our DRR activities…and these are some of the 
documents the government used to come up with reports they were sharing with the rest 
of the world.” 
INGO1 also revealed a good grasp of SF4DRR and engagement with the government in 
coming up with country-specific SF4DRR priorities. However, INGO1 observed,  “we 
haven’t done much because the Sendai Framework came out around February 2015, and 
a lot of our organisational restructuring started around May 2015…Things were not as 
normal in-house. There was too much apprehension, guys looking for space within and 
outside, it wasn’t a good working environment. So I can confess that it wasn’t until the 
restructuring ended and staffs settled that we started looking at the Sendai Framework 
critically.”  
 In summary, INGO1 exhibited a very good grasp of global DRR frameworks and 
showed proof of using them both within and without the organisation. The frameworks 
have influenced some of INGO1’s DRR priorities especially in the area of advocacy and 
influencing toward better DRR governance. And in INGO1’s perspective, the 
organisation is contributing more to the DRR framework discourse and reporting in the 
country than the lead government department is actually reporting back to key in-
country stakeholders. There seems to, therefore, be a gap between what DRR 
stakeholders contribute to the DRR discourse in the country and how the lead DRR 
government department engages with wider stakeholders.  
5.3.4 Funding for CCB4DRR 
With Kellett and Caravani (2013) reporting that financing for disaster risk 
reduction makes up a tiny fraction of overall investments in development aid; Watson 
et al. (2015) revealing that development assistance for DRR supports a range of actions 
but is biased towards enhancing preparedness for effective response and building back 
better in recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction leaving only 8% of development 
assistance to DRR going to  investing in DRR for resilience; and Kelman (2013)  reporting 
that every $1 invested in preventive DRR saves $7 (and sometimes more); this research 
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considered it important to  investigate the state of overall DRR funding and state of 
funding for CCB4DRR within the six INGO and donor case studies.  
 When asked about how much of the organisation’s non-grant development 
funding goes to DRR and then to CCB4DRR, INGO1’s DRR advisor disclosed, “I will be 
honest with you, we have not computed it, partly because we are doing things (meaning 
DRR) through mainstreaming and through integration.” However, by the time of 
conducting this interview, INGO1 was in the process of developing an internal DRR 
position paper, and the DRR advisor reflected, “…because we are on the forefront of 
engaging government through advocacy and advocating that government should at 
least budget up to 10% of their funding to go into DRR, we felt that things should start 
from in-house for us an organisation, and we came up with a draft DRR position paper 
that we can use for in-house and external engagement.” 
 This paper had been circulated to INGO1’s key internal stakeholders and the DRR 
advisor was waiting for feedback before the paper could be revised and submitted to 
the board for approval and adoption. Upon reflection and nudged by the interview, the 
DRR advisor made a voluntary pledge promising that “…in that paper (the then draft DRR 
position paper) I will propose that we have at least between 5% and 7% of our non-grant 
development budget going to DRR in total…As a technical person, I would propose that 
at least 4% of DRR funds should go into supporting community capacity building. But if 
the DRR allocation starts at 7%, I will go up to 6% of that DRR allocation toward CCB4DRR 
because the need is massive in communities”.   
5.3.5 How do institutional donors and INGOs measure DRR 
success in Kenya?  
For all the six case studies, responses to this question were re-arranged into 2 
categories, and the two categories were:  
i. Measures focused on local-level DRR success, and  
ii. Measures focused on national-level DRR success.  
And for INGO1, the analysis revealed three top indicators by which the 
organisation measures DRR success. The three indicators include ‘household coping 
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ability in the face of shocks’, ‘continued household commitment to DRR practices’ and 
‘continuity and performance of child-led DRR.’ 
 When asked how as an organisation INGO1 measures the 
effectiveness and success of her contribution to the country’s DRR agenda, 
INGO1’s DRR advisor revealed that the organisation implements multi-phase 
and multi-year projects. At the end of each project phase, INGO1 conducts an 
evaluation, and the DRR team contributes to the evaluation indicators used. 
Upon probing into some of the top indicators used to measure DRR success, 
the DRR advisor responded,  
We were looking at how many households faced disasters in the last one year 
and were able to implement risk reduction strategies and remain safe…The 
other one was about how many community member were trained in disaster 
risk reduction in the last one year and have remained active post training. They 
would have to give you examples of how they have remained active…Some of our 
priorities are on child-led DRR. So we looked at some of the clubs that were 
formed or where DRR activities were being undertaken, and then what they 
have done in the school and in the community under child-led DRR. Those are 
some of the indicators we use.  
Going by the above response, it’s clear that there are other indicators INGO1 uses 
to measure DRR success but chose to share the above three, probably because INGO1 
considers them to be the most important. And a closer look at the three indicators shows 
that they all focus on measuring DRR success at the grass-root level, another indication 
of the importance INGO1 attaches to prioritising and supporting local/community level 
DRR. 
 
5.3.6 What changes do institutional donors and INGOs 
working on DRR want to see as a result of their 
contribution to the DRR agenda in the country?  
The purpose behind this question was to ultimately indirectly find out where or 
at what level both case donors and INGOs wanted to see changes as a result of their 
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DRR contribution in the country. For all the six case studies, responses to this question 
were re-arranged into 9 categories, namely: better resource allocation, better DRR 
comprehension and integration, improved coordination, improved DRM governance, 
improved community capacity, more child-led DRR, professional disciplines taking DRR 
seriously, reduced hazard impacts and things that need to be stopped. Data analysis 
assigned INGO1’s response to 5 of the 9 categories, namely: improved DRM 
governance, better resource allocation, improved community capacity, more child-led 
DRR, and things that need to be stopped.  The analysis is therefore presented in that 
order.  
Improved DRM governance  
 When asked ‘what specific changes or improvements INGO1 would like to see in 
Kenya as a result of highly effective DRR work in the country’, as if he had been waiting 
all his life to answer the question, the DRR advisor firmly responded: “the first one is 
about risk governance”. After a pause, he continued, “…to me that is the starting point.” 
And then he went on to elaborate, “you can imagine as we are talking now, this country 
has taken over 15 years without a national policy for managing disasters. And you know 
when you don’t have a national policy for disaster risk management, even your strategies 
are not well aligned to anything constructive”.  
And to explain further, the DRR advisor pointed out what the country has taken 
very long to finalise and adopt a National DRM policy. “I think there has been a deliberate 
delay to pursue for this policy…In risk governance, this country is romancing response 
activities. Just like the drought now, they are romancing it (meaning the drought 
response) because it is an easy milk cow for enriching those who are at the top of the 
country’s leadership. Response is expensive, is not sustainable--but the bottom line is the 
response is making so many Kenyans rich out of corruption.” Corruption was therefore 
singled out as a critical factor delaying the finalisation and adoption of Kenya’s National 
DRM Policy. This is probably one of the reasons D. Alexander and Davis (2012, p. 3) 
lament that “in the modern world, aid, relief and development are big business. The 
agencies that provide them have often been accused of perpetuating situations of 
inequality, aid dependency and injustice.”   
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Still, on governance, INGO1 pointed out the proliferation of national disaster 
management departments and the need to shrink and harmonise them at the national 
level. The DRR advisor angrily lamented, “…why do we have so many organisations or 
agencies managing disaster at the national level? There’s a lot of duplication at the top, 
with a lot of political appointees to represent various interests.”  
 
Better Resource Allocation & Improved Community Capacities 
Elaborating more on desired changes and improvements, the DRR advisor 
identified better resource allocation to DRR as the 2nd area that needs improvement. He 
asserted, “When risk governance is improved, I would like to see adequate funding given 
through the various government agencies and departments, and improving the 
capacity building of community members at the grass root level…so that their level can 
be raised to reduce their exposure, give them good awareness and help them reduce 
their own vulnerability so that they can take charge at that particular level to manage 
their own risks in their own environment… sometimes they need some resources to make 
their safety become a reality. So I would like to see that one also change in this country.” 
In the foregoing paragraph, ‘improving community capacities’ aimed at enabling people 
to take charge of reducing their vulnerabilities were identified as the 3rd area that 
requires improvement in the country.  
 
More Child-led DRR 
 Increased child-led DRR was identified as the 4th area that needs improvement 
by way of scaling up. After enumerating how different supported schools have 
registered greater DRR engagement and results, the advisor concluded by underscoring, 
“they have done wonders!... I would like to see a lot of engagement of children and 
youths in disaster risk management---because it is proven that children actually try and 
implement what they have been taught”.  
Things that need to be stopped 
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Lastly, data analysis (partly by inference) identified and assigned some of the 
responses to the category of ‘things that 
need to be stopped’. These include the 
need to shift focus from disaster response 
to resilience-building focused DRR and the 
need to move from rhetoric to executing 
for results.  The DRR advisor pointed out, 
“In risk governance, this country is romancing response activities”. And this view was 
shared by Mondoh (2013) in his HFA Progress Report on Kenya when he observed the 
challenge of the prevalence of a ‘response oriented mindset’ among humanitarian 
agencies and institutions, government, donor agencies and communities. Mondoh’s 
report asserted “There has been too much concentration at allocating resources to 
response programs but little towards long term risk reduction”. And as reasoned by 
Fawcett et al. (2011), Kellett and Caravani (2013), Kelman (2013), and Mondoh (2013), 
INGO1 wants to see a country-wide shift from focusing on disaster response to 
resilience-focused DRR.  
 Still on ‘things that need to be stopped’, INGO1 raised concerns over a lot of talk 
that doesn’t lead to executing for results. And citing examples, the DRR advisor 
revealed how this a problem both within INGO1 and also in some of the lead 
government’s disaster management departments. Talking about the rhetoric that leads 
to no execution, the DRR advisor sadly noted,  
And unfortunately the same obtains even in INGO1, and those are some of the 
things that incited me to propose the 5%-7% funding toward DRR. There is 
nothing as unpleasant as your strategy saying you want to build community 
resilience, and to quote our former county director, saying “from now onwards 
our language is going to be resilience, resilience, resilience”, but when you look 
at the tools of trade and resources to ensure that, you find there is nothing 
dedicated to taking you in that direction. 
 In addition to the country director’s ‘resilience building’ rhetoric, for INGO1, 
technical specialists including the DRR advisor do not have control over funding 
allocation toward their priorities. Instead, field managers are responsible for budgeting 
“In risk governance, this country is 
romancing response activities.” 
--INGO1-- 
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for everything that falls under ‘field programmes’ including resilience related DRR 
activities. These budgets are then submitted to the Operations Department at National 
Level (Nairobi) for eventual approval. Sometimes, field managers don’t include DRR in 
the budgets, and other times, the operations department in Nairobi significantly cuts 
down DRR in the overall budget.  
And there is nothing as unpleasant as being reduced to plead with people to put 
a budget for your priority activities in their respective areas. Yet these are the 
same people who would have either produced or reviewed Community Disaster 
Preparedness Plans (CDPPs) and brought them to Nairobi for endorsement, and 
therefore they know critical DRR issues that demand budget allocation...There 
has always been a mismatch between priorities outlined in the CDPP and 
resource allocation to enable execution of these priorities…Thus even in-house, 
it’s unfortunate that to some greater extent we are not serious about community 
capacity building for DRR.   
 
This lamentation is corroborated by  C Fitzgibbon and A Crosskey (2013) in their 
assertion that holistic development planning in the marginal dryland areas of the Horn 
of Africa (which includes Kenya) is severely lacking, and capacity to develop quality 
strategic development plans that tackle multi-sectoral issues such as DRR, poverty 
reduction and resilience building is weak. Fitzgibbon and Crosskey further observe that 
too often, development actors are stuck in sectoral silos, and consequently, staff 
working in one area cannot see any link or overlap between their sector and others. This 
appeared to be the case with INGO1 vis-à-vis the recounted struggle to have DRR 
accorded due consideration by all lead planners. And because such lamentations 
reportedly abound across many aid agencies, D. Alexander and Davis (2012, pp. 3-4) 
concluded that “many of the world’s leaders still view disaster risk reduction as an 
‘optional extra’, the first thing to be eliminated when fiscal stringency is needed.” 
 
 On government rhetoric, the DRR advisor quips “there have been so many 
meetings especially in the last two years of the National Disaster Risk Reduction 
Platform. Unfortunately, it is more of a talk shop”. And he continued by citing a more 
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recent example centred on national preparations for the May 2017 Cancun/ Mexico 
Global DRR Platform.   
Two-three weeks ago, they (referring to a government department) still had the 
audacity to call us for another meeting to prepare for going to the May 2017 
Global DRR Platform in Cancun, Mexico---and once more wanted us to write and 
share what we have done so that they can go and present at the global level---
the way they did with the Hyogo Framework. I have been looking at emails flying 
left, right and centre and professors (mentioning two universities) are telling 
them “you have been misusing us.” They have told the National Disaster 
Operation Centre off. This researcher accessed one of the emails indicating 
frustration, and it read in part, “none of the agreements we have been having 
along the way have ever been implemented, and yet you keep on calling us for 
more meetings to prepare for international presentations when we are doing 
very little in our communities.” In a conclusive remark, the DRR advisor noted, 
“Therefore no meeting has taken place. They have refused”. 
Overall, in terms of desired changes consequent to effective DRR work in the 
country, INGO1 exhibits greater desire to see more changes around DRR governance 
with the hope that once governance issues have been fixed, there will be less talk and 
better DRR execution resulting into tangible results at the grassroots level.  
5.3.7 Comments on ‘upper Vs local DRR support’ 
 For all the six donor and INGO case studies, the semi-structured 
interview guide asked the following question, “What would be your comments 
on growing literature that seems to suggest there’s inadequate support to 
community-level DRR action and yet there is comparatively more support to 
global, regional and national level DRR activities by many key stakeholders?”   
 Responding to the question, the DRR advisor agreeably stated, “This is 
very true because just as the statement reads, it’s a funnel. A funnel of activities 
with so much at the top and a trickle downstairs.” The advisor further reflected, 
“I might not have had the opportunity to be at the international level, but look 
at the national level! Let me talk about Kenya. There have been so many 
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meetings especially in the last two years of the National Disaster Risk Reduction 
Platform. Unfortunately, it is more of a talk shop”.  
 Furthermore, in support of literature, INGO1 highlighted that this is 
the reason Kenya as a country had a proliferation of disaster management 
departments at the national level, that is not reflected in execution at the 
grassroots. It’s in line with the literature that INGO1 went on to reveal how 
some members of the National DRR Platform refused to engage with the lead 
government department when asked to support preparations for participation 
in the May 2017 Mexico Global DRR Platform.  And as already stated, in their 
refusal, their lamentation specified “none of the agreements we have been 
having along the way has ever been implemented, and yet you keep on calling 
us for more meetings to prepare for international presentations when we are 
doing very little in our communities.” 
5.3.8 Comments on whether and how evidence from this 
research may be used. 
 Part of the interview guide run a statement with a question at the end 
reading as follows: “There’s ample literature showing that inadequate 
prioritisation of community capacity building for DRR remains the biggest 
obstacle to realising greater DRR progression in many countries including 
Kenya. Would INGO1 be willing to use this kind of evidence?” In response, 
INGO1 stated,  
“This is evidence that can strengthen our draft DRR position paper--
when it sees the light of day. We can use that for in-house engagement 
and also use it for external engagement/ and or advocacy with both the 
national government and county government so that they see the sense 
in giving DRR the priority it deserves during both budgeting and 
implementation.” 
Going by the above narrative, it appears there is willingness to use findings from this 
research as part contributory evidence to inform DRR goings-on in the country.  
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5.3.9 Overall comments 
 DRR priorities: Reflecting on all data collected on INGO1 together with the 
preceding analysis, it becomes clear that INGO1 has a very strong history of long-term 
engagements with prioritised communities around the world. Analysis showed that in 
Kenya, INGO1’s DRR priorities have a lot to do with strengthening local DRR action. Even 
capacity building for county government institutions is aimed at influencing the same 
local/ county governments to be able to eventually release resources in support of 
community-prioritized DRR activities.  Relatedly, INGO1’s internally-looking priority of 
training more staffs in DRR is aimed at ensuring the organisation has adequate DRR 
implementation capacity in all its program areas; and this is corroborated by Howard’s 
contention that ‘we cannot teach what we don’t know’ (Howard, 2014).  
 Priorities’ selection criteria: INGO1 uses an externally looking lens when 
selecting DRR priorities. Top considerations include national and country government 
priorities and county government DRR priorities would usually include community 
identified DRR priorities. The latter is what points to INGO1’s high level of prioritisation 
for CCB4DRR.  
 Knowledge and use of global DRR frameworks: INGO1 has very good knowledge 
and use of DRR frameworks to a level where the advisor indicated INGO1 seems to be 
reporting more to the government on NGO1’s contribution toward the implementation 
of frameworks than the government is actually intentionally engaging INGO1 on the 
same. This appears to be a general weakness on the government side. INGO1’s advocacy 
and influencing agenda toward better DRR governance in the country is rooted in their 
understanding and use of the HFA and SF4DRR narratives.  
DRR Funding: good to note how the interview led to a voluntary pledge to 
introduce minimum thresholds for DRR and CCB4DRR funding. It is baby steps, but a 
good start. It also shows how making relevant and compelling literature to practitioners 
has the power to make them make informed decisions.  
Ways of measuring success: Going by the above response, it’s clear that there 
are other indicators INGO1 uses to measure DRR success but chose to share the above 
three because they are the most outstanding. And a closer look at the three indicators 
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shows that they all focus on measuring DRR success at the grass-root level, another 
indication of the importance INGO1 attaches to prioritising and supporting 
local/community level DRR. 
 
Desired changes consequent to effective DRR in the country: overall, in terms 
of desired changes consequent to effective DRR work in the country, INGO1 exhibits 
greater desire to see more changes around DRR governance with the hope that once 
governance issues have been fixed, there will be less talk and better DRR execution 
resulting in tangible results at grassroots level. 
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Figure 5. 2 A Mind Map of INGO1 Findings 
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5.4 Analysis and Discussion of Case Study 2 – INGO2 
INGO 2 is a humanitarian and development organisation that has worked in 
Kenya since the 1990s, works through partners, and is therefore not a direct 
implementing agency. It has very strong advocacy and influencing agenda with a keen 
focus on ‘shifting power’ to local institutions and works in less than 20% of Kenya’s 47 
counties. Its budget and geographic spread make it fit the middle-sized INGO category 
in the country.   
5.4.1 What are the DRR priorities currently being supported 
by respective institutional donors and INGOs working 
on DRR in Kenya? 
During data analysis, it emerged all the six case study responses to this question 
could be organised and presented under four broad categories, and these include 
‘government-focused priorities’, ‘community-focused priorities’, ‘intra-agency focused 
priorities’ and ‘cross-cutting priorities’. And a close examination of INGO2’s response to 
the question revealed that INGO2’s current DRR priorities in Kenya fall under 3 of the 4 
aforementioned broad categories. The 3 categories include community-focused 
priorities, government-focused priorities and cross-cutting priorities. The ensuing 
presentation of analysis and discussion follows the same sequence, and therefore starts 
with ‘community–focused DRR priorities’.   
It should be noted that by the time of conducting the case study interview with 
INGO2, the organisation had just completed a 5-year resilience-building programme in 
the arid and semi-arid lands of Kenya and was in the process of reflecting and preparing 
to launch another phase of resilience programming.  
Community Focused DRR Priorities 
It is worthy of mention here that for INGO2, community-focused priorities were 
the first to be brought out during the interview. Under this category, data analysis 
revealed four dimensions or sub-areas of DRR focus, and they include: (a) community 
managed DRR (CMDRR), (b) building community capacity to lobby, (c) strengthening 
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accountability to communities, and (d) enhancing access to timely early warning (EW) 
information.   
Firstly, INGO2 highlighted that much of their most recent DRR work in Kenya was 
a result of the severe 2011 Horn of Africa drought that ravaged especially Kenya, 
Ethiopia, and Somalia leaving in its wake ‘000,000s of people dead and millions of 
livestock decimated. Consequent to this drought, INGO2 secured DFID resilience-
building funding for the period 2011-2016. Referring to the DFID-funded resilience 
program, INGO2’s DRR advisor explained,   
That was the bulk of our resilience work that also encompassed sections on DRR 
where we made major interventions. Our priority areas were building 
community capacity and empowering communities to be able to identify risks 
in their own localities and how they would manage those risks. Communities 
would, therefore, come up with their action plans, and then from prioritized risks, 
we would look at how to facilitate communities; either through their own 
resources or with resources from INGO2 to come up with projects that would 
address identified risks.  
 The analysis revealed that linked to INGO2’s support for CMDRR, was the 2nd-tier 
community focused priority of ‘equipping target communities with lobbying skills.”  The 
communities were trained on advocacy skills to come up with key areas where they 
would want to lobby government or any other agencies for inclusion. For our case, we 
had the county integrated 
development plans. We assisted 
our communities to ensure that 
their action plans have also been 
integrated into those plans.  
Linked to INGO2’s quest to 
build community capacity to lobby 
is the 3rd tier community-focused 
priority of “strengthening 
Figure 8: people in Ele Borr, Northern Kenya, identified 
disease and maternal health as a key problem in their 
community. With help from one of INGO2’s local partners, 
they succeeded in getting government funding to build a 
clinic in their community. 
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accountability to communities”, to which INGO2 explained,  
The other bit (referring to DRR priorities) was mainly on accountability to 
communities affected by disasters and just ensuring that there is accountability 
right at the community because we work through local partners. …we are 
building accountability mechanisms that communities are able to hold INGO2, 
our local partners, any other agencies and the government accountable to ensure 
that their priorities are being looked at.  
 Expounding on key areas of emphasis when working on strengthening 
accountability to communities affected by disasters, the DRR advisor pointed out the 
importance of sharing project information including sensitive aspects, for instance, 
budgets, and being able to follow up with whichever stakeholder and ask the right 
questions.  
If there are budgets that the government has set aside for DRR interventions, for 
instance, water projects, ---do communities have information and even the 
budget? What allocation is there? Can communities ask questions and follow up 
for instance with contractors on the ground? …We felt accountability is one key 
area because we must move away from this tokenistic way of doing things and 
help communities understand what their rights and entitlements are and that 
they are able to understand how to ask questions in case things don’t go right.  
Rooted in lessons learned from the 2011 Horn of Africa drought crisis, the 4th tier 
of INGO2’s community-focused DRR priorities was the ‘promotion of community access 
to practical early warning information’. Evaluations had revealed that while there was 
adequate EW information on the severity of the crisis by as early as March 2010, the 
situation remained unrecognised, and there was no early action leading to avoidable 
catastrophic malnutrition levels and mortality (Kim & Guha-Sapir, 2012). This is where 
Basher (2006, p. 2171) recommends adopting the ‘end-to-end’ concept to  EWS where 
information is communicated to all key stakeholders and is acted on with a built-in 
monitoring and feedback mechanisms. For the 2011 Horn of Africa drought crisis, it is 
action on existing EWS that had largely been the missing link in closing the EWS loop.   
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Armed with the above lessons, the DRR advisor explained, “Part of the funding 
that we got was to enable communities get early warning information---climate 
information services”. The advisor further explained that INGO2 had developed a 
working relationship with the Kenya Meteorological Department in which the latter 
would conduct end-user field visits to INGO2-supported communities and take time to 
explain EW information to people, and how they should use shared information.  
 
Government Focused DRR Priorities 
Under government-focused priorities, INGO2 revealed that in addition to 
building community capacity to lobby key stakeholders, the organisation had ‘advocacy 
and influencing’ high on its DRR priorities. The advocacy and influencing agenda focuses 
on elevating issues springing from community level to national, regional and global 
platforms.   
We engage in different platforms--- at the national level, regional level, even 
globally. This is in a bid to push for issues that have come from communities that 
we feel have no voice to reach the national government or the global platforms. 
In these situations, we would have our own staff pitching the voice at that level. 
We, therefore, connect right from communities going up to the national and 
regional levels even up to the global levels.  
More remarkable here is the fact that INGO2’s advocacy and influencing agenda is 
driven by issues arising from their community engagements.  
Cross-Cutting DRR Priorities 
Data analysis further revealed that in order to leverage its ‘advocacy and 
influencing’ priority, INGO2 adopted a strong empirical research agenda aimed at 
generating compelling community-rooted evidence in support of advocacy and 
influencing at national and global levels. Citing one example of the ‘Shifting Power 
Project’ which aims to strengthen the capacity of local and national organisations so 
they can play a leading role in decision making during humanitarian crises, INGO2  
explained,  
   138 
 
The Shifting Power Project (funded by a European donor) was born out of 
research that INGO2 and a group of other agencies did. We were checking out 
who are the first responders whenever there is a crisis, so it was identified that 
the first responders are actually the local communities and the local 
organisations that we work with who are always at the forefront whenever there 
is a crisis before even INGOs  decide to get into the crisis and maybe do their 
appeals… why can’t they (referring to community groups and local NGOs) also 
be given space and opportunity to engage in these platforms and bring their 
voices to this level so that they are heard because they play a big role? 
 INGO2 also showed that the research findings that proved local NGOs were the 
first responders from which the Shifting Power Project was born, were also used to push 
the ‘localisation agenda’ during the Grand Bargain discourse at the 2016 World 
Humanitarian Summit. The localisation agenda aims to allocate at least 25% of 
international humanitarian funding to local organisations (the first responders). 
Referring to the research, its findings, and the need to support local NGOs, INGO2 
stressed,  
 
Those are the areas that INGO2 really pushed for during the Grand Bargain 
because we had evidence to back that up from the different crises we have had 
in Kenya and from other regions where INGO2 works…Local responders should 
have an opportunity, should be funded better and should be facilitated to 
respond…they are the front liners in any situation. That is just one example of 
how we used the evidence.  
 
In summary, the analysis revealed that while INGO2’s DRR priorities fall under 
the three broad categories of ‘community-focused priorities’, ‘government-focused 
priorities’ and ‘cross-cutting priorities’, all the three broad categories have one thing in 
common. They all zoom in on community issues. For instance, INGO2’s advocacy and 
influencing focus on elevating issues raised from community level to national and global 
levels. And INGO2’s research studies also aim to generate local level evidence that feeds 
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into the advocacy and influencing agenda.  INGO2’s priorities, therefore, demonstrated 
a good level of support for CCB4DRR.  
 
5.4.2 How do institutional donors and INGOs working on DRR 
in Kenya decide which DRR priorities to support in the 
country?   
While all aggregated six case study responses to this question were categorised 
under ‘externally looking’, ‘internally looking’ and ‘not involved’ criteria; analysis 
revealed that INGO2 uses externally and internally looking criteria to select its DRR 
priorities. 
 
Externally Looking Selection Criteria 
 Explaining factors influencing how INGO2 selects her DRR priorities, the DRR 
advisor pointed out how the organisation considers the country’s development 
indicators to select priority geographic areas.  
We have had different ways of approaching it, but mostly, it is in terms of where 
the needs are…Our mandate is usually working with the most marginalized or the 
most vulnerable or the poorest of the poor so that we ensure we are not 
furthering issues of power imbalances…Most of our work is targeted to the arid 
and semi-arid counties. We feel that those are the counties that are most 
vulnerable given historic issues that development has not probably reached most 
of these communities because of marginalization. 
 As indicated in INGO2’s case study description, the organisation has worked in 
Kenya since the 1090s. And because of her prioritisation of the most marginalised 
geographic areas, in addition to supporting communities during times of stress, INGO2 
explained: “we feel that beyond emergency response, we should also look at resilience 
so that we consolidate the gains that we have had throughout the years.” It is clear 
therefore that building the resilience of target communities in the most marginalised 
areas of Kenya is a key DRR priorities’ selection criteria for INGO2, hence the adoption 
of resilience-building focused DRR interventions in target communities. 
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 The analysis also revealed that once the matter of selecting the right geographic 
areas has been dealt with, INGO2 uses a ‘community-led’ approach to determining 
required priority interventions in target communities. “We decided to approach issues 
of resilience building which also encompass our DRR work using a community-led 
approach…out of what communities generate in their action plans, we also pick out 
issues to engage with… issues that are raised at the community level become the basis 
upon which we engage at every level.  
 This a commendable approach to working with communities and echoes Robert 
Chambers’ observations in his seminal work titled “whose reality counts”. In this 
seminal work, Chambers (1998) asserts that the realities and priorities of poor people 
often differ from those imagined for them by professionals and policymakers. Chambers 
observes and recommends that the challenge is, therefore, to enable poor and 
marginalised people to analyse their conditions and identify their priorities in ways that 
freely express their realities and generate proposals that are doable, credible and 
persuasive to policymakers.  
Internally Looking Selection Criteria 
 In addition to using an externally-looking lens while scanning for which DRR 
priorities to support, INGO2 indicated the organisation also looks from within the global 
organisation to inform her in-country DRR priorities.  Thus further to pointing out the 
aforementioned externally looking criteria, INGO2 added, “And of course INGO2 has her 
priorities even at the global level, and most of these are drawn from our different 
community experiences. We try to see how we can use them for supporting more areas.”  
In summary, a closer look at both INGO2’s externally and internally looking DRR 
priorities’ selection criteria reveals an organisation that has developed the ability to 
listen to target communities, support them to determine their priorities and use 
community generated priorities to even inform the organisation’s global agendas/ 
priorities. INGO2, therefore, uses a DRR priorities selection criteria that has communities 
and community capacity building for DRR at its core.  
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5.4.3 Knowledge and use of international DRR frameworks 
In each of the six INGO and donor case study interview guides, there were 
specific questions indirectly looking at whether donors and INGOs have knowledge of 
global DRR frameworks and whether these frameworks have had any influence on 
agency DRR priorities. The interview question on HFA was presented as follows: “During 
the implementation of the Hyogo Framework for Action, there were periodic 
compilations and sharing of regional and country platform DRR progress assessment 
reports.  Are you aware of these reports?” 
 To the above question, INGO2 responded, “I would say partly yes because as I 
mentioned, there was a different colleague who was championing this work; even 
engaging in the different platforms both at the regional level and sometimes globally. I 
have seen some but I have not engaged in them to that level as compared to him as a 
Resilience Officer.  I would say that I have had information from time to time. Like for the 
HFA, I remember there was one in Nigeria, as a build up towards the post-2015, so those 
engagements I had information on, but I wouldn’t say I have all reports or I am aware of 
all reports but I have seen some of them.” And probed further into whether HFA 
progression assessment reports may have had any influence on Christian Aid’s work in Kenya, 
the advisor responded, “I wouldn’t confidently say that any of the progression reports have 
significantly influenced any of the work that we are doing.” 
 Asked whether the advisor was aware of the Kenya National DRR platform, the 
advisor indicated awareness of the existence of the Kenya DRR platform but 
acknowledged “we have been participating but not consistently”. Relatedly, however, 
the advisor pointed out the existence of an interagency working group (IAWG) that has 
a DRR sub-working group in which INGO2 is a regular and very keen participant. This 
disclosure, corroborated by INGO1’s aforementioned stakeholder agitation during 
preparations for the May 2017 Cancun Global DRR Platform seems to point to low 
stakeholder buy-in into the Kenya DRR platform and its would-have-been functions.  
 On the SF4DRR, it was obvious the DRR advisor had some knowledge of the 
framework but didn’t disclose much to show greater comprehension of SF4DRR. The 
advisor highlighted that while INGO2 was in a gap period between the phased out 
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resilience-building program and waiting to find out whether there would be funding 
opportunities to launch a possible successor program, the organisation is still keenly 
engaged with SF4DRR because there are other countries that have active DRR 
programmes.   
 To recap this section, the DRR advisor exhibited some level of awareness of HFA 
and SF4DRR but did not have what would be considered ample working knowledge of 
the two frameworks. On the contrary, this is one organisation that has a very strong 
CCB4DRR commitment but seems to draw very little if anything from the in-country 
government led DRR agendas. It appears INGO2 is well engaged into global DRR 
framework goings-on, but due to seeming weaknesses with the Kenya National DRR 
Platform, INGO2 is less informed and engaged with how to contribute to the 
implementation of SF4DRR within the country. In addition, while there seemed to be a 
disconnect between INGO2’s global engagement with DRR frameworks and cascading 
this to the lower levels, the gap may be a result of staff attrition at the country level.  
5.4.4 Funding for CCB4DRR 
Studies by Watson et al. (2015), Kelman (2013), and Kellett and Caravani (2013) 
revealed that abysmal development assistance funding goes to DRR and whatever goes 
to DRR is also biased towards preparedness for effective response leaving only 
droppings if any going to investing in DRR for resilience. With those studies’ intimation, 
this research considered it essential to examine the state of overall DRR funding and 
state of funding for CCB4DRR within the six INGO and donor case studies.  
 Asked about how much of the organisation’s disaster management funding goes 
to DRR and then to CCB4DRR, INGO2’s DRR advisor disclosed, “Out of the total grants, if 
I can pick from the last financial year that we had, out of the total grants that we sent 
out which was almost 2.4 million Euros, up to 50% were either directly or indirectly 
looking at issues of DRR and climate change work”. 
 And asked how much of the commitment to DRR was going to CCB4DRR, the 
advisor revealed “we had four projects in total… A good estimate would be out of the 
total amount, each project would have like 15-20% allocation on just capacity building. 
However, INGO2 also indicated that “sometimes it is hard to put a specific figure to it 
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because for different projects we have looked at different ways of aiding capacity 
building. For instance, we sometimes identify community champions who we would take 
for sensitive training or use them as TOTs, and other times do exchange visits or even 
invite other agencies like KENYAMET to help communities with climate information 
sharing.” 
In a summary, of the three INGO case studies covered by this research, INGO2 
reported the highest funding commitment to both DRR (up to 50% of total budgets) 
and CCB4DRR (15-20% of DRR funds).  This is corroborated by INGO2’s adoption of 
community-led approaches to its work, much of which being focused on resilience-
building DRR interventions. INGO2 is walking the talk. No rhetoric.  
  
5.4.5 How do institutional donors and INGOs measure DRR 
success in Kenya?  
For all the six INGO and donor case studies, responses to this question were re-
arranged into 2 broad categories, and the two categories were:  
iii. Measures focused on local-level DRR success, and  
iv. Measures focused on national-level DRR success.  
And for INGO2, the analysis revealed three top indicators by which the organisation 
measures DRR success. The three indicators include ‘community capacity to 
successfully lobby upstream’, ‘community capacity to attract external resources’, and 
‘results from policy influencing.’ The first two indicators fall under the broad category 
of ‘measures focused at local-level DRR successes’, while the last one on policy and 
influencing falls under the broad category of “measures focused at national-level DRR 
success”.    
Community capacity to successfully lobby upstream 
Asked how as an organisation INGO2 measures the effectiveness and success of 
its contribution to the country’s DRR agenda, the DRR advisor started her response by 
pointing to results of INGO2’s priority to build community capacity to lobby upstream. 
With an introspection question, the advisor reflectively explained, “have we enabled 
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communities to be able to raise their voice and ask and lobby and actually tell 
government or whichever other agencies that want to work in their locality that ‘these 
are the priorities we have, these are the ones that have already been resourced, can you 
come in and help fill this specific gap?’” Still, on community capacity to lobby, the advisor 
further explained, “the other one is how community action plans have been incorporated 
into the county integrated development plans… so that we know that the priorities that 
the communities came up with have actually been taken up”. 
 
Community capacity to attract external resources 
Related to measuring DRR success by looking at results from ‘community 
capacity to lobby upstream’, is the measure that looks at ‘community capacity to attract 
external resources.’ To the latter, the DRR advisor explained, “we always look at the 
community action plans we have had. Beyond our own funding, we look at percentage 
funding that communities were able to attract through their own lobbying to other 
agencies or the government for support to their DRR activities.” 
Results from policy influencing 
 Still, on how INGO2 measures the success of their contribution to the country’s 
DRR agenda, the advisor exposed, “another area is our influence on various policies…As 
INGO2, we look at how we are influencing policy out of the evidence or out of the 
information we come up with from the communities we are working with. Are we able 
to influence government policies at different levels---at the county level, at the national 
level, and beyond?” 
In summary, INGO2 presented strong emphasis of measuring DRR success at the 
community level, and much of the yardstick looks at whether target communities have 
the capacity to take DRR matters into their own hands, lobby, attract resources and hold 
key stakeholders more accountable. Even the measure of success that looks at policy 
results at national level seeks to identify results from community-focused influencing 
agendas.  And as argued by Eade (2007, p. 632) who in  her seminal work “Capacity 
Building: Who Builds Whose Capacity?” points out that the role of an engaged outsider 
in CCB is to support the capacity of local people to determine their own values and 
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priorities, to organize themselves to act upon and sustain these for the common good; 
INGO2 is using the right yardstick in measuring DRR success. It is all about people-power. 
And like reasoned by Lao Tzu’s assertion that “when the best leader’s job is done, the 
people say ‘we did it ourselves’” (Gill, 2002, p. 315), INGO2 has passed the baton to its 
target communities.  
5.4.6 What changes do institutional donors and INGOs 
working on DRR want to see as a result of their 
contribution to the DRR agenda in the country?  
The purpose behind this question was to ultimately indirectly find out where or 
at what level both case donors and INGOs wanted to see changes as a result of their 
DRR contribution in the country. For all the six case studies, responses to this question 
were re-arranged into 9 categories, namely: better resource allocation, better DRR 
comprehension and integration, improved coordination, improved DRM governance, 
improved community capacity, more child-led DRR, professional disciplines taking DRR 
seriously, reduced hazard impacts,  and lastly, things that need to be stopped. Data 
analysis assigned INGO2’s response to 3 of the 9 categories, namely: ‘improved DRM 
governance’, ‘better resource allocation’, and ‘things that need to be stopped.’ The 
analysis is presented in that order.  
 Improved DRM Governance 
Asked ‘what specific changes or improvements INGO2 would like to see in Kenya 
as a result of highly effective DRR work in the country’, the DRR advisor pointed out the 
need for vital changes around policy issues, and in part reflected, “beyond the many 
policies and frameworks we have had at the country level, is there a way to bring all 
these together?' Like now, we have the climate change policy, we have the draft policy 
on disaster response, at what point then do these speak to each other?” In addition to 
desired policy and frameworks harmonisation related changes, the advisor also singled 
out the need to harmonise DRR governance structures.   
We have so many departments, we have so many people running around with 
different things, yet at the end of it all, communities experience these things 
together so they (communities) will not tell you that this is climate change that 
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we are doing, or that this is disaster response or this is development work. Unless 
we get that meeting point, we will continue running with so many things fairly 
apart from each other and will not be able to bring everything together.  That is 
the worry that I have.  
 INGO2, therefore, desires to see a couple of DRM governance changes in the 
country, and the two include harmonisation of DRM policies and frameworks and the 
reduction and harmonisation of national DRM departments.  
Better Resource Allocation 
 Expounding more on desired changes consequent to successful DRR in the 
country, the advisor added, “Another desired change is to provide more resources to 
communities to help them lead their own preparedness plans or DRR activities. A lot of 
the resources should not just end at the County level… Sometimes they (communities) 
may have good DRR committees and plans at that level but it is not resourced…” Still, on 
better resource allocation, INGO2 shared reflections from research they had conducted 
as a part contribution to the May 2016 Grand Bargain inputs. The advisor reflected, 
“Clearly, there was that disparity as most of the funding was going to INGOs and UN 
agencies…very little resources go to first responders.” 
 INGO2, therefore, desires to see changes leading to adequate DRR resource 
allocation to local NGOs and actors compared to the level of especially financial 
resources presently allocated to INGOs and UN agencies. INGO2’s quest for better 
resource allocation to local NGOs that play the crucial role of first responders is validated 
by Craig (2007) and Duncan and Thomas (2000) who in their respective works on CCB 
assert that CCB involves development work which strengthens the ability of community-
based organizations and groups  to build their structures, systems, people and skills.  
They, therefore, recommend that where there are organisations within target 
communities, building the capacity of such organisations should be considered part of 
CCB.  
Things that need to be stopped.  
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Illuminating more on specific changes and or improvements INGO2 would like to 
see in Kenya as a result of highly effective DRR work in the country, the DRR advisor 
pointed out several things that need to be stopped.  
I feel there is the missing link from the community to the county and to the 
national level. For example, we have an agency like the National Drought 
Management Authority (NDMA) that gathers early warning information, say for 
drought; and from what I have seen or experienced, it is an extractive way of 
getting information…there is no feedback loop back to the community. NDMA 
would have an early warning bulletin, but for a community like Marsabit, they 
have no access to this information.  This information would only be relevant to 
someone like me who has access to the internet in Nairobi...But there is no way 
the community gets this feedback for them to make timely decisions…  
 INGO2, therefore, would like to see a stop to processes that only extract from 
communities, and see them replaced with those that provide value-addition feedback 
loops to communities. This desired change is in concert with views by  D. Alexander and 
Davis (2012) who assert that one of the ‘elephants in the room’ in official publications 
and international gatherings convened to discuss DRR is the ‘human right to hazard 
information’. Alexander and Davis argue that in scores of countries around the world, 
the right of access to knowledge of the risks that citizens face, are persistently denied.  
 By inference, one of INGO2’s outcry pointed to the desired need to stop 
spreading especially scarce resources thin, and be more focused. “So, you have one 
project here, another one there, many times commissioned by the county government. 
For example, they may have put up health facilities and spread them across. But they 
have not resourced them, so there are no staffs and no drugs”.   
 Related to the importance of freeing and allocating more resources to the 
community level, INGO2 lamented, “resources actually do not get to where they should 
get…A lot of the resources should not just end at the County level”.  It appears that due 
to the country’s devolution governance system in which budgets are allocated to both 
the central government and to the 47 counties, the two layers of government trap and 
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retain more resources leaving very little trickling down in support to community 
development programmes including resilient building DRR activities.  
In summary, 5 out of INGO2’s 7 desired changes aim to improve local/ community 
DRR action. This again highlights the importance INGO2 gives the overall agenda of 
prioritising things that Maton (2008) and Page and Czuba (1999) reasoned foster power 
in people and translate to increased community capacity to take charge of their 
wellbeing.  
5.4.7 Comments on ‘upper Vs local DRR support’ 
 For all the 6 donor and INGO case studies, the semi-structured 
interview guide asked the following question, “What would be your comments 
on growing literature that seems to suggest there’s inadequate support to 
community-level DRR action and yet there is comparatively more support to 
global, regional and national level DRR activities by many key stakeholders?”   
Intrigued by the questions, the DRR advisor agreeably responded,  
I think this is a valid point, given some of the work that I have mentioned to you 
earlier. A case example is the ‘Shifting the Power Project’ that we have. Out of 
the research that was done looking at what resources were given to local 
partners and communities for disaster response versus the kind of work they do, 
and in comparison looking at what INGOs and UN bodies take out of the global 
funding for humanitarian response...we felt that where the need is most and 
where most of the work is done and where the communities are left after we have 
all pulled out is where very little resources go. Very little resources go to first 
responders and to those who remain with communities when we have all gone. 
 The advisor argued this is the sole reason INGO2 took the finding seriously and 
used it as part input to the 2016 Grand Bargain. The May 2016 Grand Bargain is a global 
compact within which aid organisations and donors committed to having by 2020 
reached a global aggregated target of allocating at least 25% of humanitarian funding to 
local and national responders as directly as possible to improve outcomes for affected 
people and reduce transactional costs (Spiegel, 2017, p. 4). 
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5.4.8 Comments on whether and how evidence from this 
research may be used. 
 Part of the interview guide run a statement with a question at the end reading 
as follows: “There’s ample literature showing that inadequate prioritisation of 
community capacity building for DRR remains the biggest obstacle to realising greater 
DRR progression in many countries including Kenya. Would INGO2 be willing to use 
this kind of evidence?”  
In response, INGO2 showed willingness to use these research findings as input into its 
already community-focused research agenda.  
For us, because one specific area we believe in is advocacy, so we would use 
such kind of evidence to build on the advocacy plans or the advocacy agendas 
that we already have. I believe that this strongly complements some of the 
advocacy issues that we have actually raised beyond communities at the county 
and at the national level and at the regional or global level. So we would use it 
for different audiences: our donors, our supporters, and the government 
because they are the main duty bearers in terms of ensuring communities are 
thriving and are better prepared to face any kinds of crisis. So we would use that 
for a strong advocacy agenda to complement most of what we have already 
actually voiced out and ensuring that community-led processes are supported 
because it is the most effective way of doing things. 
For DRR actors like INGO2 who are already ahead in moving forward CCB4DRR, the research 
would help to validate what they are already doing very well.  
5.4.9 Overall comments 
DRR priorities: In summary, the analysis revealed that while INGO2’s DRR 
priorities fall under the three broad categories of ‘community-focused priorities’, 
‘government-focused priorities’ and ‘cross-cutting priorities’, all the three broad 
categories have one thing in common. They all zoom in on community issues. For 
instance, INGO2’s advocacy and influencing focus on elevating issues raised from 
community level to national and global levels. And INGO2’s research studies also aim to 
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generate local level evidence that feeds into the advocacy and influencing agenda.  
INGO2’s priorities, therefore, demonstrated a good level of support for CCB4DRR.  
 
Criteria for selecting priorities: In summary, a closer look at both INGO2’s 
externally and internally looking DRR priorities’ selection criteria reveals an organisation 
that has developed the ability to listen to target communities, support them to 
determine their priorities and use community generated priorities to even inform the 
organisation’s global agendas. INGO2, therefore, uses a DRR priorities selection criteria 
that have communities and community capacity building for DRR at its core.  
 
 Knowledge and use of global DRR frameworks: The DRR advisor exhibited some 
level of awareness of HFA and SF4DRR, but did not have what would be considered 
ample working knowledge of the two frameworks. On the contrary, this is one 
organisation that has a very strong CCB4DRR commitment but seems to draw very little 
if anything from the in-country government led DRR agendas. It appears INGO2 is well 
engaged into global DRR framework goings-on, but due to seeming weaknesses with the 
Kenya National DRR Platform, INGO2 is less informed and engaged with how to 
contribute to the implementation of SF4DRR within the country.  
DRR Funding: In a summary, of the three INGO case studies covered by this 
research, INGO2 reported the highest funding commitment to both DRR (up to 50% of 
total budgets) and CCB4DRR (15-20% of DRR funds).  This is corroborated by INGO2’s 
adoption of community-led approaches to its work, much of which being focused on 
resilience-building DRR interventions. INGO2 is walking the talk. No rhetoric.  
 
Ways of measuring success: In summary, INGO2 presented strong emphasis of 
measuring DRR success at the community level, and much of the yardstick looks at 
whether target communities have the capacity to take DRR matters into their own hands, 
lobby, attract resources and hold key stakeholders more accountable. Even the measure 
of success that looks at policy results at national level seeks to identify results from 
community-focused influencing agendas.  Like argued by Eade (2007, p. 632) who in  her 
seminal work “Capacity Building: Who Builds Whose Capacity?” points out that the role 
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of an engaged outsider in CCB is to support the capacity of local people to determine 
their own values and priorities, to organize themselves to act upon and sustain these for 
the common good; INGO2 is using the right yardstick in measuring DRR success. It is all 
about people-power.  And as reasoned by Lao Tzu’s assertion that “when the best 
leader’s job is done, the people say ‘we did it ourselves’” (Gill, 2002, p. 315), INGO2 has 
passed the baton to its target communities.  
 
Desired changes consequent to effective DRR in the country: In summary, 5 out 
of INGO2’s 7 desired changes aim to improve local/ community DRR action. This again 
highlights the importance INGO2 gives the overall agenda of prioritising things that 
Maton (2008) and Page and Czuba (1999) reasoned foster power in people and translate 
to increased community capacity to take charge of their wellbeing.  
 
In a nutshell, INGO2 has very strong commitment to local DRR including CCB4DRR 
as indicated by its current DRR priorities, criteria for selecting these priorities, how much 
of its funding goes to DRR and CCB4DRR, emphasis of measuring DRR success at 
community level, and 5 out of the 7 desired DRR-related changes in the country are all 
focused on improving local/community DRR action. 
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Figure 5. 3 A Mind Map of ING02 Findings 
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5.5 Analysis and Discussion of Case Study 3 – INGO3 
INGO 3 is a faith-based INGO that works with partners and uses three integrated 
pillars for its programming. The three pillars include community development, disaster 
relief and rehabilitation, and peace and justice. Through its local partners, INGO 3 
supports people in community groups to work together to overcome illiteracy, 
malnutrition, unemployment, child mortality and injustice. Its budget and geographic 
spread make it fit the small-sized INGO category in the country.  
For the following analysis, it must be noted that INGO3’s interview respondent was a 
person of very brief responses.  
5.5.1 What are the DRR priorities currently being supported 
by respective institutional donors and INGOs working 
on DRR in Kenya? 
During data analysis, it emerged all the six case study responses to this question could 
be organised and presented under four broad categories, and these include 
‘government-focused priorities’, ‘community-focused priorities’, ‘intra-agency focused 
priorities’ and ‘cross-cutting priorities’. And a close examination of INGO3’s response to 
the question revealed that the organisation’s current DRR priorities in Kenya fall under 
the ‘community-focused priorities’ broad category. The ensuing presentation of 
analysis and discussion uncovers the details.  
Community-focused DRR priorities 
 The analysis of INGO3’s community-focused priorities revealed a strong focus on 
‘community managed DRR’ and ‘child-led DRR’.  In his response, the DRR advisor in part 
indicated, “INGO3 is currently supporting the community managed disaster risk 
reduction initiative, CMDRR”. To explain further, the DRR advisor cited a number of 
examples including the case where INGO3 worked with displaced communities in North 
Western Kenya following the country’s severe 2007/2008 post-election violence.  
It was a huge number (referring to post-election violence-displaced people) and 
so INGO3 worked with them. What was common there was diarrhoea and 
waterborne diseases, so we taught them on hygiene and then drilled boreholes 
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so that they could have clean water. Above all we trained them on community 
managed DRR and they came up with their own committee which they have now 
registered. What this committee does up to today is for example if there is 
drought approaching, they will tell the community, “Two years ago drought 
came and we lost much of our livestock, since we are anticipating drought, please 
sell your livestock, remain with small stocks.” They will tell the community, “The 
rainy season is about to start, and during the rainy season the spread of cholera 
is so much and so frequent, so what do we need to prepare to do? Let us prepare 
and have water purification tablets, let us be careful with the water we drink”. 
And it has worked so well because it is done in the indigenous language. 
 In addition to using examples to explain CMDRR as a top priority, the DRR Advisor 
revealed a tight link between CMDRR and child-led DRR. “Besides that (referring to 
CMDRR), we also took the same to schools. In fact, in schools, we went ahead and did 
pit latrines besides training the pupils and doing a competition on hygiene and 
sanitation. So now these schools have DRR clubs in Turkana and that has helped.”  
In summary and as brief as the response was, the analysis showed that INGO3 is 
supporting CMDR including child-led DRR in rural schools. CMDRR is a great contributor 
to CCB4DRR. 
 
5.5.2 How do institutional donors and INGOs working on DRR 
in Kenya decide which DRR priorities to support in the 
country?    
While all aggregated six case study responses to this question were categorised under 
‘externally looking’, ‘internally looking’ and ‘not involved’ criteria; analysis revealed that 
INGO3 uses externally and internally looking criteria to select its DRR priorities. 
 
Externally Looking Selection Criteria 
 Explaining factors influencing how INGO3 selects their DRR priorities, the DRR 
advisor pointed out, “Our priorities are based on information from the National Disaster 
Management Authority. So we would study the NDMA, then study the county 
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government strategic plan and priorities and see if it aligns with our capacity and then 
look at INGO3 global priorities. In addition to this, we would look at a fourth component 
that is the XYZ (pseudonym) Alliance which we are members of. So we also promote the 
priorities of XYZ Alliance. We would merge the four, then based on that we would be 
able to see where we fit and what to run with.”  
The proliferation of guns and resultant perpetual violent conflicts among Kenya’s 
arid and semi-arid pastoralist 
communities has long been a 
deterrence to many INGO and 
donor willingness to prioritise 
some of these areas for 
programming support beyond 
emergency responses (ref to Fig 
5.4). Relatedly, INGO3 is one of 
the 2 Case Studies that 
identified security or access to an area as one of the criteria used to prioritise where to 
work. In addition to security and access to an area, INGO3 revealed that “funding is a 
factor.” This funding factor is probably best demonstrated by INGO2’s already reported 
situation where the organisation phased out a 5-year resilience-building programme 
and by the time of the interview was still in the waiting mode for funding opportunities 
before it could launch another related multi-year programme.  
Internally Looking Selection Criteria  
In the foregoing section, INGO3 indicated that after studying and collating both 
NDMA and County government DRR plans and priorities, they also map these collated 
priorities against INGO3’s internal capacities and global priorities.   INGO3’s internal 
capacities and global DRR priorities are therefore part of internal criteria used to select 
their DRR priorities. The desire to strengthen and disaster-proof existing development  
programmes was also identified as a key DRR priorities selection criteria. Citing an 
example, the DRR advisor explained,  
 
“Our development work could be at risk because of disasters. For example, in 
Figure 5. 4 an armed herder from a village in Baringo County, Kenya 
drives his cattle to grazing fields [Anthony Langat: Al Jazeera] 
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Magarini we have a community food security programme where we are teaching 
farmers on agriculture. And we have come to the realization that the work is at 
risk because of frequent droughts, like two years droughts followed by another 
year of flooding. So we realized that if we do not embed DRR in that work then 
we are going to lose the work.” This rationale is commended by Schipper and 
Pelling (2006) when they point to a poor assumption where scores of 
development practitioners think that DRR is already  incorporated into ‘pro-poor 
development’ leading to awful manifestations of what UNDP (2004) and 
Yodmani (2001) call ‘unresolved development problems.’  
 
In summary, INGO3 revealed that national/NDMA and country government DRR 
priorities, security and access to communities, funding availability, internal capacities, 
organisational global priorities and the need to disaster-proof on-going programmes 
form the criteria used to determine INGO3’s DRR priorities. When compared and 
contrasted with INGO1 and INGO2’s DRR priorities’ selection criteria, ING03’s selection 
criteria doesn’t immediately reveal anything that speaks to how community DRR needs 
(including the need for CCB4DRR) influence INGO3’s DRR priorities. However, the 
researcher noted that INGO3’s commitment to CMDRR must be where community DRR 
priorities come to the front only that INGO3 didn’t bring this up.   
 
5.5.3 Knowledge and use of international DRR frameworks 
 In each of the six INGO and donor case study interview guides, there were 
specific questions indirectly looking at whether donors and INGOs have knowledge of 
global DRR frameworks and whether these frameworks have had any influence on 
agency DRR priorities. The interview question on HFA was presented as follows: “During 
the implementation of the Hyogo Framework for Action, there were periodic 
compilation and sharing of regional and country platform DRR progress assessment 
reports. Are you aware of these reports?” To this question, the DRR advisor responded: 
“Yes I am aware.” 
 To every participant in the six INGO and donor case studies that answered 
affirming knowledge and awareness of HFA and its related progress assessment reports, 
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a probing question aimed at finding out whether and how the reports may have had any 
influence on the organisation’s DRR support priorities in the country was asked. A 
thorough analysis of the participant’s answer quickly revealed the advisor was neither 
conversant with the HFA nor its related progress assessment reports. Asked whether he 
was conversant with the SF4DRR, the advisor responded, “to a very small extent, yes”. 
And asked whether he would be willing to share the little he knew about SF4DRR, the 
advisor explained, “I can talk but very minimally. In terms of providing good direction, in 
terms of assessment, it is an eye-opener, but as I said it is still limited.” 
 In summary, the DRR advisor acknowledged to be having limited knowledge and 
utilisation of HFA and SF4DRR, and these two frameworks, therefore, didn’t seem to 
have had any direct influence on INGO3’s DRR priorities. To some extent, this points to 
a gap between what the Kenya DRR Platform exists for and what it is delivering especially 
in the area of creating awareness on globally agreed priorities and creating a sustainable 
movement to localise and implement these priorities.  
5.5.4 Funding for CCB4DRR 
It was Matthew B (2015) who asserted that institutional budgets are a great indicator 
of respective institutional values and priorities. For DRR, Mathew’s assertion is 
corroborated  by Watson et al. (2015), Kelman (2013), and Kellett and Caravani (2013) 
whose studies revealed that abysmal development assistance funding goes to DRR and 
whatever goes to DRR is also biased towards preparedness for effective response leaving 
only droppings if any going to investing in DRR for resilience. With those studies’ 
intimation, this research considered it essential to examine the state of overall DRR 
funding and state of funding for CCB4DRR within the six INGO and donor case studies.  
 Asked about how much of the organisation’s disaster management funding goes 
to DRR and then to CCB4DRR, INGO3 explained, “DRR is a very small component of 
INGO3’s disaster management because about 90% mostly goes to disaster response. So 
for disaster risk reduction we only have about 10%. But we are saying that in the coming 
years it will grow so that even non-disaster projects should have a percentage going 
towards disaster risk reduction. So it will probably rise to 20 % or 30 % but at the moment 
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it is within 10 %. On funding for CCB4DRR, the DRR advisor stated, “Actually I can say 
about 80% of the 10% is dedicated to community capacity building for DRR.”  
Based on foregoing data, it emerges therefore that for now, about 10% of the 
organisation’s disaster risk management budget goes to DRR. And because INGO3 uses 
community managed DRR approaches to its DRR work, much of the DRR allocation (80%) 
goes to CCB4DRR. This research was however not able to find out the % proportion of 
INGO3’s budget that was dedicated to disaster risk management. This would have 
helped to calculate over all % budget allocation to DRM, DRR and CCB4DRR.   
 
In summary, similar to findings from studies undertaken by Watson et al. (2015), 
Kelman (2013), and Kellett and Caravani (2013), INGO3 is spending more on disaster 
response and far less on resilience-building DRR, though it was encouraging to note that 
much of the DRR funding goes to CMDRR which is strong on CCB4DRR. Thus while 
CMDRR (and CCB4DRR) is a high priority, it’s a low ranking priority when viewed from 
how much of the INGO3’s budget is dedicated to DRR.   
 
5.5.5 How do institutional donors and INGOs measure DRR 
success in Kenya?  
For all the six INGO and donor case studies, responses to this question were re-arranged 
into 2 broad categories, namely:  
i. Measures focused on local-level DRR success, and  
ii. Measures focused on national-level DRR success.  
And for INGO3, the analysis revealed that the organisation uses one compound 
indicator to measure DRR success. This single indicator is “Community Transformation”, 
and it falls under the broad category of “measures focused at local-level DRR success”.   
Asked how as an organisation INGO3 measures the effectiveness and success of her 
contribution to the country’s DRR agenda, the DRR advisor stated, “Overall, I would say, 
INGO3 measures by transformation. The question being ‘Have these activities led to 
transformation?’” To explain this further, the DRR advisor went on to describe 
characteristics of how community transformation would look like:   “And if we break 
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down the transformation, we will look at adoption, application and ownership. In 
addition, is adoption spreading to the next village? For example, if we are in Village A, 
after one year, is what these people have adopted spreading to village B? So that is how 
we will measure our success.” 
The DRR advisor provided several exemplars based on the described characteristics of 
transformation. On the characteristic of ‘ownership’, he gave an example of a 
community that had a transport problem because “there was a river that was so tricky, 
and from the river, it was so hilly and vehicles could not pass there or they would fail to 
climb and roll back causing accidents. People suffered. The community members said, 
“We cannot tarmac a road, but we can demonstrate what we can do.” So they raised 
funds, got some cement, brought sand by themselves and just cemented a small portion 
of that river road. Again, when the Government saw what the community had done, they 
came and worked on the whole road.”  
 The foregoing example is attributed to INGO3’s CMDRR approaches through 
which target communities are enabled via training to identify community risks, take own 
initiative to address them (ownership) and also lobby for additional external support.  
In summary, the analysis showed that INGO3 focuses only at the local level when 
measuring DRR success, and ‘community transformation’ is the primary indicator used 
to assess success and or failure. For INGO3, transformation can be summed up as 
community empowerment to undertake possible DRR activities to a degree where 
results attract non-target communities to replicate the same activities. A great way to 
measure DRR success. INGO3’s approach to measuring DRR success is rooted in the 
organisation’s CMDRR which has a strong element of CCB4DRR.    
 
5.5.6 What changes do institutional donors and INGOs 
working on DRR want to see as a result of their 
contribution to the DRR agenda in the country?  
The purpose behind this question was to ultimately indirectly find out where or at 
what level both case donors and INGOs wanted to see changes as a result of their DRR 
contribution in the country. For all the six case studies, responses to this question were 
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re-arranged into 9 categories, namely: better resource allocation, better DRR 
comprehension and integration, improved coordination, improved DRM governance, 
improved community capacity, more child-led DRR, professional disciplines taking DRR 
seriously, reduced hazard impacts,  and lastly, things that need to be stopped. Data 
analysis assigned INGO3’s response to 4 of the 9 broad categories, namely: more child-
led DRR, professional disciplines to take DRR seriously, DRR comprehension and 
integration, and things that need to be stopped.  The analysis is presented in that order.  
Asked ‘what specific changes or improvements INGO3 would like to see in Kenya as a 
result of highly effective DRR work in the country’, the DRR advisor stated, 
“I would like to see DRR included in schools as part of the school curriculum, so that 
from childhood it goes up to all levels.” The DRR advisor went on to specify some of the 
desired changes consequent to a DRR culture that would emerge among professionals 
once they have interfaced with DRR through their early childhood school curriculum. He 
stated,  
I would like, for instance, the engineering professionals to use DRR language. 
For example, when people are building houses, the engineers usually come in to 
do all the planning and architectural work. They apply for certificates but it’s 
usually more of a formality and less about ensuring safety. So we can reduce the 
risk of disasters immensely if for example, engineers, architects and all the 
government authorities, for example when they are approving construction, use 
a language that really makes the owners or people involved to know that the 
reason they are doing all these things is to reduce the risk that that could be 
associated with this construction.  
 Another area identified by INGO3 for much-needed change was the need for 
government and its DRR partners to have a much better understanding of DRR, 
especially during planning processes. The DRR advisor stated,  
And above all, I would like to see Disaster Risk Reduction in organisations and 
government treated as a long term thing. Because I think part of the failure of 
most disaster risk activities have been time; whereby you are told to implement 
a disaster risk programme in six months.  And from experience, I realized it 
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doesn’t work in a short time because people need to understand it, people need 
to apply it, adopt it and then it can spread to other areas. So, in terms of 
programming, I would like to see DRR treated from long-term perspectives.   
 By inference and experience, INGO3 was suggesting that all DRR stakeholders in 
the country ought to ‘stop treating DRR like it is a quick fix’ thing. And while INGO3 
lamented the treatment of DRR as a quick fix, the DRR advisor pointed out the need to 
integrate DRR into all types of programming, whether short-term or long-term 
programmes.  Driving the point home, the DRR advisor emphasised, “I want to repeat 
this that it is very important to think of DRR whenever we are doing community 
development or disaster response. Let us embed DRR in it, even if it is a short-term food 
assistance project.”  
 To explain the desire for DRR integration even into short term programme 
interventions,  INGO3 cited a case where during the 2006 drought, churches and 
mosques in Marsabit were distributing scarce relief food aid only to their respective 
followers.   Being a conflict-sensitive faith-based organisation that embraced the ‘do no 
harm’ principle and conflict sensitive programming approaches (Anderson, 1999), 
INGO3 broke ranks with this conflict insensitive approach when the organisation started 
a food assistance program in the same area. “When we went there, we said the food is 
for all drought-affected people.” While INGO3’s food rations were being stored in a 
church and the church compound served as a distribution point, the organisation 
ensured inclusion by training community members to identify food assistance 
beneficiaries based on need alone, and not on religion. With a beam, the DRR advisor 
narrated,  
Muslim women and Christian women went in the same queue and got the same 
quantity of food. But that was not the end of the story. They went to their 
mosques and told Imams, “Christians have shared with us their food, same 
quality and same quantity. Next time we get food from our brothers in Saudi 
Arabia or Kuwait, we want the Christians also to come to the mosque and get 
food.” And God answered their desire, they got food. They went to church and 
called Christians and said, “We are not going to eat our food alone, we want you 
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to also come and share with us.” And that immensely reduced religious conflicts 
in Marsabit.  
 In a place laden with perpetual resource-based conflicts, this was a good 
exemplar of how DRR can be integrated even into very short-term people-centred 
projects.  
In summary, the analysis revealed that when DRR is very successful in the 
country, INGO3 would like to see positive changes both at the local and national level.  
The inclusion of DRR in the school curriculum and DRR integration in both short-term 
and long-term community-focused programmes seek to see changes at the local level. 
The desire to stop treating DRR as a short-term quick fix is both local because that’s 
where the implementation happens, but it’s also at the national level because that’s 
where government and partners would need to jointly embrace the desired change 
during related planning processes.   
 
5.5.7 Comments on ‘upper Vs local DRR support’ 
 For all the 6 donor and INGO case studies, the semi-structured 
interview guide asked the following question, “What would be your comments 
on growing literature that seems to suggest there’s inadequate support to 
community-level DRR action and yet there is comparatively more support to 
global, regional and national level DRR activities by many key stakeholders?”   
With a bit of anger in his voice, the DRR advisor agreeably responded, “there is 
more talk about the community but little action.” To explain further, the DRR advisor 
cited the example of many researchers and writers that have written extensively about 
conflicts in the Horn of Africa, but whose writings contribute very little to possible 
solutions.  
So for example on conflict, conflict is a disaster, but what is the solution? The 
solution is peace, but you go and write books, write a book on conflict and entitle 
it ‘Conflict in the Horn of Africa’…. Your book with the title ‘Conflict in the Horn of 
Africa’ will sell a lot. So many people will buy it. They will refer to it because the 
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word ‘conflict’ wakes up people immediately…. if we really want to manage 
conflict we do not even need to study about conflict. We need to go back and say 
how was it when things were working well?... What made this thing to work?... 
what we call the peace pillars… The peace pillars are at the community level… I 
may not have answered that question adequately, but as I mentioned, there is 
more talk and less action. 
 
INGO3’s opinion is corroborated by GNDR (2009) whose frontline views report about 
progress towards implementation of HFA carry a revealing commentary by Bishop 
Donald Mtetemela, a renowned Tanzanian development worker.  Reflecting on HFA, 
Bishop Mtetemela had commented, “The people I work with every day see many clouds 
– international initiatives and plans, but very little rain – actual change at the frontline.” 
The GNDR report was published under the title “Clouds but little rain” explaining that 
“It’s an image that sums up the challenge of turning the Hyogo Framework for Action 
2005-2015 (HFA) into practical, sustainable activity at the frontline where people at-risk 
live, eat and work. This is the challenge that must be met if a substantial reduction in 
disaster losses is to be achieved.” 
Later on, in a review of critical gaps and challenges for the Sendai Framework for 
Disaster Risk Reduction, Oxley (2015) captures and lists HFA’s flawed phenomenon of 
“clouds but little rain” as number 2 out of 11 gaps and challenges which SF4DRR missed 
to prioritise. Oxley explains that the term “clouds but little rain” denotes the growing 
implementation gap between high-level talk and policies and local action. 
In summary, INGO3’s views agree with findings from the literature on the big gap 
between high-level rhetoric and poor support for local level action.  
 
5.5.8 Comments on whether and how evidence from this 
research may be used. 
 Part of the interview guide run a statement with a question at the end reading 
as follows: “There’s ample literature showing that inadequate prioritisation of 
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community capacity building for DRR remains the biggest obstacle to realising greater 
DRR progression in many countries including Kenya. Would INGO3 be willing to use this 
kind of evidence?”  
 INGO3 positively responded, “Yes we would be willing to use that kind of 
evidence.” And INGO3 further explained how such evidence would be used. “First of all, 
to evaluate our own past DRR work…so after that, we will also help our partners to 
evaluate their work. And because we are also in Government forums, we would use that 
evidence to shape the direction of County Government priorities. But above all, we would 
use it to shape our own priorities.” 
INGO3 is, therefore, another willing DRR actor in Kenya that finds value in using 
findings from this research to inform both its programming options and influencing agenda 
with county governments.  
5.5.9 Overall comments 
DRR priorities: In summary and as brief as the response was, the analysis showed that 
INGO3 is supporting CMDR including child-led DRR in rural schools. CMDRR is a great 
contributor to CCB4DRR. 
 
Criteria for selecting priorities: In summary, INGO3 revealed that that national/NDMA 
and country government DRR priorities, security and access to communities, funding 
availability, internal capacities, organisational global priorities and the need to disaster-
proof on-going programmes form the criteria used to determine INGO3’s DRR priorities. 
When compared and contrasted with INGO1 and INGO2’s DRR priorities’ selection 
criteria, ING03’s selection criteria doesn’t immediately reveal anything that speaks to 
how community DRR needs (including the need for CCB4DRR) influence INGO3’s DRR 
priorities. However, the researcher noted that INGO3’s commitment to CMDRR must be 
where community DRR priorities come to the front, only that that INGO3 didn’t bring 
this up.  
 
Knowledge and use of global DRR frameworks: In summary, the DRR advisor 
acknowledged to be having limited knowledge and utilisation of HFA and SF4DRR, and 
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these two frameworks, therefore, didn’t seem to have had any direct influence on 
INGO3’s DRR priorities. To some extent, this points to a gap between what the Kenya 
DRR Platform exists for and what it is delivering especially in the area of creating 
awareness on globally agreed priorities and creating a sustainable movement to localise 
and implement these priorities.  
DRR Funding: In summary, similar to findings from studies undertaken by Watson et al. 
(2015), Kelman (2013), and Kellett and Caravani (2013), INGO3 is spending more on 
disaster response and far less on resilience-building DRR, though it was encouraging to 
note that much of the DRR funding goes to CMDRR which is strong on CCB4DRR. Thus 
while CMDRR (and CCB4DRR) is a high priority, it’s a low ranking priority when viewed 
from how much of the INGO3’s budget is dedicated to DRR.  
 
Ways of measuring success: In summary, the analysis showed that INGO3 focuses only 
at the the local level when measuring DRR success, and ‘community transformation’ is 
the primary indicator used to assess success and or failure. For INGO3, transformation 
can be summed up as community empowerment to undertake possible DRR activities to 
a degree where results attract non-target communities to replicate the same activities. 
A great way to measure DRR success. INGO3’s approach to measuring DRR success is 
rooted in the organisation’s CMDRR which has a strong element of CCB4DRR.  
 
Desired changes consequent to effective DRR in the country: In summary, the analysis 
revealed that when DRR is very successful in the country, INGO3 would like to see 
positive changes both at the local and national level.  The inclusion of DRR in the school 
curriculum and DRR integration in both short-term and long-term community-focused 
programmes seek to see changes at the local level. The desire to stop treating DRR as a 
short-term quick fix is both local because that’s where the implementation happens, but 
it’s also at the national level because that’s where government and partners would need 
to jointly embrace the desired change during related planning processes.  
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Figure 5. 5 A Mind Map of INGO3 Findings 
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5.6 Analysis and Discussion of Case Study 4 – Don1 
 
With an annual development and humanitarian grant contribution of more than US$ 
90 million to the government of Kenya, Don1 is a European donor that falls under the large 
types of donors in the country.  
5.6.1 What are the DRR priorities currently being supported 
by respective institutional donors and INGOs working 
on DRR in Kenya? 
During data analysis, it emerged all the six case study responses to this question 
could be organised and presented under four broad categories, and these include 
‘government-focused priorities’, ‘community-focused priorities’, ‘intra-agency focused 
priorities’ and ‘cross-cutting priorities’. And a close examination of Don1’s response to 
the question revealed that the agency’s current DRR priorities in Kenya fall under the 
‘government-focused priorities’ broad category. The ensuing presentation of analysis 
and discussion uncovers the details.  
National and Local Level Government-focused DRR priorities 
Within her government-focused priorities, Don1 presented two sub-areas of 
focus, and these are ‘funding and tech support to NDMA’ and ‘supporting county 
drought mitigation projects through NDMA’. On funding and tech support to NDMA, 
Don1 explained,    
 
Don 1 in Kenya is engaged in development work through what we call X 
Development Fund (pseudonym). Then we are engaged in humanitarian 
operations…There is also the private sector engagement… We also have issues to 
do with promoting trade…DRR activities done by the Kenya delegation are mainly 
through our support to the National Drought Management Authority. 
Probed to specify what the agency’s actual DRR priorities are in the country, Don 1 
specified,  
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It is a blanket DRR because our main outlet is the National Drought Management 
Authority (NDMA). We are building its capacity as an institution in terms of 
paying salaries, improving their knowledge management handling and so forth. 
We are also now supporting disaster response and preparedness activities at 
county level government…The NDMA has offices in the County Governments, 
which is one of the outlets…At the county level, we have the county steering 
groups which meet regularly. They come up with what they call County 
Integrated Development Plans, and they normally prioritise projects they feel 
should be supported; projects which can help mitigate drought-related disasters. 
Then those projects are funded by Don1 through the NDMA.  
Don1 added,  
But of late, with this current drought, we have gone into hunger cash transfers. 
We are contributing to the Hunger Safety Net Project with the Government which 
is basically response and preparedness activities through NDMA.  
In summary, all of Don1’s current DRR support to Kenya focuses on strengthening 
the National Drought Management Agency through funding its administrative structures 
and providing technical support. While there was mention of support to county drought 
mitigation projects through NDMA, Don1 clearly stated their support to County 
government projects ‘is basically preparedness and response,’ including through the 
hunger safety net project. Don1 did not reveal any prioritisation of CMDRR nor 
CCB4DRR. Don1’s current DRR priorities in the country, therefore, fit the picture painted 
by Watson et al. (2015), Kelman (2013) and Kellett and Caravani (2013) whose studies 
lament the global trend of spending heavily on disaster preparedness and response 
while investing far less in resilience-building DRR.  
 
5.6.2 How do institutional donors and INGOs working on DRR 
in Kenya decide which DRR priorities to support in the 
country?   
While all aggregated six case study responses to this question were categorised 
under ‘externally looking’, ‘internally looking’ and ‘not involved’ criteria; analysis 
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revealed that Don1’s response falls under the ‘not involved’ category, meaning Don1 
does not get involved in deciding which particular DRR priorities to support in the 
country.  
 
‘Not Involved’ in selecting priorities 
Asked whether there are any criteria Don1 uses to inform its choice of DRR 
priorities in the country, Don1’s research participant explained,   
The way we operate, like I 
told you earlier is that we 
give NDMA the resources 
and they are the ones 
who prioritise in terms of 
the micro projects. For 
instance, if we have given 
NDMA money, and there 
are DRR needs in 
Marsabit (one of the 
drought-prone counties),  
NDMA through their 
Marsabit office and their county steering groups will look at what needs to be 
prioritised at that level through the money. Maybe they will see that livestock 
and value chain is what needs to be invested in, so they will do that. And then 
after some time they may see water is the issue and they invest in water. So we 
have given them that flexibility. 
 Asked whether there is any form of guidance Don1 gives to NDMA to 
somewhat inform some of their decisions, Don1 responded, 
There are no guidelines we give them per se on how they are going to use those 
resources. But overall, we may say this is for Hunger Safety Net, this is for 
response and preparedness and it goes that way. So from there, they write 
regular reports to us and we carry out regular audits.  
Figure 5. 6 NDMA: funding allocation in an emergency year 
 
Coordinatio
n 5%
Preparednes
s 30%
Response
50%
Information
15%
NDMA: funding allocation in an emergency year
Coordination Preparedness Response Information
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In a related separate interview, NDMA was asked, “If you were to draw a virtual 
pie chart representing the different NDMA priorities in a normal year, what would be 
the approximate per cent funding allocation to the different NDMA priorities?” In 
response, NDMA stated,  
 
We have been in emergency mode for almost two years now, but I think the 
biggest percent now goes to response. Maybe a half, like fifty per cent. Of course, 
this is not the tradition. This is in terms of a particular bad year. Then we also 
have preparedness taking about 30%. We have other things like monitoring and 
evaluation and information taking another 15%. These are operational costs, not 
salaries and the rest. The rest could be about 5% on coordination. And this is in a 
bad year, like where we are this year. But under normal circumstance co-
ordination would have the biggest (ref to Fig 5.6).  
Asked how much the allocations 
would look like in a normal year, 
NDMA explained, 
 
Coordination in a normal 
year could even be like 20%, 
but response now comes to 
another 20%. In a normal 
year, we should be doing 
more preparedness which 
could go for 40%. Then we 
would have information going for another 20% (ref to Fig 5.7).  
 
 In summary, Don1 entirely devolves to NDMA the responsibility to decide which 
DRR priorities will be supported using resources allocated by Don1. Analysis of NDMA 
data showed that much of the funding goes to both preparedness and response during 
both bad and good years. Concerning the funding channelled to NMDA, Don1 had 
commented, “So what happens with this money and how it operates, is that when we do 
Coordination 20%
Preparedness
40%
Response
20%
Information
20%
NDMA: funding allocation in a normal year
Coordination Preparedness Response Information
Figure 5. 7 NDMA: Funding allocation in a normal year 
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not have emergencies we have mitigation measures ongoing.” There’s no doubt from 
this analysis that while NDMA engages in mitigation interventions, this is far less 
prominent based on how funding is distributed among the agency’s priorities. One 
would, therefore, be right to conclude that for both Don1 and NDMA, prioritising and 
supporting CCB4DRR isn’t anywhere high on their respective agendas.   
 
5.6.3 Knowledge and use of international DRR frameworks 
 In each of the six INGO and donor case study interview guides, there were 
specific questions indirectly looking at whether donors and INGOs have knowledge of 
global DRR frameworks and whether these frameworks have had any influence on 
agency DRR priorities. The interview question on HFA was presented as follows: “During 
the implementation of the Hyogo Framework for Action, there were periodic 
compilation and sharing of regional and country platform DRR progress assessment 
reports. Are you aware of these reports?” To this question, the Don1 research 
participant responded, “No”.   
Subsequently, the researcher explained to Don 1 the existence of HFA’s successor 
framework, the SF4DRR. Asked whether the Don1 research participant was aware of 
SF4DRR, the participant stated, “We have heard of it especially in the UN circles, but it is 
not something which we use as a Framework of reference.”  
 It is clear and concerning that this donor participant did not have a working 
knowledge of both FHA and SF4DRR, knowledge of which would be useful in determining 
the framework’s usefulness to the country’s DRR agenda, and then knowing how Don1’s 
work needs to either influence or be influenced by any on-going global DRR framework. 
The issue of Don1 not having sufficient working knowledge of global DRR frameworks 
seems to point to inefficiencies in the government department/ ministry responsible for 
creating adequate awareness around the frameworks, promoting their use and ensuring 
accurate national reporting on progress being made.  
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5.6.4 Funding for CCB4DRR 
Studies by Watson et al. (2015),  Kelman (2013), and Kellett and Caravani (2013) 
revealed that abysmal development assistance funding goes to DRR and whatever goes 
to DRR is also biased towards preparedness for effective response leaving only 
droppings if any going to investing in resilience-building DRR. With those studies’ 
intimation, this research considered it essential to examine the state of overall DRR 
funding and state of funding for CCB4DRR within the six INGO and donor case studies.  
Asked about how much of the organisation’s disaster management funding goes 
to DRR and then to CCB4DRR, Don1’s research participant responded, “So let us put 30 
million divided by 425million times 100, and you will get the percentage.” Earlier on, 
Don1 had revealed 
that the agency 
makes multi-year 
development aid 
funding to Kenya, and 
the year 2017 was 
part of a five-year 
€425Million funding 
cycle.  Don1 
explained that out of the 
five-year €425Million, 
€30Million is what is channelled through the NDMA as dedicated disaster risk 
management (DRM) funding.  And when asked to explain the rationale behind Don1 
committing all her DRR funding through NDMA, Don1 explained,  
We believe that NDMA being a fully-fledged Government of Kenya entity will 
continue to exist with or without donor support. Thus, empowering such 
institutions remains more feasible to tackle DRR long term issues in view of 
sustainability. 
As analysed and presented in Figures 5.8 and 5.9, Don1’s dedicated DRM funding 
amounts to 7% of its overall 5-year aid funding to Kenya. Out of the €30million dedicated 
Non DRM 
Development 
Funding, €395= 93%
Dedicated DRM 
funding thru 
NDMA, €30= 
7%
DON1: 5-YEAR DEVELOPMENT AID FUNDING TO KENYA (AS OF 
2017)
Non DRM Development Funding Dedicated DRM funding thru NDMA
Figure 5. 8 Don 1: 5 year development aid funding to Kenya (as of 
2017) 
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to DRM through NDMA, €10million which is 2.4% of Don1’s overall aid funding to Kenya 
is what can be accounted for as dedicated to resilience-building, thus as actual DRR 
funding. And it is in the resilience-building elements of DRM that we find life-changing 
CCB4DRR.  
 
These calculations 
corroborate with 
aforementioned findings 
by Watson et al. (2015), 
Kelman (2013), and 
Kellett and Caravani 
(2013) who revealed 
abysmal development 
assistance funding goes to 
DRR and whatever goes to DRR is also biased towards preparedness for effective 
response leaving barely anything to invest in DRR for resilience. 
 
In summary, 2.4% of Don1’s overall aid funding to Kenya seems to be the only 
amount going to resilience-building DRR where CCB4DRR is espoused. As long as more 
resources are committed to preparedness and response and less to mitigation, it remains 
evident that CCB4DRR is not yet a high support priority by both Don1 and NDMA.  
 
5.6.5 How do institutional donors and INGOs measure DRR 
success in Kenya?  
For all the six INGO and donor case studies, responses to this question were re-
arranged into 2 broad categories, and the two categories were:  
i. Measures focused on local-level DRR success, and  
ii. Measures focused on national-level DRR success.  
And for Don1, the analysis revealed four indicators by which the organisation 
measures DRR success. The four indicators include ‘no disaster-related deaths’, 
Research and 
Knowledge 
management,
€6.8M= 23%
Drought preparednes 
and response, 
€13.2M= 44%
Hunger safety 
nets, €10M= 33%
DON1: HOW €30M DRM FUND TO NDMA IS ALLOCATED  
Figure 5. 9 Don1: How €30M DRM fund to NDMA is allocated 
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‘reduced loss of livelihood assets’, ‘community/ beneficiary transformation’ and 
‘accurate and appropriate EWS’. The first three indicators fall under the broad category 
of ‘measures focused at local level DRR successes’, while the last indicator (‘accurate and 
appropriate EWS’) belongs to the broad category of ‘measures focused at national-level 
DRR success.’ 
 
Asked how as an agency Don1 measures the effectiveness and success of its contribution 
to the country’s DRR agenda, the Don1 research participant stated, 
I think the first one is if we hear there are no deaths related to emergencies, I 
think that is very important. You know previously there used to be reports of 
millions of people who have died and all that. If we hear there is no much loss in 
terms of assets like livestock and such livelihood assets; that reflects some good 
success which has been happening. For DRR, also when we talk about early 
warning, appropriate early warning mechanisms are in place, that is also quite a 
success, and that has been very effective. In Kenya, we now have a very effective 
early warning mechanism, which is more or less very accurate. A few years back 
our biggest problem and used to be an early warning but now it is no longer the 
problem. The problem now is response because they are giving proper alerts 
before emergencies… when we do our monitoring, we want to see how actual 
beneficiaries and their lives have been transformed, if they have. 
While Don1’s funding to drought management in Kenya is channelled through 
NDMA, and much of this funding goes to preparedness and response will less going to 
actual drought mitigation activities; it was a pleasant surprise to note that Don1 still 
expects  to see reduced loss of livelihood assets and community transformation as 
measures of DRR success in the country. There is, therefore, a mismatch between Don1’s 
expected DRR results and where her investments are being made.  
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5.6.6 What changes do institutional donors and INGOs 
working on DRR want to see as a result of their 
contribution to the DRR agenda in the country?  
The purpose behind this question was to ultimately indirectly find out where or 
at what level both case donors and INGOs wanted to see changes as a result of their 
contribution to the DRR agenda in the country. For all the six case studies, responses to 
this question were re-arranged into 9 categories, namely: better resource allocation, 
better DRR comprehension and integration, improved coordination, improved DRM 
governance, improved community capacity, more child-led DRR, professional disciplines 
taking DRR seriously, reduced hazard impacts,  and lastly, things that need to be 
stopped. Data analysis assigned Don1’s response to 3 of the 9 broad categories, namely:  
improved coordination, better resource allocation, and better DRR governance. The 
analysis is presented in that order.  
 Asked ‘what specific changes or improvements Don1 would like to see in Kenya 
as a result of highly effective DRR work in the country’, the interviewee started by 
pointing out required changes in overall DRM coordination. He narrated, “If currently 
you go to any meeting and you ask them ‘what were the challenges with this current 
drought response?’ they would tell you ‘coordination’. Everybody tells you 
coordination. There was still no proper coordination. We had everybody doing their own 
thing and everybody was citing coordination…That remains a challenge because you 
know, Don1 will respond in our own way, World Bank would respond in their own way, 
etc. The day we will have a scenario where all these stakeholders come together and 
jointly plan, that will be the game changer.”  
 After the explanation on coordination, Don1 pointed out a combination of 
required DRR governance and resource allocation changes.  “We would like to see total 
government ownership and total government empowerment in the sense that the 
government can be able to respond to drought and to mitigate drought without 
external assistance. That would be the thing we would like to see even in terms of 
budgetary allocations; that everything is in their hands. That is what we would like to 
see.” 
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In summary and in comparison, section 5.6.5 showed that Don1 uses local/ 
grassroots -level indicators to measure DRR success, while in this section, analysis has 
shown that Don1’s desired changes (consequent to her engagement and contribution to 
the country’s DRR agenda) are all focused at the higher (national) level. Being a donor, 
these desired changes may be partly explained by recent changes in Kenya’s economic 
status. Kenya's Vision 2030 aspires to have double-digit growth rates and attain middle-
income country status by 2030. Indeed, on 30 September 2014, Kenya effectively joined 
the ranks of middle-income countries, sixteen years ahead of schedule (UNDP, 2018)! 
The country’s new economic status (in which aid is being reduced) may therefore partly 
explain Don1’s quest to see a Kenya that is taking ownership of her DRM (and DRR) 
agenda, coordinating better, and allocating adequate resources to the country’s drought 
risk management agenda. One would hope that when these desired changes become a 
reality, this would subsequently translate into better prioritisation and support to the 
empowering CCB4DRR.   
 
5.6.7 Comments on ‘upper Vs local DRR support’ 
 For all the 6 donor and INGO case studies, the semi-structured 
interview guide asked the following question, “What would be your comments 
on growing literature that seems to suggest there’s inadequate support to 
community-level DRR action and yet there is comparatively more support to 
global, regional and national level DRR activities by many key stakeholders?”   
Absorbed by the question, Don1 first disagreed with the statement and argued, 
No, I think that statement is wrong. Or rather, it can give a very wrong impression 
in the sense that even though they support for example to the regional or the 
national level, that is the avenue which is being used to eventually get to the 
grassroots…There is no way from Don1’s Capital City you would expect them to 
come in with trucks carrying millions going straight to the communities on the 
ground and starting operations there. No, it doesn’t work, even Governments 
don’t allow that. So there are structures which we cannot ignore, and 
unfortunately, that is how it is. 
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 After the researcher’s further explanation to help Don1 understand the 
statement, Don1’s participant eventually conceded but with a suggestion, “I think the 
wording there should be: ‘the results at local level are not as effective as they are 
supposed to be’". And he continued, “I will agree with you to a certain extent but there 
are reasons for these poor results.” When asked to explain the reasons, Don1 continued,  
I think these are very old reasons. First and foremost like what I told you, these 
resources are supposed to cascade down more often than not. For example, Don1 
is going to support INGOX (pseudonym) to carry out activities in Samburu. Some 
of the resources will have to go to INGOX’s overhead costs including operational 
costs, staffs salaries etc. This is part of the development cost and we can’t change 
that.  
 The researcher flipped the question around and stated: ‘For Kenya, if we are 
going to see desired DRR results we must do 1,2,3,4 things along the 15-year timeline of 
the Sendai Framework for Action. From where you sit, do you think local DRR action 
would feature prominently on the list of must-do things?  Don1 responded, 
“Unfortunately it wouldn’t, and unfortunately it wouldn’t.” Asked why it wouldn’t, Don1 
explained, “it features, but it has been swallowed by the bigger picture.”  
In summary, when Don1 argued that “I think the wording there should be: ‘the 
results at local level are not as effective as they are supposed to be”, and later indicated 
that local DRR action wouldn’t, unfortunately, feature prominently among key ‘must 
dos’ if Kenya was selecting key DRR priorities towards achieving desired DRR results in 
the country, these statements revealed that overall, Don1 agreed with the statement.   
 
5.6.8 Comments on whether and how evidence from this 
research may be used. 
 Part of the interview guide run a statement with a question at the end reading 
as follows: “There’s ample literature showing that inadequate prioritisation of 
community capacity building for DRR remains the biggest obstacle to realising greater 
DRR progression in many countries including Kenya. Would INGO3 be willing to use this 
kind of evidence?”  
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Don1 positively responded, “Yes. When asked to explain ways in which the 
agency would be willing to use this kind of evidence, Don1 explained, “For the NDMA 
case, we would tell NDMA they will need to prioritise that (referring to CCB4DRR).” Don1 
continued to explain, “For greater programming purposes, that is something we would 
take into account. We would share that information with our partners and tell them to 
prioritise that (CCB4DRR) because it is evidence-based. We would, therefore, tell them 
we would like to see projects which have CCB4DRR as a priority.” 
Don1, therefore, showed willingness to use the evidence for influencing purposes with 
its funded partners.  
5.6.9 Overall comments 
 DRR priorities: In summary, all of Don1’s current DRR support to Kenya focuses 
on strengthening the National Drought Management Agency through funding its 
administrative structures and providing technical support. While there was mention of 
support to county drought mitigation projects through NDMA, Don1 clearly stated their 
support to County government projects ‘is basically preparedness and response,’ 
including through the hunger safety net project. Don1 did not reveal any prioritisation 
of CMDRR nor CCB4DRR. Don1’s current DRR priorities in the country, therefore, fit the 
picture painted by Watson et al. (2015), Kelman (2013) and Kellett and Caravani (2013) 
whose studies lament the global trend of spending heavily on disaster preparedness and 
response while investing far less in resilience-building DRR 
 Criteria for selecting priorities: In summary, Don1 entirely devolves to NDMA the 
responsibility to decide which DRR priorities will be supported using resources allocated 
by Don1. Analysis of NDMA data showed that much of the funding goes to both 
preparedness and response during both bad and good years. Concerning the funding 
channelled to NMDA, Don1 had commented, “So what happens with this money and 
how it operates, is that when we do not have emergencies we have mitigation measures 
ongoing.” There’s no doubt from this analysis that while NDMA engages in mitigation 
interventions, this is far less prominent based on how funding is distributed among the 
agency’s priorities. One would, therefore, be right to conclude that for both Don1 and 
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NDMA, prioritising and supporting CCB4DRR isn’t anywhere high on their respective 
agendas.   
 Knowledge and use of global DRR frameworks: It was obvious and concerning 
that this donor participant did not have working knowledge of both FHA and SF4DRR, 
knowledge of which would be useful in determining the framework’s usefulness to the 
country’s DRR agenda, and then knowing how Don1’s work needs to either influence or 
be influenced by any on-going global DRR framework. The issue of Don1 not having 
sufficient working knowledge of global DRR frameworks seems to point to inefficiencies 
in the government department/ ministry responsible for creating adequate awareness 
around the frameworks, promoting their use and ensuring accurate national reporting 
on progress being made.  
DRR Funding: In summary, 2.4% of Don1’s overall aid funding to Kenya seems to 
be the only amount going to resilience-building DRR where CCB4DRR is espoused. As 
long as more resources are committed to preparedness and response and less to 
mitigation, it remains evident that CCB4DRR is not yet a high support priority by both 
Don1 and NDMA.  
 
Ways of measuring success: While Don1’s funding to drought management in 
Kenya is channelled through NDMA, and much of this funding goes to preparedness and 
response will less going to actual drought mitigation activities; it was a pleasant surprise 
to note that Don1 still expects to see reduced loss of livelihood assets and community 
transformation as measures of DRR success in the country. There is, therefore, a 
mismatch between Don1’s expected DRR results and where her investments are being 
made.  
 
Desired changes consequent to effective DRR in the country: In summary and 
in comparison, section 5.6.5 showed that Don1 uses local/ grassroots -level indicators to 
measure DRR success, while in this section, analysis has shown that Don1’s desired 
changes (as a result of highly effective DRR in the country) are all focused at the higher 
level--the national level. Being a donor, these desired changes may be partly explained 
by recent changes in Kenya’s economic status. Kenya's Vision 2030 aspires to have 
double-digit growth rates and attain middle-income country status by 2030. Indeed, 
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on 30 September 2014, Kenya effectively joined the ranks of middle-income countries, 
sixteen years ahead of schedule (UNDP, 2018)! The country’s new economic status (in 
which aid is being reduced) may therefore partly explain Don1’s quest to see a Kenya 
that is taking ownership of its DRM (and DRR) agenda, coordinating better, and 
allocating adequate resources to the country’s drought risk management agenda. One 
would hope that when these desired changes become a reality, this would subsequently 
translate into better prioritisation and support to the empowering CCB4DRR.   
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Figure 5. 10 A Mind Map of Don1 Findings  
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5.7 Analysis and Discussion of Case Study 5 –Don2 
Don2 is one of the Far East donors with strong use of technical volunteers 
deployed to its overseas development missions.  
5.7.1 What are the DRR priorities currently being supported 
by respective institutional donors and INGOs working 
on DRR in Kenya? 
During data analysis, it emerged all the six case study responses to this question 
could be organised and presented under four broad categories, and these include 
‘government-focused priorities’, ‘community-focused priorities’, ‘intra-agency focused 
priorities’ and ‘cross-cutting priorities’. And a close examination of Don2’s response to 
the question revealed that the agency’s current DRR priorities in Kenya fall under three 
of the four broad categories, namely: ‘community-focused priorities’, ‘government-
focused priorities’, and ‘cross-cutting priorities’. The ensuing presentation of analysis 
and discussion follows the same sequence, and therefore starts with ‘community-
focused DRR priorities’.   
Community-focused DRR priorities 
Within her community-focused priorities, Don2 presented two sub-areas of 
focus, and these are ‘community managed DRR (CMDRR)’, and ‘building local level 
partner capacity’. On community managed DRR, Don2 explained,    
 
Back in 2011, Don2 decided to support Northern Kenya, specifically Marsabit and 
Turkana counties. We had a project known as ECORAD. ECORAD is Enhancing 
Community Resilience Against Drought in Marsabit and Turkana…So we did it 
Marsabit, where we worked with communities. The project had about four 
outputs, which were sustainable natural resource management, under this, we 
focused on water resources, how and where these communities are sourcing their 
water from. We also mapped out these water resources. We had the livestock 
value chain where we were working with communities in developing market 
facilities, supporting the associations of livestock keepers and of course 
supporting communities in terms of pasture management. 
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Government-focused DRR priorities 
Still describing the different areas of focus for their ECORAD project, Don2 further 
stated, 
And then there is an output on capacity development of government officers 
both at the local level and even at the national level. By that time, Kenya had not 
really fully devolved and therefore we did not have counties as such. 
 Cross-cutting DRR priorities 
 Don2 further indicated that “Normally what happens with Don2 is that before 
we commit any resources into a programme, we conduct a study which will inform future 
interventions. So ECORAD is a project in the sense that we are supporting communities, 
but it is also a study on our part to understand the issues and identify where there are 
gaps for future interventions.” 
 As a result of their DRR-related studies to inform future programming, Don2 
cheerfully partly stated that “…we needed to understand the Turkanas, and using the 
CMDRR tool borrowed from EU, we were able to work with communities to understand 
their needs… We also had a study on water resource potential in Turkana and based on 
that study, Don2 made a decision to put in more resources and focus only on Turkana 
County…Currently, as I am talking to you, we have a new phase of ECORAD that is 
focusing only on Turkana County.”   
Intrigued by Don2’s mention of using CMDRR tools to study the needs of the Turkana 
community, the researcher asked Don1, ‘what is CMDRR?’ And Don2 explained,    
CMDRR is a community development tool where you are working with 
communities to allow them an opportunity to decide what is good for themselves. 
So you sit down with communities, and for example if there is drought and they 
are suffering from many challenges you work out the solutions with them. The 
end product of that would be a community action plan, which states that these 
are the areas that we will need your support, and these are the things that we 
can do ourselves. So that was the product, we got the community action plans, 
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and based on those action plans we were able to identify what we could do based 
on the available resources.  
 In concert with Don2’s foregoing definition of CMDDR, McKnight and Kretzmann 
(1997, pp. 2, 17) assert that development must start from within the community, for 
communities cannot be developed from the top down, or from the outside in.  They 
further argue that communities have never been built upon their deficiencies; rather, 
community development has always depended upon mobilizing the capacities and 
assets of a people and a place. This is a notion supported by  Chambers (1998, p. 289) 
who in his seminal work ‘whose reality counts?’ remarks that the “the challenge is to 
enable poor and marginalized people to analyse their conditions and identify their 
priorities in ways which freely express their realities, and generate proposals that are 
doable, credible and persuasive…”  
 In yet another of his works, Chambers (1995, p. 199) observes that “much of the 
challenge is to give up power. It is to enjoy handing over the initiative to others, enabling 
them to do more and to do it more in their way, for their objectives.” 
Apart from conducting community-focused research to inform future DRR interventions, 
the analysis further shows that Don2 is engaged in a wide range of DRR related cross-
cutting research.  
We are supporting the forest sector in different parts of the country…We are 
working with both Kenya Forest Service and Kenya Forest Research Institute 
(KEFRI) to conduct some research…we will be supporting Prosopis management. 
Prosopis is a plant that has been proven to work very well in maintaining 
groundwater, and besides that, it is also an opportunity for income generation 
for communities” 
 In summary, the analysis showed that Don2 has very strong prioritisation and 
support to community capacity building for DRR through her approach of using CMDRR. 
Don2 is engaged in CMDRR to the level where her technical staffs get directly involved 
in working with communities in CMDRR. Don2 was the only donor interviewed that 
indicated doing own grassroots studies to inform own DRR programming. Don2, 
therefore, exhibited very strong prioritisation and support for local DRR action.  
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5.7.2 How do institutional donors and INGOs working on DRR 
in Kenya decide which DRR priorities to support in the 
country?   
While all aggregated six case study responses to this question were categorised 
under ‘externally looking’, ‘internally looking’ and ‘not involved’ criteria; analysis 
revealed that Don2 uses externally and internally looking criteria to select its DRR 
priorities. 
 
Externally Looking Selection Criteria 
 Analysis showed that part of Don2’s externally looking selection criteria for her 
DRR support priorities includes ‘seeking to align with national government data and 
priorities’, ‘seeking complementarity with peer agencies initiatives’ and ‘using 
evidence gleaned from in-country studies, surveys, assessments and gaps analysis’.   
On seeking to align with national government data and priorities, Don2 explained,  
According to our systems, we require the Government Ministry to make a 
proposal to Don2 and say these are the areas we think you can support…The 
Government makes a proposal to Don2 but it doesn’t come directly to Don2. It 
goes to the embassy of Don2. Once the proposal has been received by our 
embassy, we will have further consultation in what is known as policy dialogue 
forum where Don2 and the embassy would meet the national treasury and the 
specific sector that prepared the proposal…We look at it, have some 
consultations, and agree that our resources can allow us to do this much… then 
this is forwarded through our hierarchy for approval. 
On seeking complementarity with peer agencies, Don2 explained,  
“We have other development partners doing different things. So we work within 
that framework knowing very well that there is another development partner 
who is supporting this area and we complement.  The idea is to complement not 
to compete against with others.”  
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 By this, Don2 meant the agency also considers what is already being done/ or 
being supported by peer agencies, and therefore tries to find out whether there are 
existing gaps which Don2 could work on to complement and therefore increase the 
effectiveness of what’s already being done by peer DRR stakeholders in a given area.  
On using evidence gleaned from in-country studies, surveys, assessments and gaps 
analysis to inform the selection of agency DRR priorities, Don2 explained,  
 “Normally, what happens with Don2 is that before we commit any resources into 
a programme, we conduct a study which will inform future interventions.” And Don2 
further explained with an example. “We also had a study on water resource potential in 
Turkana, and based on that study, Don2 made a decision to put in more resources and 
focus only on Turkana County. Currently, as I am talking, we have a new phase of 
ECORAD [Enhancing Community Resilience Against Drought] that is focusing only on 
Turkana County.  
 As part of using evidence from assessments and gaps analysis, Don2 also 
emphasised the use of CMDRR methodologies to come with community prioritised DRR 
actions. Don2 explained,  
CMDRR is a Community development tool where you are working with 
communities to allow them an opportunity to decide what is good for themselves. 
So you sit down with communities, and for example, if there is drought and they 
are suffering from many challenges, you work out the solutions with them. The 
end product of that would be a community action plan, which states that these 
are the areas that we will need your support, and these are the things that we 
can do ourselves. 
 Don2 is one of the most visible donors in the country and brings with it great DRR 
expertise into supported countries. The donor also has an approach of using volunteers 
from the home country to directly work with Don2’s supported communities. Part of 
Don2’s DRR rigour is found in its perpetual in-country DRR needs assessments/ surveys 
and gaps analysis. Don2 further explained,  
Needs surveys, like I told you, is a process and more or less a continuous process. 
So what is required from this office, is once in a while, like in three months, we 
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submit it to our headquarters. However, the process itself is ongoing. And right 
now, as I am speaking, we are in consultation with Kenya school of agriculture 
with the view of supporting them in the near future. This is part of our needs 
survey consultation. The thing about needs survey consultation is that it doesn’t 
have to result in a project. It is sort of just sourcing for information. We collect as 
much information as possible and then we go to a stage where we identify which 
are the neediest areas. We are basically prioritizing. And then in a span of say 
three months, we will forward this to our headquarters. It is more or less a 
continuous process.  
Internally looking Selection Criteria 
 Analysis showed that part of Don2’s internally looking selection criteria for her 
DRR support priorities includes guidance from Don2’s country assistance strategy paper, 
seeking to align with agency comparative advantage, the lesson from previous projects 
and security considerations.  
Don2 explained,  
After every three years, Don2 has what is known as the country assistance 
strategy…it basically identifies the sectors that Don2 is ready to support. It 
identifies the resources available and the expertise available from Don2. What 
informs this country assistance strategy is the needs survey…Throughout our stay 
in the country, we interact with government side and identify support needs by 
continuously consulting with them…So our country strategy for Kenya, for 
example, is based on the needs that were identified during the needs surveys. 
This explanation helps shows the link between Don2’s continuous in-country 
DRR needs assessments, how evidence therefrom informs the development of 
Don2’s three-year cycle country assistance support strategy, and then how the 
country assistance support strategy becomes the bedrock upon which all other 
DRR priorities are built with the 3-year strategy support cycle. The most 
impressive thing about Don2 is the way their country support assistance strategy 
developed. It is deeply rooted in continuous needs assessments and own agency 
studies.   
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 While explaining factors influencing how Don2 decided which DRR priorities to 
support in Kenya, Don2 further highlighted,   
Different countries have different needs, some of them are common, and others 
are not common.  So you look at the needs and then you look at where you have 
a comparative advantage. 
 Don2 also indicated how security is a key consideration when deciding which 
geographical area to prioritise, and different geographical areas have varied DRR 
support needs.  
Turkana is one area where the effects of drought are most felt, and that is 
agreeable across the board. That aside, we have other factors that Don2 also 
considers. You know, for many years we have not been in Northern Kenya, mainly 
because of security issues. So looking at those factors, security factors, in 
particular, we would not go to other counties. Turkana became a bit convenient 
because it is not very insecure. So we also look at such factors because we are 
sending to the place expatriates (meaning staffs and volunteers from Don2’s 
home country) and we need to take care of their safety. 
 And lastly, Don2 indicated the agency evaluates her community resilience-
building DRR projects, draws lessons and decides what has shown good results that need 
to be scaled up. “We are using our earlier approaches and studies to upscale and 
geographically work within wider areas.”  
In summary, Don2 has robust criteria for selecting her in-country DRR priorities. 
While she liaises with NDMA to determine priority geographic areas, Don2 conducts own 
grassroots studies, engages in continuous needs surveys to determine where to focus 
DRR investments, and builds on lessons from previous resilience-building DRR projects 
to inform on-going DRR priorities. This is, therefore, a highly engaged donor agency that 
works well at both national and community level.  
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5.7.3 Knowledge and use of international DRR frameworks 
In each of the six INGO and donor case study interview guides, there were 
specific questions indirectly looking at whether donors and INGOs have knowledge of 
global DRR frameworks and whether these frameworks have had any influence on 
agency DRR priorities. The interview question on HFA was presented as follows: “During 
the implementation of the Hyogo Framework for Action, there were periodic 
compilations and sharing of regional and country platform DRR progress assessment 
reports.  Are you aware of these reports?” 
To the above question, Don2 responded,  
 
 Personally, I have not been privy to the details, but I know there are those 
documents. Like I informed you, there is a person who is responsible for this sector and 
she is the one who has been pursuing this line of discussion. There are those documents, 
and as an office, we are definitely aware of it, but as a person, I have not had time to 
interact with the documents myself. 
 When the researcher inquired about the specific title or designation 
of the person who would know more about HFA, Don2’s research participant 
explained,  
We have an officer responsible for climate change, we call it climate change 
sector. Her title is Project Formulation Advisor. She is responsible for this and I 
am sure if she was available she would give you detailed information on this 
Hyogo framework. I am aware that during the process before the end of the 
Hyogo framework and the new Sendai Framework, Don2 as an organization was 
actively involved in the processes. In fact, we interacted with the Government of 
Kenya in supporting them to come up with a position and even facilitated their 
travel to Japan. I am aware that we had discussions at various forums where the 
government of Kenya participated, and Don2 supported and facilitated the 
processes. I am aware of all these, but I may not have the details. 
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 Unfortunately, subsequent efforts to reach the mentioned Project Formulation 
Advisor were not successful.  However, when Don2’s participant was asked: “Do you 
think the Hyogo framework and the Sendai Framework have any influence on what 
Don2 does in Kenya or not?” Don 2 revealed,  
It has a lot of influence. Like I mentioned to you, at this level (meaning Don2’s 
department of agricultural, to which this participant belonged) a lot of our 
discussions with the government of Kenya side are informed by documents that 
are available, for instance, the strategy for agriculture, policy documents, etc. 
At a higher level, the Sendai Framework informs the discussions at that level. So 
yes, the Sendai framework informs our decisions and a lot of consultations that 
happen. 
In summary, Don2 is one of the donors that supported the Kenya government 
delegation to participate in the Sendai Conference that culminated into the 2015 fifteen-
year SF4DRR. While the participant was not the lead DRR person for the agency and had 
not had ample time to interact with the SF4DRR documents, it was still impressive to 
note he was aware of processes that led to SF4DRR and make a link of how SF4DRR 
documents form part of the body of documents referenced even by his department 
when interacting with the government’s Ministry of Agriculture.  
 
5.7.4 Funding for CCB4DRR 
As already indicated in preceding case studies and the Literature Review 
Chapter, studies by Watson et al. (2015), Kelman (2013) and Kellett and Caravani (2013) 
revealed a concerning truth where a tiny portion of development assistance  funding 
trickles down to  DRR, and the trickle to DRR itself is more biased toward disaster 
preparedness and response and not to resilience-building DRR activities. Nudged by 
revelations from these studies, this research considered it essential to examine the state 
of overall DRR funding and state of funding for CCB4DRR within the six INGO and donor 
case studies.  
 Asked about how much of the agency’s disaster management funding goes to 
DRR, Don2’s research participant responded,  
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“We have not specifically identified and separated that this is the fund that goes 
to DRR. Unfortunately, that is an exercise that may take some time, but we can 
do that.”  
 As already mentioned, efforts to reach Don2’s Project Formulation Advisor were 
not successful. Consequently, the inquiry on how much of Don2’s funding goes to DRR 
and to CCB4DRR was therefore not brought to conclusion, and nor was there any 
literature with this kind of data to help make informed conclusions.  
 Asked whether there are any resources dedicated to community 
capacity building for DRR, Don2 quickly pointed out,  
Yes, of course we do! You remember, I mentioned the CMDRR. It is exactly that. 
Although I may not exactly tell you that this is the proportion of the budget that 
went into that component (CMDRR) because that’s a component that cuts across 
other components. For example, when we are establishing a water facility in a 
certain site, we will work with these communities to understand their challenges, 
and then we will support the community to come up with a management 
committee that will manage the facility. So when we are interacting with 
communities using the CMDRR, we will work with the communities at different 
levels and at the same time develop the water facility. The point I am trying to 
put across is that CMDRR or community development support goes alongside 
other components of our projects. They work together and this is why it may be 
difficult to say specifically this proportion of the budget was for CMDRR and this 
percentage for water facility development. They are all put together. 
 When asked to use a scale of  1-10 (where 10 is the highest score) and 
provide a score that represents the extent to which Don2 prioritises community 
capacity building for disaster risk reduction, Don2 explained, 
If I am talking about the specific project in DRR, then community capacity 
development has a very important place. However, I will hesitate to look at the 
importance of community capacity development in terms of budget allocation. 
For example, if you are developing a water facility here, you know infrastructure 
takes a lot of money and you say only 5% will go into capacity development of 
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the community, which may give you an impression that community capacity 
development is not that important. But that is not the case, because you cannot 
do it the other way round where you put 95% into developing committees and 
associations and working with communities and then use 5% to develop an 
infrastructure. It wouldn’t make sense. So I would hesitate to prioritise in that 
manner. But there is no doubt that community capacity development is an 
essential part of DRR, without which even all this investment may account for 
nothing.  
 And to drive home the point of not equating the proportion of budget support 
to CCB4DRR to the overall DRR budget, Don 2 shared the following example,   
And we have so many examples of such things happening in northern Kenya and 
specifically in Turkana because communities there are pastoralists. We have had 
cases where somebody has come and put up a very good facility, a water point, 
but for the whole year, nobody uses it because the community has moved to 
Uganda to look for pasture. So if you had worked with the community you would 
know when they go to Uganda and which routes they pass. So if you must do that 
intervention, you would know that I need to put it along with their routes, and 
the routes are also identified in terms of seasons. Some routes may not be used 
until a certain season. So that is how important working with communities is. If 
you look at it in terms of budget, it will give you a totally different picture but still, 
it is very important. 
 And to emphasize Don2’s different ways of working compared to peer agencies, 
Don2 asserted, 
For Don2, working with the communities has always been very important, not 
just for DRR, but virtually in all our activities. For many years, we would have very 
many development partners working at very high levels, the national level, but 
on the ground, you do not see them. For Don2, it is the other way round. You 
would find our interaction at the higher level only limited to those important 
things that must be done at the higher level while most of our interaction goes 
to the grass root level and is informed by what the communities themselves 
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have prioritised. So you must interact with communities to identify what their 
needs are. For many years, Don2 has prioritized community capacity 
development, so no doubt, it is a very important area for us.  
 Asked to explain how Don2’s community engagement is organised and managed, 
Don2 explained,  
It is very interesting because the way you are describing an implementing agency 
is exactly what Don2 is. We are on the ground working directly with communities 
while at the same time we are a donor agency in the sense that we have resources 
which are sourced from the Don2 public to Kenya.  
Don 2 continued to explain how actual implementation on the ground looks like.  
As I am speaking right now we have experts, Don2 experts (from Don2 home 
country) on the ground working with the communities. The CMDRR I am talking 
about is conducted by the Don2 experts on the ground. So we are implementing, 
but that does not mean that we do not outsource some activities. Because 
particularly for CMDRR, getting an expert from Don2 country to come and 
engage communities in Turkana may pose a lot of challenges not only to the 
expert, but also he/she may miss out on quite a number of things because you 
need a person who understands the community better. So we have a number of 
local partners whom we are working with specifically on CMDRR. When it comes 
to infrastructure development, we would contract some local firms to do quite a 
number of works. So yes, we contract some work and at the same time we also 
implement, so it is both ways. 
In summary, while Don2 was not able to share ready figures of how much of her 
development funding to Kenya goes to DRR and CCB4DRR, the agency provided a 
plausible argument cautioning against judging the place of CCB4DRR in the big scheme 
of DRR especially for agencies that support of a lot of DRR infrastructural development. 
The argument is based on the fact that infrastructural DRR projects are capital intensive 
and even the smallest % funding support to CCB4DRR around these projects translates 
into adequate funding for CCB4DRR purposes.  However, there’s agreement the % 
proportion of development assistance funding that translates into resilience building 
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DRR is very key. It’s from this % proportion that either CCB4DRR is and or is not 
supported. And because Don2 is engaged in working directly with target communities 
using CMDRR approaches, there is no doubt she is one of the donors with the highest 
prioritisation and support to local DRR action including CCB4DRR in the country.  
 
5.7.5 How do institutional donors and INGOs measure DRR 
success in Kenya?  
For all the six INGO and donor case studies, responses to this question were re-
arranged into 2 broad categories, namely:  
iii. Measures focused on local-level DRR success, and  
iv. Measures focused on national-level DRR success.  
And for Don2, the analysis revealed that the organisation uses two indicators to 
measure DRR success. The two indicators include ‘community & local government 
feedback and recommendations on project outcomes’ and ‘Don2's willingness to 
replicate or scale up a project.’ The two indicators fall under the broad category of 
“measures focused on local-level DRR success”.  
 
Asked how as an agency Don2 measures the effectiveness and success of its contribution 
to the country’s DRR agenda, Don2’s research representative stated,  
If you look at the report of the last phase of ECORAD, we allowed beneficiary 
communities and the government to measure ‘how do you think this was 
effective?’ and the outcome, of course, was that they think that it was very 
effective and they wanted ECORAD spread firstly across the beneficiary counties 
and then to other counties. So as an organisation, we feel it has been very 
effective and in fact, that explains why we are using our earlier approaches and 
studies to upscale and geographically work within wider areas. So yes, we think 
it has been very effective and there is even a need to continue with the same 
approach. 
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In summary, because Don2 has direct engagement with communities in 
implementing DRR actions, she focuses her attention on community and local 
government feedback to assess the extent to which implemented projects are deemed 
to have been successful.  This approach is supported by Robert Chamber's community 
development thesis of ‘whose reality counts?: putting the last first’ (Chambers, 1995). In 
this work, Chambers fervently argues that if the poor and weak are not to see efforts of 
the so-called development agencies and their global summits as a celebration of 
hypocrisy, signifying not sustainable well-being for them but sustainable privilege for us 
(the so-called development agencies), the key is to enable them to express their reality, 
to put that reality first and to make it count. And Chambers further asserts, ‘to do that 
demands altruism, insight, vision and guts.’ Going by Chambers caution, it was 
encouraging to note Don2’s insight and guts by prioritising ‘beneficiary community 
feedback’ a top indicator when assessing the extent to which her DRR efforts are either 
a success or a failure.  
 
5.7.6 What changes do institutional donors and INGOs 
working on DRR want to see as a result of their 
contribution to the DRR agenda in the country?  
 
The purpose behind this question was to ultimately indirectly find out where or 
at what level both case donors and INGOs wanted to see changes as a result of their 
DRR contribution in the country. For all the six case studies, responses to this question 
were re-arranged into 9 categories, namely: better resource allocation, better DRR 
comprehension and integration, improved coordination, improved DRM governance, 
improved community capacity, more child-led DRR, professional disciplines taking DRR 
seriously, reduced hazard impacts,  and lastly, things that need to be stopped. Data 
analysis assigned Don2’s response to 6 of the 9 categories, namely: better resource 
allocation, improved coordination, better DRR comprehension and integration, 
reduced hazard impacts, improved DRR governance and things that need to be 
stopped. The analysis and discussion try to follow that order.  
 Improved Coordination for Improved Resource Allocation  
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 Asked ‘what specific changes or improvements Don2 would like to see in Kenya 
as a result of highly effective DRR work in the country’, Don2’s response started with an 
appreciative approach by highlighting what’s already in place: “The changes started 
much earlier. The country has been working to reform the support that addresses 
drought issues, specifically setting up institutions like NDMA, and coming up with a 
common strategy for every partner which even Don2 subscribes to, the EDE (Ending 
Drought Emergencies). That in itself is a very good step in the right direction.” 
 And following this appreciation, Don2 launched into areas whose improvements 
have the potential to result in greater DRR effectiveness in the country. And improved 
resource allocation was top on Don2’s list. “In terms of making DRR work in this country, 
there is definitely a need for more resources. There is need to invest more and allocate 
resources better because some of the challenges that this country has faced for a very 
long time is that you will find many development partners working in one specific area 
at the expense of others, clearly telling you that there is very little coordination 
happening. Of course, the government has already reformed that; they have set up the 
National Drought Management Authority (NDMA) that tries to coordinate all the 
interventions and together with support from development partners, NDMA is really 
working very well.  
 
 Don2 believes that better Disaster Risk Management (DRM) coordination in the 
country will lead to better DRR resource allocation. The focus here is therefore on 
better DRM coordination for better resource allocation. This is expected to happen 
through better stakeholder coordination for proportionate geographic targeting---
leading to the eventual spread of aid agencies across the most vulnerable geographical 
areas, as opposed to situations where some areas get over-served with others remaining 
grossly underserved by aid agencies.    
 
 Improved Coordination for Harmonisation of Implementation Approaches 
 In addition to the desired need for improved stakeholder coordination whose 
objective is eventual better resource allocation across geographical areas, Don2 also 
pointed out the need for improved coordination with the objective of harmonising 
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different stakeholder implementation approaches.  Don 2 explained:  
Lack of coordination has meant that every development partner comes up with 
their own ideas, with their own methodologies and with their own tools. So that 
every time one development partner comes to a certain village, they come with 
their own idea of community development and setting up structures that are only 
suitable to their way of working.  
And citing an example, Don2 further explained the challenges of using different 
approaches: 
And there are those development partners who for one reason or the other chose 
to give handouts whether material or monetary. For Don2’s case, we have had 
an issue with that. We do not think handouts really enhance resilience. It is not 
sustainable. You need to involve the people. The people need to work through the 
intervention so that they see their product. Because if you just bring the handout 
whether it is food or money, they may not understand how to address their issues. 
With coordination, the little resources available would be used more effectively.  
 Don2 would, therefore, like to see better coordination of stakeholder 
approaches leading to weeding out ideas and approaches that undermine resilience 
building.   
Better DRR Comprehension and Integration 
Under this broad category of ‘Better DRR Comprehension and Integration”, Don2 
asserted, “And then, of course, there is a need to balance between short, mid-term and 
long-term interventions. You will find in as much as everybody wants to have those long 
term interventions for sustainability purposes, once in a while we are caught off-guard, 
then there is a need for emergency support which really tells you that all the work that 
has been done before may not be good enough. Every time there is a need for 
emergency and you see that communities and institutions are not resilient, it tells you 
that the work that was done before needs some strengthening and you need to put in 
some more resources on doing it better.” 
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In the foregoing assertion, Don2 highlighted the desired need to see key 
stakeholder improve their comprehension of DRR concepts leading to increased 
integration of ‘resilience-building DRR’ into every aspect of development programming. 
This is a concept Bosher (2013, p. 242) describes as ‘built-in resilience.’ Bosher suggests 
that built-in resilience is a quality of anything to keep adapting to existing and emergent 
threats. 
  
Reduced Hazard Impacts 
 Data under this broad category was arranged under three sub-categories, one of 
them being ‘reduced impacts of drought’. Within this parameter, Don2 explained, 
“There is still a need to elevate the position of drought challenges so that it is prioritised 
at the highest level and addressed at the global level. Once that is done, it means more 
resources will come to address the issues of drought.” 
Improved DRR governance 
 Still expounding on specific changes and or improvements Don2 would like to 
see in Kenya as a result of highly effective DRR work in the country, Don2 pointed out,  
Of course, there are other challenges. Like devolution is still very new in the 
country, and there are those teething problems, for instance, counties think that 
they need to hold on to resources, thinking they need to be the ones to safeguard 
their own resources. They are not so happy when they see every resource going 
through national government and then straight to communities. They want that 
money to be channelled through the county government, which is 
understandable because that is the whole idea about devolution. But then again, 
there are institutions which have already been put in place, and in my opinion, 
they need to be respected, we need to respect the systems, even as we strengthen 
the county government system.  
 Because Don2 is one of the donor agencies that support the NDMA, and NDMA 
has devolved branches at County Level, Don2 is eager to see NDMA implement through 
its county-level branches without being caught into actual county government 
bureaucracies that tend to silt and trap already limited funds at that level.    
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Things that need to be stopped 
As already mentioned above, Don2 had lamented: “And there are those 
development partners who for one 
reason or the other chose to give 
handouts whether material or 
monetary. For Don2’s case, we have had 
an issue with that. We do not think 
handouts really enhance resilience. It is 
not sustainable. You need to involve the 
people. The people need to work 
through the intervention so that they see the product. By inference and practice, Don2 
was suggesting that these stakeholders should ‘stop giving out handouts for they 
undercut the spirit behind community resilience building.’  
 Also, by inference, Don2 was suggesting ‘stop allowing the country government 
from silting and trapping already meagre resources at the county government level’.  
In summary, Don2 identified 6 areas where she would like to see change when 
DRR has been successful in the country. Coordination was top on the list with duo 
objectives of resulting in better resource allocation to the most deserving communities 
and leading to increased adoption of harmonised resilience-building DRR approaches 
when working with communities. Don2’s desired changes reflect community resilience 
building thinking and have all the hallmarks of CCB4DRR. This is, for instance, the more 
reason Don2 descried the practice of dolling out handouts on the part of some DRM 
stakeholders.  
 
5.7.7 Comments on ‘upper Vs local DRR support’ 
 For all the 6 donor and INGO case studies, the semi-structured interview guide 
asked the following question, “What would be your comments on growing literature 
that seems to suggest there’s inadequate support to community-level DRR action and 
yet there is comparatively more support to global, regional and national level DRR 
activities by many key stakeholders?”   
“We do not think handouts really 
enhance resilience. It is not 
sustainable. You need to involve the 
people. The people need to work 
through the intervention so that they 
see their product.” 
---Don1--- 
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Responding to the question, Don2’s research participant affirmatively stated, 
It is very true, and it boils down to prioritization. Government institutions have 
not been there (meaning they previously didn’t exist). Now they exist at higher 
levels at the expense of where support is most needed. So, if you go to the 
community, you don’t feel the institutions, they are not there…For many years, 
we would have very many development stakeholders working at very high levels, 
the national level, but on the ground, you do not see them. For Don2, it is the 
other way around. 
In summary, Don2’s comments agree with findings from the literature on the big 
gap between high-level rhetoric and poor support for local level action.  
 
5.7.8 Comments on whether and how evidence from this 
research may be used. 
 Part of the interview guide run a statement with a question at the end reading 
as follows: “There’s ample literature showing that inadequate prioritisation of 
community capacity building for DRR remains the biggest obstacle to realising greater 
DRR progression in many countries including Kenya. Would Don2 be willing to use this 
kind of evidence?”  
 Don1 positively responded, “That is very true, and this is what I was saying a few 
minutes ago, that for a very long time, many development partners ignored or did not 
prioritise community engagement. These agencies would come in and for instance say, 
‘this is what is needed, you need a livestock market here, so let’s start putting up the 
infrastructure’. Only to realise two years down the line, nobody has ever used that 
infrastructure. Why? Because you did not consult the community.”  
  When asked to explain ways in which the agency would be willing to 
use this kind of evidence, Don2 explained, “This research will help to affirm and 
strengthen our on-going support to local DRR action through our CMDRR 
approaches.”  
There’s, therefore, willingness on the part of Don2 to use findings from this research.   
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5.7.9 Overall comments 
 
 DRR priorities: In summary, the analysis showed that Don2 has very strong 
prioritisation and support to community capacity building for DRR through her approach 
of using CMDRR. Don2 is engaged in CMDRR to the level where her technical staffs get 
directly involved in working with communities in CMDRR. Don2 was the only donor 
interviewed that indicated doing own grassroots studies to inform own DRR 
programming. Don2, therefore, exhibited very strong prioritisation and support for local 
DRR action.  
Criteria for selecting priorities: In summary, Don2 has robust criteria for 
selecting her in-country DRR priorities. While she liaises with NDMA to determine 
priority geographic areas, Don2 conducts own grassroots studies, engages in continuous 
needs surveys to determine where to focus DRR investments, and builds on lessons from 
previous resilience-building DRR projects to inform on-going DRR priorities. This is, 
therefore, a highly engaged donor agency that works well at both national and 
community level.  
 
Knowledge and use of global DRR frameworks: In summary, Don2 is one of the 
donors that supported the Kenya government delegation to participate in the Sendai 
Conference that culminated into the 2015 fifteen-year SF4DRR. While the participant 
was not the lead DRR person for the agency and had not had ample time to interact with 
the SF4DRR documents, it was still impressive to note he was aware of processes that 
led to SF4DRR and make a link of how SF4DRR documents form part of the body of 
documents referenced even by his department when interacting with the government’s 
Ministry of Agriculture.  
 
DRR Funding: In summary, while Don2 was not able to share ready figures of how 
much of her development funding to Kenya goes to DRR and CCB4DRR, the agency 
provided a plausible argument cautioning against judging the place of CCB4DRR in the 
big scheme of DRR especially for agencies that support of a lot of DRR infrastructural 
development. The argument is based on the fact that infrastructural DRR projects are 
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capital intensive and even the smallest % funding support to CCB4DRR around these 
projects translates into adequate funding for CCB4DRR purposes.  However, there’s 
agreement the % proportion of development assistance funding that translates into 
resilience building DRR is very key. It’s from this % proportion that either CCB4DRR is and 
or is not supported. And because Don2 is engaged in working directly with target 
communities using CMDRR approaches, there is no doubt she is one of the donors with 
the highest prioritisation and support to local DRR action including CCB4DRR in the 
country.  
 
Ways of measuring success: In summary, because Don2 has direct engagement 
with communities in implementing DRR actions, she focuses her attention on 
community and local government feedback to assess the extent to which implemented 
projects are deemed to have been successful.  This approach is supported by Robert 
Chamber's community development thesis of ‘whose reality counts?: putting the last 
first’ (Chambers, 1995). In this work, Chambers fervently argues that if the poor and 
weak are not to see efforts of the so-called development agencies and their global 
summits as a celebration of hypocrisy, signifying not sustainable well-being for them but 
sustainable privilege for us (the so-called development agencies), the key is to enable 
them to express their reality, to put that reality first and to make it count. And 
Chambers further asserts, ‘to do that demands altruism, insight, vision and guts.’ Going 
by Chambers caution, it was encouraging to note Don2’s insight and guts by prioritising 
‘beneficiary community feedback’ a top indicator when assessing the extent to which 
her DRR efforts are either a success or a failure.  
 
Desired changes consequent to effective DRR in the country: In summary, Don2 
identified 6 areas where she would like to see change when DRR has been successful in 
the country. Coordination was top on the list with duo objectives of resulting in better 
resource allocation to the most deserving communities and leading to increased 
adoption of harmonised resilience-building DRR approaches when working with 
communities. Don2’s desired changes reflect community resilience building thinking and 
have all the hallmarks of CCB4DRR. This is, for instance, the more reason Don2 descried 
the practice of dolling out handouts on the part of some DRM stakeholders.  
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Fig 5.11 (below) presents a mind map of Don2’s overall findings.
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Figure 5. 11 A Mind Map of Don2 Findings 
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5.8 Analysis and Discussion of Case Study 6 – Don3 
With a published expenditure of about US$ 27million for the Kenya Country 
Programme in 2017, Don3 aims to address poverty, inequality and exclusion in an 
integrated and area-based approach supporting communities and government to 
achieve sustainable and inclusive economic growth.  
5.8.1 What are the DRR priorities currently being supported 
by respective institutional donors and INGOs working 
on DRR in Kenya? 
During data analysis, it emerged all the six case study responses to this question could 
be organised and presented under four broad categories, and these include 
‘government-focused priorities’, ‘community-focused priorities’, ‘intra-agency focused 
priorities’ and ‘cross-cutting priorities’. And a close examination of Don3’s interview 
data triangulated with document reviews on the question revealed that the agency’s 
current DRR priorities in Kenya fall under two of the four broad categories, namely: 
‘government-focused priorities’ and ‘community-focused priorities.’ Because Don3’s 
response to the question indicated a strong weave between support to both 
government institutions and local communities, the ensuing presentation of analysis 
and discussion has kept to the same woven format.   
Government-focused and Community focused DRR Priorities 
 Responding to the question: ‘which DRR priorities is Don3 presently supporting 
in Kenya?’ the DRR Advisor explained,  
We are looking at issues of capacity building and we are working at two levels: 
at the institutional level, that is with the government and institutions that are 
mandated for DRR. And then we are also working at the community level. 
Therefore a number of the things that we do will either be at the institutional or 
community level but some will cut across. Capacity building for example that 
looks at issues of preparedness targets both the institution and the community. 
So we are not only looking at Community-Based DRR but we are also looking at 
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what the capacity of Government is, to help the country be prepared and to 
respond in the event of disasters.  
The following excerpt from Don3’s 2014-2018 Kenya Country Program Document 
corroborates with Don3’s DRR Advisor’s response to the question:  
 
Don3 aims to build the capacities of institutions, communities and vulnerable 
people, particularly women, to increase their resilience and reduce the risks and 
impacts of disasters, recurrent conflicts, violence and shocks, including from 
climate change.  
 
Asked to explain the rationale behind Don3’s decision to engage with both government 
institutions and also directly with communities, the DRR advisor asserted,  
When it comes to disaster risk reduction, there is the responsibility that can only 
be undertaken at the upstream level-- the institutions and all these instruments 
that you need to effectively undertake your DRR. But then there is also work that 
needs to happen at the community level so it is really looking at how effective 
your work and your programming is going to be. I think this is what has informed 
the two levels of engagement. 
Don3 expounded further on institutional capacity building as follows:  
At Don3, we work a lot with the government. Government is our key 
implementing partner as well as our entry point. When we talk of capacity 
building, we are looking at institutional frameworks, the legal frameworks that 
need to be in place as well as technical skills other than just the knowledge. 
 Having explained the agency’s areas of capacity building focus for line 
government departments, Don3 highlighted areas of focus for community capacity 
building.  
For our community engagement, we prioritise two things, transfer of knowledge 
and giving the community skills. Under this, we have used the concept of 
community-based DRR through trainings that are designed for Community 
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based DRR. But then, we are also looking at how we can increase their resilience 
to the various risks that they are exposed to.  
On support to community resilience building, Don3 continued to explain key areas of 
focus: 
This is when we actually do projects, community-based projects. So that if we are 
looking at issues of how we can enhance their capacity or their resilience to 
drought, then we are looking at projects that help them to minimize the impact 
of drought. If it is in the area of livestock, do they have sufficient water? Are they 
able to manage diseases or prevent diseases? If it comes to issues and aspects of 
food security, can they look at production systems that are not overly reliant on 
rainfall? That is what we are looking at. For some, we also look at alternative 
forms of livelihoods. If the predominant source of livelihood is very much exposed, 
then what else can they do? So there is the aspect of resilience building and 
moving them away from the exposure as well as just giving them the knowledge. 
Expounding on the big picture of Don3’s capacity building content to communities, the 
DRR advisor further explained,   
Our capacity building involves training, and sometimes it involves the necessary 
equipment or tools. It is not just training but the whole package that enables the 
community to do what they need to do and as well as initiating tangible projects 
around the community…We have had very specific capacity building in terms of 
the concept of community-based disaster risk reduction…we also do capacity 
building specific to build certain skills and knowledge in technical areas that 
enhances their resilience. So that goes with the tangible projects that we are 
undertaking. For instance, if we are doing irrigation farming, we do capacity 
building around the farming; if we are working with pastoralists on livestock 
production then we undertake capacity building that enables them to do that 
particular thing.  
 Don3 started her response to the question on the agency’s current DRR support 
priorities by stating ‘We are looking at issues of capacity building and we are working 
at two levels…’ and equally closed her remarks on the questions by stating, 
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One thing that I would say about capacity building is we have attached a lot of 
importance to building capacity, so you will find every component of work we do 
within the community there will always be an aspect of capacity building. 
In summary, Don3 has woven a strong DRR tapestry that provides technical 
support to government DRR departments while at the same time working directly with 
local communities using CMDRR approaches and where required supporting the 
implementation of resilience-building DRR projects. Analysis showed that Don3 is 
unquestionably another donor agency with a very strong commitment to working 
directly at the local community level. Because of her very strong commitment to 
community capacity building and the use of CMDRR approaches, it was evident that 
CCB4DRR is very high on her agenda.  
 
5.8.2 How do institutional donors and INGOs working on DRR 
in Kenya decide which DRR priorities to support in the 
country?   
 
While all aggregated six case study responses to this question were categorised 
under ‘externally looking’, ‘internally looking’ and ‘not involved’ criteria; analysis 
revealed that Don3’s response falls under ‘externally looking’ and ‘internally looking’ 
criteria.  
 
Externally looking selection criteria 
Explaining factors influencing how Don3 selects their DRR priorities, the DRR 
advisor reflected,  
It is a whole process…Government is our key implementing partner as well as our 
entry point. So when it comes to prioritisation on the larger geographic area, for 
example, the county, we prioritise together with the Government and we look at 
the level of exposure or impact of a certain disaster, the support that is already 
being issued, whether it is sufficient or whether there are gaps. That is how we 
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look at it in a bigger picture so that we are able to narrow down to the geographic 
area.  
Don3 further explained the next steps in the selection criteria process once larger target 
geographic areas have been jointly agreed through consultations with the government.  
Once we get to that area, we begin to work with the communities so as to pick 
the specific area. They are able to identify which is the specific community within 
this area that has been selected that we need to go to. It is an engagement that 
we get into, a kind of back and forth on ‘what are the issues?’ Who is most 
vulnerable? Who has not received any support? We work with the help of the 
local levels…We look at key gaps and how we may be able to support these very 
key gaps. 
 
Internally looking selection criteria 
 In addition to the externally looking priorities selection criteria, Don3 also uses 
an internally looking priorities selection criteria. However, the analysis found that both 
the externally looking and internally looking criteria inform each other and are therefore 
mutually dependent.  Don3 explained, 
We work under the bigger framework. We have our Country Programme 
Document (which is our strategy) that defines our priority areas---areas that we 
want to engage in. It sets our larger strategic direction and informs what we get 
engaged in and what we don’t get engaged in. The Country Programme 
Document is aligned to the Government’s medium-term plans… Once we have 
these broad areas defined, then we develop specific projects through which we 
address some of these components.  
 With regard to what informs Don3’s strategic choices within the Country 
Programme Document, Don3 explained,  
When we talk about the various priorities that need to be addressed within the 
country, we also look at ‘’what are the key gaps?” Some assessments have been 
done that also help to identify key areas that need to be looked at. We did a rapid 
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assessment, I think in 2012 to identify the key gaps within DRR, and also 
conducted key players mapping. This helped to define some of the areas that we 
wanted to engage ourselves in. And we ask ourselves, “If we really want to see 
success in the area of DRR, how can we be able to support on these very key gaps 
that have been identified?” 
After indicating how overall DRR priorities are underpinned by the County Programme 
Document which sets the primary implementation framework, Don 3 highlighted how 
the finer details are arrived at: 
There is a common understanding that we are not able to do the entire spectrum. 
So it depends on our comparative advantage in terms of what we are able to 
undertake and the capacities that we have as Don3.  
 In summary, Don3’s DRR priorities selection criteria include conducting gaps 
analysis to inform the Country Programme Strategy Document, collaborating with 
government to determine geographic areas of focus, working with counties to agree on 
priority local geographic areas and then working with target communities using CMDRR 
approaches to identify respective community  DRR priorities. The priorities’ selection 
criteria are further guided by introspection to determine both available capacities and 
comparative advantage. Overall, it was worth noting that part of Don3’s priorities 
selection criteria includes working directly with prioritised communities to come up with 
community-selected DRR priorities using CMDRR approaches. Local level consultations 
are therefore part of the criteria used to determine Don3’s DRR priorities.  
 
 
5.8.3 Knowledge and use of international DRR frameworks 
In each of the six INGO and donor case study interview guides, there were 
specific questions indirectly looking at whether donors and INGOs have knowledge of 
global DRR frameworks and whether these frameworks have had any influence on 
agency DRR priorities. The interview question on HFA was presented as follows: “During 
the implementation of the Hyogo Framework for Action, there were periodic 
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compilations and sharing of regional and country platform DRR progress assessment 
reports.  Are you aware of these reports?” 
 In the affirmative, Don3 responded, “Yes. I am aware of the Kenya reports that 
were always done at that time by the Ministry of State for Special programmes.” And 
while Don3 acknowledged awareness of the then Country HFA progress reports, the DRR 
advisor also acknowledges, “…in as much as the report gave the progress of what was 
happening, some of which we also provided input, the reports didn’t influence what we 
did…we used different mechanisms to identify some of the things that we needed to do.” 
 Is emerges therefore that while Don3 contributed to the then required country 
HFA progress reporting, consequential National HFA reports didn’t influence Don3’s 
priorities. It appears the government department responsible for these reports was 
more extractive to key stakeholders without making a deliberate effort to close the 
feedback look with key stakeholders. Part of the feedback loop would have included 
identifying spaces for sharing the reports and using such spaces to highlight critical areas 
for great DRR value addition.  
Asked whether Do3’s DRR advisor was conversant with the SF4DRR, the advisor 
responded with a very strong “yes” and almost in bullet point format proceeded to 
explain Don3’s uptake for SF4DRR:  
We are doing a lot as far as the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction is 
concerned. 
 We participated and supported the government in preparation toward 
the Sendai Framework and we also sponsored government officials to 
participate in the conference. 
 Soon after the conference, we supported the government together with 
other partners to begin to think “how do we roll out the Sendai 
Framework in Kenya?” 
 And we worked with the other partners on an action plan on the 
implementation of the Sendai framework, which is still a draft because 
what we did we did not finish. We expected that the government was 
going to finalise and roll it out as an official document, but it is still the 
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document that is currently guiding some of the work that the national 
platform is doing. 
So that is at the national level. Bringing it down to the counties: 
 We have been working to roll out the Sendai framework. One is to raise 
awareness on this framework that it exists, that this is the content and 
that this is how we can begin to take it forward and that is what we are 
doing as Don3.  
 We have worked with some specific counties and they actually have 
county action plans on how they can roll out the Sendai framework.  
 So when we look at even the work we are doing now, it is to try and align 
ourselves on the priority areas of Sendai Framework.  
 SF4DRR is one of the key things that we commit ourselves to… and 
supporting how it gets rolled out at the national and at the local level.  
In summary, Don3 is very much aware of SF4DRR and is a donor that is blazing 
the trail in supporting the government in the implementation of the framework. At the 
national level, Don3 has supported the government to come up with a draft SF4DRR 
action plan to guide the work of the national platform. At County level, Don3 has 
supported select counties to come up with County Disaster Risk Reduction Action Plans 
based on the SSF4DRR with budgetary allocation for the implementation of Climate 
Change/Disaster Risk Reduction interventions into key sectors focusing on Health, Water, 
and Infrastructure. Don3 has therefore done exceptional work in supporting the central 
government and county government institutions to understand SF4DRR and break it 
down into workable action plans. And in-house, Don3 has aligned itself to SF4DRR global 
priorities. 
 
A review across Gaillard and Mercer (2013); Robertua (2013); UNISDR 
(2013a);UNISDR (2013b); Benicchio (2012); Djalante et al. (2012); Izumi and Shaw 
(2012); van Riet and van Niekerk (2012) ; Hagelsteen and Becker (2012); Scott and 
Tarazona (2011); J Twigg and Bottomley (2011); Kent (2011); Pelling (2007a); UNDP 
(2004) ; Walter (2004); Walter (2002); and Walter (2001) revealed consensus among 
these authors that while there continues to be a growing interest and focus on DRR, 
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poor local capacity for DRR remains a major impediment to making required progress. 
The literature review had therefore observed the urgent need to address the gap 
between global DRR agendas, national level policies and strategies and local level risk 
reduction activities. It was very inspiring to note Don3’s strategic decision to prioritize 
and support engagement with county governments around SF4DRR.  
 
5.8.4 Funding for CCB4DRR 
As already indicated in preceding case studies and the Literature Review 
Chapter, studies by Watson et al. (2015), Kelman (2013) and Kellett and Caravani (2013) 
revealed a concerning truth where a tiny portion of development assistance  funding 
trickles down to  DRR, and the trickle to DRR itself is more biased toward disaster 
preparedness and response and not to resilience-building DRR activities. Nudged by 
revelations from these studies, this research considered it essential to examine the state 
of overall DRR funding and state of funding for CCB4DRR within the six INGO and donor 
case studies.  
 Asked about how much of the agency’s disaster management funding goes to 
DRR, Don3’s DRR advisor responded, “That is a hard question…Honestly, I don’t know 
what percentage…I do not have it now, it is information that I could look out for you.” 
(Unfortunately, follow up efforts to access this data did not yield results). In the absence 
of DRR-related funding data, Don3 still emphasised, “One thing that I would say about 
capacity building is we have attached a lot of importance to building capacity, so you 
will find every component of work we do within the community there will always be an 
aspect of capacity building. So that for everything you would have transferred the 
necessary knowledge and the necessary skills because we are looking at in the longer 
term what would be beneficial to these people. So capacity building normally is a very 
central component of any of our projects.” 
 While Don3 didn’t provide data on dedicated DRR funding, the researcher 
accessed a 2016 online report with a section dedicated to Don3’s 2016 Kenya 
Programmatic Footprint. Under this section, DRR is included in the budget line including 
“environment, natural resource management, climate change, resilience and DRR” as 
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presented in Fig.5.12.  This cumulative line item that includes DRR accounted for 32% of 
Don3 overall budget in 2016. It just remains unclear how much of this 32% is dedicated 
to DRR.  
The clue to how much of the 32% went to DRR in that year may be found in one 
of Don3’s comments while reflecting on how much of Don3’s budget may actually be 
going to resilience-building DRR: “You know DRR funding is not as large, particularly 
when it is almost coming from the same pot as humanitarian.”   Don3’s comment on 
how much of overall DRM funding goes to DRR is reflective of aforementioned study 
findings by  Watson et al. (2015), Kelman (2013) and Kellett and Caravani (2013) who 
pointed out that a tiny portion of development assistance  funding trickles down to  DRR, 
and the little that trickles down to DRR is itself more biased toward disaster 
preparedness and response and not to resilience-building DRR activities. 
While Don3 didn’t avail data in regard to how much of her funding goes to both DRR 
and CCB4DRR, her country programme document is explicit in providing direct support 
to communities toward building resilience and reducing risks to shocks. And Don3 
emphasised the overall importance laid on capacity building in every Don3 community 
undertaking. In addition, it was comforting to find DRR listed in the cumulative budget 
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Figure 5. 12 Don3's 2016 Kenya Programmatic Footprint Report 
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line item that accounts for 32% though it was not clear how much of the 32% actually 
went to DRR.  
  
5.8.5 How do institutional donors and INGOs measure DRR 
success in Kenya?  
For all the six INGO and donor case studies, responses to this question were re-
arranged into 2 broad categories, and the two categories were:   
iii. Measures focused on local-level DRR success, and  
iv. Measures focused on national-level DRR success.  
And for Don3, the analysis revealed two indicators by which the agency measures DRR 
success. The two indicators include “immediate outputs” and “long-term outcomes.” 
 
Asked how as an agency Don3 measures the effectiveness and success of her 
contribution to the country’s DRR agenda, Don3’s DRR advisor responded,  
You can measure success depending on how you want to define it. One, if it is a 
project, “have I delivered what I needed to deliver?” That is one way in which 
you can measure your success. Two, and I think also which is what we are trying 
to look at is, “in the longer term, are we seeing the necessary changes that we 
intended?” …And of course, then you know there are also contributions from 
other people. We are very particular when it comes to the results, the outcomes 
at a higher level. Even in terms of our reporting, we will always be looking at 
“what are the changes that are coming out?” 
As part of the analysis, Don3’s response to the question was triangulated to her 
DRR priority areas which are mainly ‘government institutional CB4DRR’ and ‘community 
CB4DRR using CMDRR approaches.’  Don3’s measure of DRR success, therefore, looks at 
intended outcomes both at the national and community level. And community-level 
outcomes are expected from supported CMDRR activities.   
 
In summary, the analysis showed that Don3 uses two indicators for measuring 
DRR success. These are ‘immediate project outputs’ and ‘long term outcomes or 
   216 
 
required long-term changes.’ And based on her DRR priority areas which are mainly 
‘government institutional CB4DRR’ and ‘community CB4DRR using CMDRR approaches”, 
it becomes clear that in addition to looking at long-term national-level results, Don3 also 
looks at long-term results from her CMDRR engagements.     
5.8.6 What changes do institutional donors and INGOs 
working on DRR want to see as a result of their 
contribution to the DRR agenda in the country?  
As already indicated in preceding case studies, the purpose behind this question 
was to indirectly find out where or at what level both case donors and INGOs wanted 
to see changes as a result of their DRR contribution in the country. For all the six case 
studies, responses to this question were re-arranged into 9 categories, namely: better 
resource allocation, better DRR comprehension and integration, improved coordination, 
improved DRM governance, improved community capacity, more child-led DRR, 
professional disciplines taking DRR seriously, reduced hazard impacts,  and lastly, things 
that need to be stopped. Data analysis assigned Don3’s response to 3 of the 9 categories, 
namely: ‘reduced hazard impacts’, ‘better DRR comprehension and integration’ and 
‘better resource allocation’. The analysis is presented in that order.  
 Reduced hazard impacts 
Asked ‘what specific changes or improvements Don3 would like to see in Kenya 
as a result of highly effective DRR work in the country’, the DRR advisor pointed out 
three areas starting with reduced hazard impacts.  
The moment DRR is effective, one of the changes that we need to see is a 
reduction in the negative impact of disasters. Be it economic, or break it down 
into the loss of lives and property. That is really what we want to see. Take 
drought, for example, I don’t think it is going to go anywhere, but we want to see 
less impact and fewer people being impacted by this.  
 Better DRR comprehension and integration 
 After explaining the desired need to see reduced hazard impacts, Don3 
highlighted the need for better DRR comprehension and integration in the country. 
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The moment we start seeing effective DRR, the other thing we are going to see is a 
change in the way we are doing our 
development…I will speak for Kenya, I 
will not speak for other countries. Not 
many people understand DRR. And a lot 
of people think DRR and humanitarian 
response are the same thing. Many 
people think it is the same thing...I think we are still very limited in the understanding of 
DRR and how to translate it into the practical things…Government is supposed to do DRR 
through different sectors: through agriculture, through livestock, water, etc. DRR should 
find its way down through most of the ministries, the technical line ministries. I think that 
is where there is a bit of a break, where we actually understand that you can re-configure 
your development to DRR so that whatever way you implement development you are 
actually reducing risks or you are already mitigating. I think that is really where the link 
breaks and so that even when you say allocate resources, I think because of that limited 
understanding of DRR, people do not even know how to allocate resources because we 
could do our normal work but in a way that is actually disaster risk reduction. So I think 
that is where the big break is. 
Don3’s reflections on the need for better DRR comprehension and integration 
corroborate with views from other expert sources including UNISDR (2011a) who 
emphasize that disaster risk reduction is an obligation for all, Amaratunga et al. (2018) 
who assert that a multi-stakeholder engagement is a key to for instance making a city 
resilient to disasters and a system needs to be properly established to involve all 
stakeholders to create disaster resilient cities; and Stein et al. (2018) who argue that 
prevention needs to be permanent, intentional, and everyone’s business, and would do 
Better DRR 
comprehension
Better DRR 
integration
Better DRR 
resourcing
Better Overall 
DRR Results
Figure 5. 13 Don3's analysis of causal links between DRR comprehension, DRR integration, 
DRR resourcing and overall DRR results 
 
“Because of that limited understanding of 
DRR, people do not even know how to 
allocate resources.” 
---Don3--- 
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well to follow some of the lessons learned from disaster risk reduction such as the need 
for multi-stakeholder and multilevel engagement.  
 
 A related interview with NDMA further confirmed Don3’s observations. The 
NDMA official asserted, “Some organisations are either ignorant or do not even know 
what it takes to implement DRR… DRR is still a very fresh thing in our country and one 
may not easily understand what the programmable aspects of DRR are…Everybody 
wants to say as long as you are writing and using the word ‘resilience’ in there, it is okay.” 
This is the dilemma of meaningless buzzword epidemics within the development sector.   
 
 Better resource allocation 
 While explaining the need for better DRR comprehension and integration, Don3 
identified a causal link between the level of DRR understanding and a level of resources 
allocation to DRR. The DRR advisor stated, “I think because of that limited understanding 
of DRR, people do not even know how to allocate resources because we could do our 
normal work but in a way that is actually disaster risk reduction.”  
Don3’s desired changes are typical of a DRR stakeholder with a greater 
understanding of the country’s present DRR architecture. Her comments on people’s 
limited comprehension of the DRR concept leading to inadequate DRR integration into 
various development aspects, which in itself reduces the potential to, therefore, 
reconfigure development to DRR, thus resulting into poor resources allocated to DRR 
couldn’t have delivered the analysis any better.  
 
5.8.7 Comments on ‘upper Vs local DRR support’ 
 For all the 6 donor and INGO case studies, the semi-structured interview guide 
asked the following question, “What would be your comments on growing literature 
that seems to suggest there’s inadequate support to community-level DRR action and 
yet there is comparatively more support to global, regional and national level DRR 
activities by many key stakeholders?”   
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 With no hesitation, Don3’s DRR advisor responded, “To a great extent, I would 
agree with that statement.” To clarify the comment, the DRR advisor further explained,  
I think the number of players thin out as we get down to the community. 
Whatever is discussed, very 
good frameworks and 
directions are given globally 
and regionally, but how that 
is cascaded down is not very 
clear. I think deliberate effort 
to link right to the local level is still missing, something misses there. And I think 
it is just because of the number of players. Resources that are available at the 
local level for you to translate what is happening globally and regionally are also 
very limited. This is a phenomenon  GNDR (2009) summarised as “Clouds But 
Little Rain,” an image representative of lots of high level (global, regional, and 
national) hype but with minimal local action and actual change.  
 When asked to identify some of the root causes for the disconnect between 
upper (global, regional and notational) level DRR engagements and local/community 
level DRR engagements, Don3 explained,  
The greatest responsibility to translate what is happening at the global and at 
the higher level to the local lies with the government. I will not speak for other 
countries. I think we are still very limited in the understanding of DRR and how to 
translate it into practical things.  
 In summary, Don3 agrees there’s a missing link between upstream (global, 
regional and national) DRR engagements and downstream (local/community level) DRR 
engagements. And Don3 identified ‘weak government comprehension of DRR’ as a root 
cause for the missing link because without good DRR comprehension, the government 
remains unable to cascade all the upstream thinking to the local level. This partly 
explains the reason why one of Don3’s DRR priorities in the country is institutional 
CB4DRR.   
“I think deliberate effort to link right to 
the local level is still missing.” 
--Don3-- 
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5.8.8 Comments on whether and how evidence from this 
research may be used. 
 Part of the interview guide run a statement with a question at the end reading 
as follows: “There’s ample literature showing that inadequate prioritisation of 
community capacity building for DRR remains the biggest obstacle to realising greater 
DRR progression in many countries including Kenya. Would INGO3 be willing to use this 
kind of evidence?” 
 Don3 positively responded, “If there is that evidence, why not? I think one of the 
challenges we have had is not being able to address the real issues. You actually 
mistarget in terms of identifying what the problem is so that you can be able to put in 
place the most appropriate intervention. And that is one statement that identifies some 
of the key problems, therefore, you are able to put in place the necessary.” 
  When asked to explain ways in which the agency would be willing to use this kind 
of evidence, Don3 explained, “To inform the work that we do in terms of targeting 
because it (meaning the research) identifies for you the areas around which you can 
design your programmes and allocate your resources.  So I think it would inform a lot in 
terms of “how do you target the resources that you have?” 
Don3 is, therefore, another case donor that showed a willingness to use the evidence to 
especially improve how it targets its limited resources around various DRR gaps.  
5.8.9 Overall comments 
DRR priorities: In summary, Don3 has woven a strong DRR tapestry that provides 
technical support to government DRR departments while at the same time working 
directly with local communities using CMDRR approaches and where required 
supporting the implementation of resilience-building DRR projects. Analysis showed that 
Don3 is unquestionably another donor agency with a strong commitment to working 
directly at the local community level. Because of her very strong commitment to 
community capacity building and the use of CMDRR approaches, it was evident that 
CCB4DRR is very high on her agenda.  
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 Criteria for selecting priorities: In summary, Don3’s DRR priorities selection 
criteria includes conducting gaps analysis to inform the Country Programme Strategy 
Document, collaborating with government to determine geographic areas of focus, 
working with counties to agree on priority local geographic areas and then working with 
target communities using CMDRR approaches to identify respective community  DRR 
priorities. The priorities selection criteria are further guided by introspection to 
determine both available capacities and comparative advantage. Overall, it was worth 
noting that part of Don3’s priorities selection criteria includes working directly with 
prioritised communities to come up with community-selected DRR priorities using 
CMDRR approaches. Local level consultations are therefore part of the criteria used to 
determine Don3’s DRR priorities.  
Knowledge and use of global DRR frameworks: In summary, Don3 is very much 
aware of SF4DRR, and is a donor that is blazing the trail in supporting the government 
in the implementation of the framework. At the national level, Don3 has supported the 
government to come up with a draft SF4DRR action plan to guide the work of the 
national platform. At County level, Don3 has supported select counties to come up with 
County Disaster Risk Reduction Action Plans based on the SSF4DRR with budgetary 
allocation for the implementation of Climate Change/Disaster Risk Reduction 
interventions into key sectors focusing on Health, Water, and Infrastructure. Don3 has 
therefore done exceptional work in supporting the central government and county 
government institutions to understand SF4DRR and break it down into workable action 
plans. And in-house, Don3 has aligned itself to SF4DRR global priorities. 
 
A review across Gaillard and Mercer (2013); Robertua (2013); UNISDR 
(2013a);UNISDR (2013b); Benicchio (2012); Djalante et al. (2012); Izumi and Shaw 
(2012); van Riet and van Niekerk (2012) ; Hagelsteen and Becker (2012); Scott and 
Tarazona (2011); J Twigg and Bottomley (2011); Kent (2011); Pelling (2007a); UNDP 
(2004) ; Walter (2004); Walter (2002); and Walter (2001) revealed consensus among 
these authors that while there continues to be a growing interest and focus on DRR, 
poor local capacity for DRR remains a major impediment to making required progress. 
The literature review had therefore observed the urgent need to address the gap 
between global DRR agendas, national level policies and strategies and local level risk 
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reduction activities. It was very inspiring to note Don3’s strategic decision to prioritize 
and support engagement with county governments around SF4DRR.  
 
DRR Funding: While Don3 didn’t avail data in regard to how much of her funding 
goes to both DRR and CCB4DRR, her country programme document is explicit in 
providing direct support to communities toward building resilience and reducing risks to 
shocks.  And Don3 emphasised the overall importance laid on capacity building in every 
Don3 community undertaking.  
 
Ways of measuring success: In summary, the analysis showed that Don3 uses 
two indicators for measuring DRR success. These are ‘immediate project outputs’ and 
‘long term outcomes or required long-term changes.’ And based on her DRR priority 
areas which are mainly ‘government institutional CB4DRR’ and ‘community CB4DRR 
using CMDRR approaches”, it becomes clear that in addition to looking at long-term 
national-level results, Don3 also looks at long-term results from her CMDRR 
engagements.    
 
Desired changes consequent to effective DRR in the country: Don3’s desired 
changes are typical of a DRR stakeholder with a greater understanding of the country’s 
present DRR architecture. Her comments on people’s limited comprehension of the DRR 
concept leading to inadequate DRR integration into various development aspects, which 
in itself reduces the potential to, therefore, reconfigure development to DRR, thus 
resulting into poor resources allocated to DRR couldn’t have delivered the analysis any 
better.  
Fig. 5.14 below presents a mind map of Don3’s Findings.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   223 
 
 
Figure 5. 14 A Mind Map of Don3 Findings 
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5.9 Analysis and Discussion of Factors and or Good 
Practice Concepts that Enabled OMO’s 
Outstanding CCB4DRR Success 
 
 Factors Responsible for OMO’s Rare Successful CCB4DRR  
A number of factors, which for this research will be referred to as ‘good practice 
concepts’ were found to have enabled OMO’s rare, and therefore, outstanding CCB4DRR 
success. And according to Amaratunga et al. (2018), a sound or good practice can be 
considered as anything that has been tried and shown to work in some way—whether 
fully or in part, but with at least some evidence of effectiveness—and that may have 
implications for practice at any level elsewhere. OMO’s good practice concepts (and or 
success enablers) were identified through the review and analysis of a number of 
sources. These sources included interviews with key informants (Bishop Dr Masika- 
founder and leader of OMO, OMO participants, learning tours groups to OMO, and 
government officials), published literature, and social media content on OMO.  
 
The interview with Bishop Dr Masika (founder and leader of Yatta’s OMO) which 
provides a thick and rich description of how OMO was founded and processes OMO 
went through before it would become probably the region’s most renowned and visited 
CCB4DRR success story, is reproduced in its entirety with the permission of Bishop 
Masika, and presented as Annexe 5.   The interview (Annexe 5) is therefore an excellent 
companion to the following analysis.  
 
5.9.1.1 Success Factor # 1: Made time to accurately 
diagnose community issues and DID NOT 
paratroop into the community with ready-made 
up solutions.  
As noted in the background section to this case study, Yatta plateau had until 
2009 suffered from severe food insecurity and Mwolyo had become deeply entrenched 
into people’s minds. To address Yatta’s Mwolyo phenomenon, therefore, required a 
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much deeper understanding of what the real issues were, lest one massaged the surface 
and ended up creating even more challenges for the community. In the words of Masika, 
“you cannot change people's mindsets by an SMS. You have to sit with them, sitting with 
leaders, sitting with women, and feeling with them." This is the reason Masika (and his 
wife Agnes) left Nairobi---Kenya’s capital city—and stayed among the Yatta people with 
the sole intention of getting to understand what the root causes of people’s problems 
were.  Among many other things, they “wanted to understand how people think and 
why”, explains Masika. 
 
This in-depth immersion in the community made him (and his wife) acutely 
aware of key community challenges, their root causes, possible remedies, which 
interventions would do well to come first, and which approaches were best suited to 
the context. This dedicated stay among the Yatta community led to a number of 
anthropological findings that accurately informed the OMO response. Masika, 
therefore, became adequately informed and equipped for the challenge. And in all 
honesty, it appears this is where most well-intentioned community development 
agencies get it wrong. In the ‘the tyranny of the urgent’(Hummel, 1994) where there’s a 
lot more to be done but very little time to even grasp how to best do it, many community 
development agencies (and their donors) find themselves misdiagnosing issues.  
 
Simply put, the wrong diagnosis leads to wrong treatments and vice versa. While 
the death of one Yatta twin mother galvanised the urgency to find solutions for Yatta’s 
historical hunger and death episodes, Masika chose the important path of making time 
to quietly settle among the Yatta people and keenly diagnose the root of the problem. 
As will be reported in the ensuing narrative, making time to accurately diagnose Yatta’s 
community developmental challenges was a critical factor in laying the foundation for 
OMO’s eventual overwhelming success.  
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5.9.1.2 Success Factor # 2: Choice of interventions/ first 
things first.  
 Consequent to his deep immersion into the Yatta community, Masika came up 
with findings that informed the choice of interventions that were very dear to people’s 
hearts. For instance, he was confronted with the sad reality of people especially women 
having to trek up to 20km to and fro remaining water points during the dry season. 
Relatedly, Masika remarks on one of his findings, “the locals have a saying that the crops 
in Ukambani wither, and all they need is ‘one rain’ locally known as ‘mwono umwe' to 
survive." Commenting on factors behind Yatta’s great OMO success, one government 
(NDMA) official easily observed, “The choice of interventions were very close to the 
people's hearts. The place is one of the driest, and the need for water was enormous. 
Starting by addressing the water issue and then linking it with food production was like 
fighting something you can see.” Meaning, there were countless households willing to 
actively answer the rallying call to address the water issue. 
OMO therefore began by laying 
emphasis on sustainable household water 
harvesting aimed at reducing distances 
travelled to water points and removing the 
dependency on mwono umwe for crop 
production. Addressing the water issue was, 
therefore, a top dream and priority by 
many, and Masika didn’t have to spend too 
much energy convincing Yatta households 
to buy into his water harvesting ideas. OMO 
therefore strategically started with 
addressing the water issue, the prime need 
for every Yatta resident, as the first 
programmatic activity. And in the first year 
alone, more than 1,000 household water 
dams were excavated. To date, thanks to OMO, there are more than 4,000 functional 
household water dams in Yatta alone. Starting with interventions that had the potential 
Box 4: The First Miracle 
Seven months after we started, at the 
height of the dry spell, the people of 
Yatta witnessed the first miracle. 
While villages in the greater eastern 
region waited for rains to start 
planting, the people of Yatta were 
ready to harvest—and it was going to 
be one of the biggest harvest ever 
seen. 
Agnes tells me that one lady, when 
she saw what was going on, asked her 
what they could do with the food. I 
am not a man of deep emotions, but a 
question like that drew my tears. 
Excerpt from Masika (2016, p. 141) 
Figure 2: The First Miracle 
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to translate into the fastest effects and impacts on OMO participants helped to steadily 
win many other households over to OMO. In a dry and thirsty land, it didn’t need to take 
any convincing for people without ponds to quickly envy neighbours that had plenty of 
water during the dry season. The unthinkable but increasing scene of household dams 
full of water must have been a great advert that turned many sceptics around.  
5.9.1.3 Success Factor # 3: Starting from the simplest and 
smallest resources available. 
 While explaining factors behind OMO’s big success, a government (NDMA) 
official reflected, “Water is the biggest problem in all of Yatta areas, and the choice of 
OMO technologies did not need big investments. People were starting from the simplest 
investments. Like, if they wanted to do a small pond, they would do it from their own 
resources or from their own energy.” One of OMO’s first digressions from traditional 
development interventions was to reject crippling material interventions and lay 
emphasis on the need for a household to start small using just what they had---own 
tools and own labour. This meant that almost every household could get on board the 
OMO programme by developing their own small dam. And that is how in the first year 
of OMO, Yatta could boast of more than 1,000 functional household water dams---the 
first miracle of great proportions. These were the first steps walking away from mwolyo 
on rainy seasons.   
In his seminal work on “Mindset Change for Community Transformation’, Masika 
(2016, p. 73) recommends that African communities need to be helped to help 
themselves, for “they need to explore resources and opportunities in their backyards 
before they invite external aid”.  Masika’s recommendation resonates with McKnight 
and Kretzmann (1997) who remind us that history shows significant community 
development only takes place when local community people are committed to investing 
themselves and their resources in the effort. They are categorical that development 
must start from within the community, for communities cannot be developed from the 
top down, or from the outside in, p.2.  They further argue that communities have never 
been built upon their deficiencies; rather, community development has always 
depended upon mobilizing the capacities and assets of a people and a place, p.17.  
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McKnight and Kretzmann’s arguments are corroborated by Eade (2007, p. 633) 
when she laments, “The sad reality is that most development aid has precious little to 
do with building the capacities of ‘The Poor’ to transform their societies. Not even the 
best-intentioned NGOs are exempt from the tendency of the Development Industry to 
ignore, misinterpret, displace, supplant, or undermine the capacities that people already 
have.” Eade’s lamentations are further corroborated by Moyo (2009) who in her seminal 
work titled “Dead Aid” firmly asserts that aid to the developing world, left the way it is, 
is the very disease of which it pretends to be the cure.  
 
The ability to, therefore, mobilise Yatta participants to start small and use their 
own simple resources to develop household water dams was one of the critical 
ingredients behind OMO’s eventual great success. Once the people noted how much 
they had accomplished with very little, they simply became unstoppable.  
 
5.9.1.4 Success Factor # 4: Mobilisation for a peer-to-peer 
collaborative spirit  
Related to starting by 
using the simplest and smallest 
resources available toward 
community development, is the 
concept of ‘pulling together’ or 
‘building a peer-to-peer 
collaborative spirit’.  How could 
an emaciated population only surviving on random sympathetic handouts even think of 
taking on the arduous challenge of digging water pans? Masika (2016, pp. 81, 140) 
explains, “On the day we 
introduced the concept of water 
pans, I could tell most women 
gathered were sceptical. First of 
all, there was the fear of 
disturbing ancestors. A taboo 
We have disabused the community of the 
notion that digging water pans could 
invite a curse because the deeper ground 
is home to ancestors and they don’t like 
to be disturbed (Masika, 2016, p. 95). 
It is during the DRR trainings that 
participants also realised if you don’t help 
your neighbour solve his problem, that 
problem will affect you. 
Source: interview with INGO3 
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nobody was ready to mess up with. Then there was the fact nobody was strong enough 
to start digging a hole big enough to hold even a gallon of water, leave alone a deep 
water pan. We, however, explained how it would work. Basing our approach on the 
concept of the merry-go-round, which they were already familiar with, we introduced 
the concept of donated labour. On a given day, women were to come together and dig 
a water pan in one home, then they would go to the next home the next day. This process 
played out until many homes one by one established their water dams. Those baby steps 
led to bigger steps as we all embarked on more grandiose ideas.”  
 There’s no doubt if it wasn’t 
for good mobilisation for the 
merry-go-round practice, the 
idea of digging water pans at 
the peak of a killer drought 
would not have seen the light of 
day. Yet everything hinged on 
community ability to harvest 
rainwater, and this wouldn’t 
have been possible unless the 
same communities prepared 
during the dry season. Thus 
good community mobilisation on one hand and mobilisation for an African approach 
of working together via a practice commonly known as merry-go-round, on the other 
hand, were twin success factors in accomplishing the first OMO challenge. And 
testimonies abound of how the Yatta merry-go-round success has been replicated by 
various groups upon completing learning tours to Yatta’s OMO.  
5.9.1.5 Success Factor # 5: Leadership 
 Even from the preceding four success factors, one could decipher that great 
leadership is interwoven in the tapestry of OMO’s enormous success. During the analysis 
of OMO’s success factors, various leadership aspects stood out including leading from 
the front, visionary leadership and consistency in OMO’s leadership.  
Box 5: Testimony from Tanzania 
"The Mbuyuni farmers returned from Yatta with a 
new vision, and they began digging up a 
storm—120 water pans are underway. As in 
Makindube, they are forming small, powerful 
groups—27 so far—that will help them grow and 
sell their vegetables, save for their children’s 
future, and support one another. Their work has 
inspired their neighbours to dig their own pans. 
One mother of seven even began digging a 
water pan with her bare hands". Details of the 
cross-country trip from Tanzania to Yatta can be 
accesses via this 
link:  http://test2.christianimpactmission.org/?page_id=21 
Figure 3: Testimony from Tanzania 
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 Leading from the front. 
Asked “why is it that we have never been able to do and achieve the kind of 
things OMO did and with almost no 
injection of external resources?” the 
(NDMA) government official reflected, “I 
would say leadership is very 
important…Everything needs leadership 
and I think Masika has been able to lead 
from the front. And you know when you 
are leading a flock, you are leading 
everything. When you tell them to stop, 
they stop. You are there and you will see 
who has sat down. If you find one who has sat down, you lift him up and move together. 
That is one thing Masika has actually been able to do.”  
 The analogy of a traditional shepherd going ahead of the flock as his sheep 
willingly and trustingly follow him couldn’t have captured the essence of leading from 
the front any better. Masika stayed with the community, won their hearts over to OMO, 
showed Yatta participants what to do and was willing to make his hands dirty. When 
asked, “What is the most important resource or support that CIM provided to OMO?” 
Masika explained, “I think leadership is the greatest thing and also the spirit of the 
movement. The other thing is building the momentum because a movement is controlled 
by the momentum, and you will have to give leadership so that the train does not move 
off the rails.” 
Leading from the front helped to keep the OMO train on its rails and was, therefore, one 
of the critical factors responsible for OMO’s great success.   
 Visionary leadership  
 Asked whether OMO started with an exit strategy, with laughter, Masika remarks 
that “I think that question has a mindset of NGOs, which is a ‘mbokisi’ (the OMO word 
referring to the ill-informed habit of thinking within the box or boundaries---an issue he 
had unpacked during the training session for a delegation of visiting participants that 
“Everything needs 
leadership and I think 
Masika has been able to 
lead from the front.” 
Source: Interview with a Kenya Government Official 
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this researcher also attended). I think the exit is when you have proper empowerment of 
the people…as a movement, we have no exit because we are moving to the next, from 
one item to another. Immediately you develop a sense of arrival, people will exit 
themselves. Mine is to keep them realizing that we have not arrived, so we do not need 
to exit. But the fact that it is a movement, it is an idea, a philosophy, they will continue 
moving from glory to glory, from one thing to another.” 
 Still, on the subject of an exit strategy, Masika emphasised “They are not exiting 
but improving, diversifying and coming up with their own innovations…In Yatta, we are 
looking at developing industrial villages, agricultural villages, and commercial villages. 
We have not gotten everything…We would like to see families doing cottage industries.  
People have already started in their own way... I think everything is a process and the 
movement is going on. If OMO was a project, we should have exited a long time ago. 
Because if it was about water, when you have water, you can exit. Whatever people 
develop, we would like them to make it bigger and better. We do not want them to 
exit but to be resilient, because it is about people, not projects.” 
After dwelling among the Yatta people and getting to understand real people 
issues, Masika emerged with a vision which he was able to effectively cast before the 
people and rally their hearts and minds towards breaking free from dependence on food 
aid among many other dependencies. According to 21st-century leadership guru, J. C. 
Maxwell (2002), vision is everything for a leader, 
vision leads the leader, and vision draws on your past 
and on the history of the people around you. In 
addition, Maxwell asserts that “one of the most 
valuable benefits of a vision is that it acts as a magnet—attracting, challenging, and 
uniting people. The greater the vision, the more winners it has the potential to attract.”   
 Masika’s ability to accurately diagnose Yatta’s development challenges, develop 
and effectively share an emancipation strategy in which people were able to imagine 
themselves surrounded by water pans and visualise themselves living on all-year-round 
bumper harvests and not on Mwolyo, was another pivotal OMO success factor. 
 Consistency in OMO Leadership 
“The greater the vision, the 
more winners it has the potential 
to attract.” 
(J. C. Maxwell, 2002) 
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Discussions with various DRR stakeholders in Kenya coupled with related 
DRR literature review revealed that high staff turnover among DRR implementing 
agencies is one of the main challenges to 
institutional capacity building for DRR. Much 
of the time, DRR mainstreaming skills within a 
single INGO or local NGO are resident in only 
one staff. And when this individual leaves, all 
the institutional DRR visioning and memory tends to move on with them. Fortunately, 
this has not been the case with CIM leadership for OMO. Masika has been at the helm 
of OMO since inception to date.  This means OMO greatly benefited from consistent 
visionary leadership. Having a consistent visionary and locally accepted OMO leader is 
partly responsible for OMO's great success.   
5.9.1.6 Success Factor # 6: Community trust in religious 
leadership 
 An interview with a senior government official from the National Drought 
Management Authority (NDMA) ascribed part of OMO’s success to general community 
trust in religious leadership. “One success that Masika has gained and it is the same 
thing that happened in the place called Ngangani, is that the audience that is there was 
first and foremost in the church. One thing that we have is trust in the religious people 
in those particular areas. The guy who was in Ngangani is a Reverend. He and Masika 
are people who have church congregations around these areas. And over time, because 
they have worked with these people through various programmes that are there, the 
people have tended to trust them. I remember the Reverend in Ngangani once confiding 
in me while I was still working in the area and said, "Jimmy (a pseudonym to maintain 
confidentially), my people approached me saying I preach very well, and they have asked 
me, yes you preach very well here and you are telling us about heaven. But what are we 
going to be eating before we get to heaven.”---recollected the Kenya Government 
Official.  
Masika has been at the helm of 
OMO since inception to date. 
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While on one hand Masika’s approaches were initially frowned at by various 
religious leaders in the Yatta area, on the other hand, the regular church goer’s usual 
trust in church leadership was going to 
eventually pay off for OMO. When 
Masika’s incredible mobilisation skills sold 
the vision and steadily won over various 
church leadership to OMO, the ground 
had been laid for a mass OMO uprising by mobilising communities through their 
different church leadership. The more reason Masika quips, “If you have a programme 
that is patronized by Anglican or Catholic churches, they will be the insurance. And they 
offer better social insurance than the other one.” Masika’s excellent mobilization skills 
coupled with the local population’s affinity to trust religious leaders were twin factors 
partly responsible for OMO’s great success.  
5.9.1.7  Success Factor # 7: The role played by 
community change agents/ and or exposure 
champions 
The idea of the role played by community change agents/ and or exposure 
champions in OMO’s great success first came to the fore during an interview with 
Masika. Responding to the question concerning the rationale behind CIM’s decision to 
support East Pokot before circulating the entire Yatta neighbourhood, Masika had in 
part response firmly pointed out, “We are not going to deal with the poor of the 
poorest.” And when asked to explain this further, Masika argued, “The reason for that 
is because when you empower many people, they are going to empower their poor. In 
Africa, the poor belong to clans and 
they belong to families, and they 
know them better that me. And the 
poor are poor because they have 
some deficits or weakness that we 
may not be able to solve in a short 
capacity building programme. But 
there are people who will build them. More so, Africans also learn more through seeing, 
“If you have a programme that is 
patronized by Anglican or Catholic 
churches, they will be the insurance.” 
(Interview with Dr Masika) 
“When people are poor it is because 
they are poor in experiences, they are 
poor in examples, and they are poor 
in role models.” 
Source: Interview with Masika 
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and when people are poor it is because they are poor in experiences, they are poor in 
examples, and they are poor in role models.” 
In his seminal work titled ‘Mindset Change for Community Transformation’, 
Masika (2016) reveals how the CIM development model stands on three pillars, and in 
order of priority lists them as: exposure, training or gaining knowledge, and crisis. 
Masika asserts that taking deliberate steps to expose individuals and a community to 
new models of reality ignites in them a sense of desire for change. Masika argues that 
“they reason if someone else could do it, so could they” (p.95) A browse through CIM’s 
Facebook wall reveals that the concept of DRR Change Agents/ Resilience Champions 
has been a critical factor in driving forward the OMO disaster risk reduction agenda by 
filling the gap of the usually missing community resilience role models. And because of 
the concept’s success, CIM has made it a primary practice in OMO’s satellite outreaches 
in other parts of the country. The concept of "resilience champions" is best 
demonstrated by Gideon Lenyanet from East Pokot, Baringo, one of OMO’s distant 
satellite outreaches in the country.  Gideon was a re-known cattle rustler who with 
support from CIM has agreed to abandon cattle rustling in favour of alternative 
livelihoods in the form of agriculture.  Having observed Gideon’s drastic lifestyle change, 
one East Pokot military officer commented, "If young boys can be agents of change, 
this place can be in peace." 
 
Being a learned fellow with a background in higher education management, 
there’s no doubt Masika borrowed from the 80/20 Rule to inform the Resilience 
Champions practice. According to Tracy (2019), the 80/20 rule also called the “Pareto 
Principle, was named after its founder, the Italian economist Vilfredo Pareto, back in 
1895. He noticed that people in society seemed to divide naturally into what he 
called “the vital few,” or the top 20% in terms of money and influence, and 
“the trivial many,” or the bottom 80%. 
He later discovered that virtually all economic activity was subject to this 
Pareto Principle as well. For example, this rule says that 20% of your activities will 
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account for 80% of your results. 20% of your customers will account for 80% of your 
sales. 20% of your products or services will account for 80% of your profits. 20% of 
your tasks will account for 80% of the value of what you 
do, and so on. When Masika argued against working 
with the poorest of the poor, ‘the trivial many’ and 
emphasised the practice of role models, ‘the vital few’, 
he was, in essence, orchestrating the Pareto Principle, 
and with overwhelming results.  
The orchestration of the Pareto Principle through the 
practice of resilience champions with the sole 
purpose of establishing resilience role models was, therefore, another prime factor 
in driving OMO toward its record success.   
5.9.1.8  Success Factor # 8: Addressing traditional 
fatalistic mindsets through the empowered world 
view model  
 A Kenyan blog titled “Juju hotbeds: Regions you are most likely to be bewitched 
in Kenya” reads in part, “Welcome to Kenya, one of the most religious countries in the 
world where people carry bibles and pray all the time, but still keep a talisman from a 
20% of your 
activities will 
account for 80 
percent of your 
results. 
Vilfredo Pareto/ Pareto Principle 
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witchdoctor for additional security. From acute 
medical problems to domestic strife, crime, 
unemployment, court cases, politics, cheating 
spouses, jobs and school exams, the mganga 
(Swahili name for witchdoctor) is Mr Fit It. But 
which communities are most feared for witchcraft? 
The Kamba community is often stereotyped as the 
mother of all witchcraft…” And the Yatta 
community, which makes up OMO’s target 
population, is part of the greater Ukambani, home 
for the Kamba people.  
 In a related blog, Rath (2013) recounts, 
“When I first arrived in Nairobi, I saw the signs but 
didn’t know what they meant. Once I started 
understanding Swahili, I learned that the profusion 
of ads, nailed to fences, stuck on poles and printed 
on A3 paper, were for waganga (witchdoctors) 
offering assistance mainly in matters of business, 
money, love and infertility. In just about every suburb of Nairobi, you’ll find at least one 
ad, hand-painted, on a little plate, nailed high up on a pole. For an average of around 
6000 shillings (US$ 60), you can get to see one of these mgangas…” 
 Coincidentally, Africa’s famed scholar on African Religion and Philosophy, Prof 
John Mbiti, is a Kenyan from the Kamba peoples.  In his seminal work on Africa Religions 
and Philosophy, Mbiti (1990) remarks that “Africans are notoriously religious”, and 
asserts that traditional concepts still form the essential background of many peoples 
even when this differs from individual to individual and from place to place. Mbiti argues 
that even if educated Africans do not subscribe to all the religious and philosophical 
practices and ideas, “the majority of our people with little or no formal education still 
hold on to their traditional corpus of belief and practices. Anyone familiar with village 
gossip cannot question this fact, and those who have eyes will also notice evidence of it 
in towns and cities,” (ref to Fig.5.17). 
  
Figure 5. 15 A roadside advert for witchdoctor 
services in Nairobi Kenya. Kitui is a location in 
Ukambani, home for Kamba peoples. 
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Little wonder 
therefore that when Masika 
and his wife decided to 
quietly settle among the 
Kamba people of Yatta, theirs 
was a daunting discovery of 
how much the Yatta 
community was deeply stooped into harmful traditional beliefs and practices. For 
instance, Masika (2016) reveals how the Kamba people feared to dig water pans because 
of the traditional view that “the deeper ground belongs to ancestors and they don’t like 
to be disturbed” (p.95); how community songs and stories reverberated with themes of 
punishment including lightning strikes, dying 
of mysterious illnesses and going mad---all for 
defying the gods, ancestors or culture (p.100); 
the farming cycle from land preparation to 
harvesting was firmly controlled by sorcerers 
and magicians and sacrifices had to be offered 
to ancestors before every planting season 
(p.122); drought, crop failure and other 
calamities were seen as punishment from the gods. Masika remarks how “this was the 
prevailing mindset, reinforced by a cold worldview of fear and despair—that we had to 
mobilise the community against.  We had to raise an army of transformed men and 
women who would take back Yatta from forces that drank the blood of their children at 
infancy and killed mothers as they gave birth” (P.123).  
And how did OMO “mobilise men and women who would take back Yatta”? 
According to Masika (2016), this was done by addressing the individual’s Traditional 
Worldview and Mindset (TWM) through the Transformed Empowered World View and 
Mindset (TEWM). TWM is stooped into a constellation of foregoing crippling beliefs and 
practices and is a worldview that imprisons the individual in fear and despair.  Masika 
(2016) argues that in TWM, individuals and communities have grasshopper mindsets in 
which they view themselves as weak, vulnerable and as victims of circumstances. Masika 
“The farming cycle from land preparation to 
harvesting was firmly controlled by sorcerers 
and magicians and sacrifices had to be 
offered to ancestors before every planting 
season.”--(Masika, 2016) 
“What a community believes 
about itself is a significant 
factor in addressing 
development.” 
(Masika, 2016) 
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also points out that “this mindset about identity is further reinforced by development 
actors who portray people as weak, poor, disadvantaged and vulnerable” (p.86). 
In order to break the 
crippling TWM grip on Yatta, 
CIM leveraged OMO by 
introducing and advancing the 
TEWM among OMO 
participants. In the TEWM 
approach, individuals and 
communities have an exalted 
and realistic view of themselves 
and are reluctant to allow 
circumstances that they are under to define them. TEWN is an empowering force that 
appeals to people’s identity in a loving and caring God.  
By embracing the myth-busting and tradition-breaking TEWM through which 
individuals and communities started seeing themselves as objects of God’s 
unfathomable love, mercy and grace, countless traditional detrimental beliefs and 
practices were slowly but steadily turned around.  They include but are not limited to 
the following: embracing the concept that God is for them and not against them; they 
had God-given power to dominate and rule over their environment (not vice versa); their 
destiny was in their hands and not in the hands of sorcerers, magicians and nature; they 
didn’t have to compete with each other duped by the notion of scarce resources, rather, 
they needed to collaborate in harnessing resources in their environment (e.g. 
collaborate to dig water pans and break dependency on the rainy season---for “crops 
need water not just rain”); women were equal to men in the development agenda and 
therefore women needed to occupy their rightful place of equality with men along the 
community development process. This mindset change is probably best captured in the 
words of Joseph, a Yatta participant: "Today, when the rest of the country is praying for 
rain, in Yatta we pray for other things." And Masika rightly but sadly observes, "There's 
no dry land in Africa, just dry minds." 
“Your mindset is your collection of 
thoughts and beliefs that shape your 
thought habits.  And your thought habits 
affect how you think, what you feel, and 
what you do.  Your mind-set impacts how 
you make sense of the world, and how 
you make sense of you. Your mindset is a 
big deal.” 
Source: (Meier, n.d) 
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 Pinkett and O'Bryant (2003), Moore (2001); Page and Czuba (1999) and Pastor 
(1996) all agree that the foundation of community empowerment lies ultimately in the 
empowerment of the individual. Still, on 
empowerment, Smith (1997, p. 120) asserts that “to 
empower is to give power, to open up, to release the 
potential of people”.  
There’s no doubt, for a people hitherto sentenced to 
a life of fear and despair at the hands of intimidating 
gods and witchdoctors, the introduction, 
advancement, and steady adoption of the TEWM module by OMO participants was 
one of the most significant factors responsible for mentally re-orienting and propelling 
OMO  participants to the right development path.  
5.9.1.9  Success Factor # 9: The law of timing  
 
In his seminal work titled “The 21 Irrefutable Laws of Leadership”, J. C. Maxwell 
(2007) presents and describes law number 19 as “The Law of Timing” and asserts that 
“When to lead is as important as what to do 
and where to go.” Maxwell further points 
out that great leaders always understand 
and exploit the law of timing. He further 
argues that Every time a leader makes a 
move, there are always only four possible outcomes: 1. the wrong action at the wrong 
time leads to disaster; 2. the right action at the wrong time brings resistance; 3. the 
wrong action at the right time is a mistake; and 4. the right action at the right time 
results in success.  
And in regard to timing, Low (2016) explains that the strategic phrase "Never let 
a good crisis go to waste" is attributed to Winston Churchill, former British Premier in 
reference to the conditions post the Second World War that allowed for the formation 
of the United Nations. Similarly, Masika (2016, pp. 96-97) explains that “sometimes the 
only option available for embracing a mindset change is when we run out of options 
“TIMING IS EVERYTHING” 
(J. C. Maxwell, 2007) 
"We can’t change 
governments, but 
we can change 
individuals." 
Source: interview with Masika 
   240 
 
through a crisis.” Reflecting on OMO’s success, Masika further argues that “In their low 
moments, people are more open to interrogating their circumstances and are more 
inclined to accept newer approaches they would readily reject were storms not 
threatening.” This is the reason the CIM development model stands on three pillars: 
exposure, training or gaining knowledge, and crisis.  
It becomes obvious therefore that OMO’s great success is partly rooted in the facts 
that OMO being a combination of “right actions” was launched at the “right time.” The 
time when most Yatta residents were more than willing to embrace changes they 
would readily reject were it not for the dire situation that threatened to decimate 
them in 2009.  
5.9.1.10  Success Factor 10: Embracing 
Transformative Community Development 
Approaches 
Knowingly or naively, there are community development approaches that either 
engender or endanger well-intentioned community developments outcomes. And this 
is probably best captured by Mahomed and Peters (2016) who in the introduction to 
their co-authored work titled  “The Story Behind the Well: A case study of successful 
community development in Makutano, Kenya ” recollect that: 
 
Development is the story behind the well . . . you can have a community that 
wants a well to get better water, and most development agencies are happy to 
just help a community sink a well, get a water pump and say ‘Hurray, we have 
clean water, we have done our job’ . . . We were arguing that just getting the 
well is not enough – because that isn’t the development. The development, we 
were arguing, is the story behind the well; it’s how you get the well that’s very 
important. Did you build local capacities? Did you change attitudes? Did you help 
the community to think differently? Did you help them to see that you are not 
going to be there to repair the well?” (p.4).  
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Mohamed and Peters’ reflections are in total sync with Masika’s views on 
community development approaches. As already presented in the interview with 
Masika, he asserts that projects, the likes of helping a community to sink a well, “do not 
constitute development. That is facility development which cannot run itself. OMO 
focuses on human development. Developing the person, developing a person’s world 
view and changing the individual's mindset. So we deal with the person because 
development is about people.” The story behind the well is, therefore, more about 
approaches---the software side of things. And a deep dive into OMO’s adopted 
community development dynamics shows that a number of engendering community 
development approaches are at the core of OMO’s grand success. These engendering 
approaches and or good practices include: addressing gender inequalities; shunning 
handouts; and modelling, monitoring and mentoring.  
Addressing gender inequalities 
According to Masika (2016), there are huge gender inequalities among the 
Kamba peoples of Kenya. For instance, during the pre-OMO era, “Yatta women and men 
lived like strangers”, and culturally, “women were regarded lower than male children”. 
But all the while, more women and far fewer men were engaged in productive 
agricultural activities. Men 
generally spent much of their 
time in bars, worse still, drinking 
their heads off using proceeds 
from meagre harvests eked out 
by women’s sweat. Men were, 
therefore, more of seed/sperm 
carriers, observes Masika. Masika 
further observes that “In Yatta, 
women accepted the status quo 
in which they could neither inherit 
property nor make any key decisions once a husband was dead.”       
“In Yatta, women accepted the status 
quo in which they could neither inherit 
property nor make any key decisions 
once a husband was dead…CIM got 
into the picture and fought this cultural 
baggage.” 
(Masika, 2016) 
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                                                                                                                                          And due 
to the ravage caused by the 2006-2008 drought, “the community’s men had gone to 
other towns in search of a better life---most never to return” (p.81).  
In the words of Masika, “CIM got into the picture and fought this cultural baggage.”  
Masika (2016) asserts that there is a strong impact of gender and culture on community 
development, and if a development programme is to succeed, it has to take into account 
the prevailing cultural ways of people in relation to matters of gender. And because 
many men had left Yatta for towns, at the beginning of OMO, there was a strong passion 
to locate and lure men back to their homes. This component of OMO, code-named 
“Operation Men Back” was led by Agnes, Masika’s wife.  
 OMO and its Operation Men Back campaign were launched at a time when the 
memories and wounds of Kenya’s bloody 2007/2008 post-election violence were still 
fresh in people’s minds. However, one common good seemed to have emerged out of 
this horrific elections episode---a coalition government brokered by a Panel of Eminent 
African Personalities led by former UN Secretary-General, Dr Kofi Annan. In the coalition 
government, the pre-election ruling party retained the presidency, while unlike before, 
the leader of the opposition took up the newly created position of Prime Minister. There 
was, therefore, no ‘winner takes it all’ type of government, and this soothed the hearts 
and minds on masses on both sides of the political divide.   
And Masika (2016) explains that in an effort to address Yatta’s gender 
inequalities, CIM and particularly his wife Agnes thought things through and came up 
with a gender in development model 
patterned after the country’s then 
coalition government. As part of the 
Transformed Empowered Worldview 
Mindset, CIM presents and advances a 
transformed and empowering ‘family 
government structure’ in which “the 
husband is the President, the wife is the 
Prime Minister, children are Cabinet Secretaries and workers are the civil servants…We 
had to guide women and men into a place of comfort on gender matters, help them to 
“The husband is the President, the 
wife is the Prime Minister, children 
are Cabinet Secretaries and 
workers are the Civil Servants.” 
(Masika, 2016) 
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engender a worldview of inclusivity in and out of the home. Our efforts have born fruit 
and the community has greatly benefited…I dare say that had we not brought men into 
the picture, ownership of the reform programme in Yatta would have been an exclusively 
women affair—it would have failed” (p.129, 171).  
 And how would leaving men out of OMO have led to programme failure? Even 
when men were absent, there were still scores of things women couldn’t do and assets 
women couldn’t dare create because the remit of those decisions and access to 
productive assets like land, hitherto exclusively belonged to the male domain. 
Addressing Yatta’s gender inequalities at the household level through the TEWM that 
promotes and advances the adoption of the transformed and empowering family 
government structure, therefore, stands out as one of OMO’s critical success factors.  
 
Shunning handouts 
It was Anderson (1999) who exposed that while many aid agencies seek to be 
neutral or nonpartisan toward the losers and winners of wars, the impact of their aid is 
not neutral in conflict settings. Anderson further revealed that aid can reinforce, 
exacerbate, and prolong the conflict; while on the other hand, it can also help to reduce 
tensions and strengthen people’s capacities to disengage from fighting and find peaceful 
options for solving problems. Similarly, there’s growing literature decrying the negative 
effects of aid on recipient countries and poorly timed and managed handouts on 
communities.   
 
For instance, in her gripping work titled “Dead Aid”, Moyo (2009) challenges and 
debunks  the mindset that seems to suggest “aid, whatever its form, is a good thing.” 
Moyo argues that Paul Kagame, president of the Republic of Rwanda, is right to lament 
that “While more than US$300 billion in aid has apparently been disbursed to our 
continent since 1970, there is little to show for it in terms of economic growth and human 
development.” “Why do the majority of sub-Saharan countries flounder in a seemingly 
never-ending cycle of corruption, disease, poverty, and aid-dependency’, despite the fact 
that their countries have received more than US$300 billion in development assistance 
since 1970,” asks Moyo. The answer she gives is that African countries are poor precisely 
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because of all that aid. Moyo points out that “Between 1970 and 1998, when aid flows 
to Africa were at their peak, the poverty rate in Africa actually rose from 11 per cent to 
a staggering 66 per cent.” 
 
In ‘Aid Dependency: The Damage of Donation’, Stanford (2015) posits that what 
causes dependency is when aid is used, intentionally or not, as a long-term 
strategy that consequently inhibits development, progress, or reform. And 
Stanford shows that food aid is particularly criticised for this. “While OMO was 
preceded by food assistance, 
giving out of food rations was 
however not an end in itself. 
We refused to be merely 
donors. Relief, as it is, can 
never be sustainable. 
Counteracting dependency 
needs to be any development 
practitioner’s primary goal. 
Dependency in the community must be reduced by every action you take... A donor 
agency should try to avoid giving the community anything for nothing. That is what 
encourages dependency,” explained Masika.  
Because OMO was all about building a people’s resilience to enhance self-
reliance and kick out dependency on handouts, Masika (2016) shows that during the 
early days of OMO, one of CIM’s role was to balance the need for strategic external 
resources with the long-term goal of eradicating all forms of donor dependency.  
CIM’s ability to mobilise OMO participants to embark on OMO activities without 
“promising to do for them what citizens ought to do for themselves” is one critical 
factor which showed Yatta residents the incredible development potential within 
them. And like a wildfire, once they noted how much they had achieved in the first 6 
months---a landscape awash with overflowing water pans and a harvest they could only 
hitherto dream of--- they simply became unstoppable. Commenting on his leadership 
team’s first field learning visit to Yatta’s OMO in 2012, Tim Andrews, the then Country 
“Dependency in the community must be 
reduced by every action you take... A 
donor agency should try to avoid giving 
the community anything for nothing. That 
is what encourages dependency.” 
Masika 
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Director of World Vision Tanzania, writes: “we came away from that encounter with a 
renewed understanding that the foundation of transformational development has 
very little to do with the transfer of external resources, capacity building and 
technologies into impoverished communities. It had a lot to do with mindset change 
at the individual level. The result was a community with the belief it had the resources 
and the will to drive its own development agenda”  (Masika, 2016, p. 14). 
 
In-situ training, modelling, and mentoring 
A read across CIM literature, interviews with Dr Masika and interactions with 
OMO participants reveal that in-situ training, modelling and mentoring were some of 
the most notable transformative good practices employed by CIM which contributed to 
OMO’s grand success. Before the advent 
of OMO, Masika had successfully 
developed a water dam and practiced 
the one-acre rule strategy himself. And 
following his view that ‘Africans learn 
more by seeing’, CIM went ahead to 
establish a model demonstration one-
acre productive farm from which OMO participants could gain insights and be inspired. 
This model one-acre demonstration farm is still being used for trainings.   
 
On the subject of training for skills transfer, Masika (2016, p. 223) observes that 
in the Traditional World View and Mindset (TWM) approach, the training and mentoring 
process takes place in the world of the 
teacher. “It pulls the student away 
from where the action should be 
taking place. A common phenomenon 
is the scenario where NGOs run 
training programmes in big hotels yet 
targeting communities.” But in CIM’s 
promoted Transformed Empowered World View and Mindset (TEWM) approach, 
“Yes, Africans learn more through 
seeing...I did the one acre 
demonstration first.” 
 Masika 
And because we know change is a 
process, after training, we mentor to 
ensure maximum adoption. 
 
Source: interview with Masika 
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“training and other programmes are field-based, with immediate application of 
principles being taught. Action-Centered learning is designed to add value to the 
community and build a sense of ownership.”   
 
By adopting the TEWM, trainings were and continue to be delivered in the form 
of learning laboratories. Reflecting on Yatta’s mentoring for transformation experience, 
Masika (2016, p. 222) explains, “It seeks to build on the ‘donot-just-tell-me-but-show-
me’ principle. It seeks to not only tell you but to explain and demonstrate how it works, 
inspiring protégés for a lifelong impact.” There’s no doubt, the combination of modelling 
and in-situ trainings that served and continue to serve as learning laboratories, played a 
crucial role in enhancing learning, leading to maximum adoption of OMO taught 
practices. It is the maximum adoption of OMO’s taught practices that partly led to 
OMO’s grand success. Thanks therefore to CIM’s combination of modelling, in-situ 
trainings and mentoring.  
 
 
The following section summarizes findings for each institutional and CCB4DRR case 
study. 
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5.10 Summary Findings Per Institutional Case Study 
and CCB4DRR Case Study. 
 
In preparation for the cross-case analysis in section 5.11, this section presents 
summary findings per institutional and CCB4DRR case study.  
 
The process of coming up with key findings included assessing whether there’s 
any coherence or storyline between an individual case DRR priorities, the criteria used 
to arrive at these priorities, ways through which an individual case donor or INGO 
measures DRR success in the country, and specific changes the individual donor or INGO 
working on DRR in Kenya wants to see as a result of their contribution to the DRR agenda 
in the country.  
 
Or put differently, is there a coherent link between an agency’s current DRR 
priorities, the criteria used to select these priorities, the agency’s way of measuring DRR 
success, and things the agency would want to see improved as a result of highly effective 
DRR engagements in the country? And what is the place or status of CCB4DRR along this 
winding route? The summary of key findings is therefore presented case study by case 
study.  
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5.10.1 Summary of key findings for INGO1 
  
 
 
 
 
Desired changes consequent to the agency’s highly 
effective DRR engagement in the country 
-government allocating adequate DRR funding to various 
government departments 
 
-finalize the DRR policy to help streamline risk governance 
 
-reduced # of government disaster management agencies 
 
-improved community capacity building aimed at helping 
communities manage risks in their environment 
 
-More children and youths in DRM 
 
-move from disaster response focus to resilience building  
-from rhetoric to executing for results 
Current DRR Priorities 
-Institutional CB4DRR 
-Advocacy and influencing  
-CCB4DRR 
-Partner CB4DRR 
-Child-led DRR 
 
Criteria for selecting DRR 
priorities 
-priorities agreed by global DRR 
frameworks 
-government DRR priorities 
Agency ways of measuring 
DRR success 
-household coping ability during 
shocks 
-continued households 
commitment to DRR practices 
-performance of child-led DRR 
Funding for CCB4DRR 
INGO1 uses an integrated approach to 
mainstreaming DRR, thus was unable to indicate 
approximate budget to DRR. However, the 
advisor indicated commitment to ensuring that 
for the future, 5-7% of long-term non grant 
funding for community development goes to 
supporting resilience-building DRR activities.  
Key: Green arrows indicate direct linkage 
between different INGO1’s variables. 
 
Figure 6. 1 Summary findings for INGO1 (indicating key linkages) 
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5.10.1.1 Synopsis of INGO1 Findings 
 
As indicated by the green arrows in Fig 6.1, there is a direct link and or a storyline 
between INGO1’s current DRR priorities, her ways of measuring DRR success, and her 
desired changes in the country consequent to the agency’s highly effective engagement 
in the country’s DRR agenda. For instance, CCB4DRR, which is one of her five DRR 
priorities in the country is directly linked with the way INGO1 measures DRR success by 
focusing on household coping ability during shocks and household continued 
commitments to DRR practices. This is also directly linked to her desired change for 
improved community capacity building aimed at helping communities manage risks in 
their environment. Child-led DRR, which is one of the critical outcomes of targeted 
CCB4DRR, features prominently among INGO1’s DRR priorities, her ways of measuring 
DRR success and desired changes consequent to highly effective DRR engagements in 
the country.  
 
There’s, therefore, enough evidence pointing to the fact that CCB4DRR is high 
on INGO1’s agenda, right from selecting which DRR priorities to support, all the way 
through ways of measuring DRR success and the kind of changes INGO1 would like to 
see as a result of her effective contribution to the country’s DRR agenda.  There’s 
especially a very strong co-relation between INGO1’s DRR priorities and what she would 
like to see as a result of executing these priorities. However, it is noted INGO1’s DRR 
advisor lamented the disconnect between the organization’s DRR priorities and the level 
of funding committed to the same priorities.  
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5.10.2 Summary of key findings for INGO2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. 2:  Summary findings for INGO2 (indicting key linkages) 
 
Key: Green arrows indicate direct linkage 
between different INGO2’s variables. 
Current DRR Priorities 
-Advocacy and influencing 
-CMDRR 
-Community capacity to lobby 
-Access to timely EW information 
-Empirical research 
 
Criteria for selecting DRR 
priorities 
-Building the resilience of 
communities which INGO2 has 
responded to in disaster situations 
(thus going beyond handouts).  
-Global agency DRR priorities. 
Agency ways of measuring 
DRR success 
-Community capacity to lobby 
upstream 
-Community capacity to attract 
external resources 
-Results from policy influencing 
Desired changes consequent to the agency’s highly effective 
DRR engagement in the country 
-better resource allocation to community DRR action plans 
-harmonization of DRR instruments (frameworks, strategies, 
policies etc.) 
-reduction in # of national DRM departments 
-stop processes that are only extractive to communities. Have a 
feedback loop.  
-stop spreading scarce resources thin. Be more focused. 
Funding for CCB4DRR 
Up to 50% of total budgets are dedicated to DRR and 
15-20% of these DRR funds support CCB4DRR 
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5.10.2.1 Synopsis of INGO2 Findings 
 
A look at Fig. 6.2 reveals direct links and or a storyline between INGO2’s current 
DRR priorities, her level of funding commitment to both DRR and CCB4DRR, her ways of 
measuring DRR success, and the desired changes she would like to see in the country 
consequent to the agency’s highly effective engagement in the country’s DRR agenda. 
For instance, her ‘CMDRR’ and ‘community capacity to lobby’ priorities are directly 
linked to the desired end picture of ‘better resource allocation to community DRR action 
plans’. And because one of INGO2’s desired changes in to see better resource allocation 
to community DRR action plans, she reported the highest funding commitment to DRR 
(up to 50% of total budgets) and to CCB4DRR (15-20% of DRR funds). 
 
The quest to go beyond handouts and build the resilience of communities which 
INGO2 has responded to during disaster situations is one the criteria INGO2 uses to 
determine her DRR priorities. This is directly linked to her level of funding commitment 
to DRR and CCB4DRR. And of the 6 cases covered by this research, only one case, that is 
INGO2, was conscious of how much of her DRM resources were focused on resilience-
building DRR and related CCB4DRR. Her ‘advocacy and influencing’ priority is linked to 
the way she measures DRR success by way of looking at ‘results from policy influencing’; 
which is also reflected in her desired changes including better resource allocation to 
community DRR action plans, and reduction in # of national DRM departments.   
 
Overall, there’s very strong evidence pointing to the fact that CCB4DRR is high 
on INGO2’s agenda right from the point of determining which DRR priorities to support, 
the criteria used to arrive at these priorities, funding commitments to DRR and CCB4DRR 
and the types of changes INGO2 would like to see as a result of effectively engaging in 
the country’s DRR agenda.  
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5.10.3 Summary of key findings for INGO3 
 
 
Key: Green arrows indicate direct linkage 
between different INGO3’s variables. 
Current DRR Priorities 
-CMDRR 
-Child-led DRR 
 
 
 
 
Criteria for selecting DRR 
priorities 
-NDMA/ government priorities 
-county government priorities 
-Priorities set by alliances 
-security determines where to work 
-internal capacity 
-global agency DRR priorities 
Agency ways of measuring 
DRR success 
Community transformation 
(adoption, application and 
ownership) 
Desired changes consequent to the agency’s highly effective 
DRR engagement in the country 
-approach DRR from a longer-term perspective 
-think DRR during both short and long term programmes/projects 
-DRR included in school curriculum 
-all professional disciplines, for instance, engineers take DRR seriously 
-stop treating or approaching DRR from a quick fix perspective 
Funding for CCB4DRR 
INGO3 is spending more on disaster response and far less 
on resilience-building DRR, though it was encouraging to 
note that much of the DRR funding goes to CMDRR which 
is strong on CCB4DRR. Thus while CMDRR (and CCB4DRR) is 
a high DRR priority, it’s a low ranking priority when viewed 
from how much of the INGO3’s budget is dedicated to DRR.  
 
 Figure 6. 3 Summary findings for INGO3 (indicting key linkages) 
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5.10.3.1 Synopsis of INGO3 Findings 
A review of Fig. 6.3 reveals a direct link between INGO3’s priorities and her 
desired changes consequent to INGO3’s highly effective engagement in the country’s 
DRR agenda; and a strong link between her DRR priorities and funding for CCB4DRR.  For 
instance, not only is ‘child-led DRR’ a top DRR priority, but the inclusion of DRR in school 
curriculum is one of her desired changes in the country. Secondly, not only is CMDRR a 
top INGO3 DRR priority, but also much of INGO3’s limited DRR funding goes to CMDRR 
and its CCB4DRR elements. Other than these two direct links between the indicated 
variables, there seem to be weak links between remaining variables. While CMDRR is 
one of INGO3’s top 2 DRR priorities, it emerges as a low-ranking priority when viewed 
from how much of INGO3’s budget is dedicated to DRR.  When selected priorities remain 
poorly resourced, we run the danger of sliding into the rim of rhetoric and less 
execution, a condition analysts have rightly likened to the natural phenomenon of 
having ‘clouds but little rain’. 
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5.10.4 Summary of key findings for Don1 
 
 
 
 Key: Green arrows indicate direct linkage 
between different Don1’s variables. 
Current DRR Priorities 
-funding + technical support to 
NDMA 
-support to county government 
drought mitigation projects 
 
 
Criteria for selecting DRR 
priorities 
-not involved in selecting priorities 
Agency ways of measuring 
DRR success 
-no disaster related deaths 
-reduced loss of livelihood assets 
-community/ beneficiary 
transformation 
Desired changes consequent to the agency’s highly 
effective DRR engagement in the country 
-government allocating adequate resources to DRM and reducing 
dependency on external aid 
-improved stakeholder coordination leading to joint DRM 
planning. 
-total government ownership of the DRM agenda including 
resourcing that agenda   
-stop depending on external assistance to respond to and mitigate 
drought conditions. 
Funding for CCB4DRR 
Don1 entirely devolves to NDMA the responsibility to decide which DRR 
priorities will be supported using resources allocated by Don1.Analysis of 
NDMA data showed that much of the funding goes to preparedness and 
response during both bad and good years. Thus for both Don1 and NDMA, 
prioritizing and supporting CCB4DRR isn’t anywhere high on their respective 
agendas.   
 
Figure 6. 4 Summary findings for Don1 (indicting key linkages) 
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5.10.4.1 Synopsis of Don1 Findings 
 
A review of Fig. 6.4 reveals a direct link between Don1’s DRR priorities and 
funding for CCB4DRR and a direct link between Don1’s criteria for selecting DRR 
priorities and level of funding for CCB4DRR. For instance, funding and technical support 
to NDMA are one of Don1’s top priorities, and because she has entirely devolved the 
selection of DRM/DRR priorities entirely to the NDMA, she doesn’t have control over 
how much of allocated funds go to which element of DRM. Unfortunately, analysis of 
NDMA data confirmed that much of the funding to NDMA goes to support disaster 
preparedness and response during both bad and good years. It emerged therefore that 
prioritizing and supporting CCB4DRR isn’t anywhere high on both NDMA and Don1’s 
agendas.  
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5.10.5 Summary of key findings for Don2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. 5 : Summary findings for Don2 (indicting key linkages)  
 
Key: Green arrows indicate direct linkage 
between different Don2’s variables. 
Current DRR Priorities 
-capacity development of government 
offices (at both local and national levels) 
-CMDRR 
-Local level partner CB4DRR 
-DRR studies to inform own programming 
Criteria for selecting DRR priorities 
-aligning with government priorities 
-complementarity with peer agencies 
-agency research and assessment reports 
-agency strategy paper 
-agency comparative technical advantage 
-lessons from previous projects 
Agency ways of measuring 
DRR success 
-Community and local 
government feedback on agency 
supported projects 
-Don2’s willingness to replicate or 
scale up a project 
Desired changes consequent to the agency’s highly 
effective DRR engagement in the country 
-adopt the ‘built-in-resilience’ practice for every type of 
intervention 
-improved coordination for better resource distribution to 
different geographic areas and for harmonization of 
implementation approaches 
-county government bureaucracies not affecting resource flows to 
local level DRR action. 
-stop giving out mis diagnosed handouts for they undercut the 
spirit behind community resilience building.   
Funding for CCB4DRR 
While Don2 was not able to share ready figures of how much of her 
development funding to Kenya goes to DRR and CCB4DRR, analysis 
showed that Don2 is engaged in working directly with target 
communities using CMDRR approaches. There is no doubt she is 
one of the donors with the highest prioritisation and support to 
local DRR action including CCB4DRR in the country. 
   257 
 
5.10.5.1 Synopsis of Don2 Findings 
 
A review of Fig. 6.5 reveals direct links and or a storyline between Don2’s current 
DRR priorities and her funding commitment to both DRR and CCB4DRR, her ways of 
measuring DRR success, and the desired changes she would like to see in the country 
consequent to the agency’s highly effective engagement in the country’s DRR agenda. 
For instance, Don2’s DRR priorities including CMDRR, capacity development of local 
government, and local level partner CB4DRR---are all linked to her way of measuring 
DRR success through community and local government feedback on her supported 
projects.  
 
While Don2 was not able to share ready figures of how much of her development 
funding to Kenya goes to DRR and CCB4DRR, the analysis showed that Don2 is engaged 
in working directly with target communities using CMDRR approaches. She is one of the 
donors with the highest prioritisation and support to local DRR action including CCB4DRR 
in the country and local partner CB4DRR. In addition, Don2’s DRR priority of capacity 
development of government offices (at both local and national levels) is directly linked 
to her desired change for improved coordination for better resource distribution to 
different geographic areas and for harmonization of implementation approaches. 
Overall, Don2 stands out tall for being a donor that works directly with communities 
using CMDRR approaches and for being a donor with a strong commitment to local level 
partner CB4DRR.  
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5.10.6 Summary of key findings for Don3 
 
 
 
Figure 6. 6: Summary findings for Don3 (indicting key linkages) 
 
Key: Green arrows indicate direct linkage 
between different Don3’s variables. 
Current DRR Priorities 
- Institutional CB4DRR 
 
-Direct support to CMDRR projects 
 
 
 
Criteria for selecting DRR priorities 
 
-consults with government 
-agency strategy paper 
-agency comparative technical advantage 
-agency current capacities 
 
Agency ways of 
measuring DRR success 
-Are we seeing the necessary 
intended changes? Desired changes consequent to the agency’s 
highly effective DRR engagement in the 
country 
-improved comprehension of DRR leading to 
increased resource allocation to DRR 
 
-reconfigure development programming into DRR. 
 
-reduction in negative impacts of disasters.  
Funding for CCB4DRR 
While Don3 didn’t avail data in regard to how much of her funding 
goes to both DRR and CCB4DRR, her country programme document 
is explicit in providing direct support to communities toward building 
resilience and reducing risks to shocks.  And Don3 emphasised the 
overall importance laid on capacity building in every Don3’s 
community undertaking. 
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5.10.6.1 Synopsis of Don3 Findings 
 
A review of Fig. 6.6 unveils direct links and or a storyline between Don3’s current 
DRR priorities and her funding commitment to both DRR and CCB4DRR, her ways of 
measuring DRR success, and the desired changes she would like to see in the country 
consequent to the agency’s highly effective engagement in the country’s DRR agenda. 
For instance, while Don3 didn’t avail data in regard to how much of her funding goes to 
both DRR and CCB4DRR, she is blazing the trail in supporting the government of Kenya 
in the implementation of the SF4DRR. At the national level, Don3 supported the 
government to come up with a draft SF4DRR action plan, while at the local level, Don3 
has exceptionally supported select counties to evolve county DRR action plans based on 
the SF4DRR and provided budgetary support to target activities.  
 
There is a strong storyline between Don3’s triangle of current DRR priorities, the 
way she measures DRR success and her desired changes consequent to effective 
engagement with the country’s DRR agenda. For instance, with her two DRR priorities 
being ‘institutional  CB4DRR’ and “direct support to CMDRR projects’, Don3 measures 
DRR success through a results framework process that seeks to answer the question 
“Are we seeing the necessary intended changes?” And her desired changes consequent 
to the agency’s highly effective DRR engagement in the country are a direct reflection 
of intended results from her DRR priorities. For instance, her ‘institutional CB4DRR’ 
priority is directly linked to the desired change (or result) for improved comprehension 
of DRR leading to increased resource allocation to DRR; and improved comprehension 
of DRR would lead to government reconfiguring development programming into DRR. 
Don3’s ‘direct support to CMDRR projects’ priority is also directly linked to her desired 
change (or result) for the ‘reduction in negative impacts of disasters.’ 
 
Overall, Don3’s stellar work in supporting especially select high disaster risk 
county governments to develop DRR action plans based on the SF4DRR and providing 
budgetary support to these action plans coupled with her direct support to CMDRR 
projects make her an outstanding donor case with strong support to local DRR action 
including CCB4RR in the country.  
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5.10.7 A summary of factors and or good practice concepts 
behind OMO’s unusual success. (The direct inverse of 
these factors/ concepts appears to be partly responsible 
for poor to failed DRR results in many other different 
parts of the country). 
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Figure 6. 7: A summary of OMO’s key success factors 
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5.11 Cross-Case Analysis Between Institutional Case 
Studies 
 
This section compares and contrasts findings from the six INGO and Donor case 
studies. Because detailed findings on each of the six institutional case studies are already 
presented in sections 5.3, 5.4, 5.5, 5.6, 5.7, and 5.8; only summary findings are 
presented in this section. To enable ease of comparing and contrasting findings, the 
cross-case analysis is presented in table format (refer to Table 5.1).  The table is 
arranged as follows: starts by indicating a key area of investigation, e.g. INGO and Donor 
DRR Priorities in Kenya; this is followed by findings under this particular area of 
investigation from each of the 6 institutional case studies; and then each area of 
investigation ends with a summary narrative highlighting major similarities and 
differences in findings.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   263 
 
 
Table 5.1: Cross-Case Analysis Findings 
 
What are the DRR priorities currently being supported by respective institutional donors and INGOs working on DRR in Kenya? 
 
Broad Categories INGO1 INGO2 INGO3 DON1 DON2 DON3 
1. Government- 
focused priorities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Community-
focused priorities 
 
 
 
3. Intra-agency 
focused priorities 
 
 
4. Cross-cutting 
priorities 
-institutional CB4DRR 
-advocacy and 
influencing  
 
 
 
 
-CCB4DRR 
-Partner CB4DRR 
-Child-led DRR 
 
 
 
 
-A lot of staff CB4DRR 
 
 
 
-advocacy and 
influencing 
 
 
 
 
 
-CMDRR 
-community capacity to 
lobby 
-access to timely EW 
information 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-Empirical research  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-CMDRR 
-Child-led DRR 
 
-funding + technical 
support to NDMA 
-support to county 
government drought 
mitigation projects 
-capacity development 
of government offices 
(at both local and 
national levels) 
 
 
 
-CMDRR 
-Local level partner 
CB4DRR 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-DRR studies to inform 
own programming 
- institutional CB4DRR 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-Direct support to CMDRR 
projects 
A summary of key similarities and differences in DRR priorities:  Four out of the six cases, namely INGO1, Don1, Don2 and Don3 have a strong focus on strengthening government 
capacity for DRR; and all the 3 donor cases have strengthening government capacity for DRR as a key priority. Apart from Don1, the rest of the remaining five cases have community 
focused DRR priorities, and all the five have community managed DRR as a top priority. Only Don1 doesn’t have community focused priorities for she directs all her support to 
strengthening the NDMA. INGO2 is unique in that while her DRR priorities fall under three different broad categories, all her priorities still zoom-in on community-issues. It’s only INGO2 
and Don2 that conduct DRR-related studies to inform either their influencing agendas or their community-based programming options. INGO1 is also unique for being the case study that 
puts a lot of emphasis on more staffs CB4DRR aimed at ensuring adequate in-house DRR implementation capacity in all her program areas.  
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How do institutional donors and INGOs working on DRR in Kenya decide which DRR priorities to support in the country? 
Broad Categories INGO1 INGO2 INGO3 DON1 DON2 DON3 
1. Externally looking 
criteria 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Internally looking 
criteria 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Not involved in 
determining 
priorities 
-priorities agreed by  
global DRR frameworks 
-government DRR 
priorities 
-building the resilience of 
communities INGO2 has 
responded to in disaster 
situations. Going beyond 
handouts.  
 
 
 
 
-global agency DRR 
priorities.  
-NDMA/ government 
priorities 
-county government 
priorities 
-Priorities set by 
alliances 
-security determines 
where to work 
 
 
-internal capacity 
-global agency DRR 
priorities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-not involved in 
selecting priorities 
-aligning with 
government priorities 
-complementarity with 
peer agencies 
-agency research and 
assessment reports 
 
 
 
-agency strategy paper 
-agency comparative 
technical advantage 
-lessons from previous 
projects 
 
-consults with government 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-agency strategy paper 
-agency comparative 
technical advantage 
-agency current capacities 
 
A summary of key similarities and differences on how donors and INGOs working on DRR in Kenya determine respective DRR support priorities:  Four out of the six case studies, namely 
INGO1, INGO3, Don2 and Don3 refer to government priorities to inform respective DRR priorities. INGO2, INGO3, Don2 and Don3 use either their global or country strategy papers to 
inform DRR priorities in Kenya. INGO2 registered a unique difference for being the only case that highlighted working on the nexus to bridge the lifesaving handouts phase with resilience-
building DRR actions for target communities as a criterion for deciding her DRR priorities. Don2 also registered the unique difference for being the only case that highlighted doing own 
research, conducting studies and assessments as part of her process to decide DRR priorities in the country. And Don1 registered the outstanding difference of being the only case that 
devolves responsibility to select DRR priorities to the NDMA---the lead government agency for drought management in the country.  
 
Knowledge and use of international DRR frameworks 
Broad Categories INGO1 INGO2 INGO3 DON1 DON2 DON3 
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No categories 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Has great knowledge 
and use of global DRR 
frameworks. Her 
advocacy and influencing 
agenda toward better 
DRR governance in the 
country is grounded on  
global DRR frameworks 
The DRR advisor 
exhibited some level of 
awareness of HFA and 
SF4DRR but did not have 
what would be 
considered ample 
working knowledge of 
the two successive 
frameworks.  
The DRR Advisor 
acknowledged having 
limited knowledge and 
utilization of HFA and 
SF4DRR.  
It was obvious and 
concerning that this 
donor participant did 
not have a working 
knowledge of both HF 
and SF4DRR.  
While Don2’s 
participant in this 
research wasn’t the 
lead DRR staff, he still 
knew much about 
processes that led to 
SF4DRR and knows 
that SF4DRR is one of 
the documents 
referenced when Don2 
is interacting with the 
Kenya government.  
Don3 is very much aware 
of SF4DRR and is blazing 
the trail in supporting the 
government of Kenya in 
the implementation of the 
framework. At National 
level, Don3 supported the 
government to come up 
with a draft SF4DRR action 
plan, while at the local 
level, Don3 has supported 
select counties to evolve 
county DRR action plans 
based on the Sf4DRR.  
A summary of key similarities and differences in the knowledge and use of international DRR frameworks: Of the six cases, its INGO1 and Don3 that exhibited greater knowledge and 
application of the SF4DRR, and of these two cases, its Don3 that had done a lot of work to ground SF4DRR in the country. INGO2, INGO3 and Don1 didn’t have a working knowledge of 
both HFA and its successor SF4DRR. While Don2’s participant wasn’t the agency’s lead DRR staff, he still knew much about the SF4DRR. The deficiencies of INGO1, INGO3 and Don1 in 
knowledge and use of international DRR frameworks seems to be rooted in a weak National DRR Platform. If it had been functioning normally, it would have already created adequate 
awareness about SF4DRR leading to increased knowledge and uptake.    
 
Funding for CCB4DRR 
 
Broad Categories INGO1 INGO2 INGO3 DON1 DON2 DON3 
 
 
 
No categories  
INGO1 uses an 
integrated approach to 
mainstreaming DRR, 
thus was unable to 
indicate the approximate 
budget to DRR. 
However, the advisor 
indicated a commitment 
to ensuring that for the 
future, 5-7% of long-
term non-grant funding 
for community 
Up to 50% of total 
budgets are dedicated to 
DRR and 15-20% of these 
DRR funds support 
CB4DRR 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INGO3 is spending 
more on disaster 
response and far less 
on resilience-building 
DRR, though it was 
encouraging to note 
that much of the DRR 
funding goes to 
CMDRR which is strong 
on CCB4DRR. Thus 
while CMDRR (and 
Don1 entirely devolves 
to NDMA the 
responsibility to decide 
which DRR priorities 
will be supported using 
resources allocated by 
Don1. Analysis of 
NDMA data showed 
that much of the 
funding goes to 
preparedness and 
response during both 
While Don2 was not 
able to share ready 
figures of how much of 
her development 
funding to Kenya goes 
to DRR and CCB4DRR, 
the analysis showed 
that Don2 is engaged 
in working directly with 
target communities 
using CMDRR 
While Don3 didn’t avail 
data in regard to how 
much of her funding goes 
to both DRR and 
CCB4DRR, her country 
programme document is 
explicit in providing direct 
support to communities 
toward building resilience 
and reducing risks to 
shocks.  And Don3 
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development goes to 
supporting resilience-
building DRR activities.  
 CCB4DRR) is a high 
DRR priority, it’s a low 
ranking priority when 
viewed from how 
much of the INGO3’s 
budget is dedicated to 
DRR.  
 
bad and good years. 
Thus, for both Don1 
and NDMA, prioritizing 
and supporting 
CCB4DRR isn’t 
anywhere high on their 
respective agendas.   
approaches. There is 
no doubt she is one of 
the donors with the 
highest prioritisation 
and support to local 
DRR action including 
CCB4DRR in the 
country.  
emphasised the overall 
importance laid on 
capacity building in every 
Don3 community 
undertaking.  
A summary of key similarities and differences on funding for CCB4DRR: of the 3 INGO cases, INGO2 reported the highest funding commitment to DRR (up to 50% of total budgets) and to 
CCB4DRR (15-20% of DRR funds). She was also the only agency that knew roughly how much of her total funding goes to resilience-building DRR. Don1 didn’t have a clue since she 
devolves budget allocation responsibilities to the NDMA. Both Don2 and Don3 didn’t have ready estimates to share, but they are working directly with communities using CMDRR 
approaches, and this guarantees attention to CCB4DRR. Still, on funding CCB4DRR, Don2 shared a plausible argument cautioning against judging the place of CCB4DRR in the big scheme of 
DRR especially for agencies that support a lot of DRR infrastructural development. The argument is based on the fact that infrastructural DRR projects are capital intensive and even the 
smallest % funding support to CCB4DRR around these projects translates into adequate funding for CCB4DRR purposes. Overall, of the 6 cases covered by this research, only one case, that 
is INGO2, was conscious of how much of her DRM resources were focused on resilience-building DRR and related CCB4DRR.  
How do institutional donors and INGOs measure DRR success in Kenya? 
 
Broad Categories INGO1 INGO2 INGO3 DON1 DON2 DON3 
1. Measures 
focused at 
local level DRR 
success 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Measures 
focused at 
national level 
DRR success 
-household coping ability 
during shocks 
-continued households’ 
commitment to DRR 
practices 
-performance of child-
led DRR 
-community capacity to 
lobby upstream 
-Community capacity to 
attract external 
resources 
-Results from policy 
influencing 
 
-Community 
transformation 
(adoption, application 
and ownership) 
-no disaster-related 
deaths 
-reduced loss of 
livelihood assets 
-community/ 
beneficiary 
transformation 
-community and local 
government feedback 
on agency-supported 
projects 
-Don2’s willingness to 
replicate or scale up a 
project 
Are we seeing the 
necessary intended 
changes? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Are we seeing the 
necessary intended 
changes 
A summary of key similarities and differences from how institutional donors and INGOs measure DRR success in Kenya: it emerges that all the six cases put critical emphasis at the local 
or community level when looking for ways of measuring DRR success. And they rightly do so because that is exactly where life changing DRR traction ought to be taking place. However, 
while all the six cases have their eyes on local level ways of measuring DRR success, INGO2’s approach to measuring DRR success brings out the issue of empowerment. INGO2 looks at 
community capacity to take matters into their hands and lobby upstream and attract those resources that may not be inherent within their community.  And among the 3 donor cases, 
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Don2’s methods of measuring DRR success by considering community and local government feedback on supported projects stand out tallest. It is in sync with Robert Chambers’ thesis of 
‘whose reality counts’. 
What specific changes would institutional donors and INGOs working on DRR in Kenya like to see as a result of their contribution to the DRR agenda in 
the country? 
Broad Categories INGO1 INGO2 INGO3 DON1 DON2 DON3 
1. Better resource 
allocation 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Better DRR 
comprehension 
and integration 
 
 
 
 
3. Improved 
coordination 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. Improved DRM 
governance 
 
 
 
 
 
-government allocating 
adequate DRR funding to 
various government 
departments 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-finalize the DRR policy 
to help streamline risk 
governance 
 
-reduced # of 
government disaster 
management agencies 
 
-better resource 
allocation to community 
DRR action plans 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-harmonization of DRR 
instruments 
(frameworks, strategies, 
policies etc.) 
-reduction in # of 
national DRM 
departments 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-approach DRR from a 
longer-term 
perspective 
-think DRR during both 
short and long term 
programmes/projects 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-government allocating 
adequate resources to 
DRM and reducing 
dependency on 
external aid 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-improved stakeholder 
coordination leading to 
joint DRM planning. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-total government 
ownership of the DRM 
agenda including 
resourcing that agenda   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-adopt the ‘built-in-
resilience’ practice for 
every type of 
intervention 
 
 
 
-improved 
coordination for better 
resource distribution 
to different geographic 
areas and for 
harmonization of 
implementation 
approaches 
 
-county government 
bureaucracies not 
affecting resource 
flows to local level DRR 
action. 
 
 
 
-improved comprehension 
of DRR leading to 
increased resource 
allocation to DRR 
 
 
 
-reconfigure development 
programming into DRR. 
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5. Improved 
community 
capacity 
 
 
 
 
6. More child-led 
DRR 
 
 
 
 
7. Professional 
disciplines  taking 
DRR seriously 
 
 
 
 
8. Reduced hazard 
impacts 
 
 
9. Things that need 
to be stopped 
 
 
-improved community 
capacity building aimed 
at helping communities 
manage risks in their 
environment 
 
 
-More children and 
youths in DRM 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-move from disaster 
response focus to 
resilience building  
-from rhetoric to 
executing for results 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-stop processes that are 
only extractive to 
communities. Have a 
feedback loop.  
-stop spreading scarce 
resources thin. Be more 
focused.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-DRR included in the 
school curriculum 
 
 
 
 
-all professional 
disciplines, for 
instance, engineers 
take DRR seriously 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-stop treating or 
approaching DRR from 
a quick fix perspective.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-stop depending on 
external assistance to 
respond to and 
mitigate drought 
conditions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-stop giving out 
misdiagnosed 
handouts for they 
undercut the spirit 
behind community 
resilience building.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-reduction in negative 
impacts of disasters.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A summary of key similarities and differences in the changes both institutional donors and INGOs working on DRR in Kenya would like to see as a result of their contribution to the DRR 
agenda in the country: INGO1, INGO2, Don1 and Don3 would like to see improved resource allocation to DRM/ and DRR action in the country. However, NGO2 goes ahead to highlight 
that this improved resource allocation should be more aimed at supporting community DRR action plans. INGO3, Don2 and Don3 all want to see better DRR comprehension in the country, 
with both Don2 and Don3 expecting to see development re-configured into DRR and the result being development programming with ‘built-in-resilience’. Don1 and Don2 would like to see 
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improved DRR stakeholder coordination leading to joint planning and better geographic resource allocation. INGO1, INGO2, Don1 and Don2 all want to see improved DRM governance in 
the country, with INGO1 and INGO2 specifically expecting to see a reduction in the # of government DRM departments. INGO1 and INGO3 share the common vision of seeing an increase 
in child and youth led DRR through the inclusion of DRR in the school curriculum. INGO1, INGO2, INGO3, Don1 and Don2 all highlighted different things that needed to be stopped around 
various aspects of DRM in the country, with no uniformity but a rich variety in what was highlighted. Probably because of its long history in community development programming, INGO1 
was alone in wanting to see improved community capacity building aimed at communities taking more charge of risk management in respective environments. INGO3 was also alone in 
highlighting the expectation to see all professional disciplines in the country embracing DRR with key emphasis laid on civil engineers. Don1 also stood alone in voicing out the expectation 
to see less and less negative disaster impacts in the country.  
       
Table 5. 1: Cross-Case Analysis Findings 
 
 
 
 
5.12 Summary and link 
 
This chapter presented background information to case studies, analysis and discussion of findings for each individual case study, and 
cross-case analysis of the six institutional donor and INGO case studies. Chapter six presents a summary discussion of these findings 
supported with literature. 
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CHAPTER 6: SUMMARY DISCUSSION OF 
AMALGAMATED KEY FINDINGS 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
Chapter 5 presented the analysis and discussion of findings per case study and ended 
with the cross-case analysis of institutional case findings. While Chapter 5 presented and 
discussed findings case study by case study including linking findings to literature, the chapter 
strategically left the discussion of amalgamated findings to Chapter 6. This chapter, therefore, 
aims to present a summary discussion of amalgamated key findings---a process that includes 
linking key findings to literature and other studies while at the same time bringing into the 
discussion the researcher’s critical thinking. This is in sync with  Merriam and Tisdell (2015) 
who argue that “findings are the outcome of the inquiry---what you, the investigator, learned 
or came to understand about the phenomenon.”  In this chapter, therefore, the researcher 
presents a summary discussion of what he came to understand about the research 
phenomenon.   
 
Concerning structure, the discussion of findings is presented following the same 
format of themes used to present findings---case study by case study in Chapter 5. For ease of 
discussion, a summary of key similarities and differences is first presented per theme, and 
then a discussion linking amalgamated findings to literature and the researcher’s synthesis 
follows. It should be noted here that the drawing of conclusions about the aims and objectives 
of the thesis is dedicated to Chapter 7 where findings are presented and evaluated in response 
to the research questions and objectives proposed at the beginning of this thesis. 
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6.1.1 What are the DRR priorities currently being supported by respective institutional 
donors and INGOs working on DRR in Kenya? 
 
For the six institutional case donors and INGOs, analysis showed that four out of the 
six cases, namely INGO1, Don1, Don2 and Don3 have a strong focus on strengthening 
government capacity for DRR; and all the three donor cases have strengthening government 
capacity for DRR as a key priority. Apart from Don1, the rest of the remaining five cases have 
community focused DRR priorities, and all the five have community managed DRR (CMDRR) 
as a top priority. Only Don1 doesn’t have community focused priorities for she directs all her 
support to strengthening the NDMA. INGO2 is unique in that while her DRR priorities fall under 
three different broad categories, all her priorities still zoom-in on community-issues. It’s only 
INGO2 and Don2 that conduct DRR-related studies to inform either their influencing agendas 
or their community-based programming options. INGO1 is also unique for being the case study 
that puts a lot of emphasis on more staffs CB4DRR aimed at ensuring adequate in-house DRR 
implementation capacity in all her program areas.  
 
 
Of the five cases that had community focused DRR priorities, INGO3 was unique for 
being the only case that reported very strong embedment of DRR in her ongoing development 
initiatives. INGO3 had explained that “we realized if we do not embed DRR in our on-going 
food security programming, then we are going to lose the results to droughts.” This rationale 
is commended by Schipper and Pelling (2006) when they point to a poor assumption where 
scores of development practitioners think that DRR is already  incorporated into ‘pro-poor 
development’ leading to awful manifestations of what UNDP (2004) and Yodmani (2001) call 
‘unresolved development problems.’  
 
INGO1 was also unique for being the INGO case that intentionally worked very closely 
with government offices at the local level aiming at build their capacity for DRR, but with the 
covert agenda aimed at ensuring the same local government offices eventually release funds 
to support community-generated DRR action plans in target INGO1 program areas. This is, 
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therefore, advocacy and influencing aimed at improving disaster risk governance in the 
country as asserted by Wahlström (2015) when she points out that that the implementation 
of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction requires strong commitment and political 
leadership both at national and local levels. Wahlstrom reasons that this is essential to ensure 
stronger risk governance and capable institutions that can take the lead and mobilize and 
motivate stakeholders. 
 
  
 And in conformity with Howard’s affirmation that ‘we cannot teach what we don’t 
know’ (Howard, 2014), INGO1’s was the only case that presented the ‘internally-looking DRR 
priority’ of training more staffs in DRR aimed at ensuring the organisation has adequate DRR 
implementation capacity in all her program areas. By the time of doing an interview INGO1, 
the organisation had 64 field-based staffs trained in CMDRR.  
 
 Don1 was also unique for clearly stating that “our support to County Government 
Projects is basically preparedness and response.” Don1 did not reveal any prioritisation of 
CMDRR nor CCB4DRR. Don1’s current DRR priorities in the country, therefore, fit the picture 
painted by Watson et al. (2015), Kelman (2013) and Kellett and Caravani (2013) whose studies 
lament the global trend of spending heavily on disaster preparedness and response while 
investing far less in resilience-building DRR. 
 
 Still on uniqueness, INGO2 was the only case that had ‘promotion of community 
access to practical early warning information’ as one of her community focused DRR 
priorities. This was a lesson INGO learned from the 2010/2011 Horn of Africa food crisis where 
evaluations revealed that while there was adequate EW information on the severity of the 
crisis by as early as March 2010, the situation remained unrecognised, and there was no early 
action leading to avoidable catastrophic malnutrition levels and mortality (Kim & Guha-Sapir, 
2012). The more reason Basher (2006, p. 2171) recommends adopting the ‘end-to-end’ 
concept to  EWS where information is communicated to all key stakeholders and is acted on 
with a built-in monitoring and feedback mechanisms. For the 2011 Horn of Africa drought 
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crisis, it is action on existing EWS that had largely been the missing link in closing the EWS 
loop.  And INGO1 has made it a priority to close the EWS loop by ensuring supported program 
areas in Northern Kenya are helped to receive, understand and supported to act on early 
warning information.   
 
 And as indicated above, apart from Don1, the remaining five institutional cases have 
community focused DRR priorities---with CMDRR as a top priority. For this discussion, we will 
borrow Don2’s description of CMDRR. Don2 had explained that “CMDRR is a community 
development tool where you are working with communities to allow them an opportunity to 
decide what is good for themselves. You sit down with communities, and for example if there 
is drought and they are suffering from many challenges you work out the solutions with them. 
The end product of that process would be a community action plan, which states that these 
are the areas that we will need your support, and these are the things that we can do 
ourselves…”  
 
 Don2’s foregoing definition of CMDDR is in sync with McKnight and Kretzmann (1997, 
pp. 2, 17) who argue that development must start from within the community, for 
communities cannot be developed from the top down, or from the outside in.  They further 
argue that communities have never been built upon their deficiencies; rather, community 
development has always depended upon mobilizing the capacities and assets of a people and 
a place. This is a notion supported by  Chambers (1998, p. 289) who in his seminal work ‘whose 
reality counts?’ remarks that the “the challenge is to enable poor and marginalized people to 
analyze their conditions and identify their priorities in ways which freely express their realities, 
and generate proposals that are doable, credible and persuasive…”  In yet another of his 
works, Chambers (1995, p. 199) observes that “much of the challenge is to give up power. It 
is to enjoy handing over the initiative to others, enabling them to do more and to do it more 
in their way, for their objectives.” This research therefore commends the effort of the five 
institutional cases that have CMDRR as a top DRR priority because through CMDRR, they are 
able to empower at-risk communities to do more towards reducing potential disaster risks. 
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Of the four cases, namely INGO1, Don1, Don2 and Don3 that were identified to have a 
strong focus on strengthening government capacity for DRR, it was only Don3 that had very 
strong commitment to working with select high risk County Governments in developing 
respective SF4DRR implementation plans including supporting these plans with seed funding. 
In an interview, Don3 has in part indicated that “resources that are available at the local level 
for you to translate what is happening globally and regionally are very limited.” This is a 
phenomenon  GNDR (2009) summarized as “Clouds But Little Rain,” an imagery representative 
of lots of high level (global, regional, and national) hype but with minimal local action and 
actual change. 
 
A review across Gaillard and Mercer (2013); Robertua (2013); UNISDR (2013a);UNISDR 
(2013b); Benicchio (2012); Djalante et al. (2012); Izumi and Shaw (2012); van Riet and van 
Niekerk (2012) ; Hagelsteen and Becker (2012); Scott and Tarazona (2011); J Twigg and 
Bottomley (2011); Kent (2011); Pelling (2007a); UNDP (2004) ; Walter (2004); Walter (2002); 
and Walter (2001) revealed consensus among these authors that while there continues to be 
a growing interest and focus on DRR, poor local capacity for DRR remains a major 
impediment to making required progress. The literature review had therefore observed the 
urgent need to address the gap between global DRR agendas, national level policies and 
strategies and local level risk reduction activities. It was therefore very inspiring to note Don3’s 
strategic decision to prioritize and support engagement with county governments around 
SF4DRR.  
 
 
6.1.2 How do institutional donors and INGOs working on DRR in 
Kenya decide which DRR priorities to support in the country?    
 
Concerning the criteria used to arrive at respective DRR support priorities in the 
country, analysis showed that four out of the six institutional case studies, namely INGO1, 
INGO3, Don2 and Don3 refer to government priorities to inform respective DRR priorities. 
INGO2, INGO3, Don2 and Don3 use either their global or country strategy papers to inform 
DRR priorities in Kenya. INGO2 registered a unique difference for being the only case that 
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highlighted working on the nexus to bridge the lifesaving handouts phase with resilience-
building DRR actions for target communities as a criterion for deciding her DRR priorities. Don2 
also registered the unique difference for being the only case that highlighted doing own 
research, conducting studies and assessments as part of her process to decide DRR priorities 
in the country. And Don1 registered the outstanding difference of being the only case that 
devolves responsibility to select DRR priorities to the NDMA---the lead government agency for 
drought management in the country. 
 
For the five cases (INGO1, INGO2, INGO3, Don2 and Don3) that use ‘externally looking 
criteria’ to determine their DRR support priorities, theirs is a commendable approach to 
working with communities and echoes Robert Chambers’ observations in his seminal work 
titled “whose reality counts”. In this seminal work, Chambers (1998) asserts that the realities 
and priorities of poor people often differ from those imagined for them by professionals and 
policymakers. Chambers observes and recommends that the challenge is, therefore, to enable 
poor and marginalised people to analyse their conditions and identify their priorities in ways 
which freely express their realities and generate proposals that are doable, credible and 
persuasive to policymakers. 
 
6.1.3 Funding for CCB4DRR 
It was Matthew B (2015) who asserted that institutional budgets are a great indicator 
of respective institutional values and priorities. And regarding funding support for CCB4DRR, 
analysis showed that of the three INGO cases, INGO2 reported the highest funding 
commitment to DRR (up to 50% of total budgets) and to CCB4DRR (15-20% of DRR funds). She 
was also the only agency that knew roughly how much of her total funding goes to resilience-
building DRR. Don1 didn’t have a clue since she devolves budget allocation responsibilities to 
the NDMA. Both Don2 and Don3 didn’t have ready estimates to share, but they are working 
directly with communities using CMDRR approaches, and this guarantees attention to 
CCB4DRR. Still, on funding CCB4DRR, Don2 shared a plausible argument cautioning against 
judging the place of CCB4DRR in the big scheme of DRR especially for agencies that support a 
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lot of DRR infrastructural development. The argument is based on the fact that infrastructural 
DRR projects are capital intensive and even the smallest % funding support to CCB4DRR around 
these projects translates into adequate funding for CCB4DRR purposes. Overall, of the six 
institutional cases covered by this research, only one case, that is INGO2, was conscious of 
how much of her DRM resources were focused on resilience-building DRR and related 
CCB4DRR.  
 
 While INGO1 (one of the largest INGOs in the country) has a good practice of 
supporting communities in its program areas to come up with DRR action plans; her DRR 
respondent reported a mismatch between community DRR action plans and resource 
allocation to supporting their execution. Matter of fact, the respondent reported a lot of 
organizational leadership rhetoric on DRR and resilience building compared to how much of 
that talk translates into committing required resources to community DRR and resilience 
building initiatives.   And then, we have Don1 that didn’t have any clue as to how much of its 
funding to the National Drought Management Authority (NDMA) goes to DRR, let a lot to 
CCB4DRR. Don1 doesn’t give any criteria on how funding allocation to NDMA should be 
utilised. And when the researcher followed up with NDMA on the utilization of committed 
donor funds, it became clear the biggest percent of received funding in normal (non- high 
emergency) years goes to preparedness and response, and to response during high emergency 
years.  Relatedly, INGO3 indicated about 90% of her DRM funding goes to emergency 
responses and the remaining 10% to DRR (through CMDRR approaches). 
 
The foregoing revelations confirm with findings from studies by Kellett and Caravani 
(2013) who reported that financing for disaster risk reduction makes up a tiny fraction of 
overall investments in development aid. Related studies by Watson et al. (2015) also revealed 
that development assistance for DRR supports a range of actions but is biased towards 
enhancing preparedness for effective response and building back better in recovery, 
rehabilitation and reconstruction leaving only 8% of development assistance to DRR going to  
investing in DRR for resilience. And studies by Kelman (2013)  reported that every $1 invested 
in preventive DRR saves $7 (and sometimes more). This means that if all the Kenya DRR actors 
focused on investing more in resilience-building DRR, the principle of ‘$1 invested in 
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preventive DRR saves at least $7’ would gradually result into seeing less and less need for 
emergency response funding.   
 
If we were to combine the details of section 6.1.1 (agency DRR priorities) and section 
6.1.3 (agency funding for DRR which is a very good indication/ measure of support for DRR) 
and present these in table form, the results would be what we have in Table 6.1 
Institutional 
Case Study 
 
Level of CCB4DRR prioritisation 
(whereby ‘prioritisation’ means 
CCB4DRR is either directly or 
indirectly reflected within agency 
strategy papers or work plans) 
Level of support to 
CCB4DRR (where in this 
case ‘support’ refers to 
funding allocation)  
CCB4DRR results from 
a combination of both 
prioritisation and 
support.  
INGO1 High Low Low 
INGO2 High High High 
INGO3 High Low Low 
Don1 Low None Lowest 
Don2 High High High 
Don3 High High High 
 
Table 6.1:  Level of institutional donor and INGO prioritisation and support for CCB4DRR 
 
And the interpretation of Table 6.1 reveals that of the six institutional case studies, only 
INGO2, Don2 and Don3 have high CCB4DRR results from a combination of their CCB4DRR 
prioritisation and funding allocation to CCB4DRR. INGO1 and INGO3 have low CCB4DRR results 
because while the two have high CCB4DRR prioritisation, this has been let down by their low 
funding allocation for CCB4DRR. And Don1 has the lowest or no CCB4DRR results because this 
donor doesn’t have any prioritisation nor funding allocation for CCB4DRR. The interpretation 
of Table 6.1 therefore shows that it is one thing to have CCB4DRR indicated as a priority for 
an agency, and yet another for the same agency to support this priority with required resource 
allocation, especially funding commitments. This therefore shows that while CCB4DRR is 
generally a high priority among the majority of institutional donors and INGOs participating in 
this research, only half the same institutional cases were providing reasonably high funding 
support to CCB4DRR.  
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6.1.4 How do institutional donors and INGOs measure DRR success 
in Kenya?  
The purpose behind research questions 3 & 4 (which were: How do institutional donors 
and INGOs measure DRR success in Kenya? and What changes do institutional donors and 
INGOs working on DRR want to see as a result of their contribution to the DRR agenda in the 
country?) were covertly aimed at assessing whether institutional donors and INGOs working 
on DRR in the country understand the  importance of prioritising and supporting CCB4DRR.   
The questions were meant to ultimately indirectly find out where or at what level (national 
level or local level) both case donors and INGOs focused when measuring DRR success and 
also where they wanted to see desired changes as a result of their DRR contribution in the 
country.  
In response to research question # 4 (how do institutional donors and INGOs in Kenya 
measure DRR success?), it emerged from the analysis that all the six cases put critical emphasis 
at the local or community level when looking for ways of measuring DRR success. And they 
rightly do so because that is exactly where life changing DRR traction ought to be taking place. 
13 out of the 14 reported ways of measuring DRR success were all focused at the local level 
(ref to table 5.1). However, while all the six cases have their eyes on local level ways of 
measuring DRR success, it is INGO2’s approach to measuring DRR success that strongly brings 
out the issue of empowerment. INGO2 presented strong emphasis of measuring DRR success 
at the community level, and much of the yardstick looks at whether target communities have 
the capacity to take DRR matters into their own hands, lobby, attract resources and hold key 
stakeholders more accountable. Even her measure of DRR success that looks at policy results 
at national level seeks to identify results from community-focused influencing agendas.  And 
as argued by Eade (2007, p. 632) who in  her seminal work “Capacity Building: Who Builds 
Whose Capacity?” points out that the role of an engaged outsider in CCB is to support the 
capacity of local people to determine their own values and priorities, to organize themselves 
to act upon and sustain these for the common good; INGO2 is using the right yardstick in 
measuring DRR success. It is all about peoplepower. And like reasoned by Lao Tzu’s assertion 
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that “when the best leader’s job is done, the people say ‘we did it ourselves’” (Gill, 2002, p. 
315), it was impressive to note that INGO2 has passed the baton on to her target communities. 
 
Analysis also showed that close to INGO2, INGO3 focuses only at the local level when 
measuring DRR success, and ‘community transformation’ is the primary indicator used to 
assess success and or failure of her CMDRR activities (which have a strong element of 
CCB4DRR). According to INGO3’s explanation, transformation can be summed up as 
community empowerment to undertake possible DRR activities to a degree where the results 
attract non-target communities to replicate the same activities. Replication by non-target 
project communities is definitely another great way to measure DRR success because no one 
would be willing to replicate what they don’t think is working.   
 
Don2 is also unique in that because she has direct engagement with communities in 
implementing DRR actions, she focuses her attention on community and local government 
feedback to assess the extent to which implemented projects are deemed to have been 
successful.  This is an approach supported by Robert Chamber's community development 
thesis of ‘whose reality counts?: putting the last first’ (Chambers, 1995). In this work, 
Chambers fervently argues that if the poor and weak are not to see efforts of the so-called 
development agencies and their global summits as a celebration of hypocrisy, signifying not 
sustainable well-being for them but sustainable privilege for us (the so-called development 
agencies), the key is to enable them to express their reality, to put that reality first and to 
make it count. And Chambers further asserts, ‘to do that demands altruism, insight, vision and 
guts.’ Going by Chambers caution, it was encouraging to note Don2’s insight and guts by 
prioritising ‘beneficiary community feedback’ as a top indicator when assessing the extent to 
which her DRR efforts are either a success or a failure. Thus, among the three institutional 
donor cases, Don2’s method of measuring DRR success by considering community and local 
government feedback on supported projects stood out tallest.  
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6.1.5 What changes do institutional donors and INGOs working on 
DRR want to see as a result of their contribution to the DRR 
agenda in the country?  
Concerning the changes both institutional donors and INGOs working on DRR in Kenya 
would like to see as a result of their contribution to the DRR agenda in the country: analysis 
showed that INGO1, INGO2, Don1 and Don3 would like to see improved resource allocation 
to DRM/ and DRR action in the country. However, NGO2 goes ahead to prescribe that this 
improved resource allocation should be more aimed at supporting community DRR action 
plans.  
Still on the desire for improved resource allocation, INGO2 further specifies the desire 
to see changes leading to adequate DRR resource allocation to local NGOs and actors 
compared to the level of especially financial resources presently allocated to INGOs and UN 
agencies. INGO2’s quest for better resource allocation to local NGOs that play the crucial role 
of first responders is strongly validated by Craig (2007) and Duncan and Thomas (2000) who 
in their respective works on CCB assert that CCB involves development work which 
strengthens the ability of community-based organizations and groups  to build their 
structures, systems, people and skills.  They, therefore, recommend that where there are 
organisations within target communities, building the capacity of such organisations should 
be considered part of CCB.  
 
INGO3, Don2 and Don3 all want to see better DRR comprehension in the country, with 
both Don2 and Don3 expecting to see development re-configured into DRR and the result 
being development programming with ‘built-in-resilience’. Don1 and Don2 would like to see 
improved DRR stakeholder coordination leading to joint planning and better geographic 
resource allocation.  
 
INGO1, INGO2, Don1 and Don2 all want to see improved DRM governance in the 
country, with INGO1 and INGO2 specifically expecting to see a reduction in the number of 
government DRM departments. Still on the desire for improved DRM governance, INGO1 had 
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lamented how country’s Disaster Management Policy has remained in draft form (therefore 
not passed or enacted) by subsequent governments leaving the country to just focus on 
response instead of focusing resilience-building DRR. INGO1 also singled out corruption in 
government DRM departments as one of the critical factors delaying the finalisation and 
adoption of Kenya’s National DRM Policy leaving the country “romancing response activities” 
because it is easy to abuse response funds compared to resilience-building funding. And 
because such lamentations reportedly abound across many aid agencies, D. Alexander and 
Davis (2012, p. 3) conclude that “in the modern world, aid, relief and development are big 
business. The agencies that provide them have often been accused of perpetuating situations 
of inequality, aid dependency and injustice.”   
 
The view of a Kenya that romanticises response was shared by Mondoh (2013) in his 
HFA Progress Report on Kenya when he observed the challenge of the prevalence of a 
‘response oriented mindset’ among humanitarian agencies and institutions, government, 
donor agencies and communities. Mondoh’s report asserted “There has been too much 
concentration at allocating resources to response programs but little towards long term risk 
reduction”. And as reasoned by Fawcett et al. (2011), Kellett and Caravani (2013), Kelman 
(2013), and Mondoh (2013), INGO1 wants to see a country-wide shift from focusing on 
disaster response to resilience-focused DRR.  
 
And going by recommendations by Back et al. (2009) and Benson and Bugge (2007) 
who assert that engaging children directly in the design and delivery of DRR activities can have 
very many benefits, both INGO1 and INGO3 share the common vision of seeing an increase in 
child and youth led DRR through the inclusion of DRR in the school curriculum.  
 
INGO1, INGO2, INGO3, Don1 and Don2 all highlighted different things that needed to 
be stopped around various aspects of DRM in the country, with no uniformity but a rich variety 
in what was highlighted. And probably because of her long history in community development 
programming, INGO1 was alone in wanting to see improved community capacity building 
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aimed at communities taking more charge of risk management in respective environments. 
INGO3 was also alone in highlighting the expectation to see all professional disciplines in the 
country embracing DRR with key emphasis laid on civil engineers. Don1 also stood alone in 
voicing out the expectation to see less and less negative disaster impacts in the country. 
  
 INGO2 was again unique for being the only institutional case that desires to see 
changes in the way early warming information is shared with at risk communities. INGO2 
would like to see a stop to early warning processes that only extract information from 
communities and see them replaced with those that provide value-addition feedback loops 
to communities. This desired change is in concert with views by  D. Alexander and Davis (2012) 
who assert that one of the ‘elephants in the room’ in official publications and international 
gatherings convened to discuss DRR is the ‘human right to hazard information’. Alexander 
and Davis argue that in scores of countries around the world, the right of access to knowledge 
of the risks that citizens face, are persistently denied.  
 
6.1.6 Analysis and Discussion of Factors and or Good Practice 
Concepts that Enabled OMO’s Outstanding CCB4DRR Success 
 
It should be noted here that because Chapter 5 presented data analysis and discussion 
of cases studies case by case, and there was only one CCB4DRR project case study analysed 
by this research (out of the intended three), this chapter could only therefore provide the 
amalgamated discussion of the six institutional case studies.  There’s therefore no additional 
discussion required on the only analysed CCB4DRR project case study, Yatta’s OMO. The same 
discussion presented in Chapter 5 suffices to be brought here, but in the interest of not simply 
adding more pages to the thesis, the researcher finds it prudent not to reproduce the 
discussion,  but to refer the reader to Chapter 5 for the complete discussion of the only 
CCB4DRR project case study.     
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Summary and link: 
This chapter presented the discussion of amalgamated institutional case study 
findings; and didn’t include the discussion of the only CCB4DRR project case study since 
there was only one CCB4DRR case making it impossible to do an amalgamated discussion on 
CCB4DRR case study projects. Chapter 7 presents research conclusions. 
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSIONS 
 
7.1 Introduction  
 
Chapter 1 of this thesis provided an introduction to the thesis followed by a 
detailed literature review in Chapter 2. Thereafter, Chapter 3 presented a detailed 
research methodology in which ‘case study research strategy’ was adopted for the 
research. Chapter 4 presented a conceptual framework providing a theoretical overview 
of intended research, key concepts and contexts of the research, and what data were 
going to be collected and analysed. Subsequently, Chapter 5 presented detailed data 
analysis and discussion of case study findings, while Chapter 6 presented a summary 
discussion of amalgamated key findings.  It is within the foregoing context that this chapter 
is dedicated to drawing conclusions about the aims and objectives of the thesis. In this 
chapter, therefore, findings are presented and evaluated in response to the research 
questions and objectives proposed at the beginning of this thesis.  
 
Accordingly, this chapter is structured as follows: 
 
 Firstly, for ease of reference, the research aim, research questions and 
research objectives are all reproduced.    
 Secondly, the findings of research objectives are presented  
 Thirdly, the implications to theory and practice are discussed  
 Fourthly, limitations of the study are identified  
 Finally, related potential research themes are suggested  
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7.2 Research Aim, Research Questions and Research 
Objectives 
 
7.2.1 Research Aim: 
The aim of the research was to explore and investigate the state of institutional donor 
and INGO prioritisation to supporting community capacity building for DRR (CCB4DRR) 
in Kenya, and to identify and analyse good practice concepts behind highly successful 
CCB4DRR initiatives in the country.  And the study was guided by the following research 
questions and objectives:  
7.2.2 Key Research Questions  
i. What are the DRR priorities currently being supported by respective institutional 
donors and INGOs working on DRR in Kenya? 
ii. How do institutional donors and INGOs working on DRR in Kenya determine DRR 
support priorities?  
iii. How do institutional donors and INGOs measure DRR success in Kenya?  
iv. What changes do institutional donors and INGOs working on DRR want to see as 
a result of their contribution to the DRR agenda in the country?  
v. What are the critical factors and or good practice concepts responsible for 
successful community DRR action where this has been achieved in the country?  
 
7.2.3 Key Research Objectives (mirroring the research questions) 
i. Explore current institutional donor and INGO DRR support priorities. 
ii. Establish how individual institutional donors and INGOs working on DRR in Kenya 
decide which DRR priorities to support. 
iii. Assess whether intuitional donors and INGOs working on DRR understand the 
importance of prioritising and supporting community capacity building for DRR 
(by analysing their current DRR priorities, analysing how they measure DRR 
success and the changes they want to see as a result of their contribution to the 
DRR agenda in the country). 
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iv. Identify highly successful cases of community capacity building for DRR in Kenya 
and analyse factors and or good practice concepts responsible for this success. 
v. Develop a conceptual framework through which institutional donors and INGOs 
working on DRR would determine where to prioritise DRR support.   
 
7.3 Findings of Research Objectives 
 
This section summarizes key findings for each of the research objectives.   
 
7.3.1 Objective 1: Explore current institutional donor and INGO DRR support 
priorities 
The first objective was to explore DRR priorities currently being supported by 
selected case institutional donors and INGOs working on DRR in the country. This was 
mainly explored through face to face interviews with designated DRR focal persons at 
respective institutions, and the interviews were complemented by case organization 
document reviews. During data analysis, findings under this objective were organized 
into four broad categories, namely: government- focused priorities, community-focused 
priorities, intra-agency focused priorities, and cross-cutting priorities.  
 
Starting with key similarities, four out of the six cases, namely INGO1, Don1, 
Don2 and Don3 have a strong focus on strengthening government capacity for DRR; and 
all the 3 donor cases have strengthening government capacity for DRR as a key priority. 
Five out of the six cases including INGO1, INGO2, INGO3, Don2 and Don3 have 
community-focused DRR priorities, and all these five have community managed DRR as 
one of their community-focused priorities. Only Don1 doesn’t have community-focused 
DRR priorities for she directs all her support to strengthening the NDMA. 
In regard to key differences and uniqueness, INGO2 was found to be unique in 
that while her DRR priorities fall under three different broad categories (government- 
focused priorities, community-focused priorities, and cross-cutting priorities), all her 
priorities still zoom-in on community-issues. It is only INGO2 and Don2 that conduct 
DRR-related studies to inform either their influencing agendas or their community-
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based programming options. INGO1 is also unique for being the case study that puts a 
lot of emphasis on more staffs CB4DRR aimed at ensuring adequate in-house DRR 
implementation capacity in all her program areas. 
 
7.3.2 Objective 2: Establish how individual institutional donors and INGOs working 
on DRR in Kenya decide which DRR priorities to support. 
The second objective was to establish how individual case institutional donors 
and INGOs working on DRR in Kenya decide which DRR priorities to support. The 
objective, therefore, sought to find out the criteria used to arrive at respective agency 
DRR priorities, and this was investigated through face-to-face interviews with 
designated DRR focal persons at respective institutions. During data analysis, findings 
for ‘Objective 2’ from all the six INGO and donor cases were organized into three criteria 
categories, namely: externally looking criteria, internally looking criteria, and not 
involved in determining priorities.  
 
Data analysis revealed that four out of the six case studies, namely INGO1, 
INGO3, Don2 and Don3 refer to government priorities to inform respective DRR 
priorities. It was noted that INGO cases refer to government priorities by way of 
reference to available government reports, while donor cases engage in direct 
discussions with target government departments/ ministries and or agencies. INGO2, 
INGO3, Don2 and Don3 use either their global or country strategy papers to inform DRR 
priorities in Kenya. 
 
INGO2 registered a unique difference for being the only case that adopted the 
criteria of working on the nexus to bridge the lifesaving handouts phase with resilience-
building DRR actions among target disaster-affected communities. Don2 also registered 
the unique difference for being the only case that highlighted doing own research, 
conducting studies and assessments as part of the process to decide DRR priorities in 
the country. And Don1 registered the outstanding difference of being the only case that 
devolves the entire responsibility of selecting DRR priorities to the NDMA---the lead 
government agency for drought management in the country. 
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These findings, therefore, revealed that the majority of the cases (5 out of 6, 
including Don1 that devolves the responsibility to determine DRM priorities to the 
government) determine their DRR priorities firstly by seeking to align with government 
priorities. This further reinforces the reason why findings under ‘Objective 1’ indicated 
that four out of the six cases, namely INGO1, Don1, Don2 and Don3 have ‘strengthening 
government capacity for DRR’ as one of their top DRR priorities.  There’s, therefore, a 
big and respectful stakeholder expectation on the host government to lead the way in 
deciding top DRR priorities.  And in the words of Don3, “I think we are still very limited 
in the understanding of DRR and how to translate it into the practical things”. This again 
explains the rationale behind finding all three donor cases prioritizing institutional 
CB4DRR.   
7.3.3 Objective 3: Assess whether institutional donors and INGOs working on DRR 
in Kenya understand the importance of prioritising and supporting 
community capacity building for DRR (by analysing their current DRR 
priorities, how they measure DRR success and the changes they want to see 
as a result of their contribution to the DRR agenda in the country). 
The purpose behind Objective 2 was to ultimately indirectly find out whether the 
six case INGOs and donors focused more at upper (national) or lower (local/community) 
country levels when measuring DRR success, and at what country level the same INGOs 
and donors wanted to see changes as a result of their meaningful contribution to the 
country’s DRR agenda. If the six case INGOs and donors were to be found majorly 
focusing their means of measuring DRR success at grass root and or local level where 
much of the DRR action is supposed to happen, as well as wanting to see most of the 
DRR changes in the country happening at local/ grassroots level, it would covertly allude 
to the fact that they somewhat understand the need and importance of supporting local 
DRR action including CCB4DRR.  
 
In regard to measuring DRR success, all responses from the 6 case INGO and 
donors were re-arranged into two broad categories, namely: measures focused at local-
level DRR success, and measures focused at national-level DRR success. Data analysis 
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showed that 13 out of the 14 reported ways of measuring DRR success were all focused 
at the local level (ref to table 5.1), and their ways or measuring DRR success is also 
reflective of their respective DRR priorities. Even Don1 that devolves all the 
responsibility for selecting DRM priorities to the NDMA still zooms in to the local level 
when measuring DRR success. It emerged therefore that all the six INGO and donor cases 
put critical emphasis at the local and or community level when looking for ways of 
measuring DRR success.  
 
And concerning where or at what level both case donors and INGOs wanted to 
see changes as a result of their DRR contribution in the country, responses to this query 
were re-arranged into 9 categories, namely: better resource allocation, better DRR 
comprehension and integration, improved coordination, improved DRM governance, 
improved community capacity, more child-led DRR, professional disciplines taking DRR 
seriously, reduced hazard impacts, and lastly, things that need to be stopped. A detailed 
analysis of responses to the query revealed a good mix between wanting to see changes 
at the upper (national) and lower (local/community) levels. For instance, INGO1, INGO2, 
Don1 and Don3 would like to see improved resource allocation to DRM/ and DRR action 
in the country, and this is both at the upper and lower levels. However, NGO2 pointedly 
indicated that this improved resource allocation should be more aimed at supporting 
community DRR action plans.  
INGO3, Don2 and Don3 all want to see better DRR comprehension in the country, 
with both Don2 and Don3 expecting to see development re-configured into DRR and the 
result being development programming with ‘built-in-resilience’. Reconfiguring 
development would be more at the upper level, with actual programmatic 
implementation happening at the lower level. Don1 and Don2 would like to see 
improved DRR stakeholder coordination leading to joint planning and better geographic 
resource allocation. Again, this is coordination at the upper level leading to better local 
level results. INGO1, INGO2, Don1 and Don2 all want to see improved DRM governance 
in the country, with INGO1 and INGO2 specifically expecting to see a reduction in the # 
of government DRM departments. INGO1 and INGO3 share the common vision of seeing 
an increase in child and youth-led DRR through the inclusion of DRR in the school 
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curriculum. The inclusion of DRR in the school curriculum would be at the upper level 
while seeing an increase in the number of youth and child-led DRR would be at the lower 
level.  
INGO1, INGO2, INGO3, Don1 and Don2 all highlighted different things that needed to be 
stopped around various aspects of DRM in the country, with no uniformity but a rich 
variety in what was highlighted. Probably because of its long history in community 
development programming, INGO1 was alone in wanting to see improved community 
capacity building aimed at communities taking more charge of risk management in 
respective environments. INGO3 was also alone in highlighting the expectation to see 
all professional disciplines in the country embracing DRR with key emphasis laid on civil 
engineers. Don1 also stood alone in voicing out the expectation to see less and less 
negative disaster impacts in the country. 
To conclude this section, the researcher sought to find out whether there’s a 
CCB4DRR link and or storyline between case INGO and donor DRR priorities, their ways 
of measuring DRR success and the changes they would like to see as a result of 
effectively engaging with country’s DRR agenda.  
 
How many of the case INGO and donor DRR priorities were found to be focused 
at the lower and or community level? A review of Table 5.1 shows that 12 out of the 21 
aggregate DRR priorities are direct community-focused DRR priorities, and 2 out of the 
21 aggregate DRR priorities are indirect community-focused DRR priorities comprised 
mainly of empirical research aimed at informing local DRR programming. Thus in total, 
14 out of the 21 aggregate DRR priorities for the 6 case INGOs and donors are all 
community-focused DRR priorities. Data analysis further revealed that 13 out of the 14 
reported ways of measuring DRR success were all focused at the local level (ref to table 
5.1). And concerning where or at what level both case donors and INGOs wanted to see 
changes as a result of their DRR contribution in the country, a detailed analysis of 
responses to the query revealed a good mix between wanting to see changes at the 
upper (national) and lower (local/community) levels. 
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With 14 out of the 21 aggregate DRR priorities for the 6 case INGOs and donors 
being categorized as community-focused DRR priorities, with 13 out of the 14 reported 
ways of measuring DRR success found to be focused at the local level, and with analysis 
revealing an even split between upper (national) and lower (local/community) levels 
concerning the country level both case donors and INGOs wanted to see changes as a 
result of their DRR contribution in the country, it is an informed verdict to pronounce 
that the six case INGOs and donors generally understand the importance of supporting 
local DRR action, but are at varying degrees of supporting CCB4DRR. This is partly 
assessed through budget allocations to both DRR and CCB4DRR and the importance 
different case INGOs and donors attached to staff CB4DRR, without which, it is 
impossible to simultaneously provide adequate support to multiple target communities. 
And like already discussed through factors responsible for OMO’s great success, it is one 
thing to understand the importance of prioritizing and supporting community capacity 
building for DRR, and yet another to know how practically get it right.  
 
7.3.4 Objective 4: Identify highly successful cases of community capacity building 
for DRR and analyse factors and or good practice concepts responsible for this 
success. 
While Objective 4 sought to identify successful cases of community capacity 
building for DRR in the country and analyse factors responsible for this success, the 
objective encountered contextual challenges. As indicated in section 5.9, sporadic mass 
protests which followed the annulment of Kenya’s August 2018 presidential election 
results made travel to various parts of the country increasingly risky. Access to almost 
all the-had-been identified locations with successful cases of CCB4DRR was 
compromised leaving only Yatta’s OMO accessible. Fortunately, Yatta’s OMO had been 
identified as probably the most successful CCB4DRR case in the country, thus provided 
the best case study through which to analyse factors behind its unique CCB4DRR 
success.  
OMO’s success factors were explored through interviews with various interest 
groups including OMO’s leadership, OMO participants, visiting groups to OMO, the 
NDMA coupled with document reviews and social media analysis.  And as summarised 
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in Fig. 6.7, ten differentiating factors were identified to be responsible for OMO’s great 
success. The ten differentiating success factors (not necessarily in their order of 
importance) include: CIM, which is the local NGO that provided leadership to OMO 
made time to accurately diagnose community issues and DID NOT paratroop into the 
community with ready-made up solutions; this was followed by appropriate choice and 
sequencing of interventions, following the first things first principle (Covey (1989)). The 
3rd success factor was CIM’s ability to make OMO participants realise the need to start 
from the simplest and smallest resources available. The 4th success factor shows that 
that CIM prioritised and mobilised for a peer-to-peer collaborative spirit, locally known 
as a merry-go-round. This was especially instrumental in sinking household water dams 
at a time when people were weak and hungry. 
 
Leadership was identified to be one of OMOs critical success factors. Specifically, 
the analysis showed that Masika was leading from the front, provided visionary 
leadership, and his stay at the helm of OMO from inception to the time of this research 
had helped to assure consistent leadership. And with good consistent leadership came 
continued community trust in OMO’s leadership and buy-in into OMO’s vision for her 
participants. Relatedly, community trust in religious leadership was also identified as yet 
another success factor. Being a religious leader, the Yatta community inherently trusted 
in the person of Masika. Other critical success factors included the role played by 
community change agents/ and or exposure champions; CIM’s ability to address 
traditional fatalistic mindsets through the empowered world view model; applying the 
law of timing; and embracing transformative community development approaches 
including but not limited to ‘addressing gender inequalities’, ‘shunning handouts’, and 
employing the combined good practice of ‘in-situ training, modelling, and mentoring.’ 
7.1.1 Objective 5: Develop a conceptual framework through which DRR 
stakeholders in the country including institutional donors and INGOs 
could determine how and where to prioritise DRR support.   
   
The purpose behind this conceptual framework is rooted in the need to have a 
simple guiding tool aimed at helping DRR stakeholders in the country understand which 
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critical pieces of information are required for them to be able to make informed DRR 
choices in the country. The need for this framework is further informed by findings from 
this research. Some of the findings reveal how a number of the interviewed case INGOs 
and donors didn’t, for instance, have good working knowledge of the Sendai Framework 
for DRR (SF4DRR), didn’t have prior working knowledge of the phased out HFA, nor did 
they have any working knowledge of the country’s previous HFA progress reports.  
 
While Fig. 7.1 (below) was the conceptual framework undergirding this research, 
Fig. 7.2 presents a proposed integrated framework aimed at informing the selection of 
agency in-country DRR priorities and to strengthen CCB4DRR outcomes. And as can be 
noted, the integrated framework borrows from the conceptual framework undergirding 
this research, and then refines it into a framework that aims to present aid individual 
agencies with a 360-degree lens to use when selecting their DRR priorities. And for 
agencies that choose priorities that require CCB4DRR before they can achieve desired 
results, the integrated framework presents guidance to consider lessons and good 
practice concepts which have enabled highly successful CCB4DRR initiatives in various 
contexts.  
 
The process of developing this integrated framework took a multi-phase 
approach. In phase one, a draft framework was developed building on discussed 
research findings. In phase two, the draft framework was shared and discussed with key 
DRR stakeholders in the country (Kenya). In phase three, comments and feedback from 
phase two were used to make first refinements to the framework. In phase four, the 
framework was presented to practicing academics at Huddersfield University and the 
University of Northumbria (with a lot of field practice experience) and they 
recommended changes that would make it a globally useful tool.  Their 
recommendations helped to develop this final version, which will also continue to see 
further refinement based on field experiences and user feedback.   
 
The framework is presented in the form of key questions per critical area of 
consideration, and answers to posed questions should help the interested DRR party 
widen the selection lens, and therefore avoid bind-sided priorities. For instance, it is 
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possible to collaborate with peer agencies when one knows who is doing what and 
where. And similarly, it is not possible to have advocacy and influencing priorities unless 
the party knows what the actual advocacy and influencing gaps or issues are.  
 
In regard to the process of selecting agency DRR priorities, the integrated 
framework (Fig.7.2) enables the interested DRR stakeholder to consider six areas that 
should influence agency DRR priorities. The six areas in a cascading order include: 1. 
taking a look at prevailing global level DRR considerations; 2. Considering regionally 
agreed DRR and CCA priorities; 3. Reviewing national level DRR and CCA priorities; 4. 
Forming a mental picture of what the agency would want to see as the end state (results) 
when they have made their DRR contribution, and then work backward from this 
picture. For instance, you can’t have a desire to harvest apples, but plant oranges. 5. 
Then the agency is encouraged to consider available complementarities and synergies 
with peer actors. 6. And lastly, the framework presents guidance encouraging the 
agency to undertake an in-house assessment of key internal areas that are important in 
working toward the desired end state (desired DRR results). And for agencies that would 
eventually include priorities that would need to be implemented at community level, 
the framework presented guidance on the need to consider good practice CCB4DRR 
concepts, especially those that have worked in related contexts. 
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Figure 7. 1 Conceptual framework undergirding this research  
   296 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Global Level 
Considerations 
 
 What is the expected 
outcome and goal of the 
prevailing globally agreed 
DRR framework, e.g. the 
SF4DRR (2015-2030?) 
 What are the guiding 
principles behind this 
framework? 
 What are the agreed 
priorities for action within 
this framework?  
3. National Level 
Considerations 
• Is there a readily available country 
specific DRR framework through which 
the global DRR framework is being 
implemented?  
• Or, does the country have an on-going 
DRR framework with clearly spelled out 
priorities for action? 
• Is there any report highlighting progress 
on each of the country’s DRR priorities 
for action?  
• From the above, are you able to gauge 
current strengths and weaknesses in the 
implementation of the  
country’s DRR agenda?  
4. Desired in-country DRR 
results  
This helps you to begin with the end 
in mind.  
 
What is the end state you would 
like to see as a result of good DRR 
practices in the country?  
 
You can’t plant oranges and expect 
to harvest apples. 
 
At what country level 
(upper/national, lower/ local) 
would you like you see these 
desired results?  
 
5. Complementarities 
 
 Are you aware of peer agency DRR 
priorities? 
 
 If you must focus on a particular 
geographic area, do you know who is 
doing what in DRR within your 
geographic areas of interest? 
 
 Are there possibilities of building on 
what others are already doing through 
either collaboration for symbiotic 
results, or jointly planning with peers to 
help bring desired results to scale? Most 
desired DRR results require collaborative 
approaches with others.  
Good practice CCB4DRR 
concepts that engender 
better and sustainable 
community DRR outcomes 
 
Because disasters happen within 
localised settings, much (thus not all) of 
the required DRR action must also 
happen within local settings. There’s 
therefore a possibility that some of your 
DRR priorities will be implemented at 
the local including community level.  
 
If you have selected local/community 
DRR priorities, it’s important to be 
aware that studies continue to show 
that the ‘how’ of supporting local DRR 
action is critical to achieving sustainable 
local/ community DRR outcomes.  
 
For instance, this research uncovered a 
number of good practice concepts that 
were adopted by Yatta’s OMO and 
resulted into Yatta’s OMO becoming 
probably the most successful CCB4DRR 
initiative in the Horn of Africa region.  
 
Do you have examples of good practice 
local/community DRR action to borrow 
from?   
 
 
 
Better and 
sustainable 
community DRR 
outcomes 
 
6. In-house  
considerations 
 
• What is your agency’s current 
capacity (human resource skills, 
financial and other capitals) to 
contribute to the desired DRR 
end state in the country? 
 
• Do you have the flexibility to 
adjust and align your capacity to 
the desired DRR end state in the 
country? 
 
• Do your existing programmes/ 
projects already have in-built 
DRR enablers?   
2. Regional Level 
Considerations 
 
Most countries belong to 
regional development blocks, 
and these blocks usually have 
agreed areas of DRR and climate 
change focus.  
 
What are your region’s priority 
areas of DRR and CCA focus?   
 
 
Figure 7. 2 An integrated framework to inform the selection of agency in-country DRR priorities and also strengthen CCB4DRR outcomes 
 
 
Agency-
informed 
DRR 
priorities 
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7.4 Evaluating the results 
7.4.1 Validity and Reliability 
Following expert advice by Merriam and Tisdell (2015), the study employed 
triangulation as a strategy to shore up internal validity. And triangulation took two 
forms. Firstly, multiple methods of data collection including interviews, observations 
and document reviews enabled triangulation. Secondly, the adoption of multiple-case 
study design allowed for multiple sources of information thus enabling triangulation of 
information aimed at reducing the risks of chance associations while allowing for better 
assessment of the generality of emerging explanations. Findings are therefore not of a 
single method nor of a single source. 
 
While the study employed multiple methods of data collection, interviews were 
the main means through which data was extracted from its original sources aimed at 
helping the researcher understand the perspectives of those involved in the 
phenomenon of interest. The utilization of interview data that are more direct and less 
dependent on inference helped to increase the findings reliability.   
 
As indicated in the methodology section, this research adopted a case study 
research strategy and collected evidence from multiple cases with the guidance of a case 
study interview protocol. The purpose behind the protocol was to provide the case 
study researcher with uniform sets of procedures on how to consistently prepare for, 
collect and analyse data from multiple cases, and write and present the research report 
using approaches that enrich reliability. The protocol, therefore, helped to minimise 
variations by laying out specific guidelines for each stage of the case study. 
 
Member check and or respondent validation was another strategy the study 
employed to increase the reliability of findings. This was especially done when during 
the process of transcribing recorded interviews into transcripts, some of the interview 
responses did not either seem to make sense or seemed to present multiple meanings. 
There was, therefore, need to refer back to participants in an effort to reduce the 
possibility of misinterpreting the intended meaning. Member check was also employed 
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during analysis to assess whether emerging themes resonated with target case study 
participants.   
 
To further augment reliability and in keeping with the recommended practice of 
commencing data analysis early in the data collection process  (Forman & Damschroder, 
2007; Merriam & Tisdell, 2015), immediately after every interview, the researcher wrote 
memos summarising key reflections, observations, impressions, hunches and things to 
pursue during subsequent interviews.  After-interview memos were always quickly 
followed by transcribing audio interview recordings into full MS Word transcripts and 
thereafter comparing transcripts with audio recordings, a process that eventually aided 
the researcher to make direct quotations from interviews during data presentation, thus 
increasing the reliability and validity of findings.  
 
Following expert emphasis from Baxter and Jack (2008)  Yin (2003) and ) on the 
importance of creating and using a case study database to effectively organise raw data 
with the purpose of enabling independent inspection thus improving reliability; the 
researcher used NVivo software (Version 11 Plus)  to create a case study database, 
organise and apply codes to segments of data deemed relevant to answering the 
research questions.   
 
7.4.2 Researcher Positionality 
According to Foote and Bartell (2011) and Savin-Baden and Major (2013), the 
term positionality both describes an individual’s worldview and the position they have 
chosen to adopt in relation to a specific research task. Holmes (2014) and (Sikes, 2004) 
argue that the individual’s worldview or ‘where the researcher is coming from’  concerns 
ontological assumptions (the nature of social reality), while epistemological 
assumptions (the nature of knowledge) concerns assumptions about human nature and 
agency. And Chiseri-Strater (1996) observes that some aspects of positionality are 
culturally ascribed or fixed, for example, gender, race, nationality; whilst others such as 
personal life history and experiences are subjective and contextual. Based on the 
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foregoing scholarly descriptions, the following paragraphs are an indication of the 
researcher’s positionality.  
 
The researcher is a male black African, born and raised in Uganda, Kenya’s 
neighbouring country and has worked in the humanitarian industry since 1994. Much of 
the researcher’s professional humanitarian career has included working in management 
and leadership positions around multiple Eastern, Southern and Northern Africa 
countries with extensive travel outside Africa for numerous Disaster Risk Management 
engagements. During the period 2006 to 2019, the researcher was based in Nairobi-
Kenya, and held various Disaster Risk Management Positions ranging from Senior 
Emergencies Officer for Africa with Christian Aid, Humanitarian Advisor for Africa with 
World Vision, Humanitarian Advisor for East Africa with World Vision, Regional Director 
for Humanitarian & Emergency Affairs with World Vision (Africa East Region), and 
Regional Head of Disaster Risk Management with Plan International (Region of Eastern 
and Southern Africa).  
 
During the aforementioned disaster risk management positions, the researcher 
worked with organizations that were very strong in both DRR integration and 
programming and some that didn’t necessarily have DRR as a top priority even when 
DRR seemed to be well woven into the fabric of their strategic document’s narrative. 
There are times when during the tenure of some of the aforementioned potions the 
researcher had to challenge organization leadership on overall commitments to DRR, 
specifically on the organization commitment to CCB4DRR. Even during the employ of 
organizations with seeming global commitments to DRR, there was always a mismatch 
between the level of high-level rhetoric and grass-roots evidence of sustainable DRR 
results. The researcher’s many years of field experience in which overall commitment to 
DRR especially CCB4DRR were not adequately prioritized greatly informed the need for 
the study’s investigation, and the investigation was not value free.  
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7.5 Contributions to theory 
 
There are multiple ways the study contributed to theory, and the following are brief 
highlights to this effect. The study provided insights into DRR priorities, ways of measuring 
DRR success and the status of CCB4DRR in the broad-spectrum. In summary, the study 
revealed that 14 out of the 21 aggregate DRR priorities for the 6 case INGOs and donors 
are categorized under community-focused DRR priorities, while 13 out of the 14 
reported ways of measuring DRR success were found to be focused at the local level. 
And concerning the country level at which both case donors and INGOs wanted to see 
changes as a result of their DRR contribution in the country, the analysis showed an even 
split between upper (national) and lower (local/community) levels focus. This led to an 
informed verdict pronouncing that the six case INGOs and donors generally understand 
the importance of supporting local DRR action.  
 
One of the study’s greatest contribution to theory is the identification of factors 
behind one of the region’s most successful DRR initiatives—Yatta’s OMO. OMO’s 
compendium of success factors exposed the fact that it is one thing to understand the 
importance of prioritising and supporting community capacity building for DRR, and it is 
yet another to know how to practically get it right. The how of implementing these 
priorities as witnessed in the factors behind OMO’s great success are as equally important 
as the section criteria behind the priorities themselves.   
 
The study also pointed out that donors who prefer channelling much of their DRM 
support through government agencies should provide informed guidelines on how 
allocated resources should be prioritized, rather than leaving this responsibility entirely 
to government agencies. Without donor engagement in setting DRM priorities, much of 
allocated resources continue to be spent on disaster preparedness and response 
without meaningful resources intentionally getting allocated to resilience-building DRR. 
Findings from this study also re-affirmed previous studies by Watson et al. (2015), Kelman 
(2013) and Kellett and Caravani (2013) who pointed out the global trend of spending 
heavily on disaster preparedness and response while investing far less in resilience-
building DRR. 
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7.6 Contributions to practice 
 
Some of the aforementioned contributions to theory are also contributions to 
practice. These include the study’s identified need for donors to provide informed 
guidelines on how funds allocated to government DRM agencies should be prioritized 
between different DRM activities keeping in mind the need to invest much more in 
resilience-building DRR.   
 
Factors behind OMO’s enormous success are replicable especially within Kenya 
and have the potential to inform similar programmes in the wider African context 
without necessarily taking a cut and paste approach from OMO’s lessons. But perhaps 
the study’s greatest contribution to practice has been the development of a proposed 
conceptual framework aimed at helping DRR stakeholders in the country understand 
which critical pieces of information are required for one to be able to make informed in-
country DRR choices.  
 
7.7 Limitations of the study 
 
While the study adopted a multiple case study strategy and this enabled cross-
case analysis of findings, it is highly probable that this being a single-researcher 
investigation, the study missed the opportunity and benefits of multiple-researcher 
ideas triangulation, especially during data analysis. In addition, while Yatta’s OMO 
provided a rich case study through which to analyse factors behind its successful 
CCB4DRR, if security had allowed, it would have been better to conduct multiple case 
studies of successful CCB4DRR and compare and contrast factors behind respective 
successes.  
 
7.8 Further research 
 
Firstly, while the study developed a conceptual framework to help DRR 
stakeholders in the country understand which critical pieces of information are required 
for one to be able to make informed in-country DRR choices, the framework needs to 
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be tested by multiple stakeholders in the actual process of determining their priorities. 
This will help to confirm the framework’s actual fit for purpose as well as highlighting 
areas for further improvement.  
 
Secondly, as highlighted in the limitations section of the study, only Yatta’s OMO 
was accessed and deeply investigated to analyse factors behind its great CCB4DRR 
success. It will be important to conduct more related multiple case studies of successful 
CCB4DRR in Kenya and compare and contrast factors behind respective successes with 
the country. In addition, similar studies should be conducted at least in Kenya’s 
neighbouring countries to facilitate comparing and contrasting findings across countries. 
This will inform possible generalisability of findings across contexts.  
 
7.9 Plans for Publishing 
 
The researcher has intentions to publish peer-reviewed papers from the study’s 
findings with emphasis on: 
a. Factors behind Yatta’s Operation Mwolyo Out (OMO). This is because OMO is 
one of the most successful CCB4DRR initiatives in Kenya and the Horn of Africa 
region at large. However, the critical factors responsible for OMO’s big success  
still remain hidden from many of the interested stakeholders.   
b. The researcher will also publish a paper summarizing key findings of the study 
highlighting the general state of CCB4DRR in Kenya. The paper will present the 
proposed conceptual framework aimed at helping DRR stakeholders in the 
country understand which critical pieces of information are required for one to 
be able to make informed in-country DRR choices.  
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APPENDICES 
 
Annexe 1: School Earthquake Safety Initiative (an excerpt from 
Pandey and Okazaki (2005, pp. 6-7) 
The United Nations Centre for Regional Development (UNCRD) is, currently, 
promoting School Earthquake Safety Initiative through a project “Reducing Vulnerability 
of School Children to Earthquakes” jointly with UN Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs (UNDESA) in Asia-Pacific region. The project aims to make schools safe against 
earthquakes and build disaster- resilient communities through self-help, cooperation 
and education. The project includes retrofitting of school building in a participatory way 
with the involvement of local communities, local governments and resource institutions, 
trainings on safer construction practices to technicians, disaster education in school and 
communities. These activities are carried out in Fiji Islands, India, Indonesia and 
Uzbekistan as demonstration cases which will be disseminated throughout the 
respective geographical regions.  
There are three major aspects of the community empowerment in earthquake 
disaster risk management through this initiative:  
Seismic safety of school buildings: The projects includes seismic vulnerability 
analysis of some selected schools in a project city of each country and retrofitting of 
some of them which cover prominent construction typology in the region. This leads to 
development of country specific guidelines on the earthquake safe construction which 
incorporates solutions to the practical problems experienced school retrofitting.  
Capacity building of communities: Retrofitting of schools in communities serves 
as a demonstration of proper earthquake technology to them. Masons in the 
communities get on-job training during the retrofitting of schools. In addition, 
technicians in each project cities get trainings on earthquake design and construction of 
houses. Consideration is given to the local practice, material availability, indigenous 
knowledge and affordability in trainings on earthquake technology.  
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Disaster education and awareness: The project includes development and wide 
distribution of educational booklets, posters and guidebook on teachers training and 
students’ drills for earthquake disaster preparedness and response. The guidebooks get 
verification and updated through trainings and mock drills. The projects also develop an 
interactive educational tool for awareness raising on earthquake disaster and simple 
seismic risk assessment of buildings aiming to motivate households for planning seismic 
upgrading of their houses.  
It was learned from earlier programs of UNCRD that the process of making safer schools 
can be used as an entry points to the communities at risk to facilitate implementation 
of a training and capacity-building programme for earthquake disaster mitigation 
technology besides its prime objective of ensuring the safety of school children against 
future earthquakes. It is achieved by demonstrating how schools can be used as 
community centers for earthquake disaster prevention and mitigation. Locally 
applicable and affordable earthquake-safer construction technology is transferred to 
these communities 
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Annexe 2: Research Briefing Pack 
 
 
March 30, 2017  
 
 
To Whom It May Concern 
 
RE: REQUESTING PERMISSION FOR DATA COLLECTION 
 
This is to confirm that the bearer of this letter, Mr Stuart Katwikirize, is a post-graduate 
student undertaking a Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) degree studies at the School of Art, Design 
and Architecture, University of Huddersfield, United Kingdom under my supervision. His 
research is titled “Supporting Community Capacity Building for Disaster Risk Reduction: 
Exploring Level of Prioritisation in Kenya.” The research, therefore, aims at exploring and 
gauging current institutional donor and INGO prioritisation to ‘supporting community capacity 
building for disaster risk reduction’ (DRR) in Kenya.  Research findings will be used to contribute 
to the development of a conceptual model through which key DRR stakeholders in the country 
including institutional donors and INGOs could determine how and where to prioritise DRR 
support.  
 
In accord with the above and on behalf of the University of Huddersfield, I am writing to 
kindly request that you grant Mr Katwikirize necessary permission and support to approach key 
departments/personnel in your organisation for this study’s data collection.  
 
I am confident that the study will not disrupt your working environment in any way, and 
any data collected will remain confidential. I am also happy to report that in compliance with 
global research ethics, Mr Katwikirize has been granted the ethical approval for this research 
from the University of Huddersfield. More details on the study are provided in the accompanying 
information pack.  
 
Thank you 
 
Yours sincerely,  
 
 
 
Prof. Dilanthi Amaratunga 
Director, Global Disaster Resilience Centre 
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School of Art, Design and Architecture 
University of Huddersfield 
United Kingdom 
Tel : +44(0)161 295 4471 
Email : r.d.g.amaratunga@salford.ac.uk  
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University of Huddersfield 
School of Art, Design and Architecture 
 
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET 
 
 
Research Project Title: Supporting Community Capacity Building for Disaster Risk 
Reduction (DRR): Exploring Level of Prioritisation in Kenya 
 
You are being invited to take part in a research project. Before you decide, it is important for 
you to understand why this research is being done and what it will involve. Please take time to 
read the following information and discuss it with others if you wish. Ask if there is anything that 
is not clear or if you would like more information. I take this opportunity to thank you for taking 
the time to read this. 
 
What is the purpose of the project? 
The research project, whose details are provided in the ‘research brief’ below, is a module 
contributing to the attainment of the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy with the University of 
Huddersfield, United Kingdom.  
 
Why have I been chosen?   
Your organisation/agency/community was purposively selected based on known level of 
engagement and contribution to DRR in Kenya. And individually, you were put forward by your 
organisation/agency/community as a key resource person on the research subject.  
 
Do I have to take part? 
While we encourage you to take part in the study, participation in this study is entirely voluntary 
and you do not have to feel obliged to take part. Refusal will involve no penalty whatsoever and 
you may withdraw from the study at any stage without giving an explanation to the researcher. 
 
What do I have to do? 
You will be invited to take part in a pre-scheduled interview. The interview will not take more 
than one hour. And at a later date, we will also request to have a much shorter interview not 
exceeding 35 minutes. Part of your participation may include helping the researcher to access 
related research documents in your organisation/agency. 
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 Are there any disadvantages to taking part? 
There should be no foreseeable disadvantages to your participation. If you are unhappy or have 
further questions at any stage in the process, please address your concerns initially to the 
researcher if this is appropriate. Alternatively, please contact Prof Dilanthi Amaratunga at the 
School of Art, Design and Architecture, University of Huddersfield, United Kingdom. Full contacts 
are given below.  
 
Will all my details be kept confidential? 
All information which is collected will be strictly confidential and anonymised before the data is 
presented in any work, in compliance with the Data Protection Act and ethical research 
guidelines and principles. 
 
What will happen to the results of the research study? 
The results of the study will be used to develop a conceptual model through which 
intuitional donors and INGOs supporting the DRR agenda in Kenya could determine how 
and where to prioritise respective DRR support. A written copy of the report will be 
made available to interested research participants. 
 
What happens to the data collected? 
Like indicated above, all data will be kept confidentially, there will be no attribution in the report. 
Only the researcher and supervisory university staffs will have access to this confidential data.  
 
 
 
Will I be paid for participating in the research? 
This research encourages free participation. However, the time and responses provided will be 
considered a great contribution to developing a decision-making tool aimed at streamlining 
support provided to different layers of DRR in Kenya, and possibly beyond.  
 
Where will the research be conducted? 
Where possible, scheduled interviews will be conducted on selected donor/INGOs premises. In 
the event that this may not be possible, alternative locations will be mutually agreed between 
the researcher and the participant. 
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Criminal Records check (if applicable) 
There are no vulnerable persons, e.g. children solicited to participate in this research. 
Consequently, it is not considered necessary to undertake criminal record checks on the 
researcher.  
 
Who has reviewed and approved the study, and who can be contacted for further 
information? 
The study was reviewed and approved by the University’s Research Ethics and Integrity 
Committee (UREIC), and Prof Dilanthi Amaratunga can be contacted for details. Contact details 
are provided here below.  
Professor Dilanthi Amaratunga 
Director, Global Disaster Resilience Centre 
School of Art, Design and Architecture  
University of Huddersfield, UK 
Tel: +44 (0)845 155 6666 
Email: d.amaratunga@hud.ac.uk 
 
Name & Contact Details of Researcher:  
Stuart Katwikirize 
Global Disaster Resilience Centre 
School of Art, Design and Architecture  
The University of Huddersfield, UK. 
Tel: +254733825050 
Email: stuart.katwikirize@hud.ac.uk; katwikirize@yahoo.co.uk 
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RESEARCH BRIEF 
Supporting Community Capacity Building for Disaster Risk Reduction: 
Exploring Level of Prioritisation in Kenya 
 
Research Overview 
This research aims to explore and gauge current institutional donor and INGO 
prioritisation to ‘supporting community capacity building for disaster risk reduction’ 
(DRR) in Kenya. The revealed level of support to community capacity building for disaster 
risk reduction will be compared and contrasted to support provided to other DRR 
priorities in the country. Eventual findings will be used to develop a conceptual model 
through which intuitional donors and INGOs supporting Kenya’s DRR agenda could 
determine how and where to prioritise respective DRR support.  
 
Case Study Selection 
Initially, this research is expected to cover a minimum of three institutional donors, 
three INGOs and three supported community DRR projects. Nevertheless, depending on 
the availability of resources including time and funding, the number of donor cases could 
be increased from 3 to 5, and the number of INGO cases also increased from 3 to 5. 
 
Case Study Objectives 
1. Explore current institutional donor and INGO DRR support priorities. 
2. Establish how individual institutional donors and INGOs supporting DRR in Kenya 
decide which DRR priorities to support.  
3. Assess the importance institutional donors and INGOs attach to prioritising and 
supporting community capacity building for DRR.  
4. Identify successful cases of community capacity building for DRR and analyse 
factors responsible for this success. 
5. Identify and analyse factors limiting greater community capacity building for DRR 
in Kenya. 
6. Develop a conceptual model through which intuitional donors and INGOs 
working on DRR would determine where to prioritise DRR support.  
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Data Collection 
This being an exploratory and interpretive case study research, open-ended interviews 
will be the main form of data collection. Access to related DRR documents, both manual 
and electronic, from participating donors and INGOs will provide secondary sources of 
information. Such documents include policy and strategy papers, plans, project 
documents, reports, etc.  
 
In compliance with good research practice, interviewees will be availed a copy of the 
interview questions and guidelines prior to the interview. The main interview will last 
for a maximum of 1 hour. A later and much shorter interview lasting, not more than 35 
minutes will be requested to help clarify emerging questions from the first interview and 
also provide an opportunity to ask questions that may have emerged as a result of 
interaction with other donors and INGOs participating in this research.  
 
Benefits to You and Your Organisation 
The research will develop a conceptual model through which key stakeholders including 
intuitional donors and INGOs supporting Kenya’s DRR agenda could determine how and 
where to prioritise respective DRR support. This will strengthen an evidence-based 
approach to deciding how and where to provide required DRR support.  All interview 
materials will be kept strictly confidential and made available only to members of the 
supervisory staff of the University.  
Contact Details 
Researcher: 
Stuart Katwikirize 
Global Disaster Resilience Centre 
School of Art, Design and Architecture  
University of Huddersfield, UK 
Tel: +254733825050 
Email: stuart.katwikirize@hud.ac.uk; 
katwikirize@yahoo.co.uk 
Supervisor: 
Professor Dilanthi Amaratunga 
Director, Global Disaster Resilience Centre 
School of Art, Design and Architecture  
University of Huddersfield, UK 
Tel: +44 (0)845 155 6666 
Email: d.amaratunga@hud.ac.uk 
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University of Huddersfield 
School of Art, Design and Architecture 
 
Participant Consent Form 
 
Title of Research Study: Supporting Community Capacity Building for Disaster Risk 
Reduction: Exploring Level of Prioritisation in Kenya 
 
 
Name of Researcher:   Stuart Katwikirize 
 
Participant Identifier Number: 
 
I confirm that I have read and understood the participant Information sheet 
related to this research, and have had the opportunity to ask questions. 
 
 
I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw 
at any time without giving any reason. 
 
 
I understand that all my responses will be anonymised. 
 
 
I give permission for members of the research team to have access to my 
anonymised responses. 
 
 
I agree to take part in the above study 
 
 
 
Name of Participant: …………………………………………………………… 
 
Signature of Participant: ……………………………………………………… 
 
Date: ………………………… 
 
 
 
Name of Researcher:  
 
Signature of Researcher:  
 
Date:  
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University of Huddersfield 
School of Art, Design and Architecture 
 
Researcher Consent Form 
This form is to be used when consent is sought from those responsible for an 
organisation or institution for research to be carried out with participants within that 
organisation or institution. This may include schools, colleges or youth work facilities. 
 
Title of Research Study: Supporting Community Capacity Building for Disaster Risk 
Reduction: Exploring Level of Prioritisation in Kenya 
 
Name of Researcher:  Stuart Katwikirize 
  
Organisations: Donors and INGOs supporting DRR initiatives in Kenya 
 
i) The aim/ purpose of the research study:  This research aims to explore and gauge 
current institutional donor and INGO prioritisation to ‘supporting community capacity 
building for disaster risk reduction’ (DRR) in Kenya. The revealed level of support to 
community capacity building for disaster risk reduction will be compared and contrasted 
to support provided to other DRR priorities in the country. Eventual findings will be used 
to develop a conceptual model through which intuitional donors and INGOs supporting 
Kenya’s DRR agenda could determine how and where to prioritise respective DRR 
support.  
 
ii) The data collection methods to be used:  This being an exploratory and interpretive 
case study research, open-ended interviews will be the main form of data collection. 
Access to related DRR documents, both manual and electronic, from participating 
donors and INGOs will provide secondary sources of information. Such documents 
include policy and strategy papers, plans, project documents, reports, etc. In compliance 
with good research practice, interviewees will be availed a copy of the interview 
questions and guidelines prior to the interview. The main interview will last for a 
maximum of 1 hour. A later and much shorter interview lasting, not more than 35 
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minutes will be requested to help clarify emerging questions from the first interview and 
also provide an opportunity to ask questions that may have emerged as a result of 
interaction with other donors and INGOs participating in this research.  
iii) Which groups will be selected for this study? Donors and INGOs known for their 
significant contribution to the DRR agenda in the country are purposively sampled for 
this study.  
 
            I confirm that I give permission for this research to be carried out and that 
permission from all participants will be gained in line within my organisation’s policy. 
 
 
Name and position of senior manager: 
 
Signature of senior manager: 
 
Date:  
 
Name of Researcher:  
 
Signature of Researcher: 
 
Date:  
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Annexe 3:  Sample Interview Guide 
 
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS FOR INGOs/ Donors 
 
Aspect of Inquiry Question Triangulated Sources 
of Information 
1. Current DRR 
support 
priorities 
Is your agency/org presently engaged in DRR and humanitarian work in Kenya?  
 
If yes, which DRR priorities is your agency/org presently supporting in the country? 
  
Publications/ 
documents 
2. Shelf life of 
priorities 
 
When were these priorities selected and do they have a timeframe? This can be 
expressed in terms of months or years.  
 
 
3. Timeline for 
reviewing 
priorities 
 
Is there a pre-determined timeline or frequency for reviewing these priorities?  
 
4. Selection criteria  
Being a government of Kenya development partner, how do you as an agency/org 
decide which DRR priorities to support in the country?  
 
Publications/ 
documents 
5. Use of global 
DRR 
frameworks: 
Statement: During the implementation of the HFA, there was periodic compilation 
and sharing of Regional and Country Platform DRR Assessment reports. 
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HFA and Kenya 
Platform 
assessment 
reports; and 
SFDRR 
Questions: Are you aware of these reports? 
 
Please tell me whether and how these reports may have had any influence on your 
agency’s DRR support priorities in the country. 
 
Questions: Are you conversant with the new Sendai Framework for DRR? 
 
If yes: What plans do you have to either use or implement the SFDRR?  
 
6.  % funding 
toward capacity 
building for local 
DRR action 
How much % of your agency Disaster Management support resources including 
funds are designated toward DRR? 
 
And how much of the DRR funding/budget is dedicated toward supporting 
community capacity building for DRR? A rough break down may be helpful.  
 
7. Measuring 
success 
 
How does your agency measure the effectiveness and success of its contribution to 
the country’s DRR agenda?  
 
 
8. Desired change  
What specific changes or improvements would you like to see in this country as a 
result of highly effective DRR work in this country?  
 
 
9. Evidence-based 
prioritisation  
There’s ample literature showing that inadequate prioritisation of community 
capacity building for DRR remains the biggest obstacle to realising greater DRR 
progression in many countries including Kenya.   
 
Would your agency be willing to use this kind of evidence?  
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If yes, what are some of the ways in which your agency may be willing to use this 
kind of evidence?  
10. Agency’s history 
with local DRR 
action 
Has your agency been engaged in community capacity building for DRR?  
 
If Yes: Describe for me your agency’s recent history in supporting local/ community 
DRR action in this country if any. 
 
 
 
Statement: I am asking because I am interested in identifying case studies of 
communities that have received capacity building support. 
 
11. Upper versus 
local level DRR 
focus  
What would be your comments on growing literature that seems to suggest there’s 
inadequate support to community-level DRR action and yet there is comparatively 
more support to global, regional and national level DRR activities by many key 
stakeholders?  
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Annexe 4:   Interview Transcript 
 
1. Current DRR Support Priorities 
00:10 
Interviewer: Is DON3 currently engaged in any DRR or humanitarian work 
in Kenya 
00:18 
Interviewee: Yes we do DRR work. It depends on how you want to define Humanitarian, 
but we do not do response; we do the longer term DRR. 
00:35 
Interviewer: Which DRR priorities is DON3 presently supporting in Kenya? 
00:46 
Interviewee: We are looking at issues of capacity building. We are working at two levels; 
at the institutional level that is with the government and the institutions that are 
mandated for DRR. And then we are also working at the community level. Therefore a 
number of the things that we do will either be at the institutional or community level 
but some will cut across. Capacity building for example that looks at issues of 
preparedness targets both the institution and the community. So we are not only 
looking at Community based DRR but we are also looking at what the capacity of 
Government is, to help the country be prepared and to respond in the event of disasters. 
When we talk of capacity building, we are looking at institutional frameworks, the legal 
frameworks that need to be in place as well as technical skills other than just the 
knowledge. 
02:02 
Interviewer: Could you say a little bit more on your Community 
engagement for DRR  
02:07 
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Interviewee: For our community engagement, we prioritise two things, transfer of 
knowledge and giving the community skills. Under this, we have used the concept of 
community-based DRR through the trainings that are designed for Community based 
DRR. But then we are also looking at how we can increase their resilience to the various 
risks that they are exposed to. That is when we actually do projects, community- based 
projects. So that if we are looking at issues of how we can enhance their capacity or their 
resilience to drought, then we are looking at projects that help them to minimize the 
impact of drought. If it is in the area of livestock do they have sufficient water? Are they 
able to manage diseases or prevent diseases? If it comes to issues and aspects of food 
security can they look at production systems that are not overly reliant on rainfall? That 
is what we are looking at. For some we also look at alternative forms of livelihoods, if 
the predominant source of livelihood is very exposed then what else can they do? So 
there is the aspect of resilience building and moving them away from the exposure as 
well as just giving them the knowledge. 
03:43 
Interviewer: How do you go about selecting which communities to work 
with on DRR? 
03:54 
Interviewee: It is a whole process. At DON3 we work a lot with the government. 
Government is our key implementing partner as well as our entry point. So when it 
comes to prioritising on the larger geographic area, the counties, for example, we 
prioritise together with the Government and we look at the level of exposure or impact 
of a certain disaster, the support that is already being issued or whether there is any 
support, whether it is sufficient or whether there are gaps. That is how we look at it (in 
a bigger picture) so that we are able to narrow down to the geographic area. Once we 
get to that area, we begin to work with the communities so as to pick the specific area. 
They are able to identify which is the specific community within this area that has been 
selected that we need to go to. It is an engagement that we get into, a kind of back and 
forth on what are the issues? Who are vulnerable? Who has not received any support? 
But that we work with the help of the local levels. 
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2. Shelf Life of Priorities 
05:10 
Interviewer: I will come back to that question later. Do you have a time 
frame in which these priorities will be supported? Or said differently, when 
were these priorities selected and do they have a timeframe for revisiting 
or reviewing? 
05:44 
Interviewee: We work under the bigger framework, we have our Country programme 
document that defines our priority areas and areas that we want to engage in. The way 
our Country Programme Document (which is our strategy) has been set out, is that it is 
informed by the UNDAF (United Nations Development Assistance Framework), which is 
then aligned to the Government’s medium-term plans. So what we are doing really fits 
into the focus and the objectives of the Government. Once we have these broad areas 
defined, then we develop specific projects through which we address some of these 
components. The projects will then be defined in terms of what components or what 
specific activities we are going to undertake with which communities within what 
specific period of time.  
3. Timeline for Reviewing DRR Priorities 
The following narrative is a continuation of the above paragraph, and it 
covers the question on the timeline for review of priorities.  
 
And the length of time is also informed by the source of funding. Some of the funding is 
DON3 internal funding, some of the funding is given to us by donors that also come with 
some agreed on specifications; like we have funding available between this time and 
this time, so that is the period within which we implement that project. Within the 
projects, we normally have annual reviews. If it’s a three-year project, for example, it 
will have an annual review but depending on the design also it will have a midterm 
review through which you are then able to recast if you need to recast any of the work 
that you are doing there. But the continuous monitoring that goes on fits back into the 
project in case you need to redesign or redefine some of the components. I would say it 
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a continuous process, but also midterm really gives us an opportunity if it is a longer-
term project. There are some funds that we have that are short term, as short as one 
year. With that, you are unable to make major changes but you can make minimal and 
necessary changes in the course of the year because that is a shorter project. 
08:15 
Interviewer: When did you decide to start supporting Communities and 
when did you decide to start working with institutions like Government? 
Has it been like this? 
Interviewee: It has always been like this, I think it is also because of the mandate and 
what you are trying to achieve. When it comes to disaster risk reduction, there is the 
responsibility that can only be undertaken at the upstream level- the institutions and all 
these instruments that you need to effectively undertake your DRR. But then there is 
also work that needs to happen at the community level so it is really looking at how 
effective your work and your programming is going to be. I think this is what has 
informed the two levels of engagement. 
09:08 
4. Selection Criteria 
Interviewer: You may have answered this earlier but I will still go ahead 
and ask, as the Government of Kenya devolvement partner, how do you as 
DON3 decide which DRR priorities to support in this country? 
09:28 
Interviewee: I think there is a common understanding that we cannot be able to do the 
entire spectrum. So it depends on our comparative advantage in terms of what we are 
able to undertake and the capacities that we have as DON3. It also depends on our larger 
strategic direction. I think that really informs what we get engaged in and what we don’t 
get engaged in. When we talk about our mandate, for example, DON3 is not a 
humanitarian agency per se and that is why we don’t get involved in response per se. I 
think there is a bigger picture that informs what we can do and what we cannot do. But 
in the last recent years when the UN within Kenya took on the "Delivering as One", 
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where we are largely working in a lot of coordination and cooperation with other 
agencies, there is really the understanding that there are other UN agencies that are 
better placed. For example, we know that a particular component will be taken up by 
say WFP if it is food distribution. So if within a humanitarian setting, there is that which 
we do; early recovery, for example, how do we begin to help the communities to get 
back to their feet? But the actual response is something that we do not do by mandate. 
So it is informed by the larger picture in terms of strategic directions and in terms of 
comparative advantage. Then when we talk about the various priorities that need to be 
addressed within the country, we also look at what are the key gaps?  And if we really 
want to see success in the area of DRR how can we be able to support these very key 
gaps that have been identified. 
12:04 
Interviewer:  How do you get those gaps for instance? 
12:09 
Interviewee: Some are glaring, for example in Kenya we do not have a policy framework 
for DRR and we know that this is very critical in terms of defining the responsibilities of 
Government, in terms of defining allocation of resources, in terms of defining who is 
going to do what, when? And some of them really stand out and when you also look at 
them, issues of policy also fit squarely in areas of interests of DON3 so we take on those 
for example. But I think some assessments have been done that also help to identify 
what are some of the key areas that need to be looked at. We (DON3 Kenya) did a rapid 
assessment, I think in 2012 to identify the key gaps within DRR and also just to look at 
who are the players and that also helped to define some of the areas that we wanted to 
engage ourselves in. 
13:35 
5. Knowledge of and Use of Global DRR Frameworks 
Interviewer: During the implementation of the Hyogo Framework for 
Action, there was periodic compilation and sharing of regional and country 
platform DRR assessment reports. Are you aware of these reports? 
   323 
 
14:09 
Interviewee:   Yes. I am aware of the Kenya reports that were always done at the time 
by the Ministry of State for Special Programmes. 
14:40 
Interviewer: Are you able to tell me whether and how these reports may 
have had any influence on DON3’s prioritization of DRR activities in Kenya 
or not? 
14:56 
Interviewee: The Reports? I wouldn’t say so. The reports didn’t influence what we did. 
I wouldn’t say the report had, I think we used different mechanisms to identify some of 
the things that we needed to do. And of course, special programmes and the other key 
partners and we heavily supported the National Platform for DRR. So in as much as the 
report gave the progress of what was happening, some of that which we also did input, 
I wouldn’t say that was what we used to determine how to move forward. I wouldn’t 
say so. 
 
15:55 
Interviewer: Are you conversant with the new Sendai Framework for 
disaster risk reduction? 
16:01 
Interviewee: Yes  
16:03 
Interviewer: What plans do you have to either use or implement the Sendai 
Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction? Or is it actually going to have any 
influence on the things that DON3 does in Kenya? 
16:18 
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Interviewee: We are doing a lot as far as the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk 
Reduction is concerned. We participated and supported the government in preparation 
toward the Sendai Framework and we also sponsored government officials to 
participate in the conference. Soon after the conference, we supported the government 
together with other partners to begin to think about how do we roll out the Sendai 
Framework in Kenya. And we worked with the other partners on an action plan on the 
implementation of the Sendai framework, which is still a draft because what we did we 
did not finish, we expected that government was going to finalise and roll it out as an 
official document, but it is still the document that is currently guiding some of the work 
that the national platform is doing. So that is at the national level. Bringing it down to 
the counties is we have been working to roll out the Sendai framework. One is to raise 
awareness on this framework that it exists, that this is the content and that this is how 
we can begin to take it forward and that is what we are doing as DON3. We have worked 
with some specific counties and they actually have county action plans on how they can 
roll out the Sendai framework. We have some very specific funding that we got from 
DFID that helps us to roll out the Sendai Framework. So when we look at even the work 
we are doing now it is to try and align ourselves on the priority areas of Sendai 
Framework. So it is some of the key things that we commit ourselves to as DON3 that 
when we talk about some of these global frameworks, how do they get rolled out at the 
national and at the local level. So that is what we are doing about Sendai. 
18:54 
Interviewer: You talked about the Country programme document, is there 
any possibility that I can access that document? Is it available to the public? 
19:02 
Interviewee: It is available, I think it is even in our website if I am not wrong, it is a public 
document. 
19:13 
6. % Funding Toward Capacity Building for Local DRR Action 
Interviewer:  How much percentage of your agency disaster management 
support resources including funds are designated towards DRR? 
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19:33 
Interviewee: That is a hard question,  
19:35 
Interviewer: You could give me a rough estimation it doesn’t have to be 
exact 
19:41 
Interviewee: Honestly I don’t know what percentage 
19:46 
Interviewer: If you look at 2017 for instance, if you don’t have it now could 
you check it out later? 
20:00 
Interviewee: I do not have it now, it is information that I could look out for you, but 
maybe one of the things that I could also mention is that we have two main sources of 
funding. We have our core funding which DON3 funds, and we also have funding that 
we receive from other donors. The DON3 funding would be within our control to 
allocate, and this is normally allocated when it comes to prioritizing all areas, we almost 
prioritise the same because it is a focus area for DON3. But when it comes to other donor 
funding, it is also influenced by the area of focus or interest of that particular donor 
which may be out of our control. So taking that information and maybe wanting to 
extrapolate to then say these are the priority areas may actually be slightly misleading 
because then also a donor comes and says we want to support work in Environment or 
we want to support work in peacebuilding or we want to support work in this and this. 
You know DRR funding is not as large, particularly when it is almost coming from the 
same pot as the humanitarian funding. 
21:26 
Interviewer: So if you can kindly follow up and give me the one for DON3 
exclusive and forget about others which are influenced externally, that 
would be great. I was going to say how much funding or budget is 
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dedicated to supporting community capacity building for DRR. You have 
your big DON3 budget, the first question was how much of that is allocated 
to DRR? The 2nd question is how much or what % of the allocation to DRR 
is also is allocated to community capacity building for DRR?  
22:26 
Interviewee: One thing that I would say about capacity building is we have attached a 
lot of importance to building capacity, so you will find every component of work we do 
within the community there will always be an aspect of capacity building. So that for 
everything you would have transferred the necessary knowledge and the necessary skills 
because we are looking at in the longer term what would be beneficial to these people. 
So capacity building normally is a very central component of any of our projects. 
23:15 
7. How Success is Measured 
Interviewer: How does DON3 measure the successes and effectiveness of 
its contribution to the country’s DRR agenda? 
23:24 
Interviewee: That is a tough one. Because you can measure success at two levels, but 
depending on how you want to define it. One, if it’s a project, have I delivered what I 
needed to deliver? That is one way in which you can measure success. Two, and I think 
also which is what we are trying to look at is, in the longer term are we seeing the 
necessary changes that we intended? And of course, then you know there is also a 
contribution from other people. We are very particular when it comes to the results, the 
outcomes at the higher level and even in terms of our reporting then we will always be 
looking at what are the changes that are coming out. 
24:25 
8. Desired Changes 
Interviewer: What specific changes or improvements would you like to see 
in this country as a result of highly effective work in Kenya? 
24:29 
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Interviewee: The moment DRR is effective, one of the changes that we need to see is a 
reduction on the negative impact of disasters. Be it economic, or break it down into the 
loss of lives and property. That is really what we want to see. Take drought, for example, 
I don’t think it is going to go anywhere, but we want to see less impact and fewer people 
being impacted by this. The moment we start seeing effective DRR, the other thing we 
are going to see is a change in the way we are doing our development and a change in 
the allocation of our resources as a country. 
26:00 
9. Evidence-Based Prioritisation 
Interviewer: I will read for you a statement. There’s ample literature 
showing that inadequate prioritisation of community capacity building for 
DRR remains the biggest obstacle to realizing greater DRR progression in 
many countries including Kenya. Would DON3 Kenya be willing to use this 
kind of evidence? 
26:55 
Interviewee: If there is that evidence, why not? I think one of the challenges we have 
had is not being able to address the real issues. You actually mistarget in terms of 
identifying what the problem is so that you can be able to put in place the most 
appropriate intervention. And that is one statement that identifies some of the key 
problems, therefore, you are able to put in place the necessary. 
27:37 
Interviewer: If yes, what are some of the way in which your agency would 
be willing to use some of this evidence? 
27:45 
Interviewee: To inform the work that we do in terms of targeting because it identifies 
for you the areas around which you can design your programmes and allocate your 
resources.  So I think it would inform a lot in terms of “how do you target the resources 
that you have”. 
28:11 
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10. Agency History with local DRR Action 
Interviewer: Two more questions and then we will be done, some of these 
questions you have already talked about but I would draw more insight 
from what your response will be again. Has DON3 been engaged in 
Community Capacity building in DRR in Kenya? 
28:31 
Interviewee: We have 
28:33 
Interviewer: Describe for me your agency’s history in supporting local/ 
community DRR action in this country if any, at least what you know? 
28:46 
Interviewee: I think I partly talked about it in terms of targeting part of our DRR 
resources to the community level in two key areas, one has been capacity building. Our 
capacity building involves training, and sometimes it involves the necessary equipment 
or tools. It is not just training but the whole package that enables the community to do 
what they need to do and as well as initiating tangible projects around the community. 
We have had very specific capacity building in terms of the concept of community-based 
disaster risk reduction and we have done this with IIRR- the training institution. I 
remember we once collaborated with them and we ran these trainings a couple of times 
largely in Turkana, Tana River and in Garissa, these are the specific places where we have 
done community-based DRR. But we also do capacity building specific to build certain 
skills that enhance their resilience. So that goes with the tangible projects that we are 
undertaking.  For instance, if we are doing irrigation farming, we do capacity building 
around the farming; if we are working with pastoralists on livestock production then we 
do capacity building that enables them to do that particular thing. So there is the general 
understanding and the knowledge of DRR that we have done through community-based 
DRR, but then there are also these skills and knowledge in a specific technical area. 
31:24 
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Interviewer: Are you able to tell me those geographical areas you talked 
about and the particular time periods when you did that? 
31:41 
Interviewee: We did Turkana and Garissa I think it was 2012-2013, Tana River I think it 
was 2013-2014 is when we did that, that is community-based DRR, but the other 
trainings that go with community projects, those ones are continuous because we have 
been with these communities since 2012 and that was when I came to DON3. 
32:22 
Interviewer: Again could you summarise for me how you select these 
communities and what informs your selection? 
32:30 
Interviewee: We begin from Government at the point where we are saying we would 
like to support certain communities, we want to support some DRR projects. Like at the 
moment, with this drought, we have been in discussion with Government and 
specifically with NDMA and asking which are the areas that you would like us to focus 
on. One of the reasons why we engage with government is because we believe they 
have the bigger picture in terms of the areas that are not adequately covered, the areas 
that have huge needs, once those bigger geographical counties have been identified, we 
move to those counties and work with the local leadership in that county. The County 
Governments have come in place now, so we engage with the county governments, 
going lower they have the ward administrators, the local community opinion leaders 
and the chiefs they help us now to identify the specific spots and who are going to be 
the beneficiaries. We try to really get a consultative process that at the end of the day it 
is those that are really viewed to be the most deserving in that situation.  
We also try to take care of issues of gender. We have women included, the marginalized 
groups and the disadvantaged, just trying to see that our beneficiaries are all-inclusive 
and a proper representation. One of the things that we have also done is we realize that 
when we talk about resilience building, it is a long term thing, it is a process and by the 
time you really are able to move particular communities or individuals or groups of 
   330 
 
people from point A to where we can say these ones can now be able to stand on their 
own, and so we are walking with communities over a period of time on the minimum 
we are actually looking at 3 years. By the time we begin to engage with a particular 
community, even if it was a short term funding like one year, we have a commitment 
that we will continue to mobilise resources so that we walk with this community so that 
we do not just come to give them an irrigation scheme and we are gone. We realise that 
to be able to build the knowledge, for some of them it requires a change in their mindset. 
So we walk with them over a period of time. 
35:22 
Interviewer: Is there any one particular community (because I am 
interested in following up and documenting) at least one community 
supported DRR project that stands out and would be worth looking into 
usually looking at the success factors what makes it work and what doesn’t 
make it work for instance. 
35:49 
Interviewee: Anywhere in this country? 
35:51 
Interviewer: Yes anywhere in this country supported by DON3? 
35:54 
Interviewee: We have a couple of groups in Tana River that I would point you to. We 
have a group that is doing honey production, we have a group that is doing farming and 
keeping dairy goats, I think those are good groups that you can look at. There you would 
look at two or three groups. I would also point you to Turkana, we have the fishing 
community, we have a community that is doing farming-irrigation and an interesting 
one that is looking at livestock product value chain, and they are running a tannery. 
36:41 
Interviewer: How long has that been in existence? 
36:47 
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Interviewee: They are doing a community tannery, we started working with them in 
2012/2013. 
37:05 
11. Comments on Upper Vs Local Level DRR Focus 
Interviewer: What would be your comments on growing literature that 
seems to suggest there’s inadequate support to community-level DRR 
action and yet there is comparatively more support to global, regional and 
national level DRR activities by many key stakeholders?  
37:43 
Interviewee: To a great extent I would agree with that statement. 
37:48 
Interviewer: And what would be your overall comment on that? 
37:53 
Interviewee: I think the number of players thin out as we get down to the community. 
Whatever is discussed, very good frameworks and directions are given globally and 
regionally, but how that is cascaded down is not very clear. I think deliberate effort to 
link right to the local level is still missing, something misses there. And I think it is just 
because of the number of players. Resources that are available at the local level for you 
to translate what is happening globally and regionally are also very limited. 
38:45 
Interviewer: Do you think it is lack of prioritization, or it is lack of 
awareness? Something must be causing this because sometimes people 
don’t know and because of ignorance then we may not give due diligence 
to something. What causes that divergence within us? 
Interviewee: I think the greatest responsibility to translate what is happening at the 
global and at the higher level to the local, lies with the government and I will speak for 
Kenya, I will not speak for other countries. I think we are still very limited in the 
understanding of DRR and how to translate it into practical things. I think we are still 
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limited as a country.  Government is supposed to do DRR through different sectors: 
through agriculture, through livestock, water, etc. DRR should find its way down through 
most of the ministries, the technical line ministries. I think that is where there is a bit of 
a break, where we actually understand that you can re-configure your development to 
DRR so that whatever way you do development, you are actually reducing risks or you 
are already mitigating. I think that is really where the link breaks so that even when you 
say allocate resources, I think because of that limited understanding of DRR, people do 
not even know how to allocate resources because we could do our normal work but in 
a way that is actually disaster risk reduction. So I think that is where the big break is. 
Resources also very interesting are not easily forthcoming for disaster risk reduction. So 
the donor community to put money on the table for DRR is not easy, thus for those that 
have the will, they could be limited in terms of resources. 
41:09 
Interviewer: Do you have any other overall comments on the subject we 
have been talking about, any questions for me? 
41:15 
Interviewee: No at this point, I am looking forward to reading the report. I think the 
subject of DRR is very interesting and not many people understand DRR. And a lot of 
people think DRR and humanitarian response are the same thing. Many people think it 
is the same thing. But for those of us in DRR we know it is not the same thing and because 
of that lack of understanding, we have not given it the attention and priority that is 
needed. 
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Annexe 5: Interview with Bishop Dr Masika 
Part 1: How OMO Started 
Researcher: Which of these two came first, Christian Impact Ministries or OMO? 
 Masika: Christian 
Impact Ministries came a 
long time ago, it is 41 
years old. It started as an 
outreach in 1976. We got 
together as young 
professionals to give back 
to society because we felt 
we were among the few 
who were privileged to go 
through the education 
system and we were 
Christians. But OMO 
started in 2009.   
Researcher: Could you take me through a step by step process of why and how OMO 
started and what has been done to date? 
 Masika: That is a long question that requires a long answer. OMO was started 
because of the need in the country. There was a drought in East and Central Africa, more 
so in the Horn of Africa between 2006 and 2009. During this time, the media gave 
information that the people of Yatta were eating dogs and donkeys because there was 
nothing to eat. In Kenya, in 2008/2009 there were a number of interventions like the 
one by Red Cross and Safaricom’s Kenyans for Kenyans. That is when I decided to embark 
on a Yatta intervention branded Operation Mwolyo Out (OMO). Mwolyo means relief. 
OMO started as an outreach to the Yatta community in 2009.  
Researcher: Since launching Operation Mwolyo Out, what has been done until today? 
 Masika: It is a model which begins with mindset change. It involves mobilizing 
the individual to realise his worth, his potential and his abilities and how to interact with 
Text Box 2: What is CIM? 
CIM is a non-denominational, non-governmental 
Christian development agency whose core 
mandate has been to develop models and training 
tools for holistic community transformation. The 
CIM training and resource centre mainly caters for 
individuals, families, NGOs, government agencies 
and corporates with a vision of transforming their 
lives and communities. The CIM Resource Centre 
in Yatta offers a wide range of trainings from farm 
techniques and technologies all the way to 
community transformation as practiced in CIM’s 
Operation Mwolyo Out program (OMO). 
Source: www.christianimpactministries.org 
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the environment for his benefit and also to preserve the environment. The second thing 
is about natural resources, for example, water. Harnessing and harvesting water so that 
it can be used. The water issue is used to mitigate the resistant drought in the region so 
that you are sure that whatever you plant, you will harvest. The empowerment is to help 
overcome crop failure. Then there are conservation methods which include how to 
reclaim land, how to conserve and use land sustainably.  
 After that we have gender programmes because we have realized that gender is 
a force, it’s an institution that if harmonized would solve most of the family problems. 
We have a problem where capacity building initiatives either focus more on women, or 
men or youth, but there is no synchronization or harmonization. For us, we instituted it 
as a government. So we come up with the principles of good governance, then gender 
mainstreaming in the family. Then the clarification of roles in relation to the programme 
because the programme has an economic angle to it. So gender is a major issue. Of 
course, we have realized that gender is greatly influenced by culture, and it is also 
influenced by government policies. But the major one to us is culture. So we always 
analyse the anthropological assessment on some of the areas where culture is a 
hindrance, then we use appropriate participatory transformation approaches. We help 
people to converse on their challenges and hindrances and on how to overcome them. 
We have the economic bit on how to do agriculture in a smart way which involves using 
the one-acre strategy, and how to become food secure and financially secure.  
Researcher: Briefly on gender, what was broken on the gender side of things that 
needed to be fixed and what were some of the symptoms of the breakage? 
 Masika: That is analysed in detail in the book "Family Governance.” But in the 
cultural positioning especially for Yatta, the man is left to do nothing. He is almost just a 
seed or sperm carrier. So we wanted to help the man realise that in the new system of 
the programme, where we do dam digging, he has to be a part of it and he can’t just be 
a spectator. He was to put in the forefront. His wife was helping him in both farming and 
marketing. So the man became a part of the farming and marketing systems. 
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Researcher: In your perspective, have OMO’s objectives already been achieved or they 
are yet to be achieved? Or put differently, is OMO still ongoing as an initiative or it has 
achieved its objectives and phased out? 
 Masika: OMO is still going on because it is a process. It was not only aimed at 
Yatta, but it was also aimed at 
Africa and what others call ‘third 
world countries.’ So we were 
able to a great extent succeed in 
Yatta in the first year of the 
programme and the success is 
still being propelled forward. 
OMO is not a project, it is a 
development movement, and it 
is not an event either. It is a 
movement and a process 
because when you get the 
model, you will realise that it has 
10 pillars. Even if you succeed to 
the 10th pillar, you will still have details on each pillar and you realise that it is a process. 
It is a process because it was not aimed for Yatta alone. Yatta was only a starting point. 
Researcher: What are the different activities conducted under OMO and what is the 
importance of each of them? A good example would be the Silangas/ or dams.  
Masika: One of the greatest things is the concept of systematic value chain 
approach. The synchronization, the 
integration because we are against 
project-based development where an 
organization deals with water and 
another deals with food security but 
the two do not meet. You find another 
one dealing with marketing, and whatever you are marketing you have not even dealt 
with the basic issues. So our main niche is the synchronization and bringing in the 
Box 3: OMO’s Ten Point Plan/ Transformation 
Pillars: 
1. Community mobilisation 
2. One acre rule (domestic climate change 
adaptation model) 
3. Gender in development 
4. Integration in development 
5. Market linkage 
6. Value addition and village 
commercialisation 
7. Investment 
8. Agri-nutrition 
9. Environmental concerns 
10. Advocacy 
Source: www.christianimpactmission.org 
Figure 4: OMO's Ten Point Plan/ Transformation Pillars 
CIM Technology Transfers to Yatta Includes: 
Zai pits, moist beds, zero tillage, aquaponics, 
organic farming, and drip irrigation 
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concept of value chain approach because we have water. But how do you use that water 
economically so that it takes you across? And how do you use that water in 
commensurate to your acreage? How do you cut your acreage in commensurate to the 
amount of water? That rationalization and helping people is what is important. 
Researcher: What types of support did you as Bishop Masika or Christian Impact 
Ministries provide the Yatta-OMO participants? 
 Masika: First of all, it is the mobilization. These people have been here, the 
resources have been here, and it was mobilization that was needed. After mobilization 
training by myself and others, the next bit was empowerment. One of the elements is, 
we do not encourage items and materials to be given to people. Our theory is that you 
can begin your business without cash-capital because human is the invaluable capital. 
If you are an agricultural entrepreneur, most people have land, they have bulls or cows 
that they use for ploughing. Then of course with your labour, you can even work for your 
neighbour and get money to buy the seeds. So we encourage people to use their own 
ingenuity, and that is how we build people to realise their potential. It is not much of 
what we give. The other bit is when we help you, you discover others are moving so you 
join the movement. Sometimes you don’t even know when you joined the movement 
because you find you have joined. For example, you find that people have dams, some 
people may not tell you when they dug their dams because they found themselves in 
the middle. Their cousins, uncles, brothers--all had dams, so they joined them and also 
dug their own dams. They may not even be able to tell you when they joined because it 
is a process and it is a mass movement in development. 
 
Researcher: What is the most important resource or support that CIM provided to 
OMO during the beginning of OMO? The number one thing, what would that be? 
 Masika: I think leadership is the greatest thing, and also the spirit of the 
movement. The other thing is building the momentum because a movement is 
controlled by the momentum and you will have to give leadership so that the train 
does not move outside the rails. 
Researcher: Could you say a bit more about that leadership? 
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 Masika: We developed structures at that initial stage. A few people started to 
dig dams using a form of merry go round; that was leadership, 10 people or six people 
would get together and do the merry go round digging, for each other. Then we brought 
in the idea of clusters then zones which were like what people call villages to build a 
bigger village. As leaders, we knew we would need this leadership because we would do 
common marketing. So if people have water and grow crops, the buyers would come to 
us. We would offer that leadership in terms of what to do, how to do it and when to 
do it and coming out with structures and systems and giving motivation to the people 
and giving them hope, trainings,  just the same way you attended that session today. 
I think after that session you become somebody.  
 At the initial stage, there were very many participatory evaluation meetings for 
individuals and villages. That again gave direction. Right now, they do not need much of 
me in Yatta because we have liberalized some of the markets. We realized if we go for 
the bigger companies and we grow French beans or bullet chillies, they are usually at 
low prices, but new young companies which do not have a name would pay more. So 
we have liberalized most of the production because they know us, and they know that 
if you come here you will get what you want. I did not want to provide Mwolyo so that 
they (Yatta-OMO participants) depend on me.  I wanted to empower them so that they 
depend on themselves. But if there is a new initiative, I still get them together but 
without a new initiative, I don’t have reason to bring them together. For example, 
recently we organized through some of the members to get the excavators and they 
came. When the people saw the excavators they used them to deepen their small dams 
because they have money. This needed some level of leadership.   
Researcher: Did OMO start with an exit strategy? If yes, what was or is in that strategy 
and how was the strategy managed? 
 
 Masika: I think that question has a mindset of NGOs, it is a bogus question [at 
which statement we both break out laughing]. In everything, there must be an exit. For 
example when we talk about growing French beans, what is the exit? It is the market! 
So that is an exit. But how does sustainability look like for these people?  It is when 
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people are able to provide water which was the main problem here for their families, 
are able to provide food, they are able to survive when it doesn’t rain, have dairy cattle, 
and are able to start new ventures. I think the exit is when you have proper 
empowerment of the people. When the project is people based, as a movement we 
have no exit because we are always moving to the next thing, from one item to another. 
Immediately you develop a sense of arrival, people will exit themselves. Mine is to keep 
them realizing that we have not arrived, so we do not need to exit. But the fact that it is 
movement, it is an idea, a philosophy, they will continue moving from glory to glory, 
from one thing to another. 
 And some of the things people are doing, we never taught them. So you can 
imagine they are not exiting but improving, diversifying and coming up with their own 
innovations. For example, as we were talking about the initial stage, you need to have 
good habitation. When you get time to move around, you will see people have done 
that in their homes. Someone began with a small dam, the dam became bigger, the farm 
also became bigger, they improved their houses, and they are continuing. 
 But at the end of the day, in Yatta, we are looking at developing industrial 
villages, agricultural villages, and commercial villages. We have not gotten everything. 
For example, we make bread out of sweet potato and the farmers grow sweet potato, 
which is one product.  We grow, process and package honey. But our intention is to 
diversify more and more and then we have in every village not only a collection centre 
but also a processing centre. We have one here and we also want to see every village 
have one. We would like to see families doing cottage industries.  People have already 
started in their own way. There are those with dairy cows that were not there. We have 
been able to sell the milk, but we are moving to the next level where we want to process 
that milk as farmers increase. I think everything is a process and the movement is going 
on. If it was a project, we should have exited a long time ago. Because if it was about 
water, when you have water, you can exit. Whatever people develop, we would like 
them to make it bigger and better. We do not want them to exit but to be resilient, 
because it is about the people, not projects.  
Researcher: Are there any households that are in OMO’s catchment area that did not 
join OMO? And in case they are there, why didn’t they join? 
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 Masika:  There is quite a number. But even though they did not join, we achieved 
our objective. One of the reasons why some did not join could be that some of the 
households were made up of elderly people who wouldn’t be able to engage in 
strategic activities like digging dams. But many of these elderly households already had 
family members taking care of them and these family members dug the dams. So the 
elderly households were now getting water from family members with dams.  There are 
others that would not see where we were going at the initial stage. So quite a number 
would oppose because there was nothing we were giving them. Yet organisations like 
World Vision and Plan International who are just in Matuu here were giving water tanks, 
goats, cows and we were giving out nothing. So some people here did not join.  
 Some of the people in areas where these organisations are working were given 
even free cows and goats, but they died and ours have grown. Those who were not given 
cows but probably had one cow now have about eight cows. On the contrary, the ones 
who were given cows, the cows died because they belonged to the organization. At the 
initial stage, they could not understand why I was not looking for resources to give to 
them. They would not understand why when I would call them for seminars and they 
come from as far as 30kms, I would not give them transport whereas other agencies 
were giving out transport allowances. So when OMO was starting, there was that kind 
of opposition.  So a few could buy it, but when you succeed in a big way, the critical 
mass will help you in developing a movement. So most of them have been swept and 
joined. They no longer oppose me because it is a movement. But they see their 
neighbours, cousins and other relatives.   
Researcher: Were there any other development agencies working with Yatta 
Communities before CIM came in to launch OMO? 
 Masika: Yes, there were quite a number. There was a church-based organization, 
and another CBO, then there was World Vision although I don’t like mentioning 
organisations. 
Researcher: No, it is okay, by then I was working with World Vision as the Regional 
Director for Humanitarian Affairs. 
 Masika: There was World Vision here in Matuu and Plan International.  
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Researcher: Where was Plan International at that time? 
 Masika: I don’t know where they do their programmes because they are still in 
Matuu, but I haven’t met them where they work. They once brought sponsored people 
to come here from the other side of Matuu, but they were not very active here. World 
Vision had not reached here, but they work around Matuu. There wasn’t much of the 
NGOs but there was an organization that used to come around and dig dams for people 
and they also paid some money. They would give people food and then they would dig 
dams for those people. That happened around the same time we started, but of course, 
because of the approach, they couldn’t reach many people. And because theirs was a 
project, it ended. [At which point we both burst out in laughter]. Because when the 
funding ends, that is when the project ends. They exit because they were riding on funds. 
Researcher: Are there any households that were in OMO that have not been able to 
break from a life of expectancy, a life of dependency on external aid? If they are there, 
what are some of the reasons for that? 
 Masika: I would say to a great extent many have changed. But of course, there 
could be a few odd pockets here and there. But when you move around, you will find 
that the strategic activities are so many that even if you do not do one thing, you may 
do the other. In other words, you cannot deny that you are not a member of OMO. 
Currently, we are not registering anyone because it is a movement. So we do not need 
to register people. One only needs to realise that people are coming out of poverty and 
food insecurity and they also join. Initially, part of my role was to identify and develop 
role models who were agents of change, and they would help to positively influence 
their people. I discovered the power of African social networks. When you have a role 
model from one location, the wife may be coming from another village and their son 
also married from yet another community. If those people have not started, they will be 
influenced by the role models' actions. That’s how I sparked the mobilization. If you did 
not like my face or colour, you would at least like the face of your mother or brother. 
End of Part 1 (The Beginning of OMO) 
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Part 2: OMO's Gains, Success Factors, Expansion and Challenges 
 
Researcher: There are very many INGOs, local NGOs and government departments 
working with communities in disaster-prone areas but have not been able to realise 
the kind of OMO results in Yatta. What are the critical factors responsible for OMO’s 
great success? Factors other practitioners around the country need to know if they 
were to follow the Yatta transformation model. 
 
 Masika: Development has been misunderstood by universities, international 
donors and international NGOs. Development in Africa is hinged on a wrong premise 
that Africans are poor, Africans are needy, and Africans need to be helped with material 
assistance.  
[Phone interruption, as Masika had to reach for his ringing phone and reject the call] 
Researcher: We were looking at factors responsible for OMO’s great success. Factors 
which other practitioners around the country need to know if they were to follow the 
Yatta transformation model. 
 Masika: Sorry for beginning from the opposite and I hope I am not hurting 
anyone.  
According to CIM, development agencies have gotten it wrong. First of all development 
in Africa is based on a wrong world view and a wrong mindset that Africa is poor, Africa 
is needy, and therefore Africa needs to be helped. That is a mistake. Our brothers who 
are trying to help us have succeeded in developing a far worse problem than the one 
they came to fight. With the premise that Africa is poor, Africa is lacking, Africa is needy, 
Africa is ignorant, Africa is powerless, donors decide on donations and make us apply 
for them within their frameworks. So 'needy' Africans apply according to donor 
requirements, and if they succeed, they implement according to foreign requirements 
which do not put into consideration the people and situations they are in. In trying to 
do a good thing, many have developed a dependency syndrome in Africa. And that is 
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why in our programmes we call it ‘Operation Mwolyo Out,’ operation relief out so 
that, first and foremost, we deal with the mind. 
 Secondly, the donor world has come with projects and many of the development 
agencies are merely heavy on service delivery because they cannot do anything beyond 
service delivery. For instance, they may say "our work is to do boreholes, we will come 
and build boreholes if it is toilets, we will come and build toilets for people, and if it is 
schools we will build schools." That does not constitute development. That is facility 
development which cannot run itself. OMO focuses on human development. 
Developing the person, developing a person’s world view and changing the 
individual's mindset. So we deal with the person because development is about 
people. For most government institutions and international agencies, their focus is 
mainly on service delivery---facility establishment. And that is why Africans are 
becoming poorer and poorer and most of the institutions are dying. You can find all that 
in this book, "Mindset Change”. We need people to speak to donors. 
Researcher: The next question is almost similar to the last one, but it is more of a filter. 
What are the differentiating factors that helped OMO achieve great success where 
many other programmes don’t seem to be achieving much? 
 Masika: People’s participation, maximum people’s participation, maximum 
focus on people’s mindset change, attitude change. That is our niche and that is what 
has helped our programme because as you saw during the class, we have gone outside 
Yatta. [I was privileged to have participated in some of the training sessions for visiting 
groups to Yatta, where Masika was one of the trainers]. 
Researcher: When you look at the factors you have just talked about, are they rare or 
absent in many other resilience-building programmes in the country? 
 Masika: To a great extent, the government provides services. NGOs are to 
provide service and as well as capacity building. But the facilitators are usually ignorant 
of people's mindsets and world views. When you are learned, just like you and I are, 
you may come to help build people’s capacity based on what you think they need. And 
failure to do research on what they know, their yesterday experiences and value system 
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means that whatever you do, whatever capacity you build, you are building on shaky 
ground and it will crumble. And it has crumbled.  
Researcher: To what extent did the church contribute to OMO’s success story? 
 Masika: Our training curriculum is based on the development of Biblical world 
view, because the African communities are notoriously religious and what they do is 
based on religious values. Almost everything in Africa was attached to religion and 
ancestors. Africans believe in animation, things are going to be animated by ancestors, 
success moved by ancestors. Our main success turns out to be what many donors do not 
want to hear. They don’t want to hear about the church. But those donors are just 
arrogant because the development in the west was based on Biblical world view. Now 
they want to tell Africans that we can do without religion. Religion has been left out in 
capacity building, yet, it is a key pillar in capacity building. Religion is a very strategic 
tool in mindset change, and change of community livelihoods, lifestyle and life skills. 
For example, the things I discussed with the visiting groups while you listened would be 
taken seriously because people value their religions. Now that these people have a 
Christian kind of affiliation, when we talked about the need and potential to subdue 
their environment, that is a term they know and it is a requirement by their faith 
whether one is Muslim as stated in the Qur’an or is a Christian. Even if you are Hindu 
and I strike a Hindu principle on changing and transforming the environment, they will 
take it seriously and it will go beyond the capacity building session. Because Africans are 
religious, I have brought in capacity building based on the Biblical World View. So we call 
our training 'Empowered Biblical World View' or sometimes we just call it 'Empowered 
World View' to avoid leaving out people who may not want to hear about the Bible. 
Researcher: What’s the name of the Professor you quoted during the training session? 
The authority on African religions.  
 Masika: That is Professor John Mbiti. He was a Professor at Makerere University. 
He later went to Ghana and Germany and is a famous fellow. His books are top reads in 
most universities around the world today. He is an authority on African Religions and 
Philosophy.   
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Researcher: Has Yatta’s success been able to influence any changes in adjacent 
communities? 
 Masika: Yes, significantly. We have the next community on the other side of 
Matuu, a place called Masinga, and they have adopted what we are doing.  
Researcher: Is Masinga part of Yatta? 
 Masika: It is not part of this Yatta, it is part of the greater Yatta. We have taken 
this to Kitui and it has had great impact. We have taken this programme to Makueni 
County, which is the next county and they have adopted the entire model for the county. 
Because of OMO’s impact, the foreword for one of my related books was written by two 
people, Prof. Kivutha Kibwana the Governor of Makueni and Tim Andrews the Country 
Director of World Vision Tanzania. If you google World Vision Tanzania, you will find a 
lot of the Biblical World View.  
Researcher: Are there any major challenges OMO faced since inception? And if they 
are there, what were they and how did you overcome them? 
 Masika: When we started, we had political challenges because the political elite 
had used the unfortunate state of communities, which is poverty, to propel themselves 
to positions. In this community, ‘Mwolyo’---relief or dependency--- used to be the stair 
many leaders used to ascend to authority. So I had a challenge from them. Secondly, 
when I began, there were Christians who thought I was confusing religion because 
religion should be set apart from development and development should be left out 
there for secular organisations. I tried to bring development in the church and that 
attracted a lot of opposition. It was actually church leaders. Lay people did not have a 
problem because they are needy and they thought this person has come with an answer. 
But pastors were fearing that it might be contaminated. So they were trying to protect 
their faith. But when success came, it came in a big way and that helped end much of 
the resistance. 
Researcher: Was the resistance from church leadership or from average church 
members? 
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 Masika: Being a leader in the church it was called resistance because I am an 
elder in religion and so they had the cold feet to adapt. Some church leaders would 
speak and discourage people. And then politicians were actively dissuading people 
because this fellow was becoming popular and destroying their stronghold. 
Researcher: Has Yatta's transformation success in any way influenced the work and 
objectives of CIM? 
 Masika: Yes. Before Yatta's OMO, we were very narrow in our focus. But after 
our success, OMO was easily accepted and celebrated that we had six pillars to 
community transformation. They included the spiritual, social and political dimensions-
--but our own political way, not national politics---you will read that from the book. Then 
the environmental dimension, technological dimension and the economic dimension. 
Hitherto, all the six dimensions were not easily accepted to be integrated into a religious 
system. But when we succeeded, that became the image and brand of CIM.  
Researcher: I have seen information where CIM is engagement in East Pokot. Why did 
CIM decide to support East Pokot before circulating the entire Yatta neighbourhood?  
 Masika: Yatta is well served because our main concern was people lacked five 
things which were a major problem. One was water. Now, at least every homestead has 
water. They told me there was no food, now every homestead has food. They did not 
have a source of income, now at least every home has a reason to have a source of 
income. And they told me children were not going to school, but at least every child can 
now go to school because the government has intervened and every family is also able 
to take their children to school. The other problem is a social problem, witchcraft, which 
was dealt with by the church.  
 We used to hear that people are dying. But if today someone is dying of hunger 
it is because they are foolish since they possibly have a neighbour who has something. 
Initially, people were dying because nobody had anything. Right now, I do not need to 
bother with Yatta because Yatta should bother with itself. Like now we are looking for 
workers but we do not get them because everyone is busy making money from their 
farm. So if anybody doesn’t have an income, we need him. He needs to do some work 
in his uncle’s shamba (farm), his cousin’s shamba, and he will be given money. You will 
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not die when your grandmother has food, your sister has food, your cousin has food, for 
you can go do some work and be assisted. That is Mwolyo/ dependency but as you do 
that, you can help yourself. According to our objectives, you do not need everybody to 
be exporting. You need about 70% and this 70% will take care of their poor people. 
Although it is not part of your question, we are not going to deal with the poor of the 
poorest.  
Researcher: That's interesting. What is the reason for that? 
 Masika: The reason for that is because when you empower many people, they 
are going to empower their poor. In Africa, the poor belong to clans and they belong to 
families, and they know them better than me. And the poor are poor because they have 
some deficits or weakness that we may not be able to solve in a short capacity building 
programme. But there are people who will build them. More so, Africans also learn more 
through seeing, and when people are poor it is because they are poor in experiences, 
they are poor in examples, and they are poor in role models. 
 Masika: I didn't answer the second part of the question you asked. 
Researcher: Yes, I had asked for reasons behind the decision to support distant East 
Pokot before circulating the entire Yatta catchment area. 
 Masika: For East Pokot, we developed courage and confidence that our model is 
unique and qualifies to solve many serious household problems. We were motivated by 
our love for humanity, but most significantly, we were motivated by the fact that we 
achieved great success in Yatta. We wanted to take it to the next level. The Pokot have 
been a marginalized community. They have been deprived of development and 
infrastructure, are highly barbaric, they are war-like, and have been terrorizing their 
region. They have been a thorn in the flesh of the Kenyan Government. They are 
neighbours with the Karamojong of Uganda and they also steal from Uganda. They have 
been a terror and their military prowess is unmatchable because they had the advantage 
of buying the best ammunition from Uganda during Idi Amin's time. They also buy arms 
from Sudan and Somalia. That's why they have been a threat to the Government. We 
wanted to go with the mindset change, the empowered Biblical world view to see 
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whether it would work. We were confident it would work and within the shortest time, 
it has worked wonders. 
Researcher: When did you start with East Pokot? 
 Masika: We started in 2014 but it took two years. According to our model, you 
study the people first to understand them. If you are going to work for people with 
people, you study and understand them. So we wanted to understand who are the 
Pokot, their thinking pattern, their mental worldview, their culture, livelihoods, lifestyle 
and life skills. We wanted to understand who is this Pokot? Of course, we took some 
interventions like treating animals, and in the name of treating their animals, we wanted 
to understand them. In the name of taking medical camps, we wanted to understand 
them. In the name of helping some students to go to schools in neighbouring counties, 
we are trying to learn. Taking clothes and food was a way of gaining entry into the 
community. So we entered in 2014 and it’s in August 2016 when we began to train them 
through engaging them in our model and philosophy on mindset change and economic 
empowerment. And in less than six months, we started seeing positive changes and 
getting overwhelming reports on what they are doing to change their own way of living.  
Researcher: Are there people who are not evangelical Christians that participate in 
OMO?   
 Masika: CIM has been accepted even by Muslims in a big way. We have trained 
Imams and we have trained Catholics. Yesterday we had the Minister for Agriculture 
from Wajir, and he is planning to bring his people who are 100% Muslims for training.  
Most of the groups that come here from Tanzania are about 70% of Muslims. The Biblical 
World View which is the Empowered World View is accepted by many. We have been 
training CARITAS (a Catholic relief, development and social service organisation). In fact, 
most of the Kenyan groups that have been coming here for training are predominantly 
Catholic because they are involved with CARITAS. We have several groups that are 
sponsored by the Catholics and now have more Muslims that commend our approach. 
Researcher: Was there any earlier known drought mitigation success story in Yatta’s 
neighbouring areas that may have inspired you as Dr Masika to launch OMO? 
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 Masika: No. I was rebelling against existing ones. We had formed an organization 
in this area to cover Yatta, but I soon realized everybody was focusing on how we can 
give relief and how to get donors. I didn't see any model I could work with. I had to start 
and write from zero. 
Researcher: In my research discussion with one NDMA official that happens to come 
from this area (Ukambani), he talked about an earlier related successful Ngangani 
initiative.  
 Masika: Yes, that is one of the projects I had talked about, but it ended because 
it was being funded. 
Researcher: Did the Ngangani initiative have any influence on OMO? 
 Masika: We actually differed in approach.  
Researcher: Could you tell me more about that? 
 Masika: I don’t exactly remember when Ngangani projects started, but I 
remember in the first year of OMO, they were digging a few dams for people who could 
pay some money. They could bring people to dig for them. A number of teachers and 
other working-class benefitted, but they can’t be many. For me, that was not something 
to copy. It was something fighting my idea and I was fighting it especially because it was 
so near. They had resources and I did not have resources. Actually, that could have 
throat cut me because they did a lot of work on that stream called Kinyongo. They 
helped them to do sand dams. They are among the usual NGO approaches all over the 
world. Our organization is a departure from what most other NGOs are doing. 
 I do not know who was funding it, but there must have been a number of donors, 
and I think they were together with the government, which should be the NDMA. 
Samaritan Purse was also helping them.  I don’t know which of the two was helping the 
sinking of sand dams. I think it was a food for work project. I remember the food got 
spoilt because of poor storage and that must have helped to kill that initiative. They 
were well spread in Machakos and they kind of disappeared. Actually, those are the 
groups I said were among the first challengers to our program because they were giving 
people food and other things, and we were giving anything to the people. Although we 
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could raise food from friendly churches, it was not systematic, it was not promised, while 
theirs was "you work and I give you". For me, it was based on 'in case I get a friend---and 
of course, I got many friends", but it was not pre-determined. 
Researcher: You said Africans learn more by seeing. Did you have to first demonstrate 
a model of the one-acre rule strategy? 
 Masika: Yes, Africans learn more through seeing. Other than mindset change, 
the next step was water harvesting, so I did the water harvesting. 
Researcher: Were you the first one to do that? 
 Masika: I was among the first ones to do that. Actually, I think I was the first 
because I did the first dam in 1990 and people used to come from all over to steal my 
water. Then I made the second one at the same time the NACODEM started doing the 
Kinyongo dam on Kinyongo River.  
I did the one-acre demonstration first because I wrote the model in 2005 and World 
Vision Kenya helped me a great deal to restructure the ideas. They did it so well until it 
became too good for me because I didn't even understand some of the terminologies 
then. It was a radical departure, a paradigm shift from the normal way of doing 
development. It was a radical one. And we went with World Vision to launch it in Sikhulu 
which was part of their Area Development Programme but it could not work because 
there was no budget for it. And again World Vision being a big organization, things are 
not done the way I wanted. Later on, I came to launch it here. I had been looking for a 
place to launch it and I found this place. Now that I had a home and a farm here. 
Researcher: At this location? 
 Masika: Yes, this place was mine but I donated it to Christian Impact Ministries 
and moved closer to the tarmac, near the dam. That is where my home is, that is where 
I will go to after I finish with you. 
Researcher: I have read where it says “Christian Impact Ministries' community 
transformation trainings are centred on three modules, namely community 
mobilization, resource mobilization, and modelling and mentoring. Could you explain 
why your community transformation trainings are centred on the three modules? 
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 Masika: First of all, in resource mobilization the first resource is human. So we 
mobilise the human. For the human, there are resources within him and resources 
without him---resources in the environment. We want to help the individual relate to 
the resources within him or herself and within the environment.  And because we know 
change is a process, after training, we mentor to ensure maximum adoption. 
Mobilization is where we move people from A to B and we help them in the process. We 
ensure that they also mobilise others because we believe in the critical mass.  
Researcher:  Take me through a step by step process of how OMO connected with 
markets. 
 Masika: First of all it is changing the people’s mindset on how to do agriculture. 
And to a great extent, our agriculture is hinged on the one-acre rule strategy. So one of 
the main pillars of this strategy is marketing or market linkage. Much of our agriculture 
is about market linkage. Otherwise, it will not help in wealth creation because if you 
have tomatoes with no market, they will rot. And as you saw during the class, the 
process of marketing begins with the mindset change, then water harvesting because 
we are focusing on the best marketing strategy which is contractual farming. And as you 
heard during the class, we can’t do contractual farming if we do not have an assured 
water resource. In other words, market linkage is not just about selling, but a whole 
value chain including water harvesting and getting people to become producers. I hope 
you got it right? 
Researcher: Thank you. I got it right and have a follow-up question. What does OMO 
do to meet quality requirements for market production? 
 Masika:  First of all, we have trainings on GAP--- (Good Agricultural Practice). But 
on quality control, most of the serious export organisations have their quality control 
specialists. When we started, we never knew about GAP trainings and the like and so we 
got their agronomist to come and train us on GAP and quality control. The GAP training 
is very detailed. It has international standards. Once we were trained on that, then the 
agronomists helped us to maintain the required standards. That was the strategy we 
used. 
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Researcher: Having provided leadership to connect to markets, how do you organize 
participants for this market production? 
 Masika: Well, there are structures already, and you heard me tell these people 
that if you want to do market-led agriculture, you need to think in terms of how to 
develop the village economy and how to get out growers. The cooperatives have failed 
in Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania and people do not want to hear that word---the word 
'cooperatives'. What you do is to use different terminology to bring the same results; 
because when you have producers or growers, what are you talking about? You are 
basically talking about cooperatives! When you have the growers and the village, they 
will be able to sell together. Our model is based on the household and the village.  
Researcher: During the class, you gave an example of two friends, a Luo and a Kikuyu 
that failed to meet the required tonnage the exporting company wanted.  If a company 
says we will only deal with you if you are able to provide this much produce for export, 
what do you do to ensure you meet the required tonnage?  
 Masika: Form a committee for that product and then the committee will deal 
with those issues. Of course, the committee will be trained by the agronomists of that 
company. When I do my bit, I help to form a committee and then hand it over to them. 
Researcher: What are some of the challenges you have faced around the market led 
production, and how have you dealt with them? 
 Masika: With contracts, for example, those for French beans, sometimes the 
market goes down and concerned exporters will begin to play small games. But with 
time, we have known the small games. I think you heard me mention in class that when 
you study market trends in Europe, you get to know when they are producing and when 
it’s so cold that they can’t produce. The solution is to, therefore, produce more when 
they don’t have much in stock.  
Researcher: How much does an average participating OMO household earn in a year? 
 Masika: Thank you for the word 'average'. While the household's mindset is on 
earning, the first thing this is food security.  Because if you were buying food you would 
be paying a lot of money, and remember, most households wouldn’t be having this 
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money. If you are able to feed your family, for instance,  if you have seven bags of maize 
and four bags of beans, you would have saved, only that you would not have put  it in 
the bank.  After food security comes high-value crops. Every household is expected to 
have something to sell. There are those who are selling daily depending on the size of 
their dam, but I have never seriously thought about how much they earn in a year. In 
my own assessment, let me say if you are able to get Ksh 10000 a month [equivalent to 
USD100, for 1USD=Ksh 100], sometimes more and sometimes less depending on the 
smallest size; then another gets 20000, I think because of the poorer ones since the 
average has to do with those who do not get much, they are able to save up to Ksh 
100,000 [equivalent to USD1000] a year in addition to feeding their families. So it is 
more.  
Researcher: And for those getting the highest, how much would they be earning per 
year? 
 Masika: There are those who would get more than 1 million to 2 million Kenya 
shillings [USD 10,000 to USD 20,000].  
Researcher: I have three questions on the bakery. Who owns it, how is it managed and 
how does it benefit OMO participants? 
 Masika: OMO farmers grow sweet potatoes and CIM buys them to make the 
bread. CIM owns the bakery in trust for OMO because we realised we cannot entrust 
community people to do some of the professional things yet. That is where quite a 
number of organisations have failed. Even county governments who have come here 
they go and place things under the care of people who do not understand. You would 
rather get a professional person to manage the bakery. The bakery is a source of income 
for CIM to facilitate outreach extensions to places like Pokot. The bakery is in itself an 
encouragement to farmers. If the bakery exists then the farmers exist.  
Researcher: What is the frequency at which farmers are paid?  
 Masika: They are paid within a week, sometimes we pay after one day, and other 
sometimes we pay there and then. But we do not like to encourage that because some 
community members would know there is money and they could come to steal. So we 
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prefer to confuse them because some evil person could cause trouble when we are 
making payments. 
This is likely to be the last question. Is there any insurance involved in any of the OMO 
processes? 
 Masika: CIM is the insurance for OMO, depending on which dictionary you read. 
[At which point we both burst out laughing]. CIM is the insurance of OMO. What do I 
mean? When we were starting OMO, CIM would provide capital for skills that needed 
to be paid for, and if there was a problem, CIM would come in to help out OMO. I know 
your question wasn’t looking for that, but CIM has to a great extent been acting as 
insurance. And actually, if you have a programme that is patronized by Anglican or 
Catholic churches, they will be the insurance. And they offer better social insurance than 
the other one.  
Researcher: The reason I brought up the subject of insurance is because today, as part 
of risk management, sometimes farmers are mobilised to pay a premium for their 
crop, and if for some reason the crop fails, then the insurance can be able to come 
through. 
 Masika: That one we do not have. 
Researcher: Is it something you think may be necessary? 
 Masika: No. It is not necessary because the water is the insurance. I want you to 
get out of your box. When you are depending on rain, there will be risks. But when you 
have water, you have already taken out the risk. [With a chuckle he asks] Are you getting 
it? 
Researcher: I am sold on to the approach.  
 Masika: So we have our risk insurance through CIM. The main risk for our 
agriculture would have been water but we are not depending on rain which is erratic. 
Actually, the risks are almost reduced to zero. 
Researcher: Lastly, could you kindly say a bit more about how CIM is insurance for 
OMO? 
   354 
 
 Masika: You see CIM is the mother of OMO, and CIM is a strong religious 
organisation. So CIM would not like to see the son die. However, it would not like to 
have over patronage in a manner that brings Mwolyo/ dependency. So one of the things 
is to ensure that no Mwolyo elements emerge. That is how we insure. It is not more of 
giving. We try to manage in such a way that we do not give because the more you give 
the more dependency you create. 
End of Interview with Masika 
------------------------------------------------------ 
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Annexe 6:   Quick Field Memo Following an Interview 
INGO2: its clear INGO2 has strong community-based approach to DRR, rooted in 
their anti-poverty approaches. INGO2 isn't a direct implementing agency, they 
work with local partners and this includes building their partner capacities. It was 
one of the agencies supporting the grand bargain that called for increased 
funding to local agencies as an effort to ensure more support trickles down to 
communities by cutting heavy expenditures in between.  They are exceptional in 
that they work with communities to assess risks and then agree with 
communities which DRR priorities to support. They also use these community-
generated priorities for advocacy engagement with other key stakeholders at all 
levels.  I felt they have a lot more to share with others in terms of taking a 
bottom-up approach knowing the biggest problem to local DRR has been top-
down approaches. Commenting on increasing literature that seems to suggest 
there's inadequate support to global, regional, and national level DRR activities 
and yet inadequate support to local/ community level DRR,   LadyX (synonym) 
said: "we look at where change is more effective, and that is at the local level." 
She then referenced the very reason why INGO2 supported the Grand Bargain 
during the 2016 WHS. INGO2 had also done a study that fed into the Grand 
Bargain. It was impressive to note that about 50% of all INGO2's funding is 
dedicated to DRR, and about 20% of this DRR funding is dedicated to CCB4DRR. 
Both INGO2 and INGO1 referenced Country Integrated Development Plans, 
which calls for a read of at least three of these plans to assess the place of DRR 
and CCB4DRR in these plans. An informal after interview discussion with MrX 
(synonym) and another staff member showed that a number 
of organizations including CAFOD, CODAID and others had done restructures in 
2016, and this affected the DRR portfolios of these organisations.  It will be 
important to follow up this lead because if it’s true, it will affect 
these organization's ability to make a continued contribution to the country's 
DRR agenda.  
Things to up with INGO2:  
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 Ask for the new-2016 resilience framework 
 Ask for the PPA project document and the project evaluation 
report. 
 Ask for any document that details or outlines some of the 
community DRR engagements, and how INGO2 follows through.  
 Try and get at least 3 country integrated development plans, and 
assess the place of DRR and CCB4DRR within them. 
 Ask for the research/ study report whose findings fed into the 
WHS and informed the call for the Grand Bargain. 
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Annexe 7:   2017 List of Study Groups to Yatta’s OMO 
Note: the names of visiting groups were directly transcribed from OMO’s visitor’s book, and 
the researcher, therefore, didn’t know full meanings behind the acronyms.   
NO NAME OF GROUP DATES 
TYPE OF 
VISIT 
NUMBER OF 
PARTICIPANTS 
  January   
1 
WORLD VISION -KENYA TAITA 
TAVETA 15-18TH Exposure 16 
2 MARY’S TEAM NRB 20th Exposure 15 
  February   
3 MAKUENI COUNTY (Farmers) 6th-11th Exposure 336 
4 
HOMABAY (SOHI 
KARACHUONYO) 8th-11th  11 
5 
WORLD VISION NORTHERN 
SUDAN 8th-12th  10 
6 PCEA PARKLANDS WOMEN 11th Exposure 38 
7 NAIROBI TEAM 11th Exposure 8 
8 
MAKUENI COUNTY (Farmer 
T.O.T’s) 13th-18th  53 
9 FARM CONCERN KITUI 24th Exposure 34 
10 ALL SAINTS CATHEDRAL 25th Exposure 26 
11 ST PAUL’S CATHEDRAL 27TH Exposure 43 
12 
MAKUENI COUNTY (STAFF 
TOT’S) 26TH -28TH 41 
13 TECHNOSERVE Marakwet 27th-1st  62               662 
  March   
14 TECHNOSERVE Nyeri 1st-3rd  54 
15 TECHNOSERVE Nyandarua 6th -8th  62 
16 
FARM CONCERN: Ethiopia 
delegates 8th -9th  7 
17 PURPOSE CENTRE CHURCH 11th Exposure 10 
18 MILDRED’S 11th Exposure 5 
19 TECHNOSERVE Bomet 1 13th-15th  53 
20 TECHNOSERVE Bomet 2 15th-17th  59 
21 HEIFER INT’L  2 
22 DAYSTAR UNIVERSITY 22nd Exposure 27 
23 DAYSTAR UNIVERSITY 23rd Exposure 20 
24 CITAM EMBAKASI 25th Exposure 26 
25 
MAKUENI-KITUI ADULT 
LEARNERS 29th Exposure 31 
26 ST PAUL UNIVERSITY 31st Exposure 7                 363 
 MAKUENI COUNTY 28th-31st Mentoring Prog. 
  April   
27 NAIROBI CHAPEL 3rd -7th Exposure 39 
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28 NAIROBI TEAM (Mary's) 7th -8th 
Weekend 
Exposure 23 
29 ASDSP KILIFI COUNTY  20th Exposure 10** 
30 WANGARI MATHAI INSTITUTE 21st Exposure 14 
31 CFF NYANDARUA (IDPS) 24th Exposure 19                105 
  May   
32 MBEERE COUNTY 10th Exposure 10 
33 KENHA 12-13th  25 
34 NANYUKI PASTORS 19th Exposure 11 
35 EGERTON UNIVERSITY 19th Exposure 41 
36 CENTRAL BANK OF KENYA 26th Exposure 18 
37 BISHOP’S FRIENDS 27th Exposure 9 
38 MAKUENI COUNTY (VDC’S) 30th, 31st Exposure 53,58           225 
 KWALE MILDRED 10th-12th Mentorship Prog 
 SOHI KARACHUONYO 19th-21st Mentorship Prog 
  June   
39 MAKUENI COUNTY VDC’S 
1st, 2nd, 5th, 
8th, Exposure 56,65,48,60,57 
40 WORLD VISION TANZANIA 5th-9th  24 
41 AFL 5th-9th  17 
42 MAKUENI COUNTY VDC’S 13th-16th Exposure 55,53,56,53 
43 
CITAM EMBAKASI Men’s 
Fellowship 17th  45 
44 CIM POKOT 20th-24th 
Mentorship 
Prog 50                639 
 NYANDARUA 9th/10th   
  July   
45 NCCK KANYONYO 11th-13th  31 
46 MAKINDU TEAM 18th Exposure 19 
47 LAIKIPIA TEAM (DP’s) 17th-21st  52 
48 IAS-INTL THARAKA NITHI 31st-4th Aug 29 
  September  
49 CHRISCO VOTA 4th Exposure 11 
50 UON FAO/KITUA 6th  7 
51 ADS NAKURU 4th-8th  51 
52 KILUNGU DCC 8th Exposure 35 
53 MESPT HOLA 12th-16th  26 
54 
MAJOR NZEVEKA TEAM-KITUI 
COUNTY 13th Exposure 15 
55 KALAMA WOMEN GROUP 16th Exposure 28 
56 NAIROBI CHAPEL 16th Exposure 14 
57 KALANZONI PASTORS 23rd Exposure 15 
58 KTTC 27th Exposure 47 
59 ADS MKE 28th Exposure 50 
60 CRSEMBU 29th Exposure 65               364 
  October   
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61 RODGERS ODIMA TEAM 3rd Exposure 4 
62 MAKUENI PASTORS 5th Exposure 51 
63 AFL/BOMET 9th-13th  24 
64 DAYSTAR UNIVERSITY 11th Exposure 12 
65 MIGWANI-NYAA’S TEAM 12th Exposure 45 
66 MATHINGAU MC Academy 13th Exposure 32 
67 NCCK Kitui 16th-19th Exposure 35 
68 NJOGU’S NAIROBI 18th Exposure 12 
69 KASARANI DCC Pastor couples 19th-21st  18 
70 CBMC NAIROBI CHAPEL 20th Exposure 16 
71 KENHA 21st Exposure 21         270 
  November  
72 FISH YATTA 1st 
Fish farming 
Initiative 10 
73 ENOCK NYANZA 18th Exposure 7 
74 AFL-BOMET.TAITA TAVETA,SSP 20th -24th 30 
75 FASTENOPHER 21st Donor 3 
76 BOMET MCA’S, TIATY MP WIFE 22nd 
Engagement 
Discussion 8 
77 KU-ACTIL 23rd  35 
78 WWGC KITENGELA Exposure 11                  104 
  December  
79 KIKIMA HDC 1st Exposure 8 
80 MILDRED’S 1st Exposure 4 
81 ALL SAINTS CATHEDRAL 2nd Exposure 31 
82 PELUM KENYA 6th-7th  30 
83 BUNGOMA 6th Exposure 4 
84 WAJIR MINISTER 6th Exposure 2                     79 
    2793 
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